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Abstract
The durable partnership between capitalism and technological innovation that 
has flourished since the Industrial Revolution has forged a tight coupling 
between prosperity and material and energy flows in the economy. During this 
time, part of the material flow has been deposited in the natural environment as 
waste, and part has been recycled back into the economy as an input for 
economic activity. Economic growth results in growth of the volume of the 
material throughput of the economy and, if there is not an increase in the 
proportion recycled, it also results in growing amounts of waste deposited in 
the environment, either in dispersed forms such as litter, or localised in legal or 
illegal accumulations on the peripheries of towns and cities. Regardless of 
whether the reasons for the large amounts of waste produced by modem 
industrial economies are due to thermodynamic inevitability or the proclivities 
of capitalist states, governments nevertheless have to devise policy responses to 
aspects of these material and waste flows that are of public concem.
This study takes the continual emergence of waste problems and policy 
responses as an assumed feature of modern industrial societies and takes as its 
central analytical endeavour the explanation of why particular waste problems 
receive policy attention at particular times, and why particular policy 
approaches are pursued by governments.
To focus on materials flows and waste streams, however, is to ignore the fact 
that it is the thinking and behaviour of people that determines what counts for 
waste and where it is disposed of. Everyone has experience and understanding 
about household waste that is likely to shape their views about waste issues, 
their motivation to participate in policy debate and perhaps even the nature of 
waste management policy itself.
It is argued that municipal solid waste differs in one important respect from 
many of the other emissions into the environment by industrial societies. 
Whereas citizens have relatively little experience of what substances like CFCs, 
carbon dioxide and radio-active waste might look, feel and smell like, everyone, 
including politicians, knows the sight, feel and smell of household waste. 
Accordingly, the study devotes considerable effort to a question that appears to 
have received little attention in the literature: how the nature of lay 
understandings of waste substances and waste places might change over time 
and be reflected in the formation of waste management policy. Public
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discourse in newspapers and legislatures was chosen as the main arena in 
which these changes and influences might be sought.
However, it was recognised at the outset of the study, that the explanation of 
the evolution of waste management policy is unlikely to rest with one factor, 
however novel it might be. For this reason, the study spans much of the 
political, economic and social context surrounding waste policy making, with a 
view to identifying a wide range of explanatory factors which might mediate in 
the influence of lay understanding of waste on policy.
The theoretical underpinnings of the study reflect this breadth of context. The 
approach taken was to build upon a number of constructionist accounts of lay 
understanding of waste, including that of Douglas's 1966 'Purity and Danger', 
as well as a number of other constructionist, realist institutionalist accounts of 
environmental policy making. In this respect, the study differs from most other 
historical accounts of waste management, which are either atheoretical, or 
positioned within a relatively restricted realist or critical realist theoretical 
framework.
In its empirical content, the study took as its subject a city and time period that 
had not previously been studied — Sydney, Australia, in the period 1900 to 
1996. In keeping with the focus on public discourse mentioned above, the 
pages of Sydney's main daily newspaper, the Sydney Morning Herald, and 
Hansard for the New South Wales Legislative Assembly and Legislative 
Council were a major source of empirical data for the study. A wide range of 
annual reports from government departments and authorities, and government 
and interest group discussion papers were also included. A small number of 
focus groups and semi-structured in-depth interviews with key waste 
management actors were also conducted to provide additional insights and 
validation of the other data sources.
The study found that, broadly viewed, waste management policy-making in 
Sydney comprised longer periods of relative stability interspersed with shorter 
periods of change accompanied by various degrees of public controversy. Of 
particular significance were the 'waste crises' of the late 1960s and the early 
1990s, both of which resulted in major legislative changes. Comparison of these 
two periods provides strong evidence for the thesis that the problems that 
excite periods of political attention are largely socially constructed.
M
The study found some evidence to suggest that periods of public disinterest in 
waste may have occurred when waste accumulations were confined to areas 
that were regarded as waste land. Public attention was excited when the 
understanding of either the place of accumulation, or the waste material itself 
changes. The rise of concern about ocean dumping in the 1930s, and the 
spectacular participation in the first 'Clean Up the Harbour' in 1989, both 
appear to be due in part to changes in the symbolic meanings the public 
attached to these areas. The appearance of plastic bags in the waste stream as a 
minor but mobile, visible and durable constituent that has become, for many, 
an objectification of waste problems, is a change in the understanding of waste 
materials that has also influenced waste policy.
Waste management issues in modem societies are complex and, for these issues 
to receive attention in public and political discourse, there is a need to reduce 
these issues into binary codes, metaphors and simple principles. The study 
found that these were important in building political momentum and 
consensus on particular issues. However their durability and utility depended 
upon their being protected from scientific analysis which had the potential to 
cast doubts on the validity of such apparently self-evident principles as the 
waste management hierarchy, the environmental desirability of re-usable glass 
milk bottles, and industry waste reduction targets.
Public fears about toxic substances were also an important influence on waste 
policy, particularly in the early 1990s. However, it is argued that this is not 
peculiar to the late 20th century, even though these substances were unknown 
prior to that. From the miasmas of the late 19th century, to the germs and flies 
of the early 20th century to the dioxin of the late 20th century, there have 
always been visible and invisible agents that are feared for their ability to make 
distant accumulations of waste dangerous to the individual. However, the 
toxic agents of danger of the late 20th century had greater impact on waste 
management policy through their association with one of the alternatives to 
landfill — incineration.
With regard to the mechanisms by which changes in public perceptions of 
waste might ultimately result in public policy change, the study found some 
evidence to suggest that aspects of the theory of moral panics are applicable to 
the 'magnification' of public concerns into something which gains political 
attention.
Ivi 1
H ow ever, to  account for the evo lu tion  of w aste  m anagem ent policy in  Sydney 
d u ring  the 20th century, it is necessary  to supp lem en t these constructionist 
explanations w ith  a range of realist o r s truc tu ra l factors, m any of w hich have 
already  been  repo rted  in  the env ironm enta l policy literature. These include 
electoral factors, the constrain ts of political ideology, factors associated w ith  the 
state agencies charged  w ith  im plem en ting  policy, environm ental m ovem ents 
and  ind iv idua l policy actors.
The study  does not, how ever, seek to  claim  superio r explanatory pow er for 
either the constructionist or realist explanations. Rather it has been possible to 
show  how  the tw o  are in ter-rela ted  in  the evolu tion  of w aste m anagem ent 
policy over longer tim e scales. It appears  th a t structural factors m ay determ ine 
the am ount of d iscursive effort th a t the political system  has to p u t into 
obtain ing prob lem  closure. S tructurally  in tractab le  policy problem s, such as 
those Sydney faced in  the early 1990s, encourage the em ergence of a d iversity  of 
b inary  codes, m etaphors and  sim ple p rincip les as policy actors a ttem pt to find 
fram ings th a t w ill m ake the p rob lem  fit the  available solutions. Some of these 
d iscursive devices will be casualties to scientific scrutiny, others w ill survive 
and  gather political m om entum  and  consensus a round  them . If a particu lar 
d iscursive e lem ent allow s problem  closure, then  the resu lting  institu tional 
innovations m ay be a reflection of the d iscursive devices tha t m ade them  
possible. These, and  other, institu tional changes will furnish  the structural 
constrain ts on fu tu re  policy discourse.
The im plications of the findings of th is s tu d y  for tw o theories relevant to long 
term  change in  environm ental policy —  ecological m odernisation  and the risk 
society —  are also discussed. If respect of the form er, it appears tha t w aste 
m anagem ent policy in  Sydney in  the la tte r p a rt of the 20th century  bears m ost 
of the hallm arks th a t have been  advanced  as characteristic of the condition of 
ecological m odern isation  in env ironm enta l policy m aking. The thesis argues, 
how ever, tha t som e care needs to  be taken  w ith  ecological m odern ist optim ism  
about the shift to anticipatory  env ironm enta l policy, at least w here  w aste 
m anagem ent policy is concerned, as an tic ipato ry  w aste policy requires 
m ovem ent of the locus of policy in terven tion  in  an upstream  direction w ith  
respect to the m ateria ls flow in  the econom y. This generally increases the 
uncertain ty  and  contestability of the u ltim ate  environm ental effectiveness of the 
proposals, and  increases the possib ility  of the  sort of policy paralysis tha t 
occurred in  Sydney in  the early  1990s.
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In respect of risk society theory, the 20th century history of waste management 
in Sydney provides some support for Beck's enunciation of the theory, but also 
suggests there are a number of aspects where it unduly simplifies the nature of 
modern risks and their role in policy evolution. The sorts of risks that lie 
behind public fears of landfills have certainly come, in the late 20th century, to 
include a substantial component of industrially produced risks. However, the 
thesis argues that the history of waste management shows that neither the 
global nature of risks, nor their invisibility, is necessarily a hallmark of modern 
industrial production of risk as Beck maintains. There is also a need to 
acknowledge that the decline in public faith in science is not only due to loss of 
public faith in science, but the trans-scientific nature of some policy issues. 
Lastly, the argument in the thesis that public concerns about waste can be 
brought to political attention in a similar fashion to that which occurs in moral 
panics, fills out an area of the theory of the risk society where Beck provides 
very little detail.
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Glossary of Waste-Related Terms
Commercial and 
Industrial waste
Construction and 
demolition waste 
Dry entombment
Hazardous waste
Intractable waste
Liquid industrial 
waste
In New South Wales, inert, solid, industrial or hazardous 
wastes generated by businesses and industries (including 
shopping centres, restaurants and offices) and institutions 
(such as schools, hospitals and government offices) 
excluding building and demolition sites and municipal 
waste.
Waste building materials from building and demolition 
sites.
Landfill in which the ingress of water is prevented by caps 
and/or liners of clay and/or synthetic membranes 
Generally, waste that is thought to be a danger to human 
health. In New South Wales in the 1990s, solid and liquid 
hazardous wastes include explosives, compressed gases, 
flammable solids, flammable liquids, substances liable to 
spontaneous combustion (excluding organic wastes), 
substances emitting flammable gases on contact with water, 
oxidising agents, toxic substances, corrosive substances, 
pharmaceuticals and poisons, clinical waste, cytotoxic 
waste, sharps waste, radioactive waste, declared chemical 
waste, quarantine waste.
Hazardous waste that is difficult to transform into a form 
that can be disposed of safely.
Generally, liquid waste produced by industry. In New 
South Wales from the 1960s to the 1980s, this term referred 
to the liquid wastes from industry that were accepted at the 
Castlereagh Depot, e.g. waste electro-plating liquids. These 
wastes, especially in the earlier part of the period may have 
contained some of the substances listed under hazardous 
waste, above.
Municipal solid 
waste
Putrescible waste
Scheduled waste
Solid waste
[xxi ]
Generally, solid waste generated within urban areas and 
managed by municipal authorities (including private firms 
contracted by municipal authorities). The waste sources, 
and therefore waste composition, varies from country to 
county and town to town, depending upon the waste 
management arrangements. In New South Wales in the 
1990s, municipal solid waste comprised waste from 
households and residential gardens and waste from street 
sweeping, litter bins and parks.
Generally, organic material that will decompose 
obnoxiously in the environment. In New South Wales in 
the 1990s, putrescible waste was defined as food waste, 
waste conisting of animal matter (including dead animals) 
and some types of sewage sludge.
Generally, waste that is mentioned in a schedule to 
government regulations or legislation. In New South Wales 
in the 1990s, scheduled chemical wastes was defined as any 
waste liquid, sludge or solid containing more than one 
milligram per kilogram of constituents listed in the 
Scheduled Chemical Wastes Chemical Control Order 1994. 
Generally, waste that meets the definition of a solid, viz. has 
an angle of repose of greater than five degrees, does not 
contain free liquids or release liquids in tranport and is 
capable of being moved by a spade at normal temperatures. 
In New South Wales in the 1990s, solid waste comprised 
municipal waste as defined above, some types of sewage 
sludge, manure and nightsoil, waste contaminated with 
lead from households or institutions, cleaned pesticide 
containers, drained and crushed oil filters, disposable 
nappies, incontinence pads and sanitary napkins, food 
waste, vegetative waste from agriculture or horticulture, 
non-chemical waste from manufacturing and services such 
as metal, timber, paper, ceramics, plastics, thermosets and 
composites.
[xxiij
Waste
management, 
waste policy
Wherever it is clear that the term is being used in relation to 
Sydney, it can be taken that what is being managed, or the 
object of policy, largely excludes agricultural or mining 
wastes, as relatively little of this type of waste is generated 
in Sydney.
(Definitions for New South Wales are based on: NSW EPA 1999. Environmental 
Guidelines: Assessment, Classification and Management of Liquid and Non-Liquid 
Wastes. NSW EPA, Sydney.)
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This chapter provides an introduction to the thesis. It commences with an 
account of the reasoning that leads to the central questions with which the 
thesis is concerned. This account has two points of departure, one in industrial 
ecology and one in the social construction of waste. The chapter then proceeds 
to an outline of the main arguments presented in the thesis, and how these are 
distributed across the thesis chapters.
1.1 Background to the Study Aims
1.1.1 Material Flows
It is well accepted in the industrial ecology and ecological economics literature 
(see, for example, Ayres and Ayres, 1996; Martinez-Alier, 1987), that modem 
Western societies depend for their way of life on a substantial flow of materials 
and energy. This flow commences with the extraction of natural resources from 
the environment, proceeds through processing and manufacture to 
embodiment in infrastructure and consumer products and finally, after varying 
amounts of time, returns to the environment as materials and energy that has 
no further use. The flow has many side branches along the way, where 
materials and energy with no further use are returned to the environment. It
[2]
also has loops by which materials considered to be of no further use by some 
are put to new uses by others, or by which waste energy, such as heat, is put to 
use.
This thesis is concerned with material flows. While waste management might 
be taken to apply to the management of waste energy, in this thesis energy 
flows are not considered and waste management is taken as applying to the 
management of waste materials.
In addition, the focus is on the flows of materials from society and economy 
into the environment. These flows have been the subject of public policy ever 
since the first time a hunter-gatherer attracted the band's opprobrium for 
defecating at the central campfire. As the magnitude and diversity of material 
flows has increased over time, so has the amount of policy effort devoted to 
them, although not necessarily in a simple linear correlation.
There are two direct forms of return of materials to the environment and one 
indirect one that are the subject of substantial bodies of public policy.
First, there are the forms of sequestration in the environment, where materials 
stay more or less where they are put, such a piles of unusable rock left at a 
quarry site, or "dry entombment" landfills. Second, there are the forms of 
dissipation into the environment where substances are emitted into the 
atmosphere or water bodies, or spread on the ground and subsequently become 
part of local, regional and global biogeochemical cycles. Lastly, some 
substances return to the environment via an indirect route through the 
metabolism of humans. Ingested substances, either food or accidental 
contaminants that are swallowed, breathed or absorbed through the skin, are 
sequestered for varying amounts of time in human bodies before returning to 
the environment in cemeteries, crematoriums and sewerage works. The errant 
materials that stray from the materials flow through the engines of the economy 
into human metabolisms have been responsible for much human suffering, 
from black lung disease of coal miners to the anaemia and cancers that killed 
the "Radium Girls" who painted luminous watch faces (Clark, 1997).
[3 ]
Much of environmental policy is concerned with these three ways by which 
materials return to the environment. Waste management policy aims to avoid 
or reduce the amount of material going into landfills, or ensure that material in 
landfills stays where it is put. Air and water pollution policy aims to reduce the 
deleterious impacts on air and water quality of dissipation of materials into the 
environment. Public policy dealing with industrial and consumer safety and 
hazardous materials aims to reduce human health impacts. While the primary 
focus of this thesis is on waste management policy, it has been necessary to 
examine some aspects of air and water pollution policy and hazardous waste 
policy, as the boundaries between the three bodies of public policy are not as 
distinct as the categorisation of the material flows, above, might suggest.
The quantity and diversity of the materials flow that makes the way of life in 
modem Western societies possible has increased markedly during the 20th 
century. According to Gardner and Sampat (1998) there has been in the USA an 
18-fold increase in the size of the materials flow. All 92 elements of the periodic 
table are now present in the materials flow, compared to some 20 elements at 
the beginning of the 20th century. Over 100,000 new synthetic compounds 
have been produced since the 1930s . Adriaanse et al, (1997) estimated the size 
of the materials flow in industrialised nations to range between 45-85 tonnes 
per person per year. Of this, some 11-25 tonnes per person per year is returned 
to the environment (Matthews, et al., 2000). Despite some de-materialisation in 
the economies of the industrialised nations, and decoupling of economic 
growth from materials flows, these flows and the returns to the environment 
have continued to grow in the latter part of the 20th century — one half to three 
quarters of resource inputs to the economies of industrialised nations are 
discharged to the environment as wastes within 12 months of the time of 
extraction. (Matthews, et al. 2000).
While it might be tempting to see this quantity as merely an outcome of policy 
failure, and so readily reduced, there is however, a certain thermodynamic 
inevitability about it. A number of economists have used the laws of 
thermodynamics to demonstrate that waste products are a necessary and 
unavoidable joint output of industrial production (e.g. Ayres and Kneese, 1969, 
Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, Baumgärtner and de Swaan Arons, 2003). So even if 
everything that is put in household garbage bins, and in the skips (dumpsters
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in USA) in the back lanes of commercial districts, was recycled back into the 
economy, there would still be substantial amounts of industrial waste products 
to be dealt with, either from the reprocessing of recycled materials, or from the 
waste generated from the use of energy needed for the reprocessing. In short, 
the amount of materials flowing in modern economies, and the amounts of 
waste materials generated may be in excess of what is possible at maximum 
feasible thermodynamic efficiencies, but it can never be reduced to zero.
Others have drawn attention to what might be termed the social and political 
predispositions of modern industrial societies to generate significant streams of 
waste materials. Arguments for this range from those that emphasise the 
production side (e.g. Schnaiberg's treadmill theory — Schnaiberg,1980; 
Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994 and Packard's planned obsolescence, Packard, 
1960), to those that emphasise cultural and social factors on the consumption 
side (e.g. Galbraith, 1958; Ewen, 1976). It is also possible to argue that, 
regardless of the locus of predisposition to waste generation, it is the structural 
dependence of the state on capital (Milibrand, 1969; Przeworski and 
Wallerstein, 1988) that prevents the state from initiating policy to bring about 
reductions in waste generation that are in the public interest.
Of course, it might be argued that such policy is not needed — that the flows of 
materials and their return to the environment in a modem market economy will 
take place harmlessly without the need for any state intervention. The 
experience of history seems to provide a ready rejoinder to this in the 
substantial body of public policy that has evolved since the Industrial 
Revolution to deal with air and water pollution and the health impacts on 
workers and the public generally.
In summary then, modern industrial societies have been, and will continue to 
be, dependent upon significant flows of materials through the economy and 
into the environment. There has been, and will continue to be, significant state 
intervention in the form of public policy that attempts to prevent or ameliorate 
the environmental and health impacts of these flows. The reasons for the 
predisposition of modem industrialised societies to generate waste materials, 
whether they lie in the laws of thermodynamics, the nature of capitalism, the 
relationships between capitalism and the state, or modern culture are only of
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passing interest in this thesis. Regardless of the reason for the flows of waste 
materials, governments have had to devise public policy responses to deal with 
aspects of the flows that have been of public concern. It is the nature of these 
concerns and the policy responses that forms the central focus of this thesis.
As with all public policy, there are many possible influences on the form that 
policy takes, and the relative importance of these may change over time. The 
20th century has seen enormous changes in the nature of the economy, society 
and politics, as well as in the nature and size of the waste stream. Changes such 
as novel substances in the waste stream; new forms of corporate political 
activity; greater public understanding of, and concern about, environmental 
issues; the sundering of the alignments between social class and political 
parties, the changing role of the media in politics, and the emergence of new 
social movements will have had an effect on the emergence of waste issues and 
policy responses.
Among the many possible and changing influences on waste policy, there is one 
aspect which has received relatively little attention and which, I wish to argue, 
is worthy of closer examination. This brings me to the second of the two points 
of departure for the reasoning which leads to the questions with which this 
thesis is concerned.
1.1.2 The Social Construction of Waste
Much of the environmental policy making in the late 20th century has been 
concerned with the return to the environment of substances from the materials 
flow which are not recognisable to us in our everyday lives. The appearance, 
smell or feel of these substances does not provide any clues as to their dangers 
or safety. A sample in a test tube of substances such as DDT, PCBs, dioxin, 
carbon dioxide and ozone would not be recognised by most people. We are, as 
Beck (1986) and Giddens (1990) have argued, dependent upon science and 
scientists to warn us of the dangers.
However, there have been some remarkable shifts in scientific understanding of 
the dangers or otherwise of many of the new materials that have been 
discovered or synthesised in the 20th century. Radium, X-rays and DDT, for
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example, were all promoted by scientists in the years after their discovery, only 
to have serious health dangers emerge that became, and continue in some cases, 
to be a focus of public and policy controversy (see, for example, Goldschmidt, 
1989, Wasserman and Solomon, 1982, Macintyre, 1987). For academics, such 
issues have provided the grist for the mill of Beckian, postmodernist and other 
critiques of science. For the person in the street, they feed fears about how to 
stay healthy in a toxic world — fears which may motivate mobilisation and 
political activism in environmental policy issues.
In contrast to the unrecognisable substances in the materials flow, the sight, 
smell and feel what we find in our own household rubbish bins, or collected by 
our municipal authority from offices, shops and factories in our town, is well 
known to most people. Almost everyone is familiar with the appearance, smell 
and feel of food waste from the kitchen, of soiled disposable nappies, of 
discarded beer cans with fermenting liquid remnants within. Moreover, almost 
everyone also seems to 'know' when such substances have crossed the 
boundary from that which is not waste to that which is, and when waste is in 
the right or wrong place, the latter evoking feelings of disgust and revulsion.
The transitions that substances or objects make, from not waste to waste, or 
from a positive to a negative valuation, or vice versa, can be startlingly abrupt. 
The parent happily allows their child to eat a carrot, but admonishes the child 
for playing with something dirty when, ten minutes later, the child wishes to 
play with the skin peelings from the same carrot. The world record for abrupt 
transitions has, perhaps, been identified in Thompson's (1979) observations 
about the clean and fastidious person who:
. ..  should quite happily discharge a stream of opaque mucous fluid, liberally studded with darker 
and more solid fragments, not to mention millions of germs and bacteria which although invisible 
he knows to be present, into a porous handkerchief and then place the whole soggy parcel, none 
too carefully folded, in his trouser pocket on top of his small change and cigarette lighter which he 
will later use to pay for his gin-and-tonics and to light his companion's cigarettes.
Thompson (1979:3)
However, the boundary between non-waste and waste seen across time and 
social space is diffuse and mobile, as Thompson (1998) notes. There is great 
degree of social malleability in this boundary and in the right and wrong places
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for the placement of waste in our surroundings. Good housekeeping for my 
parents in the 1950s was to carefully wrap all kitchen food wastes in many 
layers of absorbent newspaper before consigning them to the garbage bin. To 
keep food wastes for several days in a bucket under the kitchen sink as we do 
now, and then compost them in the backyard, would have been seen as 
eccentric or slovenly. Across the social space of urban households, for example, 
empty beer cans accumulate for weeks un-noticed behind the couch in the 
student household, are promptly put in the right recycling container in the 
environmentally-correct consumerist household, or have their lids carefully cut 
away and are transformed into containers for nails and screws in the frugal 
D.I.Y household. As Thompson's (1979) early explorations in rubbish theory 
and other more recent endeavours in cultural studies (e.g. Appadurai, 1986) 
suggest, there is much to be learnt from the study of the trajectories of material 
objects and the attendant meanings that people place on them in modern 
societies.
However, the initial focus for this thesis is on the meanings that are placed on 
materials once they cross the boundary from objects of practical value to 
become waste (the transient-rubbish boundary in Thompson's categorisation). 
Furthermore, the emphasis extends beyond rubbish objects in private 
ownership in or around households or commercial premises (Thompson's 
interest) to the fate of these objects as they decompose or persist in the 
environment and become subject to public concern and policy. There are 
perhaps some novel aspects here to be explored that are not to be found in the 
world of objects that have practical or symbolic value — e.g. aggregation may 
result in the emergence of new meanings. An aggregation of cars in a car park 
or an aggregation of fine antique furniture does not produce the additional 
layers of meaning that attend upon an aggregation of waste products in a 
landfill, such as fears of disease and vermin. Waste mountains make front page 
newspaper stories, large collections of antique furniture do not.
The anthropology of purposefully placed waste aggregations in modern 
societies has been the subject of the seminal work by William Rathje (Rathje and 
Murphy, 1992). However, in this thesis, I am interested also in the waste 
materials originating in urban areas and that circulate in the environment, both 
the obvious waste in public spaces — litter, and the less obvious contaminants
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that enter biogeochemical cycles. Consequently, agricultural and mining 
wastes, which largely originate outside of urban areas, and which certainly do 
not feature in waste management policy in Sydney, are not considered in this 
study.
There is much in the changing social world that could be expected to bring 
about changes in the position of the boundary between non-waste and waste, 
both across time and social space. There is also much that will impact on the 
meanings that people attach to waste materials, either in aggregations or 
circulating in the environment. As O'Brien (1999) argues, this is an area which 
has been neglected by sociologists, but from which much could be learnt.
However, while in agreement with O'Brien on this point, my interest in this 
thesis is more with the relationships between the meanings attached to waste 
and the public policy of waste management. In contrast with the novel 
substances in the materials flow alluded to at the beginning of this section — 
the substances which require science to discover whether they are dangerous to 
human health or the environment — no science is needed to tell the citizen, or 
the politician, or the bureaucrat whether a large accumulation of household 
waste on their doorstep is a good idea or not. In other words, everyone has 
experience and understanding about household waste that is likely to shape 
their views about waste issues, their motivation to participate in policy debate 
and perhaps even the nature of waste management policy itself.
Having traced a path from each of two points of departure, one in industrial 
ecology and one in the social constructivist view of waste, and converged upon 
the public policy of waste management, it is now possible to state the question 
that the thesis sets out to answer.
1.2 Research Questions
The question that this thesis sets out to answer is whether the formation and 
evolution of public policy for the management of solid waste in the city of 
Sydney in the period 1900-1996 was affected by changes in the understanding
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among the general populace of waste substances and waste places and, if so, in 
what way.
The starting and end points for the time period chosen for the study stem from 
several considerations. The question itself demands a relatively long period of 
study, sufficient to encounter changes in waste management policy and how 
waste is understood by the populace. However, as the starting point is placed 
at more distant dates in the past, increasing methodological difficulties arise in 
relation to the ease with which empirical data can be obtained. In addition, the 
institutions of government, which form the context for waste management 
policy, become increasingly different from those of the present day.
With these considerations in mind, there are a number of possible starting 
points that might be chosen some time in the early part of the 20th century. The 
Sydney Morning Herald, the main daily newspaper in Sydney, began 
publishing an index to its articles in January 1930. For a topic only reported on 
occasionally, and with an estimated 500 000 pages of news articles in the 
duration of the 20th century, 1930 recommends itself as a starting point for 
practical methodological reasons. The British colonies of Australia formed a 
federation in 1901, thereby establishing the three levels of government that have 
formed the context for waste management policy since that time. However, it 
was not until the Local Government Acts of 1906 and 1919 that local 
government in New South Wales was established, after a long period of 
institutional experimentation in the 19th century, in the form it was to take until 
major reform in 1993.
The thesis commences with some definitional discussion of the nature of the 
wastes with which it is concerned. Accepting that what is regarded as waste 
will change across time and social space, I define the type of waste with which 
the thesis in concerned in terms of physical state and origin (the place at which 
material crosses the boundary from being of value to being of no or negative 
value). The thesis is concerned with solid wastes, and with those wastes, 
handled by municipal authorities or their contractors which originate in and 
around urban households and commercial and industrial premises.
[ 10]
These definitional matters are followed by a review of the literature relevant to 
the research question (chapter 2). This finds that the seminal work of Douglas 
(1966), Thompson's (1979) rubbish theory, the insightful study of Lynch (1990), 
and William Rathje's Garbage Project (Rathje and Murphy, 1992) provide a 
useful foundation for a constructionist account of solid waste management. Put 
simply, what counts as waste and what makes waste something to be feared, 
has to do with how the human mind places order and classification on its 
surroundings. Substances that are regarded as waste are frequently ambivalent 
or anomalous in some way that is a threat to these orderings and classifications.
Insofar as waste is a form of deviant matter, the body of work on moral panics 
(Cohen, 1972; Thompson, 1998) provides a bridge between the constructionist 
account of dirt and danger on the one hand and, on the other, the media and 
political behaviour in modern societies which has to be considered in any 
analysis of solid waste management policy. The work of Cohen and Thompson 
and others deals with the question of how particular groups in society can come 
to be regarded as deviant and a threat to moral order, leading to pressure on 
legislatures to take action against these groups. Despite the potential offered by 
the theories advanced in the literature mentioned above, there have been, as far 
as can be ascertained, no social constructionist studies of the evolution of waste 
management policy over extended periods of time.
There have, however, been some realist historical studies of waste management 
(Melosi, 1980; Colten, 1994; Raufer, 1998) and several social histories of dirt and 
trash (Hoy 1995; Strasser 1999). These are generally atheoretical, although the 
level of detail and social context in Hoy and Strasser's work invites 
constructionist theorising.
Theoretically oriented historical studies of waste management policy and politics 
appear to be even fewer, with Gandy's studies of New York, London and 
Hamburg, interpreted within a neo-Marxist regulationist framework, being the 
only ones spanning more than a decade or so.
It is concluded from work of these and other scholars that, while a social 
constructionist approach has much to offer, it would be unwise, given the
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findings of the realist accounts, to expect constructionist explanations to 
provide all of the explanation for the evolution of waste management policy.
While there is a certain paucity of theorising about the evolution of waste 
management policy, this is not the case for environmental policy making.
Within this literature, there is, once again, much that points to the utility of 
constructionist approaches in understanding waste policy evolution (e.g. 
Luhmann, 1989; Hajer, 1995; Hannigan, 1995; Williams and Matheny, 1995). 
These studies and others would suggest that, if the evolution of waste 
management policy proceeds in the same fashion as other areas of 
environmental policy, then elements of waste policy discourse, such as 
dualisms, binary codes and story lines will have an important role in the 
formation of waste policy.
Given that waste management aims to reduce the health and environmental 
risks posed by waste accumulations and dissipation in the environment, and 
that anticipatory policy such as waste minimisation and recycling is a 
prominent feature of late 20th century waste management, the developing body 
of work around Beck's (1986,1992(a)) theory of the risk society and Huber's 
(1982, 1985, 1989, 1991) theory of ecological modernisation is clearly relevant to 
a study of the evolution of waste management policy. I do not, however, intend 
these two areas of theory to monopolise the theoretical foundation for the 
study, to the exclusion of a constructionist approach which I suggest has 
considerable potential, yet is relatively under-researched. My intention is, 
rather, to draw attention to any implications that the study may have for the 
theories of the risk society and ecological modernisation.
The literature review suggests that there are, in addition to the question posed 
at the start of this section, a number of supplementary research questions which 
would allow for a fuller account of the formation and evolution of waste 
management policy. These questions include:
• whether waste policy making may sometimes be a form of moral panic 
over deviant matter,
• whether the various dualisms, binary codes and story lines that occur in 
waste policy discourse have a role in problem closure, policy formation 
and policy paralysis,
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• how realist and constructionist accounts of waste policy formation and 
evolution might relate to each other, and
• whether Beckian and ecological modernist theories of long term change 
in environmental policy making are supported by the history of waste 
management in Sydney.
The following section provides a brief summary of solid waste management in 
Sydney in the 20th century, before introducing the main arguments of the thesis 
and tracing their development through the chapters of the thesis.
1.3 Introduction to the Thesis
1.3.1 Waste Management in Sydney
Sydney was founded as a penal colony of Great Britain in 1788 on the south 
side of Port Jackson. It was some fifty years before some form of municipal 
governance was established in Sydney. Municipal councils assumed 
responsibility for garbage disposal, which function generally involved the 
collection of garbage and its transport to, and dumping on, areas regarded as 
waste land on the outskirts of settlement. Some garbage was taken a short 
distance out to sea and dumped, a method favoured during and immediately 
after the 1900 outbreak of bubonic plague. Incineration was a popular method 
of disposal during the first half of the 20th century.
Like many other cities in the Western world, Sydney experienced substantial 
economic growth and growth in the per capita consumption of material goods 
in the period following World War II. During the 1950s in Sydney, households 
had increasing amounts of household waste to dispose of, increasing numbers 
of households owned a car, and rising standards of living and public health 
lifted expectations of the quality of suburban life. These three factors put 
considerable pressure on the waste management infrastructure and 
institutional arrangements, which until 1970, were largely the province of local 
government. Dumping of rubbish on roadsides and in bushland, better 
management of local government tips to reduce public health risks, and the 
search for additional tip space or ways or reducing the volume to be disposed
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of were prominent issues for local government in the 1950s and 1960s.
Responses by local government included adoption of landfill techniques as an 
alternative to open tips and representations to the State Government that 
resulted in stricter litter laws.
The economic growth and rise in living standards at this time were, of course, 
due partly to the technological innovations in the chemicals and plastics 
industries that made possible a vast expansion in the range of consumer goods. 
These industries also brought with them a new class of industrial wastes. In the 
late 1960s, problems were encountered with the disposal of hazardous liquid 
industrial wastes in local government landfills. A study commissioned by the 
New South Wales Government recommended the centralised management of 
solid waste and, in 1970, the Waste Disposal Act established the Metropolitan 
Waste Disposal Authority (MWDA). The Authority was responsible for 
minimising the health and environmental impacts of the collection, transport 
and disposal of solid waste. During the 1980s, substantial private sector 
investment in waste transport and processing occurred, and by the mid 1990s 
market share in this industry lay with several large corporations. The late 1980s 
to mid-1990s brought substantial re-organisation of the public sector side of 
waste management. This re-organisation was in response partly to the 
difficulties experienced by the MWDA in establishing additional landfills or 
incinerators to dispose of the growing volumes of solid waste, and partly to a 
change in focus of waste management from disposal to avoidance, 
minimisation and recycling. Successive State governments in the 1990s 
committed themselves to substantial reductions in the amount of waste going to 
landfill. The MWDA underwent a name change to the Waste Management 
Authority (WMA) and then later to the Waste Recycling and Processing Service 
(WRAPS or Waste Service). Some functions were transferred to the NSW 
Environment Protection Authority (EPA), and the Waste Minimisation and 
Management Act in 1995 devolved the planning of waste collection, processing 
and disposal to Regional Waste Boards comprised of groups of municipal 
councils.
Figure 1.1, below, provides a schematic overview of the period from 1932 
(when the main newspaper source used in this study began to be indexed) and 
1997 (the end of a period on heightened public debate and policy change).
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Figure 1.1 Number of articles per year on waste issues appearing in the Sydney Morning 
Herald from 1932 to 1997 (including hazardous waste, landfill siting debates, 
recycling, litter, packaging, and incineration, but excluding industrial action 
by local government staff involved in waste collection and transport). The 
boxes below the line describe the main topics of concern during the peaks of 
media attention. The boxes above the line mark the points in time at which 
various changes in waste management policy occurred.
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1.3.2 The Argument in Brief
The thesis argues that solid waste management policy is indeed influenced by 
the social construction of meaning in relation to waste substances and places in 
the environment where waste is deposited intentionally or unintentionally. The 
influence of the social construction of meaning in relation to waste substances 
and places of waste accumulation operates through the elevation of particular 
aspects of waste or waste management to become matters of public concern and 
policy debate. The thesis proposes that there are three ways by which 
accumulations of waste in the environment, either purposefully placed or 
aggregated by the forces of nature, come to excite public concern. Two of these
[ 15]
involve juxtapositions of waste and places of accumulation that may be largely 
invisible to public notice for long periods of time. However, at particular times, 
these juxtapositions begin to attract public concern and policy debate for two 
reasons: either there is a change in the way in which the place of accumulation 
is understood or used, or there is a change in the way in which the waste 
material itself is understood.
The thesis identifies two instances when considerable public concern was 
aroused by a change in the meanings attached to places where waste was 
accumulating. The first is the ocean dumping controversy in the early 1930s, 
when the gradual transition of Sydney's ocean beaches from waste places (night 
soil was buried on Manly's Steyne Beach in the late 19th century), to foci of 
outdoor recreation and national identity, meant that garbage washed up after 
ocean dumping could no longer be ignored.
The second relates to the transformation of Sydney Harbour in the Australian 
bicentennial year of 1988 from a working port to a symbol of nationhood where 
many of the bicentennial celebrations took place. In 1989, despite previous 
unsuccessful attempts to organise a major community clean-up, and without 
any marked increase in the amount of waste and litter accumulating on the 
Harbour foreshores, 'Clean Up the Harbour' attracted 20,000 volunteers and 
removed 3,000 tonnes of waste and litter where it had being accumulating in 
previous years without exciting undue public concern.
Change in the way that waste materials are understood has also resulted in 
public concerns that impact upon waste management policy. The thesis argues 
that plastics in the waste stream (including the litter stream) have led to public 
fears about the contents of landfills and the demonising of plastic bags that has 
resulted in them receiving media and political attention far in excess of their 
proportion in the waste stream.
The third way by which accumulations of waste may come to excite public 
concern is through what I have termed 'agents of danger'. By agents of danger, 
I mean invisible mechanisms, imagined or real, that convey dangers to a 
person's cleanliness or health from distant accumulations of waste. Agents of 
danger, from 19th century miasmas and mephitic air, to 20th century flies,
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germs and ecologically circulated organic or radio-active pollutants, are a 
persistent feature of public concern about waste accumulations. In this thesis, it 
is argued that the emergence of new agents of danger is a further way by which 
accumulations of waste may come to excite public concern and policy debate. 
However, in contrast to the first two ways described above, where public 
concern was circumscribed in time and space, the emergence of new agents of 
danger in the late 20th century appears to be more related to maintaining a 
general distrust of landfills by the public.
Turning to the process by which political attention is attracted by public 
concerns about waste problems, the thesis argues that this has some of the 
features of moral panics, particularly with respect to the role of the media in the 
early stages of emerging waste policy debates in creating the inventory of 
symbols and meanings which provide the frames for subsequent reporting and 
political debate. It is concluded that moral panic theory has some utility in 
explaining the process by which policy debates about waste issues emerge, but, 
it has to take its place among many other factors that shape these debates.
Among these is the construction of waste management issues and policy 
options by policy actors, which was an important influence, both upon the time 
it took for new policies to be introduced by the New South Wales Government, 
and upon the final form that policy took. The thesis argues that, in 1969 and 
1970, the framing of waste problems as being due to 'fragmentation', and 
consequently requiring a central authority to take responsibility, created a 
coincidence of interest among the main interest groups at the time, which led to 
the 1970 Waste Disposal Act and the establishment of the Metropolitan Waste 
Disposal Authority in a short space of time and with relatively little public 
controversy. These findings lend strong support for constructionist theories of 
policy formation which emphasise the importance of discursive devices such as 
binary codes or dualisms, generative metaphors and story-lines that make 
discursive closure and policy progress in particular directions possible, while 
closing off other directions.
Examination of waste management in the period from 1988 to 1996, however, 
requires a broader explanatory framework beyond social constructionism. The 
Waste Minimisation and Management Act of 1995 was preceded by some six
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years of heightened public concern, vigorous policy debate around what 
became known as the 'waste crisis' (figure 1.1). It was also a period of general 
policy paralysis on the part of the State Government.
Both constructionist and realist approaches are essential to understanding this 
unique period in the history of waste management in New South Wales. From 
the perspective of policy formation, the central questions are why waste 
management became such an important public concern during this period, and 
why it took so long for concrete policy responses in the form of significant 
legislative reform to occur.
There were a number of reasons that waste issues gained public and media 
attention, and then became highly politicised. With the establishment of the 
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority in 1971, waste management was 
gradually rationalised over the ensuing two decades, with waste transfer 
stations replacing the smaller landfills in the inner parts of Sydney that had 
been operated by local government. Economies of scale encouraged larger 
landfills on the outskirts of Sydney. Over the same period, the Authority 
prevaricated for some fifteen years over building a liquid waste treatment 
plant, with the consequence that some one million tonnes of liquid industrial 
waste was disposed of in pits at the 'temporary' Castlereagh Depot in western 
Sydney. In addition, no progress was made with establishing facilities to treat 
various hazardous industrial wastes, so that in the late 1980s public concern 
was raised by reports that some 8,000 tonnes of waste hexachlorobenzene had 
been accumulated and stored by ICI at its chemical plant in Sydney's inner 
south. As problems with leaching of pollutants from the Castlereagh Depot 
occurred, and various committees of inquiry attempted to find a means for 
disposing of the more hazardous wastes that could not be sent to the 
Castlereagh Depot, the 'toxic danger' news story framing, with its 'killer waste' 
and 'toxic time bombs' became well established.
With solid waste volumes increasing during the 1980s, and the rationalisation 
of waste management mentioned above, the Authority proposed in late 1989 to 
construct a large landfill (that was often referred to as a 'mega-landfill or 'mega­
tip') on the north-western outskirts of Sydney at Londonderry. After several 
years of community opposition and legal challenges to this and another landfill
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proposal, the Authority then decided to place a landfill over the top of the 
Castlereagh Depot. The prospect of a 'mega-tip' over a 'toxic time bomb' added 
further to public concerns about waste management.
A further phenomenon which elevated waste into public consciousness during 
this period was the large scale 'clean-up' campaigns, commencing with 'Clean 
Up the Harbour' in 1989, described above. Subsequent and expanded clean-up 
campaigns in the next few years also attracted large numbers of volunteers, at 
least some of whom, according to the evidence presented in this thesis, saw 
their litter gathering activity as a means of doing something about wider 
environmental issues, such as climate change and ozone layer depletion.
With elevated public concern about the environment generally, and waste in 
particular, and a centralised waste management authority searching for a 
location for a mega-landfill in Sydney's west, the stage was set for politicisation 
and policy paralysis. The key factor in the former was the existence of a 
number of marginal electorates in western Sydney, which was where most of 
the feasible landfill sites were situated. The availability of landfill sites in this 
part of Sydney was in part due to the city's history and geography, with the 
Hawkesbury estuary and Kuring-gai National Park on the northern periphery, 
and the Royal National Park and various military and water catchment reserves 
on the southern periphery, making landfill siting infeasible in those areas.
In the early part of the period of policy paralysis, the Government was reluctant 
to make landfill siting decisions and endanger its hold on power by losing the 
western Sydney marginal seats in the forthcoming election of May 1991. In this 
election, the conservative Liberal-National Party Coalition was returned to 
government with a decreased number of seats, such that it could only form 
government with the support of four independents, some of whom held pro- 
environmental views.
While this state of affairs would not have helped the Government in pursuing 
its legislative program, the thesis argues that there were two other important 
factors that contributed to the period of policy paralysis. The first of these was 
the Coalition's commitment to the neo-liberal ideology of 'new 
environmentalism', which favoured the achievement of environmental goals
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using market forces rather than regulation. New environmentalism favoured 
'small government' policy initiatives such as removing the public sector 
monopoly on the disposal of putrescible waste and monetary compensation for 
those living in the vicinity of the new landfill. These proposals only raised the 
ire of local government and the general public, who feared that the profit 
motive would encourage the production of more waste, and who saw landfill 
siting not as an economic issue, but as a moral issue of whose waste should end 
up in whose backyard. The Government's inability to find support for such 
proposals further lengthened the period of policy paralysis.
As the 1995 election approached, the substance of the waste policy platforms of 
the Labor opposition and the Coalition government converged around the 
transfer of waste management responsibility from the former Metropolitan 
Waste Disposal Authority, known at that time as the Waste Service, to regional 
organisations based on groups of local governments. However, the Coalition 
was constrained by its ideology to a sparse proposal that gave little indication 
as to how this was to be achieved, having recourse instead to simple ideological 
justifications. Regionalisation presented in this way had the appearance of an 
abrogation of responsibility. The Labor Party, on the other hand, was not 
constrained by the 'new environmentalism'. It was able to surround its 
proposal for regionalisation of waste management responsibility with a 
detailed set of regulatory and administrative arrangements which gave the 
appearance of comprehensive policy reform commensurate with the publicly 
perceived seriousness of the waste crisis. This subsequently formed the basis of 
the Waste Minimisation and Management Act passed in 1995 after Labor won 
the 1995 election.
The second of the two factors that the thesis argues are important causes of the 
period of policy paralysis relates to the need for politics to deal with 
simplifications of policy issues, the political legitimacy of which is readily 
destroyed by various types of scientific evaluations. Throughout the period of 
policy paralysis, there were a number of simplified policy principles that were 
put forward and gathered some support, before losing their legitimacy when 
evaluated in detail by economists, environmental scientists or industrial 
chemists. The support that had built during the late 1980s and early 1990s for 
the idea that the solution to Sydney's waste crisis lay with recycling, was
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dissipated by an environmental interest group which showed that the local 
government areas with the highest levels of recycling were also those 
generating the highest amount of waste to landfill. The public policy emphasis 
on recycling (along with waste reduction targets) was criticised by prominent 
economists for the lack of analysis of costs and benefits.
Environmental interest groups attempted to promote simple principles for 
reducing the environmental problems (including the creation of solid waste) 
associated with packaging. These included using paper packaging rather than 
plastic, and refillable milk and beverage containers rather than cans and plastic 
containers. These principles could have been translated into policy initiatives 
such as container deposits or bans on plastic bags, but lost any chance of 
gaining broad support when various studies (some of which were industry 
funded) of the energy and environmental costs of the competing packaging 
alternatives cast doubt on the environmentalists' claims. However, the findings 
of such studies were never conclusive, being dependent on a range of 
contestable assumptions and presenting findings in terms of multiple 
environmental impacts that could not be reduced to a single metric.
Comparison of these events with the relatively rapid discursive closure round 
the centralisation-fragmentation framing in the late 1960s — a framing that was 
never subjected to the sort of scientific scrutiny described above — leads to the 
conclusion that discursive closure and the formation of discourse coalitions to 
support a particular waste policy principle is a fragile process that can only 
survive if interest groups refrain from the destructive deployment of scientific 
scrutiny.
Having expanded the account of 20th century waste management policy in 
Sydney to accommodate the intricacies of the waste crisis period in the early 
1990s, the thesis then places this account within a broader theoretical context. 
This analysis is conducted on a number of fronts. It considers the relationship 
between discursive factors (those dealt with in a constructionist analysis) and 
structural factors (those dealt with in a realist analysis), it raises the possibility 
of cyclic swings in waste management policy from centralised to regionalised 
responsibility and back, it discusses the implications of the findings for several 
areas of theory about long term change in environmental policy and compares
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the findings from this study with those from the small number of historical 
studies of waste management. A brief introduction to these aspects of the thesis 
now follows.
The thesis argues that constructionist and realist analyses are, at least for the 
20th century history of waste management in Sydney, complementary rather 
than competing. It is suggested that structural factors may determine the 
amount of discursive effort that the political system has to put into obtaining 
problem closure, and constrain the universe of possible codes, symbols, 
metaphors and simplified policy principles that discourse can range across. For 
example, in the late 1960s, when there was no central waste management 
authority, and with the interests of the main policy stakeholders favoured by 
such an authority, it took relatively little effort to obtain discursive closure with 
a centralisation-fragmentation framing. However, with the structural obduracy 
of the waste problems in the early 1990s, a great deal of discursive effort was 
expended on a range of problem frames, before discursive closure took place 
around the idea of regionalisation of waste management authority.
The relationship between discursive and structural factors can also work in the 
opposite direction. Policy discourse at one period in time can determine the 
structural factors which bear upon discourse at a later time. For example, the 
discursive closure that was obtained with the centralisation-fragmentation 
framing of the waste problems of the late 1960s, resulted in the Metropolitan 
Waste Disposal Authority, which agency played a role in establishing the 
background structural conditions within which policy discourse operated in the 
early 1990s.
The second aspect of the discussion of the broader theoretical context is the 
possibility of cyclic change in the responsibility for waste management policy.
It is argued that waste management policy in Sydney in the latter part of the 
20th century shows some mechanisms by which cyclic alternation between 
centralised and regionalised authority could take place. When waste 
management responsibilities and functions are distributed among local 
governments, unsatisfactory performance can easily be represented as problems 
of 'fragmentation' of responsibility. Local governments may find difficulty in 
responding to this due to the inherent conflicts of interest among themselves,
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thereby providing a higher level of government with justification for providing 
a centralised authority. However, one consequence of centralisation of waste 
management can be centralisation of the waste stream itself. For a single 
organisation with responsibility for waste transport and disposal, there are 
attractive economies of scale to be had, including with large landfills. If 
establishment of landfills becomes politically difficult and a 'waste crisis' 
ensues, then devolution of responsibility to local government becomes an 
attractive option, not simply because it relieves the central government of the 
problem, but also because a number of smaller landfills may be easier to site 
than one large one. Once waste management responsibilities are distributed 
among local governments, then the stage is set once more for attributing 
shortcomings in waste management to 'fragmentation'.
The third aspect of the discussion of the broader theoretical context is the 
implications of the findings of this study for two theories relevant to long term 
change in environmental policy — ecological modernisation and the risk 
society. In respect of the former, it appears that waste management policy in 
Sydney in the latter part of the 20th century bears most of the hallmarks that 
have been advanced as characteristic of the condition of ecological 
modernisation in environmental policy making. The thesis argues, however, 
that some care needs to be taken with ecological modernist optimism about the 
shift to anticipatory environmental policy, at least where waste management 
policy is concerned, as anticipatory waste policy requires movement of the 
locus of policy intervention in an upstream direction with respect to the 
materials flow in the economy. This generally increases the uncertainty and 
contestability of the ultimate environmental effectiveness of the proposals, and 
increases the possibility of the sort of policy paralysis that occurred in Sydney 
in the early 1990s. The important point here, which seems to be overlooked in 
accounts of ecological modernisation, is that the same scientific rationality, 
needed to develop anticipatory solutions to environmental problems, is also 
capable of undermining political momentum, built around the simplified policy 
principles that are necessary for discursive closure and policy progress.
In respect of risk society theory, the 20th century history of waste management 
in Sydney provides some support for Beck's enunciation of the theory, but also 
suggests there are a number of aspects where it unduly simplifies the nature of
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modern risks and their role in policy evolution. The sorts of risks that lie 
behind public fears of landfills have certainly come, in the late 20th century, to 
include a substantial component of industrially produced risks. However, the 
thesis argues that the history of waste management shows that neither the 
global nature of risks, nor their invisibility, is necessarily a hallmark of modem 
industrial production of risk as Beck maintains. The decline of the monopoly of 
scientific rationality in the risk society is borne out by the events around the 
closure of the Castlereagh Depot, but there is a need to acknowledge that this is 
not only due to loss of public faith in science, but the trans-scientific nature of 
some policy issues. Lastly, the argument in the thesis that public concerns 
about waste can be brought to political attention in a similar fashion to that 
which occurs in moral panics, fills out an area of the theory of the risk society 
where Beck provides very little detail.
The fourth aspect of the discussion of the broader context for the study findings 
is the comparison with the findings from the small number of historical studies 
of waste management. The evolution of waste management policy in Sydney 
during the 20th century is found to be broadly similar to that in the USA and 
the UK, with the rise of sanitary movements in the late 19th and early 20th 
century, and the increasing professionalisation and demunicipalisation of waste 
management in the latter part of the 20th century. However, 
demunicipalisation appears to have occurred to a lesser extent in Sydney, due 
to strong public opposition to the transfer of putrescible waste management to 
the private sector and support for this by a Labor government. The upsurge in 
waste-to-energy plants in the USA in the 1980s did not occur in Sydney, despite 
the efforts of USA companies to sell the technology. This was due to the 
advances made by the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority in low cost 
landfill disposal and effective leachate control, together the high levels of public 
concern about incineration that had been caused by public debate and public 
inquiries over a national high temperature incinerator for the disposal of 
hazardous waste. These differences between Sydney and other large cities 
show the potential for public fears about landfills and agents of danger, and 
their impacts on waste management policy to cause substantial departures from 
the broad trends which are discernible across a number of countries. Lastly, the 
experience with recycling in Sydney runs counter to Gandy's (1993) view that 
higher levels of recycling are more likely to occur where there is central waste
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management responsibility. Recycling rates in Sydney in the late 1980s were 
higher than in London or Hamburg, due to the introduction of kerbside 
recycling by local governments, rather than by the actions of the Metropolitan 
Waste Disposal Authority which, if anything, had delayed progress with 
recycling while it experimented unsuccessfully with recycling and buy back 
centres (also known as bring centres in the United Kingdom).
The discussion of the broader context for the study findings concludes by 
returning to the concept of the materials flow with which this chapter 
commenced. It is argued that the policy domains where the sorts of 
constructionist analysis that has been undertaken in this study will be of most 
value can be located at specific loci in the materials flow. These are also the 
domains where Beckian risk politics will be played out and the ecological 
modernist transition to anticipatory policy will continue to fall short of the 
theoretical ideal.
1.3.3 Organisation of the thesis
The remaining chapters of the thesis fall into several groups. Following the 
literature review (chapter 2) and methodology (chapter 3), there are three 
chapters, (chapters 4, 5 and 6) which provide an account of institutional and 
policy evolution in waste management in the 20th century. As described in 
section 1.2, it is this policy evolution for which explanation is sought.
The next five chapters (chapters 7-11) each deal with a single theme within the 
20th century history of waste management in Sydney that is of relevance to the 
development of the arguments in the thesis.
Chapter 12, following the sequence outlined in section 1.3.2, above, develops 
the main arguments in detail, referring both to the previous chapters and to 
relevant literature.
The study's conclusions are presented in chapter 13.
The thesis includes a second volume of appendices. Seven of these 
(Appendices B2 and B4-B9 provides more detailed accounts of the material
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presented in chapters 2 and 4-9. Appendix B2 contains a number of reviews of 
particular bodies of literature, the main findings of which are presented in 
chapter 2. Appendices B4-B9 supplement the material presented in chapters 4- 
9. Chapters 4-11 and appendices B4-B9, taken together, present the entirety, 
from the sources available, of the account of the history of waste management 
in 20th century Sydney. This gives the reader the opportunity to draw their 
own conclusions from this material, which would not be possible were I only to 
present that part of the account that supports the arguments I wish to develop.
A brief description of relationship of the chapters 2-11 to the arguments 
presented in section 1.3.2 and chapter 12 now follows.
As outlined in section 1.2, above, chapter 2 presents a review of the literature 
and refines the research questions the thesis endeavours to answer. This review 
provides the justification for including a consideration of realist explanations 
for waste policy evolution, rather than confining the study to a constructionist 
approach.
Chapter 3 describes the methods used in the study. After outlining some 
distinctions between primary and secondary sources, justification is provided 
for the reliance of the study on sources such as newspapers, Hansard and 
government reports which, in some research traditions would be regarded as 
secondary sources, but which are regarded as primary sources in the 
constructionist and discourse analytic tradition. The length of the period 
covered in the study constrains the choice of newspapers to the one newspaper, 
the Sydney Morning Herald, which has been indexed for much of the 20th 
century. The validatory role of the small number of key informant interviews 
and three focus groups that were undertaken is also explained.
Chapter 4 describes the origins of the division of waste management 
responsibility between State and local government. As section 1.3.3 shows, the 
changes in this division of responsibility is one of the dominant features of solid 
waste management policy in late 20th century Sydney. The chapter commences 
with a brief account of the development in the 19th century of the division of 
responsibility for various urban management functions between the State and 
local government. These arrangements remained largely unchanged until the 
1960s when there were four new pieces of legislation introduced that dealt with 
environmental problems, the last of which was the Waste Disposal Act of 1970. 
This chapter traces the origins of the centralisation-fragmentation framing and
[26]
the idea of a central authority in the legislation that preceded the Waste 
Disposal Act, describes the growing liquid waste disposal problems in the late 
1960s and shows how the centralisation-fragmentation framing brought about a 
coalition of interest among those involved in the liquid waste disposal problem. 
The chapter also shows how the discursive closure around the idea of a central 
authority resulted in the exclusion of other possible solutions to the problem 
that did not require a central authority.
Chapter 5 turns to the history of the central authority that was created by the 
Waste Disposal Act of 1970, the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority. Its 
successful activities (centralisation of the waste stream into large landfills), 
unsuccessful activities (experimentation with recycling centres) and failures to 
act (delays in establishment of a liquid industrial waste treatment plant) played 
an important role in establishing the structural factors that were the context for 
the period of policy paralysis in the early 1990s.
Chapter 6 is the last of the three chapters that cover the institutional and policy 
evolution in 20th century Sydney. This chapter deals with the period of policy 
paralysis from the late 1980s to the passing of the Waste Minimisation and 
Management Act in 1995. It describes the insubstantial, ineffectual and 
politically expedient legislation and legislative proposals of the period and 
explains the political circumstances that contributed to this period of non-policy 
making. The latter part of the chapter traces the emergence of consensus 
around the idea of regionalisation of waste management responsibilities and 
shows how the Liberal-National Party Coalition government was prevented by 
its political ideology from transforming this idea into substantial legislative 
reforms commensurate with the perceived scale of the waste crisis. The chapter 
finishes with an account of the waste reforms introduced by the Labor Party 
when it gained government in 1995.
Chapter 7 is the first of the five single theme chapters. It provides an account of 
how areas of Sydney that were regarded as waste places gained new meanings 
and symbolic identities that resulted in the waste and litter which had been 
accumulating in these areas becoming the focus of public concerns. The two 
main areas are the ocean beaches and the Harbour foreshores, and these two 
instances support the argument in the thesis that changes in the understanding 
of the places where waste accumulates gives rise to public concern and, in some 
cases, to changes in waste management policy. The chapter also documents the 
rich construction of meaning around the foreshore rubbish that was the focus of
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the first of Sydney's mass community clean-ups in 1989. This supports the 
argument later in the thesis that waste in general, and the plastics component in 
particular, can be seen as a form of deviant matter that can catalyse mild forms 
of moral panics.
Chapter 7 then considers the industry that is responsible for much of the waste 
materials that end up in the litter stream — the packaging industry. As this 
industry has been politically active in both recycling and litter debates, the 
description of the industry's influence on waste management policy is split 
between this chapter and the recycling chapter — chapter 9. Chapter 7 
describes the continuity in packaging politics from the late 1970s onwards, with 
governments using the threat of container deposit legislation to extract funding 
from the packaging industry for anti-littering campaigns . The packaging 
industry meanwhile promoted the moral dimension of littering as a dvic 
misdemeanour and deflect attention from the alternative framing of litter as a 
problem of excess packaging production. This contest of meaning over plastic 
and packaging is dealt with in further detail in Chapters 9 and 11.
Chapter 8 provides a description of what have been termed in this thesis 
'agents of danger'. It demonstrates that one of the continuities throughout the 
20th century (and earlier) is popular belief in agents that convey harm to the 
individual from distant accumulations of waste. The nature of the agents has 
changed, but they remain potent forces in mobilising public resistance to 
incinerators and landfills. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first 
traces the history of agents of danger from the bubonic plague outbreak of 1900, 
through the controversies about incinerators which occurred periodically from 
the 1930s to the 1970s, to the events in the 1980s which resulted in incinerators 
of household waste being regarded by the public as little different from high 
temperature incinerators for the destruction of hazardous wastes. Other events 
in the 1980s, aided by imaginative media frames, resulted in the popular 
perception that all municipal solid waste landfills would be contaminated with 
hazardous waste. The rising public concerns in the 1980s about the dangers of 
incinerators and landfills contributed community mobilisation against the 
proposal of Waste Management Authority (formerly the Metropolitan Waste 
Disposal Authority) to establish mega-landfills in Sydney's western periphery.
The second part of chapter 8 reports the findings from three focus groups that 
were designed to validate and supplement the account of agents of danger 
developed from documentary sources and described in the first part of chapter
[28]
8. In addition to confirming the inferences drawn from the documentary 
sources about popular understanding of agents of danger, the focus groups 
provide strong additional support for the argument presented in chapter 7, that 
waste in general, and the plastics component in particular, can be seen as a 
form of deviant matter. The focus group discussion of what might be found at 
the bottom of a landfill demonstrates how ambiguous materials engender 
disgust and fear of mutation that contributes to popular dislike of landfills.
Chapter 9 describes a number of aspects of recycling in Sydney from the post­
war period onwards. As Strasser (1999) shows, a great deal of recycling that 
takes place in households and charity shops, or is carried out by poor and 
disadvantaged social groups, is largely invisible to all but those involved in it. 
As a consequence of the choice of documentary sources used in the study, this 
chapter is dominated by the materials and recycling policy issues that have 
captured media and political attention, viz. packaging and container deposit 
legislation. The chapter outlines the structural and discursive features of 
recycling as a policy issue, showing that there was considerable continuity from 
the late 1970s onwards. In the case of the structural features, the case of paper 
recycling is taken as an example to show how the nature of economic 
relationships in the paper industry made policy intervention to increase 
recycling difficult. The slow uptake of recycling was yet another structural 
factor that lead to the waste crisis of the early 1990s. In the case of discursive 
factors, the chapter documents the rise of symbolic meaning attached to 
recycling which led to public and political support for this simple principle 
which appeared to be the solution to the waste crisis, and to political rejection 
of economic critiques. The chapter also supplements the description in chapter 
7 of the continuity in packaging politics since the late 1970s. Container deposit 
legislation was advanced by the environmental movement as a means of 
increasing recycling, but continued to be used by government to extract 
funding or concessions from the packaging industry. The industry in return 
continued to resist by funding studies of the behavioural aspects of recycling, 
thus framing non-recycling behaviours as a form of civic irresponsibility, and 
studies of the economics of recycling, which tended to be negative because of 
the ease of estimating industry costs compared to the difficulties of estimating 
environmental benefits.
Chapter 10 is somewhat briefer than the other single theme chapters. It deals 
with the role of various environmental groups in the evolution of waste 
management policy. The chapter does not claim to provide a cohesive account
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of the development of the environmental movement in Sydney. Rather, it 
identifies the points of contact between environmental organisations and the 
waste issues of interest in this study. These organisations played a number of 
different roles in waste policy discourse, including contributing to the changing 
symbolic meanings of Sydney's ocean beaches and broadening the range of 
policy options being debated in the early 1990s. The Waste Crisis Network was 
particularly important in this latter respect. The chapter also describes an 
incident on the Woronora River in 1977 that demonstrates both the role of 
environmental groups in constructing symbolic links between waste and other 
environmental issue, and the invisibility of waste in waste places.
Chapter 11 provides the evidence to support the argument that policy progress 
was delayed during the waste crisis of the early 1990s when various scientific 
evaluations damaged or destroyed the political legitimacy of simplified policy 
principles. The chapter commences with four simplified packaging policy 
principles promoted by the environmental movement — replacing plastic bags 
with paper, replacing polystyrene cups and trays with paper ones, replacing 
plastic packaging with bio- or photo-degradable plastic and replacing non- 
returnable beverage containers with re-usable glass ones. The account shows 
how various scientific studies (some funded by the packaging industry) 
exposed contestable assumptions and presented environmental impacts in 
terms of several non-comparable metrics, such that these simplified principles 
that were popularly and politically comprehensible failed to gain support and 
so delayed policy progress.
Chapter 11 then turns to an example of a simplified policy principle — 
recycling — that had gained considerable popular and political support, to the 
extent that it was considered by the government as its main policy approach to 
the waste crisis. This lost its political gloss when the Waste Crisis Network 
used the improving availability of waste stream data to show that local 
government areas with the best recycling records were contributing the most 
waste to landfill. Consequently, the government cast around for new policy 
directions rather than consolidating policy around recycling. The chapter 11 
also provides an account of several other simplified policy principles where 
there were similar threats to political legitimacy.
As mentioned above, the arguments of the thesis are presented in full in chapter 
12, and the conclusions set out in chapter 13.
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2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Definition of Waste
Among the main historical studies of waste and waste management, there is a 
remarkable degree of variation in the extent to which authors concern 
themselves with defining what is meant by the term 'waste'. Some, such as 
Gandy (1993), devote relatively little attention to definition. Others, such as 
Strasser (2000), go to considerable lengths to demonstrate the historical and 
social flexibility in what is considered as 'waste'. As this thesis is concerned 
with waste management over a span of almost a century, some attention to the 
definition of 'waste' is appropriate.
As discussed in appendix B2.1.1, dictionary definitions of 'waste' lead 
immediately to the conclusion that what counts for waste depends on human 
perceptions. This is rarely acknowledged in professional or legislative 
definitions, which generally seek to define waste in terms of such things as its 
physical composition, its origins, or the dangers it might pose to human health. 
These definitions do not, however, go uncontested, as is borne out by 
experience in the European Court of Justice in the last 15 years (appendix 
B2.1.1). In appendix B2.1.1, it is suggested that, following the judicial reasoning 
in the European Court of Justice, there is a plausible argument that all materials 
circulating in the economy after the phases of initial resource extraction, 
manufacture and consumption, or dissipated into the environment after one or 
all of these phases, could be considered to be waste. Just as plausibly, however, 
all these materials might be considered not to be waste, but simply materials 
which pose various degrees of danger or discomfort to humans.
To provide some definitional boundaries for the subject matter of this thesis, the 
following approach has been taken. Firstly, this thesis is mainly concerned with 
solid materials. However, because, public policy formation is never neatly 
partitioned according to the physical state of the substances with which it is 
concerned, it is necessary to allow the scope of empirical and analytical inquiry 
in this study to stray into such areas as water pollution, air pollution and the 
substances, both liquid and solid, that became known in the latter part of the 
20th century as hazardous or toxic waste.
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Secondly, this thesis is concerned with a particular class of solid waste materials 
defined by their relation to human activities in industry, commerce, 
administration and domestic life.
As for any modem nation, the economy of New South Wales depends upon the 
extraction, transport and processing of materials into finished goods. Given the 
high proportion of the population located in Sydney (63 per cent in 1999 — 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2003), much of the processing, consumption and 
disposal takes place in the Sydney metropolitan area. Industrial processes of 
extraction and manufacturing create material by-products of low value for 
which there may be neither a buyer nor a profitable use. It is such materials 
that, at least in the latter half of the 20th century have been termed 'industrial 
waste'.
The behaviour of people in their daily lives in the residential households of the 
greater Sydney region also produces solid materials that are perceived by the 
householder to be of low value and, if allowed to accumulate in or around the 
household, a source of discomfort or danger, or at least a source of neighbourly 
disapproval. These solid materials have, in the latter part of the 20th century, 
generally been termed 'household waste'.
In addition to factories and households, the activities carried out in shops and 
offices also produce solid materials of an approximately similar nature to that 
described above for households. These solid materials have been generally 
termed 'commercial waste'. Obviously, the boundary between commerce and 
industry is a fairly diffuse one and sometimes the solid waste originating from 
the two has been termed 'commercial and industrial waste'.
Two forms of commerce, the construction and demolition of buildings, generate 
solid materials of perceived low value and this material, in the latter part of the 
20th century, has been termed 'construction and demolition waste'.
The class of solid materials, then, that are the subject of this thesis are materials 
that, in the course of the industrial, commercial, administrative and domestic 
activities carried out in a city, come to be perceived by those who produce them
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to have little or no value, or are perceived to be a source of discomfort or 
danger if they were allowed to accumulate close to the point of their 
production.
It will be seen from the literature specific to Sydney that is reviewed 
subsequently in this chapter and its accompanying appendix, that for much of 
the 20th century in Sydney, the solid waste materials referred to above were 
popularly known as 'garbage' or 'rubbish', particularly that emanating from 
households. The terms 'solid waste' and 'municipal solid waste' gradually 
spread from professional and policy discourse to popular discourse in the 1960s 
and 1970s. By the 1980s and 1990s, quite extensive categorisations of solid and 
liquid waste materials were in use in professional and policy discourse. The 
glossary at the front of this thesis provides definitions for the types of waste 
referred to in the body of the thesis and its appendices.
2.1.2 Definition of Waste Management
As discussed in appendix B2.1.2, the semantic uncertainties associated with the 
term 'waste' carry over into the meaning of 'waste management'.
Consequently, waste management can potentially refer to the organisation, 
regulation, administration or control of most materials circulating in the 
economy or being dissipated or sequestered in the environment, as well as to 
the same actions applied to energy or to human effort. In this thesis, 'waste 
management' refers to the organisation, regulation, administration or control of 
the type of wastes defined in the previous section to be the subject of the thesis. 
These are the solid materials which come to have little value in the course of 
human activities in public spaces, factories, offices, shops and households, and 
for which accumulation at the point of production is regarded as unacceptable. 
Waste management, then, includes the collective organised behaviours of 
societies directed at the accumulation of solid materials of little or no value to 
the owner that are regarded as undesirable, or materials that might accumulate 
in this way, either by preventing the production of the materials in the first 
place, or by removing and treating them in various ways before reusing them in 
the economy or dissipating or sequestering them in the environment in ways 
that are acceptable.
[35]
'Waste management' in this thesis generally refers to the actions of higher levels 
of social and economic organisation, such as local governments, the legislatures 
of the New South Wales State Government, State Government agencies, public 
interest groups and private sector firms. The term 'waste management policy' 
refers to the actions of governments relating to waste management.
2.1.3 The Literature Review
The literature on solid waste can be broadly divided into that within the 
engineering and biophysical sciences and that within the socio-economic 
disciplines. Even by itself, the literature within the socio-economic disciplines 
that is relevant to the understanding of solid waste management is of 
considerable extent. Consequently, in embarking on a review of this literature, 
it is necessary at the very outset to set some guidelines and boundaries that 
might be justified by the nature of the research task set for the study in 
chapter 1.
Search Strategy
The search strategy used for this literature review proceeded iteratively among 
the four steps below.
1 Literature on nuclear waste and hazardous waste was excluded from 
preliminary searches, but when studies on solid waste that appeared 
highly relevant to the research task were found to draw on other studies 
in the nuclear and hazardous waste literature, these latter studies were 
examined for possible relevance to the research task.
2 Available abstracts in the sociological, psychological, anthropological 
and environmental education literature in the Sociofile, Psychlit and 
ERIC bibliographic databases were examined to gain an understanding 
of what aspects of solid waste management in modern industrial cities 
are dealt with by these discipline, and of the apparent potential of the 
particular disciplinary approaches for the research task.
3 All available accounts of waste management over relatively long periods 
were examined in detail.
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4 Many of the frequently cited environmental policy texts published in the 
last decade were examined, with particular attention to any accounts of 
waste management policy. Where these texts referred to the public 
policy literature in a context that appeared relevant to the research task, 
these small parts of the large public policy literature were also 
examined.
Period Covered in the Literature Review
The literature review was carried out during 1997 and 1998. Consequently, the 
majority of the literature discussed in this review was published prior to 1999. 
However, where works of particular relevance to the thesis that were published 
in the period between 1999 and the submission of the revised thesis in 2005, 
these may be referred to in the literature review, or elsewhere in the thesis.
Organisation o f the Literature Review
The Australian National University places a 100,000 word limit on PhD theses. 
To permit a reasonably comprehensive treatment of the relevant literature, it 
has been necessary to restrict this chapter to a discussion of the main findings 
from the review. The literature is discussed in detail in appendix B2, in which 
the sequence of discussion mirrors that in this chapter.
2.2 Waste-Related Studies other than Policy Studies
2.2.1 Disciplinary Breadth of the Field
Solid waste management has been the subject of research in the social sciences 
in a number of disciplinary areas. These include behavioural psychology, social 
psychology, sociology, education, economics, policy studies, political science, 
marketing and advertising research, media studies and anthropology. Much of 
this could be described as a sort of disciplinary nibbling at the edges of solid 
waste management issues. As these issues have gained more media and
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political attention since the 1970s, disciplines such as behavioural psychology, 
social psychology, education, marketing and communication studies, education 
and some parts of sociology and anthropology have identified aspects that are 
amenable to consideration and analysis from their particular disciplinary 
perspectives (appendix B2.1.1). Perhaps not surprisingly, it is difficult to 
assemble such a collection into a cohesive theoretical framework that might 
underpin the study of waste management policy.
2.2.2 Constructionist Accounts of Dirt and Danger
The work of Douglas (1966) and Lynch (1990) and others (appendix B2.2.2), 
however, appears to provide some of the foundations for a constructionist 
account of solid waste management. Put simply, what counts as waste and 
what makes waste something to be feared, has to do with how the human mind 
places order and classification on its surroundings. Substances that are 
regarded as waste are frequently ambivalent or anomalous in some way that is 
a threat to these orderings and classifications. Lynch (1990:25-26, 53-54) also 
introduced the idea of waste places — "symbolically debased areas of the city' 
that signal that social norms and controls are relaxed in their vicinity and so are 
likely to attract litter or dumping.
2.2.3 Deviance and Moral Panics
Insofar as waste according to Douglas's and Lynch's account is a form of 
deviant matter, the body of work on moral panics (appendix B2.2.3) provides a 
bridge between the constructionist account of dirt and danger and media and 
political behaviour in modern societies which has to be considered in any 
analysis of solid waste management policy. The work of Cohen (1972), 
Thompson (1998) and others examines how particular groups in society can 
come to be regarded as deviant and a threat to moral order, leading to pressure 
on legislatures to take action against the specific group, or the wider problem of 
which the specific group is held to be just one example (Cohen's 'not only this' 
phenomenon). The claim for a wider problem shifts the locus for policy making 
from the local to the regional or national. Moral panics and the 'not only this' 
phenomenon could be seen as the selection of politically tractable symbols for 
problems about which there broad, but more vague, concerns. Indeed Cohen, 
Thompson and others have suggested that moral panics are more likely to
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occur at times when social change is creating ambiguity and stress for existing 
ways of understanding.
2.2.4 History
Hoy (1995) provided a comprehensive social history of dirt and cleanliness in 
the USA from colonial times to the present (appendix B2.2.4). Her study, while 
not having the social constructionist and anthropological approach of Douglas 
(1966), nevertheless can be regarded as providing an emphasis on Western 
society that complements Douglas's focus on traditional societies.
The value of Hoy's study is that it shows, at least for the USA, that there can be 
substantial shifts over time in the focus of both individual and collective 
cleansing behaviour. The domains that are regarded as in need of cleansing are 
likely to influence both the nature of the wastes that cleansing generates, and 
the sites regarded as appropriate for the disposal of these wastes. For example, 
it was the focus on the household in the 19th century that produced the rags, 
bones, dust and cinders that comprised 19th century domestic refuse. It was 
the disinterest in the street as a focus for cleansing concern that allowed this 
refuse to accumulate there. The sanitary reform movement in the late 19th 
century, in directing its attention to the public space of cities, created a new 
component in the urban waste stream, street sweepings, as well as precluding 
waste disposal on the streets and forcing its removal further afield. Similarly, 
the preoccupation with personal and household cleanliness in the 1950s 
allowed public space to become dirtier again, although what constituted the 
dirt at this time had changed to discarded packaging.
It is likely that movements in the boundaries between domains considered to 
need their cleanliness maintained and domains where cleanliness could be 
ignored were similar in Australia, in that Australia also had an upsurge of 
sanitary reforms in the late 19th century (see, for example, Bashford, 1994), as 
well as the development of advertising and consumerism (the source of 
packaging) parallel with that in the USA. However, there is the possibility of 
other influences on how these boundaries have changed over time in Australia. 
Shelton (1998:10), following Wright (1980) points out that Australia's colonial 
history has resulted in a change in the meaning of waste over time from 
meaning areas of land that had not yet been brought into some form of 
production for human use to discarded materials of human construction that
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currently have no value in the market economy. In addition, the growth of 
environmentalism in the late 20th century has resulted in the transfer of some 
areas of land from being regarded as waste to being valued for their lack of 
evidence of human impact, or their pivotal role in ecosystem functions. Such 
shifts indicate that the changes in waste management policy over time are 
unlikely to be explained solely in terms of changes in the technology of waste 
management.
The second inference that can be drawn from Hoy's study is that lay 
understandings and representations about dirt and waste carry a number of 
elements that have proved remarkably resistant to a major change in the 
scientific understanding of how disease may or may not related to 
accumulations of waste. The idea of danger from something that is invisible or 
nearly invisible, pervasive and able to travel from distant filth to endanger the 
cleanliness of the individual or their immediate surroundings appears to be an 
enduring one. When, for example, sewer construction in late 19th century 
Philadelphia resulted in the decrease of cesspools and their associated miasmas, 
sewer gas or 'mephitic air' became the new threat to health. Medical authorities 
attributed typhoid, rheumatism, pneumonia, malaria, croup and diphtheria to 
breathing sewer gas that had escaped from waste pipes into the home (Raufer, 
1998:66). The same attribution of disease to sewer gas occurred in New York 
(Melosi, 1980:60).
Furthermore, the idea of invisible agents of danger did not disappear with the 
miasmic theory of disease at the end of the 19th century. Despite scientific 
evidence to the contrary, germs and flies, and to a lesser extent, rats, took on 
some of these miasmic qualities during much of the 20th century. The germ 
theory provided an opportunity to distinguish between dirt that was dangerous 
to health, and dirt that was harmless, even if it was offensive to the senses, but 
this opportunity was lost as germ theory became a supplement to, rather than a 
replacement for, the miasmic rationale for public sanitation. While Hoy did not 
examine the relationships between the pursuit of cleanliness and toxic wastes in 
the late 20th century, it is obvious that popular representations of toxic waste 
that have emerged in the last few decades carry the same miasmic qualities of 
invisibility, pervasiveness, and ability to travel and endanger the individual by 
increasing the likelihood of developing cancer. Indeed, Brown and Mikkelsen 
(1990:xxi) note that two recent books on toxic waste open with discussions of 
plague and argue that toxic chemicals are 'the plague of our time'. There are 
also similarities between the fear of miasmas and the 19th century fear of cancer
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which represented it as 'an alien and living invader that gave little warning 
before "eating" into people .... People imagined cancers to be living, moving 
creatures in themselves — uninvited beasts which surreptitiously ganged up on 
the body' (Patterson, 1987:30-31, cited by Raufer, 1998:163).
The idea of invisible or near-invisible agents of danger has been present for well 
over 200 years. Tuan (1981:95-96) gives examples from 14th and 16th century 
Europe in which plague was attributed, not only to local sources of 
putrefaction, but to the 'drawing up' of noxious vapours in India and the 
Middle East. As late as 1891, a London physician was attributing the spread of 
plague around the world to the odours emanating from the mounds of corpses 
left unburied after natural disasters in China (Tuan, 1981:98).
Lastly, Hoy's study shows that ideas about cleanliness are inextricably linked 
with ideas about morality. In the early 20th century, the immigrants to the USA 
were seen as a threat both to middle-class standards of cleanliness and to 
middle-class morality. Public programs in the immigrant neighbourhood 
sought to inculcate both domestic hygiene and American values. This link 
between cleanliness and morality in the period of sanitary reforms in the late 
19th century and early 20th century has also been commented on in an 
Australian context in the work of Bashford (1994:93) — 'Firmly conflating 
morality and physicality, sanitary reformers held that health and disease were 
fundamentally determined by individual and environmental moral and social 
conditions'.
While it may no longer be acceptable for public programs to be based on the 
assumption that dirt and immorality go hand in hand, the household and 
personal cleanliness products industry, through its use of the effective social 
approval advertising format, continues to depict a society where one's social 
acceptability depends on scrupulous attention to the cleanliness of self and 
domestic surroundings. This, together with Hoy's observation that cleansing 
activities may have been part of a reaffirmation of local or national identity or 
sense of purpose in times of difficulty or ambiguity, suggests that the 
relationship between the evolution of waste management policy and broader 
social issues is worthy of investigation.
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2.3 Economic and Technical Policy Studies
Cost has always been a significant consideration in the provision of waste 
management infrastructure. With the development of environmental 
economics in the second half of the 20th century, economic scholarship has 
played an important role in the assessment of waste minimisation, recycling 
and disposal options. A substantial literature exists in this area, a small fraction 
of which is reviewed in appendix B2.3.
Nevertheless, this review is sufficient to establish several points in support of 
the direction being proposed in the present study. Firstly, the practicalities and 
costs of preventing waste dumping means that authorities that raise the costs of 
disposal are just as likely to encourage illegal disposal as waste reduction or 
avoidance. Waste policy will always have to be more than pricing policy.
Secondly, the emphasis placed on efficiency by neo-classical economics, and its 
eschewing of equity and distributional issues, makes it singularly ill equipped 
to deal with the task of explaining the evolution of waste management policy. 
The ideal of directing waste to places with the lowest disposal costs collides 
head-on with the politically significant question of whose waste ends up in 
whose backyard. What appears to the economist as unhelpful distortions of the 
market ideal — 'dictation by unwarranted social pressures' or ' the powerful 
mantras of environmentalists', to use the terms of economists Choe and Fraser 
(1998) — may well be manifestations of the most important explanatory factors.
Thirdly, the difficulties encountered in technical and economic studies of waste 
policy in deciding just what counts as waste and what environmental and 
health effects should be included in analyses introduce a degree of subjectivity 
into these studies that is further encouragement for a constructionist approach 
to understanding waste policy.
These three points do not mean, however, that economic considerations have 
no role in the explanation of waste management policy. Many of the day-to- 
day decisions made by private firms and public utilities involved in waste 
management are very much influenced by economic considerations. What is 
being argued is that these considerations can be regarded as approximate 
constants across the broad sweep of history that is of interest to the present 
study (the basic principle used by hierarchy theory in attempting to understand 
complex systems — see for example, Simon, 1973).
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2.4 Historical Policy-Related Studies
There have been a number of studies that have provided accounts of waste 
management policy over relatively long periods of time. These include Melosi's 
(1980) study with its main emphasis on USA cities in the period 1880-1920 
(appendix B2.4.1), Gandy's (1993,1994) studies of late 19th and 20th century 
London, Hamburg and New York (appendix B2.4.2) and Colten's (1994) study 
of chemical waste disposal in the USA from 1900-1960 (appendix B2.4.3). The 
work of Melosi and Colten was mainly descriptive, whereas that of Gandy was 
more concerned with seeking explanation for the trends in waste policy 
formation he identified, part of which was within a neo-Marxist regulationist 
framework.
A number of waste management policy studies covering shorter periods were 
also reviewed. These include Luton's (1996) study of the establishment of a 
municipal waste incinerator in Spokane, USA (appendix B2.5.1), Ozawa's (1991) 
study of the attempt to establish a waste incinerator at Brooklyn Navy Yard, 
New York (B2.5.3), Lake's (1994) and Williams and Matheny's (1995) studies of 
hazardous waste management policy in the USA (appendix B2.5.5) and Gilpin's 
(1980) short review of Australian waste management policy in the 1970s 
(appendix B2.5.5).
In my view, these historical studies provide useful accounts from which the 
main features of waste policy making can be abstracted. These include:
• the cycles of public attention and inattention to waste matters,
• broad spatial patterns of senescence and rejuvenation within cities, that 
can result in formerly unproblematic waste areas becoming a focus for 
political attention,
• the political interest in the degree of centralisation or decentralisation of 
waste management responsibility within government, and the raft of 
arguments for one or the other,
the distribution of waste management responsibilities between 
municipal, State and Federal governments,
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• the influence of other public policy changes, in particular symbolic 
environmental politics in State or Federal legislatures remote from the 
locus of application of waste policy,
• the influence on waste policy of environmental discoveries,
• the distribution of waste management functions between the private 
and public sector,
• the professionalisation of waste management and policy-making, the 
application of scientific rationality and planning, and the balance 
between the health and engineering professions
• the role of the established formal environmental groups, public opinion 
and the media,
• the engagement of local grass-roots organisations in municipal politics,
• the power of particular toxic substances, particularly dioxin, to mobilise 
community resistance and paralyse the politics of waste facility siting,
• the strategic behaviour of large waste-generating and waste-processing 
industries, in particular the way in which they have influenced the 
distribution of financial and environmental risks, and
• the susceptibility of waste processing industries to price instability 
caused by factors external to the industry.
2.5 Waste Policy and Policy Theory
The accounts of the evolution of waste management policy summarised in 
appendix B2.4 and B2.5 provided an opportunity for at least some of the 
respective authors to test existing theories about public policy-making in 
general and environmental policy-making in particular. The degree of 
abstraction that has been employed varies considerably, from Gandy's neo- 
Marxist regulationist explanations, to Ozawa's empirical generalisations about 
the role of science in environmental policy-making, to Colten's and Melosi's 
largely atheoretical treatments.
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2.5.1 Political Systems Theory
Luton, after describing what he regarded as the advantages and disadvantages 
of a range of theoretical approaches to understanding public policy-making, 
chose political systems theory as his preferred conceptual framework for the 
study of the establishment of the Spokane waste-to-energy plant. Luton 
claimed that political systems theory had the potential to incorporate insights 
from other areas of theory, and modified Easton's (1965) model of a political 
system to produce a general model of a local solid waste policy system, (Luton, 
1996:Fig 2.1, p.49) and a model of the Spokane solid waste policy system 
(Luton, 1996:Fig 2.2, p.51), reproduced in figure 2.1. Luton recognised there 
were several disadvantages of the political systems approach, including the risk 
that the depicted relationships between the components of the system could be 
seen as static, and the problem that the theoretical inclusiveness of the approach 
could well incorporate the shortcomings in addition to the strengths of other 
theoretical approaches.
In Luton's assessment of the utility of the political systems approach in his final 
chapter, it is clear that this approach's strength is that it ensures that the 
complex interconnectedness of solid waste policy-making is never lost sight of. 
The multitude of events, decisions and individual actions that lie behind waste 
management policy-making in Spokane can all be accommodated by his model. 
However, it is difficult to see how the political systems approach can be more 
than a diagrammatic check list of the readily identified entities, such as 
governments and interest groups, and whether or not these entities interact 
with each other in some way. For example, Luton's account identifies a number 
of ways in which the views of the general public and local government officials 
about the balance between state and private sector involvement in waste 
management had an influence on particular waste management decisions. He 
also shows how these views can be traced back to their origins in the political 
cultures brought by immigrants to the American West. However, such specific 
influences can only be shown in the vaguest of ways in a political system 
model, such as shown in figure 2.1, where political culture is simply 
represented as an undifferentiated and all-encompassing influence on the 
components of the model.
If it is accepted that the primary purpose of theory is to condense and organise 
knowledge about the world and to explain (Neuman, 1997:37, 48), then this 
application of political systems theory appears to fare better with the first
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purpose than with the second. This is at least partly because its 
comprehensiveness, inclusiveness and naturalistic components draw attention 
away from abstract concepts that might have more explanatory or predictive 
power. There is some suggestion of this in Luton's own conclusions.
Figure 2.1: General model of local solid waste policy system.
(After Luton, 1996:Figure 2.2, p.51.)
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If we return to the basic political questions asked by public policy theorists and 
apply them to solid waste policy making, we may conclude that the answer to 
the question 'Who rules?' is 'No one does.' In this system, no one element has 
sufficient power to control the system's overall response to a given problem. To 
the question 'Who governs?' the answer is 'Everyone does.' In this system, 
everyone is interconnected, so even those who think they are choosing not to 
participate are, by that decision, affecting the manner in which we govern 
ourselves and the solutions our governance develops for the problems it faces.
To the question 'Who benefits?' one might answer 'Almost everyone, and no 
one.'
(Luton, 1996:261)
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These somewhat glib answers divert attention from the lack of macro- or meso- 
scale theory that might form the foundation of explanations that go beyond the 
detailed network of actors and events so ably described in Luton's work. To 
give just one example, if the abstract concept of risk and uncertainty is 
introduced, then the question 'Who benefits?' can be reframed in terms of who 
bears the inevitable risks associated with solid waste management and who 
manages to insulate themselves from these risks. There are many risks and 
uncertainties involved in upgrading waste management infrastructure to deal 
with growing populations and growing per capita generation of waste. Many 
of these relate to the unpredictability of local decision-making about the 
location of such things as incinerators, transfer stations, recycling centres and 
landfills. Local opposition can result in delays and burgeoning costs. Delays 
can also result in serious environmental damage and health hazards. The 
volumes of waste generated can change rapidly with unexpected population 
influxes. The composition of some waste materials, such as packaging, is 
beyond the control of those managing the waste stream. Novel packaging 
materials can lead to unexpected hazards in incinerator emissions. New 
discoveries with environmental monitoring can lead to more stringent emission 
standards and the need for upgrading waste management infrastructure.
Luton's account suggests that one of the main private sector operators in the 
waste management system for Spokane, Wheelabrator, who constructed and 
operated the waste-to-energy incinerator under contract to the Solid Waste 
Disposal Project (SWDP), was particularly adept in ensuring that it was 
insulated from many of the risks outlined above. The terms of this contract 
enabled Wheelabrator to fine SWDP substantial sums of money if there were 
delays in obtaining permits for construction, or in SWDP supplying waste once 
the incinerator was ready to receive it (Luton, 1996:25). The 'put or pay' clause 
in the contract meant that SWDP was legally bound to supply waste in the 
quantities required by the incinerator, or make financial restitution for any 
shortfalls (Luton, 1996:28). With the decision by the Supreme Court that 
incinerator ash should be managed as hazardous waste, the Spokane waste-to- 
energy incinerator then required additional treatment of its ash before it could 
be landfilled. The cost of the additional equipment was borne by SWDP under 
the terms of its contract with Wheelabrator which specified that SWDP should 
pay for the costs of any pollution control equipment needed as a result of new 
environmental standards (Luton, 1996:27, 29). In effect, SWDP, rather than 
Wheelabrator, bore the risks associated with uncertainties in contested local
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approval procedures, in forecasting future waste volumes and in future 
environmental standards. There is little doubt, then, returning to the questions 
Luton posed, that Wheelabrator benefited considerably through insulating itself 
from the uncertainties of solid waste management. Exactly why Wheelabrator 
was able to negotiate such a favourable contract is not explained directly in 
Luton's account. However, it can be noted that the number of firms in a 
position to tender for the operation of a large waste-to-energy facility was 
relatively small, because of the wide range of specialised expertise required. 
Secondly, with the discovery of the potential for landfills to pollute Spokane's 
groundwater supply, and the need for alternatives to local landfills, greater 
levels of expertise were required in developing new waste management 
infrastructure than was available among the professional staff of local 
government. This would suggest that structuralist theories of public policy­
making may have something to offer in explaining how the costs of uncertainty 
in waste management are distributed.
Finally, in assessing the utility of Luton's rendering of political systems theory, 
it can be noted that the theory seems to be largely ahistorical. Apart from 
Luton's inclusion of Waste's city ecology model which posits cycles of activism 
and conservatism in local government, there is nothing in the rich tapestry of 
actors, organisations, governments and the relationships between them to 
provide a sense of which relationships might be expected to occur at which 
times in the 'story [that] has no ending'.
2.5.2 Realist/Structuralist Approaches
This contrasts with the clearly historical nature of Gandy's (1993) study. As 
described in appendix B2.4.2, Gandy suggested that a long period of 
municipalisation of waste management was followed by a period of 
demunicipalisation. This he attributed to changes external to local government 
policy-making, mainly pressures from national governments for cost reductions 
and pressures for action from the environmental movement and the public. On 
the question of whether the process of policy-making, as distinct from the 
content of policy, has changed, Gandy is largely silent. However, the 
substantive nature of, and rationale for, waste management policy has received 
close attention in Gandy's work. In providing a context for his study, Gandy 
suggests that policy proposals and their rationales fall into three groups, each 
with its own theoretical underpinnings (Gandy, 1993:23-29):
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• market-based and technocratic approaches which are underpinned by 
logical positivism and neo-classical economics and have an emphasis on 
technological change and correction for market failure,
• behavioural and humanistic approaches which are underpinned by 
liberal pluralism and humanism and have an emphasis on 
environmental education and behavioural change, and
• political economy approaches which draw on structuralism and realism 
and emphasise fundamental changes in the nature of property, the 
economy and social and political structures.
Gandy concluded that the rationales for the first two policy approaches were 
incapable of explaining both the evolution of waste management arrangements 
and the limits to recycling rates.
He suggested that the trends of municipalisation and demunicipalisation could 
be explained in terms of the periodisation in capitalist states posited in neo- 
Marxist regulation theory. Although the temporal match between Gandy's 
periodisation of municipal waste management and the competitive regulation, 
Fordist and post-Fordist phases posited by regulation theory was certainly less 
than perfect, it nevertheless serves to signal the possibility that part of the 
explanation for the nature of waste management policy-making may lie with 
the interaction of fundamental political, economic and social structures. 
Lending support to this possibility is the close involvement of local government 
in waste management and the favour that regulation theory has found in 
understanding changes in the nature of municipal governance (see, for 
example, Goodwin, Duncan and Halford, 1993). Col ten's account of how the 
USA chemical industry was able to delay public policy-making to reduce the 
impact of its waste disposal practices (appendix B2.4.3) is also broadly 
consistent with Lindblom's (1977,1981) views about the structural power of 
business.
Gandy also concluded that his findings demonstrated the utility of a research 
approach that combined empirical and historical accounts of waste 
management policy, claiming also that this approach provided a better 
understanding of the evolution of recycling than did ahistorical theoretical 
analyses based on positivist and neo-classical economic explanatory
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frameworks. A similar argument for policy studies generally was advanced by 
Dror (1986:5) who maintained that short time spans prevent the recognition of 
basic patterns over time. The shortcomings of neo-classical economics in 
normative analysis of policy options in recycling have also been referred to in 
section 2.3, above.
Gandy argued that because his approach had been rarely used, in comparison 
to a relatively greater number of policy studies with a positivist and neo­
classical economic framework, there was a need for further application of his 
approach to the evolution of waste management policy in large cities. Such a 
view is broadly consistent with that of Melosi (1993:18) who, in a review of 
studies of the environmental history of cities, observed that: 'the study of 
environmental policy-making in cities is still in its infancy and the study of 
environmental regulation as it pertains to cities still lacks comprehensive 
treatment'.
2.5.3 Empirical Generalisations
Ozawa (1991) described a number of policy disputes, not so much as theoretical 
studies, but rather to promote the use of consensual procedures in public 
policy-making under scientific uncertainty. One of the disputes involved waste 
disposal by incineration and Ozawa made some generalisations about the 
relationships between science and politics in environmental policy-making. 
Firstly, she argued that in most cases the use of science in environmental policy­
making can be schematised as shown in figure 2.2. The lighter arrows signify 
that in some situations, when the science supporting two conflicting policy 
positions is also contradictory, decision makers may refer the question to an 
expert in the field before making their decision.
Ozawa suggests there has been an increasing trend in American legislatures for 
scientific findings to be the justification for formulation of public policy. Prior 
to the Roosevelt administration, science figured but rarely in government 
decision-making.
The New Deal agencies marked the entry of science into public policy-making 
and the rationale for the formation of such agencies was that they enabled the 
employment of technical experts with the required scientific knowledge 
(Ozawa, 1991:3-4).
[50]
Figure 2.2: Schematic representation of the role of science in environmental policy­
making. (After Ozawa, 1991:Figures 2.1 and 2.2, pp.29-30).
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This form of policy-making has logical positivist underpinnings and assumes 
that science is objective and neutral. Therefore any discrepancies in the 
supporting science brought to the decision by stakeholders must be due to 
error, which then may be an incentive for decision makers to seek further 
scientific assessment to uncover the source of error and validate one or other of 
the policy positions. However, the discrepancies may not be so much due to 
error as to expert, but nonetheless subjective, judgements about uncertainties 
on the part of those providing scientific support.
The facilitated one day policy dialogue on the Brooklyn Navy Yard incinerator 
was instrumental in surfacing the source of the 240-fold discrepancy in the 
cancer risk estimates between the Hart Report and the Center for the Biology of 
Natural Systems. At the time of the incinerator proposal, there were three 
competing theories of dioxin formation in municipal waste incinerators. The 
Hart Report dismissed the theory that dioxin is synthesised from precursors at 
points beyond the combustion chambers and in the smoke stack. The two 
remaining theories posited that the formation of dioxin was influenced by 
conditions in the combustion chambers. Accepting this view, the Hart Report 
produced its estimates by selecting from among the incinerators for which data 
was available, the two which had combustion chamber designs similar to the
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proposed incinerator. The Center for the Biology of Natural Systems, on the 
other hand, subscribed to the theory rejected by the Hart Report. Accordingly, 
it then was logical to base its estimates on data from all the nineteen 
incinerators for which data was available (Ozawa, 1991:51-57). The discrepancy 
in the cancer risk estimates had its origins in the choice of incinerator data 
assumed to be representative of the proposed incinerator.
Ozawa maintained that in the absence of consensual procedures like the 
facilitated policy dialogue, there is little incentive for the discovery of the 
origins of the differences in scientific assessments. Indeed, it may be in the 
interests of those providing the supporting science for a policy position to 
deliberately conceal the assumptions underlying the analysis, leaving agency 
staff with the arduous task of meticulously working through competing 
assessments in an attempt to reconcile the differences (Ozawa, 1991:33-36).
The second result of science supported environmental policy-making in the face 
of uncertainty is that legitimate political concerns may be submerged by the 
focus on the science. Ozawa suggests, for example, that some of the opposition 
to the Brooklyn Navy Yard incinerator may have been on the grounds that it 
was an 'end-of-pipe' solution that did not attempt to reduce the amount of 
waste generated. However, once decision-making was set in the adversarial 
mould, there was perceived to be a greater chance of defeating the incinerator 
proposal by concentrating on the health issue. Consequently, not only was a 
legitimate political demand lost sight of, but the possibility of alternatives to 
incineration was left out of consideration. Finally, as more science is brought to 
bear on the justification of each side of a dichotomous choice, the sunk costs 
make it difficult to change tack to new alternatives (Ozawa, 1991:37-39).
2.5.4 Positivist Approaches
Waste management policy can be theorised as the adoption of a particular 
policy by a government, with the act of adoption being related to a series of 
independent causal mechanisms. Feiock and West (1993) used this approach in 
a regression analysis of the adoption of recycling programs in USA cities. 
Feiock and West reviewed the local policy adoption and urban politics 
literature and concluded that the various influences on local policy adoption 
that had been identified to that time could be condensed into distinct
groupings.
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• The need/responsive policy making model posits that the adoption of 
local policies is simply in response to an 'objective need' (p.400) for the 
policy.
• The diffusion of innovations model depends on the concept that some 
local governments are intrinsically more or less innovative that others.
• The political institutions model assumes that factors such as electoral 
competition between political parties, electoral arrangements, 
relationship between elected councillors and management, and 
executive leadership are important in determining the adoption of 
policies by local government.
• The Federalism model places its emphasis on the hierarchical 
arrangement of Federal, State and local government, positing that 
actions by the first two, such as coercion, provision of incentives, and 
technical assistance have a strong influence on the policies adopted by 
the third.
• The economic model posits that fiscal capacity is the pre-eminent factor 
influencing the adoption of policies by local government.
• The interest group model sees the mobilisation of interest groups as an 
important influence on policy.
• Administrative capacity determines the extent to which local 
government has the expertise to undertake the information gathering 
and assessment of policy options necessary for the introduction of new 
policies.
Feiock and West operationalised each of these explanatory concepts into 
numerical indicators. Values for these were obtained from secondary sources 
and mail survey for 818 USA cities and a series of probit models used to assess 
the importance of the various explanatory concepts in predicting the incidence 
of adoption of kerbside recycling in the cities. The models provided the 
greatest support for explanations of policy adoption based on response to need, 
electoral competition by political parties, fiscal capacity and interest group 
organisation.
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2.5.5 Concluding Comments
Even the most casual comparison of the existing studies of the evolution of 
waste management policy discussed above with the body of theory that has 
developed to explain public policy-making in general, and environmental 
policy-making in particular, would suggest that there remain many unexplored 
avenues — a conclusion also reached by Gandy and Melosi in their studies 
reviewed above.
As modem waste management policy-making revolves around a number of 
environmental aspects, it might be argued that the first place to start in 
expanding the range of theory brought to bear on waste management policy 
would be with theories of environmental policy-making. However, it might be 
expected at the outset that these theories may have some difficulty explaining 
all waste policy-making, because they tend to have their origins in the events of 
the latter half of the 20th century, whereas waste policies were being debated 
long before the advent of modem environmental concerns. This suggests that a 
focus on theoretical aspects of waste policy-making might also be of value in 
testing the applicability of theories about environmental policy-making in a 
policy domain which may have received less attention than domains such as 
nuclear power or nature conservation.
2.6 Theories of Environmental Policy-Making
While it is common to regard the late 1960s as the time when environmental 
issues first became a permanent and substantial presence on political agendas, 
and so the time from which environmental policy-making became a serious 
preoccupation of government, a range of public policy-making about issues that 
would now be regarded as environmental issues was occurring well before the 
1960s. For example, in the United States, Federal legislation concerned with 
forest preservation was passed in 1891, national park management in 1916, oil 
pollution control in 1924 and water pollution control in 1948 and 1956 (Costain 
and Lester, 1995:29). In Australia, the first part of the Royal National Park 
south of Sydney was reserved in 1879, and the Queensland and Tasmanian 
Governments introduced legislation for the creation of National Parks in 1906 
and 1915, respectively (Fisher, 1993:14-15).
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Prior to the 1970s, very little, if any, of the environmental policy-making of the 
time was singled out for study as a separate area of public policy-making 
(Lester, 1995:2). However, with the upsurge in the late 1960s of popular, media 
and political interest in environmental issues, and the subsequent institutional 
change, environmental policy-making became visible as a topic of study, not 
only by those with in interest in public policy-making, such as sociologists and 
political scientists, but also by environmental scientists provoked by their 
perceptions of the urgency of the problem to criticise existing institutions and 
propose remedial policy prescriptions (see, for example, Odum, 1971). For the 
latter group perhaps, there was little concern over the question of whether the 
environmental issues of the late 20th century are so different from any issues of 
an environmental nature in earlier times, or are so different from other issues 
that are the subject of public policy-making, that the existing body of 
knowledge about public policy-making can be ignored.
For social and political scientists, however, this is a question of some 
importance. If it is believed that modem environmental problems are no more 
than slightly larger versions of the sorts of impacts that humanity has always 
had upon the environment, then one will have confidence that the existing 
corpus of theory will be able to be fruitfully applied to environmental 
problems. For example, environmental economists perceived environmental 
issues to be no more than problems of scarcity of environmental quality and 
moved quickly to apply the understandings of neo-classical economics about 
scarcity and markets. This gave rise to an environmental policy literature, a 
small part of which is concerned with waste problems, as described briefly in 
section 2.3 above.
It also can be argued, as do Doyle and Kellow (1995:52-53, 271-272), that the 
fundamental questions that lie at the core of environmental issues are no 
different to questions that have long been the concern of political ideologies, 
such as the extent to which the state should use its powers of coercion to limit 
individual behaviour, or matters of distributive justice. They find support for 
this view from Walker (1989:25), as well as pointing out that environmentalism 
can be seen as part of broader critiques of technology. However, they also refer 
to Paehlke's (1989) view that environmentalism is distinctive in its focus on 
technological choices, and the criteria for assessing these choices and their 
unintended consequences.
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For multi-paradigm disciplines in the social sciences, there are likely to be 
disputes as to which paradigm can best explain what is occurring as societies 
respond to the emergence of environmental issues. For this reason, some 
extensions of existing theory to environmental matters could be viewed, at least 
in part, as paradigmatic ambit claims — Dickens (1992), for example, as a claim 
for critical realism or neo-Marxism, or Hannigan (1995) for social 
constructionism, or Lester (1995) for logical positivist political science. Others 
have perhaps been more selective, seeking to demonstrate through empirical 
enquiry the utility of specific theories or methodologies rather than complete 
paradigms. Hajer's (1995) extension of the discourse analytic and 
argumentative traditions of Foucalt, Harre and Billig to acid rain policy 
evolution in the UK and the Netherlands and Williams and Matheny's (1995) 
study of hazardous waste regulation with its postmodernist underpinnings 
could be taken as examples this approach.
It might be held, however, that modern environmental problems are 
fundamentally different from those of the past and signal a discontinuity in the 
progress of modernisation and industrialisation. In this case, there will be 
doubts as to whether existing theory, itself a product of modernisation and 
industrialisation, can engage at all with modern environmental issues, let alone 
provide useful insights. This latter belief was, of course, central to the rallying 
calls for the ecologising of sociology and sociologists that occurred in the 1980s 
(see, for example, Dunlap and Catton, 1980). A similar argument has also been 
put by Dror (1986:2) that policy science had its origins during the post-war 
period of prolonged economic prosperity, so that inadequate attention had been 
paid to policy making under the adverse conditions of the late 20th century.
Others, rather than attacking existing theory head-on at the outset, arrive at the 
point of being able to set much of existing theory aside through a quasi- 
grounded theory approach, combined in some instances with the importation 
of quite specific theoretical perspectives from novel disciplinary directions. 
Luhmann's (1989) account of self-referential systems of communication and its 
debt to neurophysiologist Maturana's concept of autopoiesis (Maturana and 
Varela, 1980) is an example of this approach.
In the following review of theories of environmental policy-making, the 
departure point is the logical positivist accounts of environmental policy 
making that see policy output as a dependent variable whose behaviour can be 
accounted for by a range of explanatory independent variables. These largely
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ahistorical explanatory factors provide, as it were, a map of the terrain which 
displays the main features that are relevant to an understanding of 
environmental policy making. From this sketch map, it is then possible to move 
to more historical and process-oriented accounts that may be relevant in 
improving the understanding of solid waste policy making.
2.6.1 Influences on Environmental Policy Making
The review in appendix B2.6.1 is a simple description of the various influences 
on the formation and implementation of environmental policy that have been 
described in the environmental policy literature. Such influences include: the 
diffusion of ideas from other policy domains, the constraints imposed by 
political ideology, the nature of the distribution of responsibility between 
various levels of government and the relations between those levels, 
environmental groups, environmental innovation by firms, the political party in 
government, the electoral system, the nature of the state agencies charged with 
implementing policy, the media and public opinion. Many of these were 
relevant to the features of waste management policy summarised from existing 
studies in the dot points in section 2.4, above. One important exception was the 
role of bureaucracies which has been extensively studied in relation to 
environmental policy but not, it seems, in relation to waste policy.
2.6.2 Theories of Evolution in Environmental Policy Making
The review in the first part of appendix B2.6.2 examines some of the theories of 
long term change in other areas of public policy that might be applicable to 
environmental policy-making. It appears that the variation over time in the 
USA in public concern over, and political attention to, environmental issues is 
not particularly well explained by either the theories that find some support in 
other domains of public policy making, or by theories relating to the emergence 
and disappearance of social problems. Costain and Lester (1995:34-35) suggest 
that, in contrast to these other domains, environmental policy making has been 
characterised by: an increasing penetration of environmental concerns into 
many of the institutions of society (the 'institutionalised environmental 
movement' of Morrison, 1986, or the 'institutionalisation of environmental 
concern' of Langton, 1984); by substantial change in how environmental 
problems are framed, evaluated and responded to; by increasingly favourable
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public opinion (which experiences periods of decline, but never declines to the 
level prior to an upsurge in support); and by growing involvement in 
environmental management of grassroots organisations and of levels of 
governance below the national level.
Ecological modernisation
The change in how environmental problems are framed, evaluated and 
responded to is central to the concept of ecological modernisation. Ecological 
modernisation was mentioned in the first part of appendix B2.6.1 as a source of 
ideas in particular domains of environmental policy making. However, as a 
theory of social change (see, for example, the account by Spaargaren and Mol, 
1992, which draws on Huber, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1991), it is also relevant to the 
task of understanding change in environmental policy over time. Ecological 
modernisation is seen as the third of three phases in the history of 
industrialisation:
• the industrial breakthrough,
• the development of industrial society, and
• the ecological switchover.
Central to this last phase in Huber's view is the emergence of new clean 
production technologies (such as micro-electronics, biotechnology and new 
materials) and the placing of monetary values on nature. Spaargaren and Mol 
argued that, with ecological modernisation, environmental policy making 
changes its emphasis from end-of-pipe solutions to preventative measures. The 
tools of ecological modernist environmental policy are such things as 
environmental auditing, clean production, life cycle analysis and energy and 
materials efficiency, compared to regulation and emission standard setting that 
dominated environmental policy in the 1970s. Spaargaren and Mol also claim 
that, at least in the Netherlands, ecological modernisation is characterised by a 
shift by the environmental movement away from its idealist anti-industrial 
stance towards a more pragmatic accommodation with industry.
It is worth noting that ecological modernisation, while often regarded as a 
feature of the late 20th century, is not without its historical antecedents. The 
president of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Samuel P. Sadtler, in 
an address to the Institute in 1909 elaborated on some of Frederick Taylor's
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ideas about scientific management, arguing that resource development passed 
through three stages, discovery, wasteful exploitation and the conservation 
stage which society was then moving into. This stage was dependent on the 
expertise of chemical engineers who, by improving the efficiency of production 
processes could both conserve resources and recover valuable byproducts for 
industry (Raufer, 1998:93-94).
Modem environmental problems can be categorised according to their position 
along the flow of materials and energy that starts with resource extraction, 
moves on to resource processing, manufacture of finished goods, the marketing 
of these goods, their use and eventual discarding, the accumulation of such 
discarded materials as waste and the diffusion of at least some of the substances 
in waste back into local, regional and global biogeochemical cycles. With such a 
concept of the materials and energy basis of the economy, it is possible to 
distinguish between upstream problems, such as the environmental impacts of 
mining, and downstream problems, such as the environmental effects of 
landfills. In a broad sense, ecological modernist environmental policy attempts 
to solve environmental problems by shifting the focus of policy further 
upstream. For example, techniques such as environmental auditing and life 
cycle analysis attempt to make changes in production processes to avoid 
environmental impacts further downstream when products are used and 
disposed of.
However, Wynne (1992:117-118) argued that the further that the policy focus is 
shifted upstream, the greater the degree of difficulty in predicting what the 
ultimate environmental outcomes of policy options will be. This is because 
with an upstream focus, there is a greater involvement of essentially 
indeterminate social factors. For example, the control of leaching from landfills 
with liners and impermeable caps has a reasonably predictable effect on the 
environmental impact of the landfill. Social factors are largely irrelevant to the 
performance of these remedial measures. But if the effort in improving landfill 
performance was shifted to, say, encouraging consumers to reject excessively 
packaged goods, the ultimate environmental effect of this is essentially 
indeterminate. Firms who felt their interests threatened by public awareness 
campaigns about excessive packaging might respond by developing packaging 
with a specific re-use function, or they might decide that placing pressure on 
government by threatening job losses might be a more successful strategy. 
Consumers might see the publicity as unwelcome government intrusion into 
freedom of consumer choice and register their disapproval by responding in the
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opposite way intended. Each of these events could have impacts on the waste 
stream that are quite different in their timing, volume and ultimate 
environmental impact. The actions of the actors involved cannot be determined 
in advance and, consequently, prediction of the environmental outcomes is not 
just uncertain, but impossible. Even if all environmental impacts could be 
determined, there still remains, as Ackerman (1997) has documented in great 
detail for packaging choices, the problem of non-comparability, i.e. the 
impossibility of comparing various expressions of environmental impact, such 
as amount of carbon dioxide emissions, or of hazardous substances, in a single 
physical metric.
Risk and reflexive modernisation
Wynne's arguments have much in common with those of the 'risk society' 
theorists, such as Ulrich Beck and, more recently, Anthony Giddens. The 
theory of the risk society (if it has sufficiently matured to be labelled as such) 
applied to the question of the evolution of environmental policy, would point to 
two important trends as possible foundations for explanation. Firstly, it posits 
there has been a shift in the types of risks that are the preoccupation of 
government and politics, from securing the populace against the unpreventable 
risks of nature (such as floods, droughts and storms — termed external risks by 
Giddens, 1998:27) to the attempted prevention of the 'manufactured risks' that 
are inevitable in a modern technological society (Beck, 1998:12; Giddens, 
1998:28). Some care needs to be taken in this distinction, especially if it is to be 
symbolised as 'the end of nature' (see, for example, Beck, 1998:10; Giddens,
1998, 26), in which there is no longer an external nature unaffected by human 
action. Regardless of whether nature is in an original state, or some 
anthropogenically altered state, it is still nature that is responsible for 
conveying the harms of modern industry from their point of production to the 
individual who suffers the consequences (for example, the transport of toxic 
chemicals in groundwater or the transport of organochlorines from equatorial 
to polar regions by global atmospheric circulation). This involves the 
exceedance of thresholds of environmental assimilative capacity — at some 
point as volume of emissions of pollutants increases, the processes of nature 
switch from being insulators or buffers between the producers of pollutants and 
the rest of society, to being conveyors of harm (Reeve, 1998). Nature is as 
important in external risk as it is in manufactured risk. Furthermore, in 
modernity, nature continues to wreak havoc through floods, droughts and
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storms — indeed, there are suggestions that global climate change is increasing 
the magnitude and frequency of these events. If this is so, then it is not so much 
that state endeavours to protect the populace from risk are switching from 
external to manufactured risks. Rather, the external risks are becoming 
manufactured risks. In addition, as alluded to above, Douglas's (1966) account 
of perceptions of danger in traditional societies shows that disease and disasters 
are frequently attributed to transgressions by individuals of the moral and civic 
order — making such dangers in every sense manufactured risks, but by social 
behaviour rather than by technological behaviour. This suggests that 
characterisations of the risk society as 'the end of nature' and as a transition in 
the attentions of the state from external to manufactured risk may be 
attempting to pack too much into the one transition. It may be more useful to 
think in terms of two transitions.
In the first transition, a traditional risk society where all risks were 
manufactured by transgressions of the moral and civic order required by 
religious beliefs, was replaced by a post-Enlightenment, pre-modern society 
where, with the aid of Baconian science, a subset of risks were separated out as 
being external, and unavoidable but perhaps calculable. In this early industrial 
world, external risks could be insured against, and the natural processes that 
provided the insulation and buffering between the technological and industrial 
activities of individuals were, unbeknownst to the state, relieving it of a 
considerable burden of coordinating and political effort.
The second transition has brought a return to another sort of risk society, a late 
industrial risk society, where most of the risks are manufactured by progress 
and modernity itself, through outstripping the insulating and buffering 
capacities of natural processes. As these processes begin to transmit harm 
between individuals, the burden of coordinating and political effort falls on the 
state. These natural processes become a focus of political attention — as have 
the transport of pollutants in water and the atmosphere, the chemistry of the 
ozone layer, and global atmospheric processes. As noted in the 1992(a):82 
translation of Beck's 1986 account of the risk society 'nature has become 
political' (emphasis in original). The greater ability of manufactured risks to 
sensitise people to the failure of the state, compared to the risks of natural 
disasters, is well documented for toxic waste problems (see, for example the 
discussion of Brown and Mikkelsen, 1997:110-124).
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The second trend that defines the risk society is the growing criticism of 
progress and science. In reflexive modernisation, progress is about 
questioning, anticipating and responding to the unintended ills of progress, 
while the methods of science are turned to the criticism of science itself (Beck, 
1992(a):155-182). The more science that is brought to the task of anticipating the 
consequences of scientific and technological progress, the more uncertain the 
future appears, and the more threadbare the cloak of scientific reassurance for 
the politician seeking to legitimate policy decisions. As Giddens (1998:29) 
observes, the politician of the risk society faces a no-win situation. Careful 
precautions that turn out to be unnecessary expose the politician to accusations 
of scaremongering. Failure to take precautions that are later found to have been 
necessary open the way for accusations of covering-up. The politics of the risk 
society brings morality, distrust of authority and science, and the social 
construction of hazards to certain domains of policy making that formerly 
occurred in a climate of ostensible objectivity and trust in authority and science. 
This is nowhere better seen that in the politics of toxic waste management. In 
what seems almost as a sketch of the contours of the risk society, but written a 
year prior to Beck's seminal account of it, Vyner (1985) observed:
Toxic waste directly assails several fundamental social beliefs: that humans 
have dominion over nature; that personal control over one's destiny is possible; 
that technology and science are forces of progress only; that risks necessary for 
the good life are acceptable; that people get what they deserve; that experts know 
best; that the market is self-regulating; that one's home is one's castle; that 
people have the right to do what they wish on their own property; and that 
governments exist to help.
(Vyner, 1985:11-12, 
cited by Brown and Mikkelsen, 1997:59)
From the perspective of the theory of the risk society, it might be expected 
environmental policy making over time will show, at least in domains where 
risks are important, more attention to anticipatory policy, increasing distrust in 
authority and scientific expertise by those affected by policies and increasing 
attention to moral issues in political discourse.
The views of Wynne and the risk society theorists on the one hand and the 
ecological modernist school on the other provide conflicting perspectives on the 
likely outcome of evolution of environmental policy towards more anticipative 
and preventative approaches. It could be inferred from the former that such 
change in environmental policy might lead to more contested, confused and 
politicised policy making due to the inability of scientific analysis to provide 
clear indications on the merits of particular policy options. Such conditions
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might also be expected to lead to delays in the formation of policy and so the 
exacerbation of environmental problems. From the ecological modernist 
perspective, the change in policy focus should lead to more expeditious 
formation of policy, due to the wider appeal of preventative solutions.
Lack of change over longer time periods
The review in the second half of appendix B2.6.2 deals with theories of lack of 
change in environmental policy making. The theme that emerges here from a 
number of authors is that industry power and conservative governments, both 
separately and in concert, have played an important role in thwarting the 
changes in environmental policy that other groups regard as necessary to 
protect the environment. Of course, there are exceptions, political awareness of 
pro-change public opinion, for example, being an important factor that has 
resulted in environmental policy-making against the perceived interests of 
business and industry.
2.6.3 Theories of Process in Environmental Policy Making
Theories of process in environmental policy making also focus on the time 
dimension, but on the sequence of steps that leads to policy formation, rather 
than changes in the nature of policy over time. The first three subsections in 
appendix B2.6.3 would probably be more aptly described as observations about 
environmental policy-making processes. These include the observation that 
policy makers often attempt to transform environmental conflicts into technical 
assessment procedures to avoid the irreconcilabilities of economic and 
ecological logics; that governments set targets on particular environmental 
indicators in the absence of a clear understanding as to whether the targets are 
feasible, for the purpose of signalling to industry the seriousness of the 
government's intent; and that when faced with difficult environmental issues, 
governments engage in electorally soothing symbolic actions such as public 
inquiries, information campaigns or creating new agencies
The remaining subsections in appendix B2.6.3 deal with more comprehensive 
accounts, all of which acknowledge that the various actors involved in 
environmental policy have their own constructions of social and environmental 
reality. These studies show the critical importance of discourse, both in the
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how particular situations come to be seen as environmental problems, in what 
counts as solutions, and in the politics leading to policy responses. Existing 
institutions, broadly defined, are also of great importance in shaping what 
forms of knowledge and problem framings are brought to policy discourse, and 
in shaping the opportunities for the strategic positioning, argumentation, 
negotiation and compromise that are necessary in bringing some sort of closure 
that can lead to policy responses. Some authors, such as Rushefsky (1995) and 
Papadakis (1996) place emphasis on a sequence of steps between problem 
perception and policy formation. For Hajer (1995), it is not so much the 
sequence of steps as the evolution of the policy story line that is important in 
explaining policy formation.
A theme connecting a number of the studies reviewed, is the role of 
simplifications in various forms, from story-lines, to generative metaphors, to 
binary codes. The complexities of modern environmental problems, and their 
location within structurally dependent webs of interests that can be conflicting 
or reinforcing makes some form of simplification inevitable if such problems 
are to be dealt with politically. However, what is not so clear, is whether such 
simplification obstructs or facilitates policy response to environmental 
problems. From Luhmann's (1989) perspective, the binary codes and self- 
referential discourse of societal subsystems can hinder society's response to 
environmental problems. Similarly, Williams and Matheny (1995) attribute the 
policy paralysis over hazardous waste facility siting to the incompatibilities of 
the managerial, pluralist and communitarian discourses associated with 
particular groups of actors with interests in the siting outcome. On the other 
hand, Hajer and Schön and Rein draw attention to the facilitatory role of 
normative dualisms and generative metaphors as problems move from their 
initial description in lay and local administrative discourses towards discursive 
closure in higher level political discourses. In this respect, Papadakis (1996) 
emphasises the importance of constructive dialogue, and the institutions that 
make such dialogue possible.
2.7 Some Relevant Insights from the Public Policy Literature
The final part of the literature review in appendix B2.7 draws attention to the 
relevance to environmental policy-making of some well known models of 
public policy-making that can serve as ideal types that may characterise policy­
making at particular times or in particular locations. However, it would appear
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that there are equally many times and places when policy making cannot be 
explained in terms of the these well known models of public policy making, 
and environmental policy making is no different in this respect. While 
Kingdon's streams and windows model has a richer time dimensionality that is 
attractive to an historical study of policy formation, but lacking from rational- 
comprehensive, incremental and garbage can models, it also has its 
shortcomings. Perhaps its greatest strength is its attention to what others might 
pass off as mere contingent events.
2.8 Research Questions
A number of conclusions have been drawn from the literature review.
Firstly, it is asserted that neither the social science literature nor the technical 
and economic literature on waste management provide a comprehensive and 
cohesive theoretical framework for the understanding of the evolution of waste 
policy. Walker (1992:251-252) drew a similar conclusion for environmental 
policy after reviewing a number of case studies in this area. While it might be 
held that such a framework is an impossible ideal, this is not to say that some 
progress towards such an ideal might be both possible and an improvement on 
the present situation.
Secondly, the broad empirical features of the formation of waste policy, both on 
long and short time scales have been adequately described and these share 
some features with environmental policy generally. There appears to have 
been, however, no studies undertaken of the formation of waste policy over 
time in a large Australian dty.
Thirdly, theoretically oriented studies of the evolution of waste policy are 
relatively rare, and none have paid much attention to the social construction of 
waste policy problems, despite some evidence from the work of Douglas and 
others that there may be potential in such an approach. Support for optimism 
about this potential comes from a number of studies of the evolution of 
environmental policy that have asserted that considerable explanatory power is 
to be found in analysis of policy discourses.
Fourthly, theories of change in environmental policy-making, with a few 
exceptions such as Downs' issue-attention cycle, tend to be prisoners of their
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own origins in the rise of modern environmentalism in the late 20th century. 
Consequently change is viewed as linear — from the industrial modernity to 
reflexive modernity as seen by the risk theorists, or from industrial modernity 
to ecological modernity as seen by the ecological modernists. The possibility of 
a degree of cyclicity appears not to have been entertained. Similarly 
constructionist studies of a particular environmental problem, such as add rain 
or hazardous waste, tend to focus on the problem identification and policy 
response phase and leave unattended subsequent implementation, its 
shortcomings and the emergence of new problems that continue the evolution 
of policy. This is not to say that the approaches taken cannot be applied over 
the longer time periods spanning several cycles, if such cycles exist, rather that 
the approach has not been tried.
Waste issues, because they have had an existence long before modem 
environmental issues, should be a fruitful testing ground for extending the 
theories of environmental policy-making that have arisen in the last 30 years of 
the 20th century. Furthermore, waste management in Sydney during the 20th 
century, with its periods of crisis, with the distribution of waste management 
responsibility between local government and State Government and with all the 
dynamics of late 20th century risk politics appears to have the diversity of 
policy-making conditions that afford a reasonable potential for comparison 
across time periods, as well as a reasonable potential for the generalisability of 
any findings to other large modern cities.
The question that this thesis sets out to answer is whether the formation and 
evolution of public policy for the management of solid waste in the city of 
Sydney in the period 1900-1996 was affected by changes in the understanding 
among the general populace of waste substances and waste places and, if so, in 
what way.
There are, however, in addition to this question, a number of supplementary 
research questions which would allow for a fuller account of the formation and 
evolution of waste management policy. These questions include:
• whether waste policy making may sometimes be a form of moral panic 
over deviant matter,
• whether the various dualisms, binary codes and story lines that occur in 
waste policy discourse have a role in problem closure, policy formation 
and policy paralysis,
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• how realist and structuralist accounts of waste policy formation and 
evolution might relate to each other, and
• whether Beckian and ecological modernist theories of long term change in 
environmental policy making are supported by the history of waste 
management in Sydney.
Because there was no reasonably comprehensive account of the history of waste 
management in Sydney, it was difficult to determine in advance the specific 
aspects of this history needed in the study of waste policy evolution. 
Consequently, it was anticipated that the compilation of the history of waste 
management in Sydney could well provide insights into the importance or 
otherwise to waste management policy making of the range of influences on 
environmental policy making that have been proposed in the past. In addition, 
it was anticipated that the compilation of the history of waste management 
could also lead via inductive reasoning to conjectures about explanations for 
waste management policy formation that lay outside the questions posed 
above.
3 METHODOLOGY
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3.1 Overview of Methodology
The aims set for the study in section 1.2 span the full range from micro-level 
social processes, such as the meanings of waste for individuals, through to 
macro-level processes, such as ecological modernisation. Both levels of 
concepts could potentially be operationalised as quantitative variables, e.g. the 
proportion of a sample of the population of Sydney agreeing with a particular 
statement in a survey, or the proportion of environmental legislation with a 
preventative approach, measured in pages on the statute books. Both levels of 
concepts also have the potential to be examined qualitatively. Further, the 
literature review itself demonstrates that the study of waste management can be 
undertaken in any one of a number of social science traditions from, for 
example, the constructionist and ethnographical approach of Douglas (1966) 
through to the logical positivist approach of Feiock and West (1993). The 
approach that has been taken in this study is one of methodological 
pragmatism, which avoids turning a particular research topic into a re-run of 
the age-old inter-paradigmatic battles of the social sciences. Rather, as Crump 
(1995) has argued for educational research, the methodological pragmatist uses 
the research methods of any of the paradigms where circumstances would 
recommend it, being aware of the strengths and weakness of each, and 
avoiding distraction by the irreconcilability of the philosophical underpinnings.
If it was necessary to attach a convenient methodological label to this study, it 
would be historical-comparative research. Of the list of characteristics given by 
Neuman (1997:388-392), there are a number that are similar to the approach 
taken here:
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• use of a diverse array of sources of its data, from both the micro-level 
and the macro-level,
• a focus on time and process,
• data is limited by what has survived from the past,
• the approach to causality is more contingent than determinist, and
• generalisations are inferred from the comparison of action in different 
contexts
Before proceeding to a description of the sources used in the study, it is 
necessary to clarify the meaning of the terms 'primary' and 'secondary'. The 
following discussion is drawn from Neuman (1997) and Potter and Wetherell 
(1987).
The terms 'primary' and 'secondary' refer to different types of sources in 
different research traditions. Within the logical positivist tradition in sociology, 
for example, primary sources of data are those created by the researcher 
through surveys, interviews, observations of behaviour and so on. Data drawn 
from printed sources, such as newspapers or works by other researchers is 
regarded as secondary data. Within this tradition primary data is valued 
because it can be ’objectively’ measured by the researcher and is closer to the 
’reality’ that the researcher wishes to study.
For similar reasons, historical research places greater value on primary sources, 
but in this tradition, newspapers, letters, government documents etc count as 
primary sources, while accounts by other historians are secondary sources.
The historical-comparative research tradition draws a similar distinction 
between primary and secondary sources. However, within this tradition, it is 
acceptable for research to be based on a mixture of primary and secondary 
sources. It is recognised that, given the need to cover broad areas of study 
across long periods of time, it is efficient to use accounts by historians as 
empirical sources, rather than locate and revisit the original primary sources 
used by those historians.
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To a significant extent in the social constructionist tradition, and particularly in 
the discourse analytic tradition, there is almost no distinction between primary 
and secondary sources. Texts are the empirical sources that are studied, and 
little distinction is drawn between texts in naturalistic records, such as 
newspapers, Hansard, or books by researchers, and texts generated by the 
researchers own interactions with others, such as transcripts of interviews or of 
focus groups. Indeed, greater value can be placed on naturalistic records 
because there is no opportunity for these sources to be affected by interaction 
with the researcher, whereas the text derived from interviews can be so 
affected.
The historical account of waste management in Sydney depends on what 
historians would regard as secondary sources (for example, MWDA annual 
reports, books by other researchers on the environmental and local government 
history), as well as upon primary sources (newspapers, Hansard). For that part 
of the thesis that deals with the influence of the social construction of waste on 
solid waste management policy, these same sources would all be regarded a 
primary sources. The only possible secondary sources for this part of the 
research would be other constructionist accounts of the influence of the social 
construction of waste on the evolution of solid waste management policy in 
Sydney. As chapter 2 concludes, there have not been any studies of this nature 
to date. However, for the parts of the thesis that take a realist approach to the 
influences on waste management policy, most of the sources used would be 
regarded as secondary sources. Only the focus groups and interviews would be 
regarded as primary sources.
Given that the study aimed to cover just under one hundred years of waste 
management in Sydney, ease of use of documentary sources was an important 
consideration. Large unsorted collections of primary documents, such as are 
held by the New South Wales State Archives and some local governments in 
Sydney, are a formidable barrier to research that is concerned with more than a 
few years and that has to be completed in a relatively short period. In addition, 
the former source, because of the 30 year rule, was not available for government 
documents dated after 1969, which is the period when the most institutional 
change took place in waste management in Sydney.
Ease of access is also an issue for newspapers as documentary sources in 
research on a topic that is likely to be reported only occasionally. The Sydney 
Morning Herald (SMH or the Herald), for example, carried of the order of 500 000
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pages of news articles over the duration of the 20th century. Assuming these 
pages were scanned on weekdays over a two-year period, the researcher would 
need to scan 1000 pages each day to cover the 20th century. For this reason, 
documentary sources that are furnished with a comprehensive index have to be 
favoured.
For these reasons, the study is based largely on a number of documentary 
sources that were readily accessible, and/or well indexed. These were the 
Sydney Morning Herald, a daily newspaper with a wide circulation and generally 
regarded as conservative in its reporting, Hansard for the New South Wales 
Parliament and the annual reports of the Department of Health, the Department 
of Local Government, the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority (MWDA), its 
successor the Waste Management Authority (WMA) and its successor the 
Waste Recycling and Processing Service (WRAPS or the Waste Service). Other 
documentary sources included government policy documents, reports from 
government inquiries and articles by Sydney waste management professionals 
at conferences held in Sydney. A range of books and articles on the history of 
Sydney that contained reference to waste management were also drawn upon.
With a reliance on the sorts of public documents described above, historical 
policy studies are susceptible to the critique of the critical realist who argues 
that little explanation will be found in the public record — that the real reasons 
for policy action should be sought among the secret deals in back rooms, the 
webs of political intrigue, hidden agendas, vested interest and personality 
politics. There are two responses to this argument. The first is that to abandon 
historical policy research for this reason may amount to throwing the 
explanatory baby out with the methodological bathwater. If the public record 
is interpreted with care, having in mind at all times that there always be more 
to it than meets the eye, then it may be possible to form some tentative 
explanations for further testing, which could be considered preferable to no 
explanations at all. The processes of internal and external criticism of 
individual documents (see, for example, Neuman, 1997:401-402) take this 
approach.
The second response is to argue that, for the longer time periods of interest to a 
historical study, devious manoeuvring out of sight of public view by those with 
an interest in policy outcomes, operates at a different level to the processes for 
which explanation is sought. As Hajer (1995:59) and Schön and Rein (1994:27- 
29) argue, those doing the deals in the back rooms still have to understand their
[71]
interests within the problem framings of the time. What is of interest is not 
how the deals are being done, but why the problem framings within which they 
are done might be different at one time to another.
A practical response to the critical realist's critique is of course, when policy 
research does not involve the too distant past, to complement the public record 
by recourse to the actors involved in the events of interest, to elicit their 
recollections of these events, their feelings about them and their interpretations 
of the meaning of the events. However, from the constructionist viewpoint, 
such sources may be inferior to documentary records from the past, because of 
the individual's tendency to re-frame their recollection of past events in terms 
of the current frames through which such events are understood.
The study did, however, gather some validatory and supplementary data from 
individuals, by undertaking three focus groups and a number of telephone 
interviews with key informants associated with waste policy in Sydney. The 
main aim of the focus groups was to assess the validity of a number of 
inferences that been drawn from the literature reviewed in section 2.2.2 and 
2.2.3, and from the study of the media reporting (in particular that in sections 
8.1-8.7). It was expected that the focus groups would also supplement the 
information obtained from media reporting. The main aim of the key informant 
interviews was to obtain additional information about key events that were 
insufficiently described by historical sources, and to compare my 
interpretations of what lay behind some of these events with the recollections of 
the informant.
Further details of each of the methods used are described in the following 
sections.
3.2 Media Analysis
The index to articles in the Sydney Morning Herald takes several forms — 
starting with quarterly volumes listing articles by subject and prepared by the 
newspaper itself from January 1930 to 30 September 1961. From 1 October 1961 
to 31 December 1978, the index comprises a series of physical index cards, one 
per article, prepared by the staff of the New South Wales State Library and 
transferred photographically to microfiche. A second set of microfiche covers 
similar index cards for the period 1 January 1979 to 31 December 1987. From
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1988, SMH articles are referenced in a database called the Infoquick Service 
with a World Wide Web interface located at (on 31.5.2000):
http: / / www.slnsw.gov.au/ infoquick/welcome.htm
This database is searchable by subject and returns listings of SMH articles, 
including the headline, date and page number. Infoquick also references the 
Sun Herald and Good Weekend for the same period.
There are some differences between the index volumes, the microfiche index 
cards, and the Infoquick database. Most notably, the index volumes appear to 
reference all letters to the editor and editorials. The first microfiche referenced 
some letters to the editor and editorials. The second microfiche and the 
Infoquick database do not reference letters. Also, as described below, there are 
considerable differences in the arrangement of subject headings across the all 
the indexes. For these reasons, letters to the editor were excluded from 
numerical analyses.
An Excel 4 database of SMH articles relating to solid waste management was 
compiled for the period 1 January 1930 to 18 September 1997. The database 
fields included, reference index identifier, subject heading in reference index, 
date of article, page number of article, type of article (article, letter to editor, 
editorial), journalist's name where given, and the description of the article 
provided by the index. The search strategy used varied according to the type 
and date of index. Prior to the 1950s, all articles about solid waste issues 
appeared under the subject heading of 'Local Government'. During the 1950s, 
the range of subject headings proliferated, and the rise of modern 
environmentalism in the late 1960s resulted in a new series of subject headings 
under which solid waste issues might be described.
For indexes prior to 1950, the search was limited to the 'Local Government' and 
subsidiary subject headings. For 1950 to 1961, the search was conducted under 
the following subject headings: 'cancer, cancer causes, chemical, factory, 
garbage, garbage disposal, garbage dumps, incinerator, industry, labour- 
garbage collectors, labour-municipal employees, local government, parks and 
reserves, plastic, plastics industry, poisons, rubbish tips, Sydney City Council'.
For 1961 to 1978, the search was conducted under the previous subject 
headings, together with: 'Australian Industry Council for Environmental
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Quality, Australian Environment Council, bottles, chemicals industry, Earth 
Day, Earth Week, ecology, Ecology Action, Environment 73, environmental 
policy, factory and trade waste, Friends of the Earth, Inspect Clubs, Keep 
Australia Beautiful, litter, Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority, NSW 
Department of Environment Control, NSW Department of Planning and 
Environment, pollution, Protect Your Environment Clubs, refuse, refuse 
disposal, Society for Social Responsibility in Science, soil pollution, Total 
Environment Centre, water pollution'.
For 1979 to 1987, the search was widened to include the following subject 
headings: 'carcinogens, chemicals-safety measures, Environmental Law 
Association, hazardous substances, NSW Land and Environment Court, NSW 
Parliament Statutes Clean Air Act, NSW State Pollution Control Commission, 
recycling (waste), salvage (waste), waste disposal sites'.
For articles after 1987, the interlinking of subject headings in the Infoquick data 
base meant that a search on the terms: 'cancer, packaging, recycling, toxic, 
waste' captured all the relevant articles.
The information from the index volumes and microfiche was entered into the 
Excel4 database by hand. The information from the returned search web pages 
at the Infoquick site was electronically pasted into Word 5 documents and 
saved as an ASCII text file. A program in Macintosh Chipmunk Basic was 
written to parse the text files and write only the details on SMH articles to a tab- 
delimited text file that could be read by Excel 4. A copy of the Basic program is 
provided in appendix Al.
The SMH articles in the Excel 4 database were assigned to subject categories by 
examination of the articles on microfilm. This enabled a number of simple plots 
of the frequency of articles in particular subject categories with time to be 
obtained.
The examination of media articles provided two types of information for the 
study. Firstly, the articles provided a record of events related to waste 
management in Sydney. Where the time, place and substance of events was 
also described in other sources, such as Hansard or government documents, 
comparison with the Herald accounts showed the factual reporting to be of 
generally good quality, as might be expected from the reputation of the 
newspaper as mentioned above.
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Secondly, media stories can provide an (admittedly imperfect) indication of 
how waste issues are understood by the public. One story in isolation may not 
be a good guide, but a whole series of articles over a period of time that frame a 
waste issue in a particular way can be a reasonable indication that many in the 
public will also see the issue in a similar way. As Hannigan (1995:47, 69) points 
out, particular accounts of environmental problems that have prolonged 
currency in the media tend to be cast in terms that resonate with widely held 
cultural concepts. The influence can also be in the opposite direction, as Bell 
(1994) found with misunderstandings of the relationship between the 
greenhouse effect and ozone depletion having spread from the media to the 
public.
3.3 Analysis of Hansard
Legislative debate and questions to Ministers in Hansard, for the period 
1930 to 1995 were examined in detail. As with the media analysis, the Hansard 
account can provide two sorts of information. Firstly, it provides basic 
information as to the progress of legislation through the Parliament, as well as 
information on events of concern that come to political notice and form the 
substance of questions to a Minister.
Secondly, and more importantly, it provides an account of how complex waste 
management issues are simplified for political communication, how the logic 
behind simplified codes and representations works and how the ideologies of 
political parties interact with this logic.
The indexes in Hansard, if followed over time, also provide a record of the rise 
and fall of public concern about particular issues. For example, concerns about 
pesticides in the 1960s were initially referenced under 'Agriculture' but in 1967, 
Hansard staff must have decided that a new term 'Chemicals' was preferable. 
As the number of questions in Parliament about hazardous chemicals and 
pesticides declined in 1990, the term was eventually dropped from the index. 
While a detailed numerical analysis would want to eliminate the biases of the 
indexers, the fact that the term appeared and disappeared is in itself an 
indication of the emergence and passing of concern.
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3.4 Analysis of MWDA Annual Reports
Any organisation with a requirement to provide annual reports faces a tension 
between the desirability of providing all the information that readers might 
wish to know and the costs of providing that information. Except for the first 
report in the organisation's existence, annual reports are always preceded by 
the previous year's report. For aspects that have not changed significantly 
between two years, or over several years, organisations can effect some 
economies by simply reproducing material from previous years. However, 
where significant changes have occurred, and these are known to the 
readership of the organisation's annual reports, the organisation will be 
compelled to report on these changes.
For these reasons, it is possible to develop an account of the significant events 
in the history of an organisation by examining its reports in historical sequence 
and identifying where novel content emerges from amongst the surrounding 
text carried over from previous years.
3.5 Narrative and Themes
With all of this material, the approach taken was to separate the information 
contained in these sources into that from which a simple narrative account of 
events in the waste management history of Sydney could be compiled, and that 
which appeared more directly relevant to the aims of the study. In both cases, 
notes were taken from the material, directly into word processor documents, 
from which the chapters following this one were prepared. As described in 
section 1.3.3, some of these chapters emphasised the course of events in the 
evolution of waste management policy in Sydney, and others dealt with 
particular themes of interest. While examining the source material, the names 
of people who had been extensively involved in the events being described 
were noted and enquiries made with government departments and other 
organisations to locate these people. Once a reasonably detailed account of the 
history of waste management had been prepared, and the areas in which there 
were shortcomings in the account were evident, preliminary contact to organise 
an interview was made with those people who had been located.
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3.6 Key Informant Interviews
The interviews with key informants were semi-structured, mostly following a 
pattern where initial questions were about specific events that would be 
familiar to the interviewee, and later questions were more directed to the 
interviewee's interpretation of events. The former questions generally related 
to aspects of the account from the source material that were unclear or 
conflicting. All interviews were introduced with an explanation of the nature of 
the study and an undertaking that the interviewees would remain anonymous. 
The backgrounds of the key informants are shown in table 3.1. Interviews with 
informants 1, 2, 4 and 7 were by telephone, that with informant 3 was face-to- 
face and the interviews with informants 5 and 6 were by email.
Table 3.1: B a c k g r o u n d s  o f k ey  in fo rm a n ts  in te r v ie w e d .
K ey
in form an t
n u m b er
K ey in fo r m a n t's  b a ck g ro u n d
1 O fficer  w ith in  the W aste  S ec tio n  o f the C o m m o n w e a lth  E n v iro n m en t P ro tec tio n  
A u th o r ity
2 S en ior  m a n a g er  w ith  an in d u str y -sp o n so r e d  litter  red u ctio n  o rg a n isa tio n
3 A c a d e m ic  w h o  h a d  b een  a m em b er  o f th e  T ech n ica l A d v iso r y  C o m m itte e  o f the  
SPC C  in  the 1970s
4 F orm er sen io r  m a n a g er  in  the W aste  S erv ice , W aste  M a n a g em e n t A u th o r ity  an d  
the M etro p o lita n  W aste D isp o sa l A u th o r ity
5 M em b er  o f an  e n v ir o n m en ta l g ro u p  in  S y d n e y  w h o  p la y ed  an  a c tiv e  ro le  in  
w a ste  p o lit ic s  in  the late 1980s an d  ear ly  1990s
6 M em b er  o f an  e n v ir o n m en ta l g ro u p  in  S y d n e y  w h o  p la y ed  an  a c tiv e  ro le  in  
w a ste  p o lit ic s  in  the late 1980s an d  ea r ly  1990s
7 S en ior  m a n a g er  in  the N e w  S o u th  W a le s  E n v ir o n m en t P rotection  A u th o r ity
It should be emphasised that the primary purpose of these interviews was to 
supplement the account constructed from documentary sources where there 
were gaps in areas considered to be of importance to the study. While the 
interviews did provide some useful insights, it was generally found difficult to 
obtain an account of events, and of the interviewee's view of these events at the 
time they occurred, that was uncoloured by more recent events and changes in 
the way of thinking about waste management issues. Given the relatively 
minor function of the interviews, and their less than satisfactory contribution to 
the study, interviewing was terminated after seven interviews had been 
conducted.
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3.7 Focus Groups
As the work on the secondary sources proceeded, it was possible to identify a 
number of themes in the lay understanding of waste that appeared to be worth 
more detailed exploration through the medium of focus groups.
Three focus groups were run. One was held with members of a school Parents 
and Citizens Association near Armidale in northern New South Wales. The 
schedule of discussion prompts is provided in appendix A2. The Armidale 
focus group was intended to be a pilot, but was very successful in eliciting the 
kind of information needed for the study and has been included in the study.
Following transcription and examination of the Armidale focus group 
discussion, a brief was prepared for the conduct of two similar focus groups in 
Sydney (appendix A3). The two focus groups were divided according to age, 
with an under 50 group and over 50 group, with a view to identifying any 
differences in views among those with experience of landfills in the post-war 
period. Groups were not divided on socio-economic lines as social class 
differences in views about landfills were not of interest to the study. A tender 
was accepted from a reputable market research firm with extensive experience 
in focus group work and previous experience with waste-related market 
research.
Analysis of the focus group transcripts was undertaken using word processor 
software to compile extracts of discussion relevant to each of the themes of 
interest to the study.
3.8 A Note on Language
In accounts drawn from the types of primary sources used in the study, it is 
impossible to avoid repeating fallacies of non-equivalence that are endemic in 
the primary sources. For example, when a Minister reports in the Legislative 
Assembly that 'The Government has decided ../ he or she is, in strict terms, 
committing a fallacy of non-equivalence, in that Governments do not decide in 
the same sense as individuals make decisions. 'The Government has decided 
...' is shorthand for something like 'Department X provided a briefing paper to 
Cabinet, which was discussed by the Cabinet, with a majority of members 
voting in favour of the recommendation'. To purge an account of these
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convenient but fallacious shorthand expressions would be to render it virtually 
unreadable. In the following chapters, the language of primary sources 
containing such expressions is retained, with the exception of more extreme 
examples of endowing higher level conceptual entities with the emotional 
qualities of the individuals that comprise them, such as 'the Government was 
upset by
An allied problem is when terminology changes significantly with time. Those 
charged with responsibility for 'abating nuisances' caused by 'rubbish tips' in 
the 1930s did not see themselves as 'managing landfills'. The approach taken in 
the following chapters has been to retain the language of the time when 
describing the conditions of the time, but to use current terminology when 
discussing interpretations of the historical record.
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4.1 Introduction
The evolution of waste management policy that took place during the 20th 
century was played out on the stage of an institutional framework, the 
foundations of which were laid in the 19th century. The first part of this 
chapter provides a brief summary of the circumstances that gave rise to the 
fundamental feature of waste management in Sydney — the division of 
responsibility between local and State Government.
4.2 Waste Management Prior to Municipal Governance
For the first 44 years of Sydney's existence, there was no provision of 
government services such as water supply, sewerage, night soil and garbage 
removal or street cleaning (Larcombe, 1961:3,4). Governor Macquarie took over
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the administration of the Colony of New South Wales in 1810 and introduced 
Government Orders which sought the cooperation and voluntary assistance of 
the citizenry in matters of civic maintenance (Maiden, 1966:17). For example, 
the Government Order of 27 February 1813 informed the householders of 'Pitt, 
York, Castlereagh, and other principal streets' that they 'were individually 
enjoined to keep the water-course opposite of their respective houses, at all 
times, free of dirt and rubbish of any kind, so that in time of heavy rains the 
water may have a free course to pass through' (Maiden, 1966:17). This 
particular Order was given persuasive force by the threat to impose a tax on 
householders to defray the cost of the government carrying out the 
maintenance tasks neglected by them. While the system of Government Orders 
may have encouraged the removal of some household waste to the outskirts of 
the settlement, the newspaper reports of the 1830s about the squalor of Sydney 
streets (Larcombe, 1961:3) leave little doubt that much household waste was 
deposited close to its point of generation.
While Governor Bourke noted in a Governor's Minute issued not long after he 
arrived in Sydney in 1832 that there was a need for some form of municipal 
governance, the idea appears not to have been acted upon (Larcombe, 1961:4). 
The first statutory institutions for local government were the Police Acts of 1833 
and 1838, which gave to police magistrates appointed by the Governor many of 
the powers that would later become the province of local government (Maiden, 
1966:33). These included the power to prevent pollution of watercourses and 
require the cleansing of butcher shops and slaughter houses.
4.3 The Emergence of Local Government Responsibility
In 1840, Governor Gipps introduced the Municipal Corporations Bill into the 
Legislative Council in response to increasing demands on the Government for 
provision of services (Larcombe, 1961:12). The Bill allowed for the 
incorporation of boroughs with elected councils which would be empowered to 
levy rates to finance the provision of routine municipal functions such as road 
construction and maintenance, water supplies, sewerage. Although the Bill was 
rejected by the Legislative Council at its first introduction, it was re-introduced 
and passed as the Sydney Corporation Bill in 1842, providing only for the 
incorporation of Sydney. The functions of the Corporation included routine 
functions such as street cleaning, cleansing and maintenance and water supply, 
although it appears that the Corporation devoted little or no resources to
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sanitary services such as garbage and night soil removal (Larcombe, 1961:16, 
57).
The Sydney City Corporation, as the first municipal bureaucracy in Australia, 
suffered from a lack of personnel with relevant training, unwieldy 
administrative procedures and insufficient financial resources (Maiden, 1966: 
191,192). In response to growing criticism, the Legislative Council appointed 
Select Committees in 1849 and 1852 to inquire into the workings of the 
Corporation. These Committees did not report favourably, and the 
Government dissolved the Corporation in 1853, replacing it with three 
Commissioners. Later in 1853, the Sydney Sewerage Act and the Sydney Water 
Supply Act were passed, authorising Government borrowings to fund the 
construction of sewerage and water supply infrastructure under the control of 
the Commissioners (Maiden, 1966:197,198).
However, the Commission, while making substantial albeit expensive progress 
in the provision of infrastructure, suffered a similar fate to the Corporation. 
After a further three Select Committees, the Sydney Corporation 
Re-establishment Act 1857 replaced the Commission with a Corporation and 
Council with the power to borrow substantial sums for general, water and 
sewerage works (Maiden, 1966: 200).
The Municipalities Act 1858 made it possible for municipal governance to be 
established outside the boundaries of the Sydney City Council and by 1860, 
eight municipalities had been incorporated in the Sydney region: Randwick, 
Waverly, Glebe, Redfern, Balmain, Paddington, Woollahra and Waterloo 
(Maiden, 1966:70-72). Under the Act, Councils were able to make by-laws 
relating to, among other things, the prevention of nuisances and the 
preservation of public health (Larcombe, 1961:40). The Municipalities Act 1867 
aimed to correct some of the administrative difficulties experienced by 
municipalities under the 1858 Act, and conferred additional powers and 
functions, including those previously the domain of police magistrates under 
the Country Towns Police Act and nuisance abatement (Maiden, 1966:85). 
However, a Select Committee in 1874 found that the majority of boroughs and 
municipalities had not established sanitary services due to a lack of funds 
(Maiden, 1966:98).
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4.4 Local Government Failures and State Responsibilities
While most of the Sydney region was under some system of municipal 
governance throughout the latter half of the 19th century, the available 
evidence seems to suggest that the management of municipal waste was 
insufficient to prevent it being a risk to public health. The first City Health 
Officer was appointed in 1857, and some municipalities appointed Inspectors of 
Nuisances. These moves, however, had little impact on public health, due to 
the lack of qualified personnel, the lack of necessary powers for councils to 
rebuild slum areas and the tendency for economic interests to over-ride public 
health concerns (Larcombe, 1961:57,58; Fitzgerald, 1987:80). The dissatisfaction 
with the performance of local government that surfaced periodically in the 
latter half of the 19th century resulted in the return of a number of functions to 
the State Government. These included the construction and maintenance of 
principal roads (the Main Roads Act 1858), control and licensing of public 
vehicles (Metropolitan Transit Commission formed in 1873) and the 
Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board (Water Supply and Sewerage Act 
1880) (Maiden, 1966:68, 202, 203).
An outbreak of smallpox led to the Infectious Diseases Supervision Act of 1881 
which established the Board of Health. With the increasing industrialisation of 
Sydney in the late 19th century and the growing number of tanneries and 
boiling-down works, this advisory body soon became involved in the 
abatement of nuisances. The Noxious Trades and Cattle Slaughtering Act of 
1894 was essentially a transfer to Australia of the traditional British nuisance 
laws and empowered the Board of Health to advise the Government on the 
regulation of these industries (Coward, 1976:15). The powers of the Board were 
further expanded with the passing of the Public Health Act in 1896, which 
enabled it to make regulations without the intervention of a Minister. The Act 
also was responsible for the establishment of the Department of Public Health 
and the Health Inspection Branch whose Sanitary Inspectors were responsible 
for policing the sanitary functions of local government, including the collection 
and disposal of garbage (Coward, 1976:16).
By 1905, there were 192 municipalities in New South Wales, covering 0.9 per 
cent of the land area. So that the New South Wales Government could divest 
itself of the responsibility of providing basic local services to the remaining 99.1 
per cent of the State, the Government (Shires) Extension Bill was passed in 1905 
to provide for the incorporation of this area. The functions of shires under this
[83]
Bill included the provision of sanitary, and garbage and refuse services 
(Larcombe, 1961:52).
The Government (Shires) Extension Bill was followed by the Local Government 
Extension Act in 1906, and upon its passage, the two were consolidated as the 
Local Government Act 1906. This Act placed local government in New South 
Wales on a more secure financial footing. Compared to the changes in the late 
19th century, the institutional arrangements established by the Act underwent 
only minor changes for much of the 20th century. In 1919, the 1906 Act was 
repealed and replaced by the Local Government Act of 1919 to bring a number 
of measures that had been introduced in other Acts within one piece of 
legislation. Reflecting a broadening in their powers, sanitary inspectors were 
renamed as health inspectors (Larcombe, 1961:65). The 1919 Act also provided 
the means for the constitution of county councils where services could be 
provided more efficiently across a group of local government areas. Only 
eleven county councils had been formed by 1944, but this number increased to 
56 at the end of 1962, with most county councils being responsible for the 
supply of electricity, and fewer numbers involved in the supply of water or gas, 
the control of noxious weeds and the operation of abattoirs (Maiden, 
1966:260-268)
4.5 Early Centralisation and Regionalisation Proposals
The idea of a central authority responsible for Sydney's waste disposal was put 
forward in the Legislative Assembly as early as 1932, when the Minister for 
Local Government, in referring to the Greater Sydney Bill that was before the 
House noted that:
In my view the disposal of garbage by metropolitan municipalities is a matter 
upon which complete control should be exercised by one authority. That 
authority should be the central governing authority of the metropolis. To 
ensure the better management of our metropolis, a new group of aldermen must 
be elected at no distant date. They will be men well fitted to control our 
beaches, and to see that those beaches are not polluted by garbage which has 
been cast upon them by the sea. It will the duty of those men to ensure the 
development of our beaches in a way that will command the respect and 
admiration of the whole State.
(Legislative Assembly, 
13.10.32:1074-1075)
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Regionalised responsibility for waste management was under consideration as 
early as 1958. As a result of the July 1958 meeting over the closure of the St 
Peters tip (see appendix B7.4.2), officers of the Cumberland County Council had 
been asked to conduct a survey of sites suitable for landfill in the metropolitan 
region. In July 1959 in a meeting of the Cumberland County Council, the Chief 
County Planner reported that a total of 130 sites suitable for landfill had been 
located and these sites provided sufficient capacity to dispose of Sydney's 
garbage for a further 35 years.
It was also recommended by the Chief County Planner that councils in the 
metropolitan area form groups to manage the operation of landfills, as the 
'system of disposal of garbage by individual Councils is no longer practicable in 
Sydney and is preventing many Councils from adopting satisfactory, 
economical methods of disposal' (cited in Legislative Assembly, 8.3.66:3919). 
This appears to have been the first proposal for regionalisation of waste 
management across the whole of the Sydney metropolitan area. As mentioned 
in appendix B8.3.L3, representatives of three Eastern Suburbs councils 
approached the Minister for Local Government in February 1960 with a view to 
forming a county council to build and operate an incinerator to serve the three 
councils (SMH, 2.2.60:8). The request was refused (SMH, 16.9.60:19), no doubt 
because of the Department's policy favouring cheaper landfill methods of waste 
disposal. Nevertheless, the proposal was put forward again in 1965 (MWDA, 
1981:3) as the Eastern Suburbs councils regarded incineration as the 'inevitable' 
solution to waste disposal in this area (SMH, 16.5.64:8). In 1961, the North 
Sydney City Council approached other councils on the north side of the 
Harbour as to their views on forming a county council to operate an incinerator, 
and found that these councils were less than enthusiastic about the proposal 
(SMH, 5.4.61:4).
In April 1965, the Canterbury Council convened a conference on waste disposal 
that resulted in the formation of the Western Suburbs Councils Refuse Disposal 
Committee (Legislative Assembly, 8.3.66:3930; MWDA, 1981:3; Butlin,
1976:247). Also in 1965, the Local Government Association, after its annual 
conference, asked the Minister for Local Government in the new Askin 
Government to appoint a committee to investigate Sydney's waste disposal 
problems. The Minister replied that the responsibility for garbage collection 
and disposal had always been the responsibility of local government, and that 
therefore the best approach would be for the councils to take joint action 
themselves (Hunt, 1968:2).
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There is some evidence that the view of the Minister for Local Government was 
not shared by all members of the Government. In March 1966, a Government 
member in the Legislative Assembly, Mr Ruddock, moved:
That, in the opinion of this House, the Government be requested to set up an 
appropriate authority to investigate and report upon the following:
(a) Garbage disposal methods in the Sydney metropolitan area and other 
densely popidated areas.
(b) The serious shortage of tipping dumps.
(c) Alternative proposals involving incineration and/or conversion of 
garbage into compost and fertilizer.
(d) Plant and equipment being successfully operated and used in other 
parts of the world.
(Legislative Assembly, 
8.3.66:3918)
The Minister for Local Government made only several single sentence 
interjections throughout the debate on the motion, and the Opposition used the 
existence of the Western Suburbs Councils Refuse Disposal Committee as an 
argument against the motion (Legislative Assembly, 8.3.66:3930).
As a consequence of the refusal of the Minister for Local Government to set up 
a committee, the Metropolitan Mayors and Presidents resolved at a meeting in 
November 1966 that all councils in the County of Cumberland contribute $200 
each to finance an expert investigation by the Local Government Association 
into the garbage collection and disposal problems in the County (Hunt, 1968:2). 
Some councils refused to make the contribution. For example, the North 
Sydney Council suggested as an alternative that a county council be formed to 
handle garbage disposal for the metropolitan region (SMH, 18.1.67:6). 
Woollahra Council refused because of its proposal to build an incinerator and 
the Windsor Council maintained it was too remote from the metropolis (SMH, 
3.2.76:7).
Regionalisation was also canvassed in a number of papers presented at the First 
Australian Refuse Disposal Conference, held at the University of New South 
Wales in August 1967 (Kirov and Toner, 1967; Parkinson, 1967; MWDA, 1981:3). 
At this conference, the Minister for Local Government re-affirmed the 
Department's view that incinerators should not be built in residential areas 
while ever the cheaper alternative of landfill was available, venturing that
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perhaps cheap nuclear power would be used in the future to incinerate garbage. 
Notably, the Minister's view was contrary to that put forward by Professor 
Kirov of the Department of Fuel Technology at the University of New South 
Wales and by the Chief Municipal Health Surveyor with Waverly Council, H.K. 
Toner (SMH, 23.8.67:3).
In September 1967, seven councils on the north side of the Harbour discussed 
the possibility of forming a group to operate an incinerator. Several of the 
councils had recently had problems with strong resident protests about the 
impacts of tips (see appendix B7.4.5-6) and were facing strict Health 
Department supervision of extensions to existing tips. The councils had also 
been lead to believe that the Health Department favoured the use of 
incinerators rather than landfill (SMH, 19.9.67:16). As mentioned in section 8.4, 
the idea of regionalisation using a number of incinerators was put forward in a 
lengthy article in the Sydney Morning Herald in January 1968 (SMH, 24.1.68:2).
The expert investigation into Sydney's waste disposal problems by the Local 
Government Association was completed in early 1968 and the Association then 
referred the report to P.A. Management Consultants for their assessment. In 
June 1968, the Local Government Association discussed the recommendations 
of P.A. Management Consultants with the Minister for Local Government and a 
decision was made to have W.D. Scott and Co carry out a preliminary survey to 
assess what might be needed to set up regionalised waste management 
operations across the whole metropolitan area (Hunt, 1968:3). Neither the P.A. 
Management Consultants or the W.D. Scott reports gave any consideration to 
waste reduction or recycling, although both recommended that an overall waste 
management plan for the Sydney region was required (Butlin, 1976:247). In 
September 1968, a Special Conference of Metropolitan Councils resolved that a 
decision on the Scott report should be deferred while individual councils, and 
particularly those already involved in regionalisation proposals, were given the 
opportunity to put forward their views.
At least one council put forward dissenting views. The Municipal Health 
Surveyor of Bankstown Council, H.C. Hunt, argued for the establishment of a 
Commonwealth research organisation, similar to the Commonwealth 
Experimental Building Station, that would provide technological solutions to 
the problems facing local government (Hunt, 1968). Hunt's report also makes 
quite clear that regionalisation posed a threat to councils such as Bankstown
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Council, that had made considerable investment in setting up facilities to take 
industrial and municipal waste from other parts of the Sydney region.
In November 1969, the mayors and shire presidents met again in a special 
conference to consider the Scott report (SMH, 15.11.69:13). The report estimated 
that it would cost $64 000 for a full study. The Minister for Local Government 
offered to pay half this cost if the councils would meet the other half 
(Legislative Assembly, 25.11.70:8395). The conference resolved that the mayors 
and shire presidents would place before their respective councils a 
recommendation that a major study into the garbage problem be approved at a 
cost of $1000 per council (SMH, 15.11.69:13).
However, before all the councils could agree to funding the study, the closure 
of local government tips to liquid industrial waste in December 1969 resulted in 
an approach to the Department of Decentralisation and Development by the 
liquid waste transport and disposal industry, the State Development Co­
ordinating Committee was convened to examine the matter, and the State 
Government brought in an overseas expert to review the question of waste 
disposal in Sydney. Soon after, as described in detail in section 4.7, the Waste 
Disposal Act, 1970 was passed.
4.6 The Environmental Acts of the 1960s and 1970
The late 1960s and early 1970s in NSW saw substantial changes in the 
legislation relating to environmental matters. The Waste Disposal Act of 1970 
was one of three Acts introduced by the Liberal-Country Party Government, the 
others being the Clean Waters Act 1970 and the State Pollution Control 
Commission Act 1970. While the events that led to the perception of the need 
for a centralised agency to manage wastes are largely waste-related, the form 
that the Waste Disposal Act took was influenced by both its legislative 
precedents and the increasing political attention to environmental matters in 
Sydney in the 1960s.
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4.6.1 Increasing Environmental Awareness
By the time of the publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring in 1962, regarded 
by some as signalling the beginning of modem environmentalism (see, for 
example, Colborn, Dumanoski and Myers, 1996:15, 51; Dryzek and Schlosberg, 
1998) the following elements of modern environmental discourse had already 
appeared in the pages of the Sydney Morning Herald in the period from 1930 
(appendix B4.1:l-2):
• nature as being essential for the physical and spiritual well being of 
humans,
• municipal waste as a polluter or desecrator of nature,
• the wastefulness of consigning to tips materials that could be re-used,
• the idea of recycling organic waste into something that could restore the 
health of the soil,
• the desirability of conserving soil and water resources,
• the possibility of dangerous chemicals in the environment,
• hidden health dangers associated with affluence generally and plastics 
specifically
In addition, the practicality of retrieving materials from the waste stream for re­
use had been demonstrated with the Canterbury Council's composting plant.
Rachel Carson's work was first mentioned in the Herald in 1962 (SMH, 
27.11.62:2) in an editorial which also referred to the serious concerns expressed 
by the Duke of Edinburgh in a recent address to the Australian Academy of 
Science. However, the idea of pesticides as danger to the environment and 
human health that insidiously circulated in the environment did not appear on 
the pages of the Herald until a series of letters to the editor in early 1968. These 
letters about the dangers of insecticides contain many additional elements of 
modern environmental discourse:
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• the questioning of local expert know ledge (SMH, 30.1.68:2; 7.2.68:2),
• appeal to the claim ed superio r know ledge of overseas experts (SMH, 
30.1.68:2),
• appeal to overseas studies (SMH, 5.2.68:2),
• the role of hum an  fallibility (SMH, 30.1.68:2),
• concern about long term  effects (SMH, 30.1.68:2; 7.2.68:2),
• bio-m agnification of toxic substances in  food chains (SMH, 5.2.68:2),
• hum ans no t exem pt from  the law s of n a tu re  (SMH, 5.2.68:2),
• the difficulty of unequivocal d em o nstra tion  of cause an d  effect (SMH, 
30.1.68:2), and
• sim ple environm ental m onito ring  by  m em bers of the public  (SMH, 
7.2.68:2).
By 1968, the science of ecology h ad  b een  p u t fo rw ard  in  the pages of the Herald 
as the b ranch  of science m ost re levan t to solving po llu tion  problem s, and  
ecological argum ents had  been  advanced  in  the p ro tests  against several landfill 
p roposals (appendix  B4.1:4). By mid-1970, im m ediately  p rio r to  the 
in troduction  of tw o environm ental Bills and  the W aste D isposal Bill in to  the 
Legislative Assem bly, there had  also been  p u b lished  in  the Herald a series of 
p rom inen t articles on industria l pollu tion, coverage of the first Earth  D ay in  the 
USA and  an article about 'spacesh ip  earth ' (appendix  B4.1:5).
The Herald rep o rted  in  M arch 1970, 'S ince the N.S.W. legislation w as 
in troduced , public  feeling against p o llu tion  has risen  sharp ly ' (SMH, 
19.3.70:10). The Herald also recorded  in  an  article on N ew  South  W ales' first 
Earth W eek in  Septem ber 1972 that:
The Herald's cutting files on pollution expanded dramatically at the end of 
1969. While several years of pollution articles filled each folder until then, a 
single folder was needed to contain the articles written during only the first six 
months of 1970.
(SMH, 18.9.72:20)
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In this period, there is little doubt that NSW politicians began to become more 
aware of the apocalyptic dimension of environmentalism. In February 1970, a 
member of the Opposition asked in a question without notice to the Minister for 
Health:
In the interval since this House last met has the Government become aware of 
massively heightened public concern regarding the effects of industrial mega­
city have upon both physical and mental health? Is this concern allied with 
apprehension felt regarding the harmful impact upon the quality of life 
generally flowing from pollution of the whole environment — earth, air, river 
and sea?
(Legislative Assembly, 
17.2.70:3277)
In responding at a later date to a part of the question he was unable to answer, 
the Minister for Health agreed:
It is true that heightened public concern regarding the effects of pollution on the 
quality of life is apparent, and the Government is taking initiatives to safeguard 
the health of the community.
(Legislative Assembly, 
17.3.70:4298)
What was even more dismaying for Cabinet, according to the Herald, was that a 
study by the Health Department had shown that:
...any attempts to eliminate pollution overnight would cause a huge industrial 
dislocation. The evidence, collected mainly by Health Department experts 
indicates that heavy industry has so developed on the basis of massive discharge 
of industrial waste into the waterways that it could take decades to adjust to a 
total prohibition.
(SMH, 19.3.70:10)
There is also little doubt that there was more to the growing awareness of the 
environment reflected in the pages of the Sydney M orning Herald than simply 
greater attention being paid to an unchanging amount of pollution that had 
always been present. The number of factories in Sydney doubled between 
1950-51 and 1965-66 and the air and water pollution from these factories was 
increasingly being mentioned in the annual reports of the Department of Public 
Health from the 1950s onwards, including the fact that the Department was 
having difficulty dealing with the growth in complaints about pollution
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(appendix B4.2:l-3). A fledgling private sector pollution control and waste 
management industry was promoting its technologies to both local and State 
government by 1970 (appendix B4.3:l).
4.6.2 The Clean Air Act 1961
The Clean Air Act 1961 had its origins in the formation by the NSW 
Government of the Smoke Abatement Committee in response to increasing 
concerns about the levels of air pollution, particularly from the power stations 
in inner Sydney, and complaints by industry about ambiguity of existing 
legislation (appendix B4.4:2). There were also complaints from the clay brick 
industry that it had been over-zealously pursued by local government 
exercising its powers under the Smoke Nuisance Abatement Act of 1902, so that 
this industry viewed favourably legislation that would replace this Act 
(appendix B4.4:ll). It is worth noting that the Smoke Abatement Committee 
dismissed as ineffective existing legislation such as the Smoke Nuisance 
Abatement Act (appendix B4.4:ll).
The Clean Air Act established an Air Pollution Control Branch within the 
Department of Public Health and an Air Pollution Advisory Committee, the 
role of the latter being to advise the minister on emission standards and the 
granting of licences to scheduled premises (appendix B4.4:6). The 
establishment of a central authority with responsibility for air pollution control 
was recommended by the Smoke Abatement Committee, and the legislature 
was aware that this model was in use in the UK and USA, the latter having 
been visited by the Minister for Public Health in the course of drafting the Bill 
(appendix B4.4:3). It is quite clear from the Government's position in the debate 
on the Clean Air Bill in the Legislative Assembly that it intended to take a 
cooperative approach with industry (appendix B4.4:7-10). The extensive 
industry representation on the Committee, while it may have been intended as 
a means of obtaining the cooperation of industry, may have also functioned to 
protect the interests of industry (appendix B4.4:6).
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4.6.3 The Water Pollution Bill 1969
Eight months after the election of the Coalition Government (i.e. the coalition 
between the National Party, a conservative party representing rural interests, 
and the Liberal Party, a conservative party representing urban business 
interests — all usage of this term refers to this particular coalition of 
conservative parties) in May 1965, the Minister for Health, Mr Harry Jago, 
visited New Zealand to, among other things, examine how water pollution was 
being approached with the legislation that had already been passed in the 1950s 
in that country. In June 1966, Cabinet gave in principle approval for 'the 
preparation of a bill on the lines of the Water Pollution Act of New Zealand' 
(Legislative Assembly, 4.3.69:4140). Approval was also given for the 
Department of Public Health to confer with other agencies in preparing the 
legislation.
It was almost another three years before the Water Pollution Bill was 
introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 27 March 1969. During this 
period, a number of aspects relating to the effectiveness of pollution legislation 
had been raised in the Legislative Assembly. These included:
• the difficulties in obtaining speedy abatement of pollution problems 
caused by poorly operated council tips, due to the lack of power on the 
part of the Department on Local Government, the focus on health rather 
than environmental impacts by the Department of Health and the 
transient nature of the events giving rise to these impacts (appendix 
B4.5:2-3),
• the idea that ineffective control of pollution was due to fragmentation of 
responsibility (appendix B4.5:4),
• the possibility of agency capture (appendix B4.5:5),
• the need for pollution control measures to be able to be updated as new 
forms of pollution occurred (appendix B4.5:5),
if the sole function of penalties is to alter the structure of costs faced by 
industries in favour of investment in pollution control equipment, then
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penalties for non-compliance need to be of a similar magnitude or 
greater than the costs of compliance (appendix B4.5:5),
• prosecution of offenders could be very costly in time and money 
because of the opportunities for legal obfuscation afforded by scientific 
uncertainty (appendix 134.5:8),
• where governments themselves are polluters, the pace of compliance by 
industry may be limited by the pace of compliance of government 
(appendix B4.5:9),
• attractive as the proposition might be that implementation of pollution 
control legislation requires only technical decisions, it is inherently 
political (appendix B4.5:10), and
• pollution control is a difficult arena of public administration (appendix 
B4.5:ll).
In addition, relatively few directions or prosecutions were made by the Air 
Pollution Control Branch during this period, although the Clean Air Advisory 
Committee reported that considerable sums had been spent by industry on air 
pollution control equipment (appendix B4.5:12-13).
The Bill bore many similarities to the Clean Air Act. The route by which action 
was to be taken against polluters was via recommendations by a Water 
Pollution Advisory Committee to the Minister for Health. This ensured that 
political considerations could be brought into pollution control directives 
(appendix B4.5:15). Licences would be required by premises discharging 
effluents into streams, which would be classified according to the effluents they 
could receive — a system that the Government knew from the New Zealand 
experience was very slow to implement (appendix B4.5:16). The Government 
proposed to take the same cooperative approach with industry (appendix 
B4.5:17).
During the first and second reading debates, it was quite clear that members 
from both sides of politics were aware of the shortcomings of the Clean Air Act, 
including its ineffectiveness against pollution by Government instrumentalities, 
and the Advisory Committee's Tack of teeth' (appendix B4.5:18).
[94]
4.6.4 The Clean Waters Act 1970
The Clean Waters Bill was introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 
27 October 1970, a period of eighteen months after the second reading debate 
on the Water Pollution Bill, during which the Government had received 
submissions on the Bill — an approach that had also been followed with the Air 
Pollution Bill (appendix B4.4:5).
A number of changes were made to procedural and administrative aspects of 
the Bill (appendix B4.6:4), the change that probably most clearly reflected the 
growing political awareness of the strength of public opinion on the 
environment being the fivefold increase in the maximum penalties for water 
pollution offences. The Government, in proposing an appeals board to handle 
appeals against decisions made under the legislation, rather than a court, made 
a strong case that the appeals process would be would be unduly lengthy in a 
court due both to legal obfuscation and uncertainties raised by technical experts 
(appendix B4.6:7-8).
The idea that pollution problems had been caused by fragmented responsibility 
was repeatedly mentioned in debate as a justification for the formation of the 
Clean Waters Advisory Committee as a central authority. The idea of a central 
authority formed a persistent thread in the debates in the Legislative Assembly 
during the passage of the Bill, although the precise definition of what 
constituted a central authority was not clearly articulated. Generally, the 
Government argued that the Clean Waters Advisory Committee would provide 
such centralisation, while the Opposition argued for a statutory authority 
which would not have the degree of industry influence that the Committee had 
(appendix B4.6:9-ll). The Government, however, argued that action was 
urgently required and that a statutory authority would take longer to establish 
(appendix B4.6:l).
The debate on the Clean Waters Bill introduced new perspectives and policy 
considerations that had not been present in the debate on the Clean Air Bill. 
Firstly, the justification for the Act was related as much to environmental 
quality as to public health. References to the state of the environment involved 
concepts from ecology or popularised forms of it that were absent from even
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the debate on the Water Pollution Bill some eighteen months previously. These 
included 'ecological balance', 'it is necessary to have regard to the whole water 
system', 'the natural habitat', 'marine breeding ground', 'the earth's water 
resources', 'eutrophication' and 'complex life environment' (Legislative 
Assembly, 4.11.70:7379; 5.11.70:7433; 10.11.70:7519,7526, 7529,7533,7534, 
respectively).
The debate also included expressions from environmentalist discourse and the 
industry response to environmentalist critiques: 'protect the environment for 
the next generation' 'it is people who pollute, not organisations' 'w hat is 
nowadays a fashionable idea that there is something wrong with economic 
growth', 'finite earth', 'eco-catastrophe' and 'irrevocable pollution of our 
waterways' (Legislative Assembly, 5.11.70:7420, 7428, 7433; 10.11.70:7527,7530; 
11.11.70:7640 respectively).
Environmental and other social movements, and public meetings protesting 
about environmental concerns were mentioned for the first time in the debates 
on the Clean Waters Bill (Legislative Assembly 5.11.70:7421,7429,7431), as were 
a number of environmental policy issues such as monopolies on technical 
expertise by government departments and capital flight between States in 
response to differing standards of pollution regulation (Legislative Assembly 
5.11.70:7430; 4.11.70:7377, respectively).
4.6.5 The 1969 Industrial Waste ‘Crisis’
The second and third environmental bills passed in late 1970s, the State 
Pollution Control Commission Act and the Waste Disposal Act, had a shared 
origin in the problem of industrial waste disposal in the late 1960s. As 
discussed in section B4.2:l, there was substantial growth of secondary industry 
in the Sydney region in the post-war period, and this resulted in an increasing 
amount of industrial waste and increasing complaints to the Department of 
Health about the effects of existing disposal practices.
The disposal methods used by industry in the late 1960s were listed in the 
Barton Report as:
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(1) Arrange with the Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage Board for it 
to be put into the public sewer after satisfying the Board that the effluent 
is of a suitable standard to be accepted, and agree to maintain that 
standard.
(2) To work with the Maritime Services Board and install such plant as will 
provide and maintain a suitable effluent for discharge into waters wider 
the control of the Board.
(3) Try to reclaim some of the material of value before regarding it as waste, 
and later either burn, or lagoon the liquid, at some point removing as 
much water as possible, leaving the remainder to dry out or percolate 
through the ground.
(4) Let the liquid go down the nearest drain in the factory and forget about it 
in the hope that nobody can trace it.
(5) To engage the services of a contractor to remove the liquid, ask no 
questions, but just pay the bill.
( 6) Some industrial wastes may be taken out to sea and dumped at a 
considerable distance from the shore.
(Barton, 1970:9)
Given the increasing efforts of the Department of Public Health in the 1960s to 
trace pollution sources, the fourth form of disposal listed above may have 
become a less viable option. Given also that the first, second, third and sixth 
options above would have required greater effort an d /o r expenditure on the 
part of factory owners and managers, than would the fifth option, it is perhaps 
not surprising that, as Barton (1970:9) recorded, the waste transport and 
disposal industry grew substantially in the 1960s. This industry was comprised 
of a relatively small number of recognised firms and a larger number of small 
contractors and tanker-truck owner/drivers. Barton (1970:10) estimated that 
the waste industry removed at least 300 000 gallons of industrial waste per 
week from factories in the Sydney region.
The waste industry operators disposed of the liquid waste it collected in four 
ways:
into pits or lagoon on land owned or leased by the operators,
into tips operated by local government,
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• into the MWSDB sewers with the permission and oversight of the 
MWSDB, and
• illegally into bushland, waterways and sewers.
From his discussions with waste transport and disposal firms, Barton found 
that relatively few owned disposal sites and many had been dependent on local 
government tips. As the volume of liquid industrial waste increased during the 
1960s and tips became saturated, they were closed to the receival of liquid 
waste, with the last tip being closed to receival of liquid waste in December 
1969 (Barton, 1970:10). According to Barton's accounting of the amounts of 
liquid industrial waste being disposed of legally, and a report in the Herald, the 
tip closure resulted in some 200 000 gallons of liquid industrial waste being 
disposed of illegally each week into bushland, waterways and sewers (Barton, 
1970:12-14; SMH, 17.4.70:4).
Barton reported that the decision by local councils to close their tips to liquid 
waste was in response to 'advice' by the Department of Public Health and to 
local complaints. This was referred to by the Minister for Decentralisation and 
Development, J.B.M. Fuller in the Legislative Council in February 1970 as a 
refusal by the Department of Health to allow liquid industrial waste to be 
mixed with municipal waste (Legislative Council, 19.2.70:3399). The Annual 
Report of the Department for 1968 reported that disposal of industrial wastes 
had become a 'rapidly increasing problem' with some privately operated tips 
being a 'serious hazard' and suitable sites for the disposal of liquid waste 'very 
difficult to obtain' (Dept Public Health, 1970:50). The Annual Report for 1969 
suggests that the issue of liquid waste disposal 'came under greater scrutiny' in 
1969 due to:
... the asphyxiation of driver of a liquid waste tanker; the exploding of a tanker 
vehicle, and the closure of most Council Garbage Depots to liquid waste and 
sludge removal contractors.
(Dept Public Health, 1971:51)
Pausacker (1978:99, 101) noted similar problems with closure of local 
government tips to liquid industrial waste in the late 1960s and early 1970s in 
Melbourne. He attributed local governments' reluctance to accept liquid 
industrial waste to several reasons, including their concerns about pollution of
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groundwater, their wish to avoid local amenity impacts that would bring 
protests from residents and their desire to conserve the landfill space that they 
had available to them.
The closure of local government tips to liquid industrial waste appears not to 
have been sufficiently newsworthy to warrant mention on the pages of the 
Herald in 1969. It was first mentioned in April 1970, in the fifth of a series of 
articles on pollution in Sydney (SMH 17.4.70:4), by which time as much as 
200,000 gallons per week of liquid industrial waste was being dumped illegally 
into waterways, sewers and reserves.
While the closure of local government tips to liquid industrial waste may not 
have been of public concern in 1969, several of the waste industry firms were 
sufficiently concerned about their future in the absence of disposal sites to make 
an approach to the Department of Decentralisation and Development. To 
understand why these firms would have approached this Department, it is 
necessary to be aware of the history and role of this Department. One of the 
initiatives of the incoming Liberal — Country Party government in 1965 was to 
create a new portfolio of Decentralisation and Development as the sole 
responsibility of a Minister, in the place of the Department of Industrial 
Development which had been the responsibility of the Premier and Treasurer. 
While the justification for decentralisation policies may have been initially to 
'check and reverse the movement of the population away from country areas 
through substantially increased regional secondary industry establishment' 
(Fuller, 1965:1), by the late 1960s and early 1970s the rationale for 
decentralisation was in terms of 'the best means of controlling the excessive 
population growth of the State's metropolitan areas' (Anon, 1969:2) and:
Whatever it may have been in the past, decentralisation today is not just a 
country problem. Increasingly, it is a metropolitan problem.
Increasingly the motivation for decentralisation is all around us, manifested in 
our daily lives — in our working lives and in our private lives, slowly eroding 
many of the benefits once accepted as attaching to life in a big city.
(Anon, 1971:2)
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Decentralisation as a means of reducing the environmental impacts of Sydney's 
growth was also alluded to by the Minister for Health in a speech on the Loan 
Estimates in the Legislative Assembly.
The procedure adopted by the Government is undoubtedly correct; it is 
subsidizing industry to settle in country areas. Every thousand people kept 
from coming to Sydney but diverted to country locations, means fewer 
expressways have to be built in expensive urban areas. It mea?is that we are 
saved from having to provide more services, the cost of which is astronomical 
and much higher for similar services in a non-metropolitan area.
Sydney is still a beautiful city but our beaches, once our pride, are becoming 
dirty and smelly. At Christmas time I took my family to one of our most 
beautiful beaches but I most certainly shall not go there again. All this is 
inevitable if a city is allowed to grow too big.
(Legislative Assembly, 
21.10.70:6826)
The Department of Decentralisation and Development provided a number of 
services to industry, including assistance in locating land outside the metropolis 
and long term low-interest loans for land purchase (Dept Decentralisation and 
Development, 1978). The Minister for Decentralisation and Development 
referred to the close relationship between his department and industry during 
the debate on the Waste Disposal Act:
My department has had a great deal of contact with industries in the 
metropolitan area, and is aware of their problems in this regard [liquid waste 
disposal].
(Legislative Council, 
25.11.70:8346)
Indeed, it appears that Fuller continued for some years to see the liquid waste 
problem as an impediment to industry rather than an environmental problem:
I have a particular interest in it [the liquid waste survey carried out by the 
MWDA in 1973] because industry is having considerable difficulty in 
disposing of liquid waste.
(Legislative Assembly,
9.8.73:38)
According to the Herald in April 1970 and the account given by the Minister for 
Decentralisation and Development in his second reading speech on the State 
Pollution Control Commission Bill in November 1970, the larger waste
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transport and disposal firms were experiencing difficulty in late 1969 in 
obtaining land they could use as liquid waste disposal sites and believed they 
should be given an area of land for the purpose by the State Government (SMH, 
17.4.70:4; Legislative Council, 25.11.70:8315). A number of the waste transport 
and disposal firms then approached the Department of Decentralisation and 
Development for assistance.
The following account of the response of the Department and subsequent 
events is drawn mainly from the second reading speech of the Minister for 
Decentralisation and Development mentioned above (Legislative Council, 
25.11.70:8314-8316). Consultations by the Department with local government 
and the Department of Public Health revealed 'an acute industry problem'. The 
State Development Co-ordinating Committee was convened to examine the 
problem. The Committee consulted with a number of industries with liquid 
waste disposal problems and estimated that there was approximately 300,000 
gallons per week of liquid waste 'requiring ground disposal'. Over a period of 
several months the Committee developed a 'close liaison' with the MWSDB, the 
Maritime Services Board, the Department of Public Health, the State Planning 
Authority and the Department of Decentralisation and Development. A sub­
committee of Ministers — the Minister for Local Government and Highways, 
the Minister for Public Works, the Minister for Health and the Minister for 
Decentralisation and Development — was formed early in 1970 to 'go into this 
matter very closely with a view to finding the best possible short and long-term 
solutions to the problems in the interests of the community generally'. The sub­
committee of Ministers appointed a steering committee comprising the Deputy 
Director of the Department of Decentralisation and Development, the President 
of the MWSDB, and the Under-Secretaries of the Departments of Health and of 
Local Government. The steering committee was supported in its work by 
senior officers of the departments mentioned above, who liaised with the Local 
Government Association, councils and the waste industry. According to the 
Herald, one solution to the liquid waste disposal problem that was attempted 
was a request from the Minister for Local Government to local government for 
it to allow the waste to be spread across all 40 council tips that were operating 
in the Sydney region. This request was refused (SMH, 17.4.70:4).
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According to an account given by the Deputy Premier of New South Wales, Sir 
Charles Cutler, some four years later, the Minister for Local Government and 
the under secretary of the Department visited a number of waste treatment 
installations overseas in late 1969 and had discussions with the authorities that 
were operating them. These discussions, together with discussions with the 
Local Government Association:
. . .  all pointed to the need for the establishment of a co-ordinating and 
controlling body that would be able to initiate measures in the short term to 
relieve the critical liquid waste disposal problem, while undertaking a 
comprehensive study of the most satisfactory method of treating this waste in 
the future.
(Legislative Assembly, 
24.9.74:1323)
The sub-committee of ministers recommended that Mr Alan Barton, an expert 
on solid and hazardous waste disposal in the United Kingdom 'report on all 
aspects of waste and garbage disposal, with particular reference to the 
problems of industry'. As a temporary measure, the MWSDB increased the 
amount of liquid industrial wastes it was accepting into the sewerage system by 
taking waste greases and fats at the Fairfield and St Mary's sewerage treatment 
works where there was some excess capacity, and discharging other untreated 
wastes at the Malabar sewerage outfall (Legislative Assembly, 24.11.70:8258; 
SMH, 14.4.70:8). This latter proposal was protested against strongly by 
Randwick Council (SMH, 22.4.70:4). The sub-committee also reviewed existing 
legislation aimed at reducing pollution and recommended that 'a State 
pollution control commission should be set up as the main feature of a co­
ordinated and vigorous attack on pollution in all its forms'.
4.6.6 The State Pollution Control Commission Act 1970
Before the Clean Waters Bill had passed through both Houses of the New South 
Wales Parliament, the State Pollution Control Commission (SPCC) Bill was 
introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 19 November 1970 by Premier 
Askin. While the debate on the Clean Waters Bill leaves little doubt that water 
pollution was seen as a serious and increasing problem, the debate on the SPCC 
Bill suggests that parliamentarians on both sides were feeling beleaguered by
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increasing ubiquity and complexity of the environmental problems that were 
being revealed in 1970 (appendix B4.7:l-7).
The SPCC was to be a supervisory, coordinating, monitoring and research 
instrumentality, with the power set environmental standards and direct local 
government and State Government departments to carry out their statutory 
powers. It was to comprise twelve commissioners, of whom seven were to 
represent various government departments and five to represent industry and 
conservation interests. The Commission was to be supported by a Technical 
Advisory Committee, the majority of whose members were to be drawn from 
government departments (appendix B4.7:8-ll).
The Government went to great lengths to demonstrate in both houses of the 
legislature that, despite the division of responsibility between the Department 
of Health and the Commission, the arrangements still represented the 
centralisation of authority that both sides of politics argued was required to 
deal with such a serious problem (appendix B4.7:12-16 and figure B4.2). 
However, the Opposition was obviously not convinced by the Government's 
assurances, and much of the debate over the SPCC Bill was structured, as with 
the previous Clean Waters and Water Pollution Bills, round generalisations 
about centralisation and fragmentation of authority (appendix B4.7:17).
Another difference from the debates on the Clean Air Bill and the Clean Waters 
Bill, was the absence of argument about the effectiveness of approaches that 
sought the co-operation of industry. While it was specifically mentioned by the 
Minister for Public Works that the SPCC would have the power to direct 
industry (Legislative Assembly, 24.11.70:8270), just how this would occur was 
not detailed and there was no debate as to whether industry should be 
approached co-operatively or punitively.
Finally, it is worth noting that, while the debate on the Clean Waters Bill 
included for the first time mention of environmental groups and public protest 
meeting, it was in the debate on the SPCC Bill that the phenomenon now 
labelled as 'nimbyism' was first alluded to:
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Unfortunately, the community is reaching the stage inhere the word pollution 
has such an emotional content that the Government may be prevented from 
doing things of major importance...
(Legislative Assembly, 
24.11.70:8271)
4.7 The Waste Disposal Act 1970
As described in section 4.6.5 above, the Waste Disposal Act had its genesis in 
the 1969 industrial waste disposal 'crisis', and the ensuing deliberations of the 
State Development Co-ordinating Committee and its sub-committee of 
Ministers. Whereas the SPCC Bill was drafted immediately following the 
recommendations of the sub-committee, the problem of waste disposal was 
referred to an investigation by a UK waste management expert, Alan E. Barton. 
Barton completed his report in May 1970 and it was tabled in the Legislative 
Assembly on 6 August 1970 (Legislative Assembly, 24.11.70:8258). The Waste 
Disposal Bill was introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 24 November, 
1970.
4.7.1 The Barton Report
Barton was a former general manager of Birmingham City Corporation's 
salvage department and a member of the UK Government7s committee on toxic 
waste disposal (Legislative Assembly, 24.11.70:8258). The terms of reference for 
his study were:
...to investigate and report on all aspects of the critical problem of industrial 
waste disposal currently confronting metropolitan Sydney and the urban areas 
adjoining it and, in the light of your professional training and experience, to 
recommend to the Government of New South Wales (a) measures which should 
be taken to relieve the immediate problem, and (b) measures which should be 
taken to prepare for and organize a comprehensive and co-ordinated approach to 
the overall problem of waste disposal and pollution control in the future.
(Barton, 1970:ii)
Barton interviewed a total of 65 people, including Government ministers, senior 
bureaucrats, councillors and alderman, local government staff, and the owners 
or operators of waste transport and disposal firms (Barton, 1970: Appendix 1) 
and visited a number of privately and local government owned tips. The study
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was completed in six weeks (Barton, 1970:i) and the twenty-two page report 
comprised sections on:
• the background to the liquid industrial waste 'crisis',
• the methods currently being used to dispose of industrial and municipal 
waste,
• a summary of the views expressed in a meeting of the major industrial 
waste producing firms in the Sydney region,
• a summary of the views of the main waste transport and disposal firms,
• brief descriptions of the status of 21 private and local government tips,
• an estimate of the quantities of industrial and municipal waste requiring 
disposal in 1970 and in 2000,
• descriptions of the activities of the Maritime Services Board and the 
Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board relevant to water 
pollution and waste disposal problems,
• conclusions, and
• nine recommendations for action.
The descriptions of the tips Barton visited provide a snapshot in time of the 
state of Sydney tips. This is summarised in table 4.1.
Barton's assessment is broadly consistent with the problems that had been 
mentioned in the Annual Reports of the Department of Public Health during 
the 1960s, but it is worth noting that eight of the twenty-one tips examined were 
being managed well or satisfactorily, with no pollution by smoke or leachates 
evident.
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T a b le  4.1: S u m m a ry  of th e  s ta te  of tip s  v is ite d  b y  B arto n  in  A p ril-M a y  1970.
T ip  L ocation O w n e r W aste  T y p e
S ta n d a rd  of 
M a n a g e m e n t
P o llu tio n
Im p a c ts
C o n c o rd C o n c o rd  C ouncil — U n sa tis fa c to ry —
B ress in g to n S tra th fie ld  C ounc il In d u s tr ia l  a n d V ery  p o o r N e a rb y  canal
P ark , m u n ic ip a l p o llu te d
H o m e b u sh
U n d e rw o o d  Rd, P riv a te  —  B ra d sh a w — P o o r N e a rb y  creek
H o m e b u sh g ro ssly
p o llu te d
U n d e rw o o d  Rd, N SW  R a ilw ay s In d u s tr ia l P o o r —
H o m e b u sh
U n d e rw o o d  Rd, M aritim e  S erv ices In d u s tr ia l  a n d P oor C o n tin u o u s
H o m e b u sh B oard m u n ic ip a l sm o k e
U n d e rw o o d  Rd, A u d le y  S an d Solid S a tisfac to ry —
H o m e b u sh D re d g e s  P ty  L td in d u s tr ia l
A u b u rn A u b u rn  M u n ic ip a l M u n ic ip a l E x trem e ly  b a d C o n tin u o u s
C ouncil sm o k e  a n d
n e a rb y  creek
g rossly
p o llu te d
B u rw o o d B u rw o o d  M u n ic ip a l In d u s tr ia l  a n d F air Som e
C ouncil m u n ic ip a l em iss io n s  from
in te rn a l fire
S m ith fie ld F airfie ld  M u n ic ip a l In d u s tr ia l P o o r —
C ouncil in c lu d in g
liq u id s
B estie St P riv a te M ain ly  so lid S a tis fac to ry N o  leach in g
in d u s tr ia l v is ib le
M a g d a la  Rd R yde C o u n c il — G ood —
M a rsfie ld  P ark , R yde C ouncil M ain ly G o o d —
V im e ria  Rd in d u s tr ia l
S ilv e rw a te r P a rra m a tta  C o u n c il In d u s tr ia l  a n d S a tisfac to ry —
M u n ic ip a l
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Table 5.1 (contd): Summary of the state of tips visited by Barton in April-May 1970.
Liverpool Solid
industrial and 
municipal
Satisfactory No pollution 
noticeable
Kelso
Redamation
Area,
Bankstown
Solid
industrial and 
municipal
Poor One water 
channel 
through tip 
badly polluted
Menai Commonwealth 
Government, leased 
to Industrial Waste 
Collection Ltd
Solid and
liquid
industrial
Satisfactory
Menai Commonwealth 
Government, used 
by Sutherland Shire 
Council
Poor Considerable 
leaching into 
adjacent 
stream
Salt Pan Creek 
East Arm
Canterbury Council Includes
liquid
industrial
Poor Pollution of 
creek and 
offensive smell
Belrose Tip, 
Crozier St
Warringah Shire 
Council
Municipal Poor High potential 
for pollution of 
creek
Terrey Hills — — Good —
Careel Bay — — Poor Potential for 
pollution
These included both tips operated by local government and tips owned or 
operated by private firms. From this, it has to be concluded that satisfactory 
management of tips was not impossible, either by local government or by the 
private sector. In fact, Barton noted that:
The Ryde sites are the best kept tips that 1 have seen in the Sydney area, and 
they are to be congratulated upon the appearance of them. If all the sites were 
like this there would be far less complaints about garbage and industrial solid 
waste tips.
(Barton, 1970:16)
In his discussions with the main producers of liquid industrial waste, Barton 
found that the representatives of these firms all believed that a single authority 
was needed to take responsibility for the disposal of liquid waste and at least
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one representative believed that all forms of pollution should be under the 
control of a single authority.
The main reason that producers of liquid industrial waste were in favour of a 
single authority was that, if better control was going to lead to higher costs for 
the waste transport and disposal industry, then it was important that all firms 
faced the same costs. Otherwise, if there were firms who were disposing of 
waste inappropriately and could offer cheap rates, then liquid waste producers 
would generally have no qualms about using the cheaper services. While 
Barton does not specifically mention it, it is also possible that the liquid waste 
producers preferred that they should all face similar waste disposal costs, so 
that they would not have to compete in areas that might be beyond their 
control. Essentially, a single authority controlling waste disposal would reduce 
the risks associated with unexpected or uncontrollable changes to their costs 
(Barton, 1970:9-11).
The other matter on which the liquid waste producers were in unanimous 
agreement was the standard of government inspection (presumably by the 
Department of Public Health and local government). All agreed that the 
standard was grossly inadequate (Barton, 1970:12).
While it is not immediately clear that avoidance of commercial risks may have 
been behind the favourable view of centralisation of waste disposal 
responsibility held by those producing liquid industrial waste, the waste 
transport and disposal industry made it quite clear to Barton that further 
investment in the industry on their part would depend on legislation to reduce 
the current uncertainty.
With respect to Purle Waste Disposal (Australia) Pty Ltd:
It was made plain by the company that until legislation was forthcoming that 
required licensing of industry, the contractors, and tipping sites (whoever 
controlled them) and so create [sic] a sense of responsibility on all concerned 
with liquid and solid industrial waste disposal, it would be futile to go ahead 
with actual building [of a liquid waste treatment plant}.
(Barton, 1970:12)
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With respect to Hallwell Transport Services Ltd:
...the firm said that whatever regulations were made in the future they certainly 
wished to stay in the business, and they would seriously consider building a 
suitable type of treatment plant, but again they would not be prepared to do this 
without some legal security in the sense of licensing of industrial firms so that 
they could be sure of continued work for their plant.
(Barton, 1970:14)
While Barton did not devote a section of his report to the views of local 
government, there is little doubt that he met with a large number of local 
government staff and councillors (42 of the total of 65 interviews according to 
his Appendix 1). It appears from two passing comments that local government 
was also a strong proponent of a centralised authority with responsibility for 
waste disposal.
There is urgent need for jurisdiction and responsibility to be defined at central 
government level — a point brought out most strongly indeed by the Local 
Government Association at a recent meeting.
(Barton, 1970:19)
What is certain, however, is that they [local governments] are of one voice in 
asking for central government action to prove that if they [presumably, local 
governments] help to get over the difficult interim period then the need for 
garbage or industrial waste tips as a means of disposal of all or any liquid waste 
will be a thing of the past before long.
(Barton, 1970:20)
In reviewing Barton's conclusions, it seems that his omissions are equally 
important as those aspects of Sydney's waste management problems to which 
he drew attention. Barton pointed to a number of factors that he believed were 
causes of the waste 'crisis'.
Firstly, in arguing that the problem should be tackled at the source, viz. the 
industries that produced liquid wastes, he implied that industry was one cause 
of the problem.
So many industries have the facilities to despoil nature, but by what right are 
they assuming that power? Is it that they are employers of labour, contribute 
much money to a city in spending power or rates, or will be frightened away 
from a town ? If the ravaging of nature denies the public the right to enjoy their 
leisure hours in a lawful and healthy way, then in time public reaction is so 
great that those in authority must act.
(Barton, 1970:20)
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Secondly, he reported that he had gained the impression that some local 
governments did not consider it their duty to provide sites for liquid and solid 
industrial waste. This was because local governments feared that 'they would 
be making a rod for their own backs by agreeing to accept more liquid [waste]' 
(Barton, 1970:20). Presumably, local government engineers and/or health 
inspectors may have been aware that management of the impacts of liquid 
waste disposal was more difficult than for municipal waste. The reluctance of 
local government to accommodate the growing volumes of liquid waste from 
industry appears to have contributed to the problem by increasing the general 
oversupply of liquid waste and by encouraging overuse of the limited amount 
of municipal waste at tipping sites rather than the construction of facilities 
specifically for liquid waste.
Thirdly, Barton reported that 'most local authorities were not interested in 
having anybody's garbage or waste other than that from their own district' 
(Barton, 1970:20). Such an attitude would seem quite reasonable, given that 
local governments could only recover the cost of operating their tips from their 
ratepayers, so that, in the absence of any mechanism of transferring rate income 
between councils, those from outside a council's area were essentially getting a 
free waste disposal service at the expense of local ratepayers.
Fourthly, some local governments leased the tipping rights at their tips to 
lessees who were more interested in maximising the returns from tipping 
charges and salvage than in reducing environmental impacts.
Having attributed Sydney's waste problems to the growing volume of liquid 
industrial waste generated by industry and a reluctance by councils to 
accommodate this, Barton also noted that:
The means [to improve the quality of tip management] already exist 
through firstly the local authorities, and secondly the State Board of Health, 
who so often sets the conditions under which a tip may operate but does not 
follow up frequently and strongly enough.
(Barton, 1970:21)
On the strength, then, of growing industrial waste volumes, local government 
reluctance and inadequate enforcement of the State's powers, Barton stated:
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I have come to the conclusion that the present critical situation confronting the 
multi-million metropolis of Sydney should never have arisen.
It could have been anticipated and suitable progressive action taken if a co­
ordinated authority had been in existence, instead of the fragmented forms of 
control that have dealt with the pollutio7i problem to date. The lack of drive and 
co-ordination is evident, and if allowed to continue I cannot see why it should 
be any more effective than it has been so far.
(Barton, 1970:19)
There are two aspects of analysis of the situation that might have been 
expected, particularly in an investigation by an overseas expert, but which seem 
to be absent. Firstly, although Barton specifically mentioned that some tips 
were very well managed and others were in an appalling state, he did not go 
beyond vague characterisations such as Tack-of drive' to analyse in any detail 
what factors might have been involved in the cases of exemplary tip 
management that were absent in the cases of unsatisfactory tip management. 
Such analysis would have been essential to a decision as to whether the 
situation could be improved by adjustments to the existing arrangements, or 
whether the only solution was to shift responsibility to a new authority.
Secondly, Barton's consideration of overseas experience with waste 
management is extremely limited, being restricted to a passing mention in his 
eighth recommendation that the separation of collection by local government 
from disposal by a central authority had been recommended in the Redcliffe- 
Maud Report on Local Government in the UK after a trial of the system in 
London (Barton, 1970:22).
Barton's recommendations to the NSW Government were essentially fourfold.
That a single authority should be established to be responsible for the 
disposal of liquid and solid industrial waste and municipal waste.
That a system of licensing of waste generating industries, waste 
transporters and waste disposal areas should be introduced.
That liquid waste treatment plants should be set up either by a 
consortium of waste generating industries, or government.
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• That controls against pollution would need to be 'comprehensive, 
effective and actively enforced' so that the cut-rate illegal waste 
dumping operators could be prosecuted out of existence and so not 
provide a temptation to industry.
Barton also recommended temporary measures involving allocating contractors 
to tipping sites with remaining liquid waste capacity, and diverting as much 
waste as possible in a treated form to the Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and 
Drainage Board's sewers.
From the Barton Report, it is clear that the idea of a central authority to take 
responsibility for waste disposal was attractive to the various groups involved 
for different reasons. For waste generating industries, the authority would 
remove uncertainty about waste disposal costs and the possibility of industries 
competing on costs over which they had little control. For the waste transport 
and disposal industry, the authority also reduced the financial risks associated 
with remaining in business, or in expanding operations. Apparently, both 
industries considered the benefits in this reduction in uncertainty and risk 
outweighed any costs involved in being subject to registration and licensing.
For local government, the nature of the attractions that led to its strong support 
are not so clear cut. The licensing of tipping areas and the attachment of 
conditions to these licences could potentially increase the costs of tip 
management to councils. A central authority might also direct councils to take 
waste from outside their area, also adding to costs. Against these 
disadvantages could be set the advantage of being relieved of the technically 
more difficult and costly responsibility for liquid waste disposal if a central 
authority was to take over this area.
While not specifically mentioned by Barton, the idea of a central authority to 
take responsibility for waste disposal would have also been attractive to a State 
government that prided itself on its achievements in industrial development, 
because it would relieve it of the discomfort of a number of waste transport and 
disposal firms having been virtually shut down due to the absence of disposal 
sites (Legislative Council, 25.11.70:8342).
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4.7.2 The Waste Disposal Act 1970
The Waste Disposal Act allowed for the establishment of the Metropolitan 
Waste Disposal Authority (MWDA) to be responsible for the disposal of 
industrial and municipal waste within the metropolitan region, defined as 
being bounded by the Hawkesbury River in the north, the foot of the Blue 
Mountains in the west, and including the municipality of Camden and the shire 
of Sutherland in the south (Legislative Assembly, 24.11.70:8212-8213).
The MWDA was to comprise seven members, viz. the President of the 
Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board (MWSDB) and six members 
appointed by the Governor on the nomination of the Minister for Local 
Government. The six appointed members were to comprise the director and 
deputy director as full-time members, two members who Tn the opinion of the 
Minister have special knowledge and experience in industry' and two members 
selected from a panel of six names submitted by the NSW Local Government 
Association (Legislative Council, 25.11.70:8339).
The Act was to introduce a system of registration of premises on which 
industrial waste was produced and of depots where waste was disposed of, and 
licences for waste transporters.
The powers of the MWDA were to include the power to:
• carry out or commissioning surveys and investigations into waste 
matters, provided these met with the approval of the SPCC,
• make, after conferring with the SPCC, recommendations to the Minister 
for legislative or other action,
• establish regional depots and, if necessary, acquire land for the purpose,
• delegate its powers to a council or members of a council's staff in the 
area where a regional depot is established,
place conditions on licences or certificates of registration,
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• revoke registrations or licences,
• make exemptions from registration or licensing,
• require the creators of industrial waste to treat or store the waste in 
particular ways, and
• in emergency situations, require registration certificate or licence 
holders to take action that would otherwise be in breach of their 
certificate or licence conditions (Legislative Council, 25.11.70:8388-8341; 
Legislative Assembly, 25.11.70:8373-8376).
The Act was not to affect any of the waste collection activities undertaken by 
local government. In addition, due to considerations of the costliness of 
compensation, the range of tenure types, and the end use of landfills as parks or 
playing fields, the ownership of existing local government tips was to remain 
with local government (Legislative Council, 25.11.70:8338-8340).
Appeals over the granting of registration or licences, or over the conditions 
attached to them, were to go to the SPCC, whose decision would be final. An 
exception was government departments and public authorities, for whom 
appeals were to be to the Premier (Legislative Assembly, 25.11.70:8376).
The MWDA was to be funded by fees associated with the issuing of 
registrations and licences, and by a levy imposed on waste received at depots 
(Legislative Assembly, 25.11.70:8376). The MWDA could also be allocated such 
funds from Treasury from time to time as the Treasurer might determine. It 
appears that this part of the Act was written specifically to allay the fears of 
local government over the waste levy which had resulted in the Local 
Government Association lobbying Parliamentarians over the matter (Legislative 
Council, 25.11.70:8341).
The debate in both Houses on the Waste Disposal Bill seemed once again to be 
following a script provided by previous debates. Putting aside the fact that the 
Clean Waters Bill, the State Pollution Control Commission Bill and the Waste 
Disposal Bill were all dealing with environmental pollution in one way or
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another, the introduction of the Bills in rapid succession may have resulted in 
the fatigue and confusion of some members. The dates and times of the 
progression of the three Bills through both Houses are shown in table 4.2.
As the table shows, the greater part of the debate on the three Bills occurred 
over a period of two days, including evenings and the very early morning. 
Under these conditions, it is not surprising that several Opposition members 
criticised the Waste Disposal Bill for merely establishing an advisory committee 
(see, for example, Legislative Assembly, 25.11.70:8390, 8393), a criticism that 
would have been valid for the Clean Waters Bill, but not for the Waste Disposal 
Bill.
While fatigue may have resulted in some ill-considered criticism from the 
Opposition, there were nevertheless a number of valid themes of criticism that 
had been established in the debate on the earlier Bills. The Opposition re­
affirmed its commitment to a single authority for all environmental matters, its 
doubts over the objectivity of industry representatives, and its belief that 
environmental standards should be determined on technical rather than 
political grounds (Legislative Assembly, 25.11.70:8213).
As it had also argued previously, the Opposition maintained that there was a 
need for technical expertise from the environmental sciences or ecology 
(Legislative Assembly, 25.11.70:8390, 8394).
In a departure from its suggestions in earlier debates, the Opposition proposed 
that the two industry representatives on the MWDA should be replaced with 
two members of Parliament who had experience in industry (Legislative 
Assembly, 25.11.70:8394).
With his QCs precision, Neville Wran, Leader of the Opposition in the 
Legislative Council, pointed out that the Waste Disposal Act would result in the 
'curious situation' that the President of the MWSDB, as a member of the 
MWDA would be taking appeals to the SPCC, of which he was also a member.
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T able 4.2: P rogression  of the C lean W aters Bill, S tate Pollu tion  C ontro l
C om m ission  Bill an d  the W aste D isposal Bill th ro u g h  the Legislative A ssem bly  an d  
Legislative C ouncil in late 1970. Stages for w hich  no debate  occurred , such as 1st an d  
3rd read in g s in the Legislative A ssem bly an d  In troduc tions an d  1st and  3rd read in g s  in 
the Legislative C ouncil have been  om itted .
Bill Stage
C om m encem ent
Tim e Finish T im e
C lean W aters Bill In troduction  in  LA 9:06am, 27.10.70 9:48am, 27.10.70
C lean W aters Bill 2nd read ing  in LA 10:41am, 4.11.70 12:44pm, 4.11.70 — 
ad jo u rn ed
C lean W aters Bill 2nd read ing  in LA 12:43pm, 5.11.70 4:20pm , 5.11.70 — 
ad jo u rn ed
C lean W aters Bill 2nd read ing  in LA 3:57pm, 10.11.70 4:45pm , 10.11.70
C lean W aters Bill In C om m ittee  in  LA 4:45pm, 10.11.70 6:03pm, 10.11.70 — 
ad jo u rn ed
C lean W aters Bill In C om m ittee  in LA 3:42pm, 11.11.70 s7:45pm , 11.11.70
SPCC Bill In troduction  in  LA 11:56am, 19.11.70 sl2 :3 8 p m , 19.11.70
W aste D isposal Bill In troduction  in  LA 4:32pm, 24.11.70 s4:42pm , 24.11.70
C lean  W aters Bill 2st read ing  in  LC 8:52pm, 24.11.70 s ll :4 6 p m , 24.11.70
C lean W aters Bill In C om m ittee  in LC s i  1:46pm, 24.11.70 s i  1:47pm, 24.11.70 
— a d jo u rn ed
SPCC Bill 2nd read ing  in LA 10:20pm, 24.11.70 sl2 :4 8 am , 25.11.70
SPCC Bill In C om m ittee  in LA sl2 :48am , 25.11.70 sl2 :4 9 am , 25.11.70
SPCC Bill 2nd read ing  in LC 7:47pm, 25.11.70 s9:30pm , 25.11.70
SPCC Bill In C om m ittee  in LC s9:30pm , 25.11.70 s9:40pm , 25.11.70
C lean W aters Bill In C om m ittee  in LC 9:40pm ,25.11.70 10:15pm, 25.11.70
W aste D isposal Bill 2nd read ing  in LC 10:15pm, 25.11.70 s ll :0 7 p m , 25.11.70
W aste D isposal Bill In C om m ittee  in LC s i  1:07pm, 25.11.70 11:12pm, 25.11.70
W aste D isposal Bill 2nd read in g  in LA 3:30pm, 25.11.70 7:50pm , 25.11.70
W aste D isposal Bill In C om m ittee  in LA 7:50pm, 25.11.70 8:22pm, 25.11.70
Note: s signifies times not given in Hansard but estimated from adjacent entries.
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Finally, it is worth noting that several aspects of waste management that were 
to become central issues in future waste management policy received some 
attention in the debate over the Waste Disposal Act. Firstly, excerpts from 
Nixon's speech to Congress on pollution were quoted that referred to the need 
for a greater proportion of waste to be re-used and recycled (Legislative 
Council, 25.11.70:8345). Secondly, a report by the World Flealth Organisation 
was cited which referred to the essential need to reduce the generation of waste 
at the source (Legislative Assembly, 25.11.70:8390). The same speaker also 
described the re-use and recycling processes being used by Coca Cola and 
Reynolds Metals in the USA for glass and aluminium respectively. In effect, the 
NSW Parliament had been introduced in 1970 to all the elements of the waste 
management hierarchy (reduce, re-use, recycle, dispose) — a concept which 
was not to appear in policy discourse until the late 1980s, but which 
subsequently became the underpinning philosophy of the Waste Minimisation 
and Management Act of 1995.
5 THE METROPOLITAN WASTE DISPOSAL 
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As described in section 4.8.2, the statutory authority established by the 1970 
Waste Disposal Act to take responsibility for waste management in the Sydney 
region was named the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority (MWDA). It 
became the Waste Management Authority (WMA) on 1.7.1989 and the Waste 
Recycling and Processing Service (WRAPS or Waste Service) on 1.3.1992. 
Although the title of this chapter refers only to the first (and, to date, the longest 
lasting) of the three names, the chapter deals with this statutory authority from 
its establishment until December 1995. Similarly, in the material that follows, 
where statements are being made that refer to the period from the early 1970s to
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the mid-1990s, the term MWDA is used to describe collectively the MWDA and 
either or both of its successors.
5.1 Directors, Powers, and Objectives
On 14 May 1971, the Waste Disposal Act was proclaimed and the membership 
of the MWDA and the State Pollution Control Commission (SPCC) announced 
by the Minister for Environment Control, Bob Beale (SMH, 15.5.71:15; MWDA, 
1971-72:1). The director, Richard Connolly, had a background in local 
government, as did the management staff (appendix B5.1:l; Butlin, 1976:263).
According to Butlin (1976), the technical staff were mainly engineers and:
On the whole they are not highly qualified in data handling, planning and 
management and least of all in research and planning in respect of restraint on 
generation and encouragement to recycling.
(Butlin, 1976:263)
The Waste Disposal Act charged the Authority with responsibility for the 
disposal of waste in Sydney and conferred upon it:
...responsibilities, powers, authorities, duties and functions with respect to the 
transport, collection, reception, treatment, storage and disposal of waste within 
the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Region; and for purposes connected 
therewith.
(MWDA 1971-72:2)
According to the MWDA's citing of sections of the Act in its first annual report, 
its responsibilities, powers, authorities, duties and functions included:
• carrying out and commissioning surveys and studies,
• conferring with the SPCC on matters relating to waste and 
recommending to the Minister for Environment Control any legislative 
or other action considered necessary,
• providing reports to the Minister on waste-related matters referred to 
the MWDA by the Minister, and
• providing reports, on the MWDA's own volition, to the Minister for 
consideration (MWDA, 1971-72:2-3).
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The power the Authority had under the Waste Disposal Act to require 
industries to treat and store waste in certain ways was not mentioned.
The MWDA was to be funded by a levy on waste delivered to landfills in the 
Sydney region and in October 1971 announced a waste levy of 
64.64 cents per ton, which would raise about $500 000 annually (SMH, 
13.11.71:8).
Richard Conolly was Director of the MWDA from its inception in 1971 to 
December 1985. His position was taken by the Deputy Director, Peter Horsley, 
whose background was in local government engineering (MWDA, 1984-85:10, 
1985-86:3). Peter Horsley retired at the end of 1988 and John Cook was 
appointed as Director and Chairman of the Authority in January 1989. His 
background was in mining engineering, and he had previously been the Chief 
Mining Engineer (Minerals) with the NSW Department of Minerals and Energy. 
Under his directorship a review of the Authority's mission and objectives was 
undertaken. The mission and objectives of the organisation changed from an 
emphasis on waste transport and disposal to what was virtually a description 
of the waste management hierarchy (table B5.1 in appendix B5).
On 1.7.89, the MWDA became the Waste Management Authority (WMA), 
brought into effect by the Waste Disposal (Amendment) Act 1989 and the Waste 
Disposal (Further Amendment) Act 1989 (see section 6.3). The second Act of 
these two provided for a Board comprising the Managing Director of the 
Authority (at that time, John Cook) and six part-time members including the 
Chairperson. In contrast to the Board of the MWDA where industry 
representatives were in the minority (see section 4.8.2 and appendix B5.1:l), 
there were no stipulations as to the affiliations of the part-time members of the 
Board of the WMA. The first part-time members all had industry affiliations 
(WMA, 1989-90:30-31).
The objectives of the WMA remained those of the MWDA of the previous year 
as listed in the third column of table B5.1. However, in contrast to the previous 
year, the WMA emphasised the list of objectives was in 'hierarchical form' 
(WMA, 1989-90:6), a reference to the waste management hierarchy described 
earlier in the 1989-90 annual report.
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On 1.3.92, according to the terms of the Protection of the Environment 
Administration Act 1991, the Waste Management Authority (WMA) was 
abolished and its regulatory functions were transferred to the newly formed 
Environment Protection Authority. The operating functions were transferred to 
a new government trading enterprise, the Waste Recycling and Processing 
Service (WRAPS or the Waste Service). Under the Public Sector Management 
Act, the Managing Director of the Waste Service, John Cook, was required to 
enter into a performance agreement with the Minister for the Environment. It is 
worth noting that one of the performance indicators set for the Managing 
Director was 'Moving the culture of the Waste Management Authority from a 
focus on disposal of waste to minimisation and management of waste'
(WRAPS, 1991-92:65).
5.2 Waste Management Planning
5.2.1 Taking Stock in 1971
The first task of the newly formed MWDA was to take stock of the available 
landfill capacity and rates of waste generation, a task that was accomplished 
with the assistance of a number of consultants' studies (appendix B5.2.1:l-3). 
While the Authority faced formidable difficulties predicting the future size and 
nature of the waste stream, it was confident that the likely increase in the waste 
stream could be planned for (appendix B5.1.1:4). Landfill was nominated as the 
preferred method of disposal, both for its expedience and the benefits in 
creating recreational areas when landfills were completed (appendix B5.1.1:5-6). 
In its 1972-73 Annual Report, the MWDA reduced its estimate of four years 
remaining landfill space, to 2.5 years (MWDA,
1972-73:8).
5.2.2 Phase I and Phase II Plans
In broad terms, the aim of the MWDA's waste planning was to minimise the 
cost of waste disposal and its environmental impacts, while accommodating the 
growth in the waste stream and the decreasing availability of landfill space in 
the inner parts of Sydney. Throughout most of the 1970s and 1980s, the MWDA 
maintained that landfill was the most economical method of disposal (appendix 
B5.2.2:4, 6). The Phase 1 Plan, produced in 1974 and implemented in the mid-
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and late 1970s was essentially a 'tidying up' of the existing local government 
waste management infrastructure (appendix B5.2.2:2). The Phase II Plan, 
implemented in two stages from the late 1970s through the 1980s, committed 
the MWDA to a pattern of waste disposal in which waste brought to transfer 
stations by garbage collection trucks was compacted into long-haul semi­
trailers for transport to larger regional landfills on Sydney's outskirts (appendix 
B5.2.2:4-6).
During the first decade of so of its operation, the MWDA made significant 
advances in improving leachate control at landfills (MWDA, 1983-84:20-21), 
although the improved techniques added to the cost of waste disposal. The 
combination of environmental considerations focussed on leachate control, and 
the MWDA's goal of minimising waste disposal costs per tonne (appendix 
B5.2.25), led to a view of the relationship between waste quantities and 
environmental quality that seemed to suggest that increasing the volume of the 
waste stream would allow it to improve the level of environmental protection 
for a given level of waste charges:
The cost of providing environmental protection measures at waste disposal 
depots is high and must be spread over a considerable waste input to keep 
regional depot charges at reasonable levels.
(MWDA, 1982-81:24)
Similarly, in the 1987-88 Annual Report, within several paragraphs of noting 
that waste management organisations were increasingly pursuing policies of 
waste reduction, it was also noted that 'To keep waste disposal charges at a 
reasonable level, these costs must be allocated over a large waste input' 
(MWDA, 1987-88:40).
However, in 1989-90, the logic of paying for environmental protection by 
having a large waste stream was reversed:
The degree of impact on the environment from the disposal of community 
wastes is proportional to the quantities of waste requiring disposal.
(WMA, 1989-90:12)
Throughout much of the 1980s, the MWDA confidently stated that the supply 
of large holes resulting from the extractive industries on Sydney's outskirts 
would continue to provide landfill capacity for at least some decades (appendix 
B5.2.2:6-7, 9), even if the actual capacity at any one time might be as little as 
several years (appendix B5.2.2.2:8). By 1988-89, however, the Authority seemed
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to be less confident about future landfill capacity, noting that it was 'secured 
only until about the turn of the century' (MWDA, 1988-89:31).
5.2.3 Taking Stock in 1990 — The Sydney Solid Waste Management Strategy
By 1990, the Authority's confidence in the extractive industries providing it 
with a supply of large holes on Sydney's outskirts had completely evaporated. 
In contrast to its claim only nine years earlier that such holes would provide for 
Sydney's landfill needs for a further 30 years, the WMA warned that 'Landfill 
capacity for the large quantities of waste is simply not available in the Region' 
(WMA, 1989-90:9), and 'Adequate landfill capacity is available to meet demand 
only until 1998 on average' (WMA, 1989-90:11; 1990-91:15). The Chairman and 
Managing Director of the WMA in their prefatory review in the 1990-91 annual 
report stated 'Sydney is now facing a landfill crisis. Less than 6 years of landfill 
capacity remains' (WMA, 1990-91:6). According to informant 4, a former senior 
manager with the MWDA, an important factor in this unexpected decrease in 
projected available landfill capacity was the rapid increase in the rate of 
generation of solid industrial waste in the late 1980s. In addition, as the State 
Pollution Control Commission placed more stringent controls on private 
landfills that were disposing of solid industrial waste, more of this waste began 
to be delivered to MWDA landfills and transfer stations.
The Sydney Solid Waste Management Strategy was published in May 1990. In 
July 1990, the Strategy was presented to a seminar of Sydney councils. The 
Herald framed the release around the Harbour theme with a headline 'Sydney is 
making a Harbour of waste' and introducing the report with a warning 
attributed to the WMA that if Sydney continued to produce waste at the current 
rates, it would produce enough over the next 20 years to fill Sydney Harbour. 
The managing director of the Authority was reported as describing the 
situation with the rising costs of disposal, and the increasing volume of waste, 
as a 'crisis'. The Authority was reported as already negotiating waste 
minimisation programs with industry, and encouraging consumers to avoid 
excessive packaging and less durable goods, and to take up home composting. 
The Authority recognised that public perception of landfilling had become 'less 
favourable', but it was still the cheapest waste disposal option (SMH, 4.7.90:3). 
However, a move away from landfill was necessary because of the lack of 
suitable land in Sydney. The managing director of the Authority canvassed the 
possibility of the introduction of mandatory recycling by households and
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container deposit legislation to improve recycling returns, but also emphasised 
that the Authority preferred to work with local councils in a cooperative 
manner (SMH, 7.7.90:11).
According to the Authority, the Strategy was premised on the assertion that 
'Reducing the waste stream is essential' (WMA, 1989-90:9). The Authority 
further pointed out that the Strategy was a departure from the earlier Phase I 
and Phase II plans.
The -production of the Strategy rather than a third plan recognises the 
limitations of the present waste management system for Sydney in the future, 
given the dwindling availability of landfill space and that community attitudes 
towards waste ynanagement and the environment have evolved substantially 
since the mid 1980s.
(WMA, 1990-91:14)
The Strategy was 'based on the logical hierarchy of waste management 
techniques' and proposed a 40 per cent reduction in the waste requiring 
disposal by 2011 (WMA, 1990-91:14).
Following the public consultation period, the WMA summarised the public 
comment it received as lying in two main areas. Firstly, there was the 
'perceived threat' to the environment of landfills. Concerns were also raised 
about the inequity of the outer regions of Sydney receiving the wastes of the 
remaining part of the city. In all, the WMA concluded that 'Little positive 
support was received for landfill or any other form of waste disposal' (WMA, 
1990-91:16).
The second area in which public comment was received related to waste 
reduction targets. The WMA noted that opinion varied from those who called 
for a zero waste society, to those who felt that the 40 per cent reduction target 
proposed by the WMA was too optimistic.
These two diverse opinions clearly reflected the differing perceptions of the 
wider community and the waste industry towards increased waste reduction 
programmes. The wider community, in urging more challenging waste 
reduction targets, tended to focus primarily on the threat to the environment 
from the continuing growth in waste generation and disposal. On the other 
hand, the waste industry tempered this same concern with an awareness of past 
and current difficulties experienced in developing reliable and economical 
markets for some recovered materials.
(WMA, 1990-91:16)
The WMA expressed the view that, in balance, there was fairly widespread 
support for a more ambitious target than a 40 per cent reduction. The
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Government's abandonment of the Londonderry landfill proposal (see section 
6.4) and its decision to allocate responsibility for establishing landfills to local 
government and the private sector, together with the fact that some other States 
had set themselves 50 per cent reduction targets was seen by the WMA as 
evidence of this widespread support (WMA, 1990-91:16-17).
In 1990-91, with the demise of the WMA in sight, the NSW Government's 
decision not to establish any new landfills and the possibility that landfill 
establishment responsibility would be transferred to local government and the 
private sector, the Director, on behalf of the Board of the WMA urged the 
Government 'to retain an integrated regional approach to waste management, 
in line with overseas trends' (WMA, 1990-91:4). However, it appears that with 
the transfer of the regulatory functions of the WMA to the EPA and the 
formation of the Waste Service, a waste planning vacuum formed because, as 
the 1994-95 annual report of the Waste Service noted: 'there has been no 
government body with direct responsibility for waste in the Sydney 
Metropolitan Region since 1992, and initiatives to establish new technologies 
and divert waste from landfill slowed' (WRAPS, 1994-95:4). According to 
informant 4, most of the planning staff from the WMA were transferred to the 
EPA, but in that position had no authority to carry out waste planning.
Whereas the WMA had suggested a waste reduction target in 1990 as part of 
the sophisticated planning techniques used in the production of the Strategy, 
from late 1992 onwards, waste reduction targets were set by the Government in 
such policy documents as the Green Paper, 'No Time to Waste, and 'Waste 
Reforms' (see sections 7.7, 7.12 and 7.14). The Waste Service then prepared 
'waste reduction scenarios, showing how much material would have to be 
recovered from the waste stream to achieve the targets (appendix B5.2.4:l-3).
5.3 Regional Landfills and Transfer Stations
Throughout most of the 1970s and 1980s, the MWDA was able to establish new 
landfills and transfer stations without major community opposition (appendix 
B5.3:l-6, 8-13), although one proposal, for a regional landfill at Cecil Park, was 
abandoned due to community opposition (appendix B5.3:7). However, 
following the announcement by the Government in December 1989 of a new 
regional landfill at Londonderry, major community opposition emerged that 
was to have significant political consequences in the early 1990s. The
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Londonderry proposal is described in detail in section 6.4. While the public 
was becoming increasingly concerned about the environmental impacts of 
landfills, there is little doubt that the increasingly sophisticated expertise of the 
Authority and its Waste Service successor was reducing the likelihood of such 
impacts (appendix B5.3:17). Also in the early 1990s, the WMA tightened the 
registration requirements for operators of waste facilities (appendix B5.3:16).
5.4 Incineration of Municipal Solid Waste
The option of incinerating municipal waste was occasionally canvassed by the 
MWDA and its successors from the 1970s through to the early 1990s when, for 
example, the energy crisis of the mid-1970s focused attention on municipal 
waste as an energy source, and when landfill was becoming a less attractive 
option in the early 1990s due to community opposition (appendix B5.4:l-4).
5.5 Liquid Waste
Since the 1970s, the liquid waste produced in Sydney by industries such as 
brewing, tanning and electroplating has been disposed of in various ways: by 
legal or illegal discharge into the Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage 
Board's sewers, by illegal discharge into bushland and waterways, by legal 
disposal on land at the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority's Castlereagh 
Depot, or supplied to the Authority's treatment plant at Lidcombe. The third 
and fourth disposal routes (the MWDA's Lidcombe plant and Castlereagh 
Depot) are described in this section. The second disposal route (illegal 
discharge into bushland and waterways) is described in section 8.6. The first 
disposal route (discharge to sewers) is only marginally relevant to solid waste 
management policy and is touched upon briefly in this section (it was the 
subject of a detailed study by Beder, 1989).
5.5.1 The Central Treatment Plant
The planning for a central plant for treating liquid industrial waste began in 
1971. The Lidcombe Aqueous Treatment Plant was completed in October 1988 
— seventeen years after planning commenced. The long delay in establishing 
the plant can be attributed to a number of factors.
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Firstly, in the 1970s, there was considerable vacillation, with periods during 
which it appeared that the MWDA would build and operate a central treatment 
plant, alternating with periods when the MWDA ceased its planning and 
research on the assumption that the plant would be built and operated by the 
private sector (appendix B5.5.1:1-3). According to informant 4, firms had 
initially expressed willingness to construct a plant, but did not have sufficient 
information about the waste stream. When the MWDA undertook a survey of 
industry to obtain this information, the proponents of treatment plants found it 
impossible to get development consent from local government.
Both the slow pace of MWDA planning and the problem of private sector firms 
withdrawing after initially expressing interest was, at least in part, due to the 
extreme uncertainty over the quantity of liquid waste such a plant would be 
required to treat. For example, Butlin (1976:275) noted that the untreated 
volume of industrial waste discharged to sewers in the Botany catchment alone 
was thirteen times greater than the treated discharge to sewers across all of 
Sydney, and that this volume was some eight times greater than the volume of 
liquid wastes requiring to be treated at a central plant. Given the relatively 
loose control by the Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage Board 
(MWSDB) over industrial waste being discharged into its sewers (see, for 
example, Beder, 1989), and the possibility of the sudden emergence of political 
interest in this waste, a central waste plant operator faced two major 
uncertainties in supply. With the enormous volume of industrial waste going 
into the sewer system, any slight increase in enforcement activity or improving 
of standards could result in the plant having insufficient capacity to treat the 
waste diverted from the sewerage system. If the operator was to turn away this 
waste, it could attract unwelcome political attention to itself. On the other 
hand, if standards for discharge to sewers were relaxed, or enforcement 
relaxed, the operator of the plant could find the supply of liquid waste 
declining. Lastly, there was little evidence in the early and mid-1970s that 
illegal dumping of liquid industrial waste in bushland around Sydney would 
become subject to enforcement any more effective than the largely ineffective 
attempts at that time. Consequently, the operator always faced the risk that 
liquid waste transporters would find the treatment plant disposal price 
unattractive compared to risking illegal disposal.
Apart from the uncertainty due to the availability of illegal disposal and 
disposal into the sewerage system, the supply of liquid waste for treatment was 
also subject to Government pressure on industry to treat wastes on site, as
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occurred in the late 1970s when a Labor Government came into power 
(appendix B5.5.1:4-5). There is also some evidence that the Government may 
have, during the periods when it was thought that the centralised treatment 
plant would be built by the Government, discouraged private sector investment 
in such a treatment plant (appendix B5.5.1:l).
A second factor in the delay in establishing a central treatment plant was the 
combination of the MWDA decision to incorporate a high temperature 
incinerator in the plant, and the public awareness of hazardous (or 'toxic') 
waste which began to emerge in the late 1970s, catalysed, at least in part, by the 
Love Canal affair in the US. This meant that, by the time the MWDA was able 
to submit a development application for a plant at Fairfield in the early 1980s (a 
'toxic waste centre' according to the Herald), there was considerable community 
opposition, which resulted in the withdrawal of the application (appendix 
B5.5.2:6-9). With discussions occurring at the Federal level about establishing a 
national high temperature incinerator, the MWDA decided to forego the 
incinerator component of the plant and submit a development application to 
establish an aqueous treatment plant at Banksmeadow. This application faced 
council and community opposition and went to an inquiry under the 
Environment Planning and Assessment Act, the findings of which raised the 
possibility of other more suitable sites. The Minister for the Environment, Bob 
Carr, requested that the MWDA assess these other sites, one of which was 
adjacent to an existing transfer station at Lidcombe. This was within an area of 
derelict industrial land (later to become the Homebush Bay Olympic site), and 
within the boundaries of the Auburn Council, which had long had a fairly lax 
approach to waste disposal in its area (see, for example appendix B5.5:2-3). The 
Lidcombe plant was approved in October 1985 and completed three years later 
(appendix B5.5.1:6-16).
The impact of the uncertainty of the supply of liquid waste was evident a few 
years later when the capacity of the Lidcombe plant had to be almost doubled 
as a consequence of the introduction by the Sydney Water Board of more 
stringent standards for discharge of industrial wastes to its sewers. Several 
years after that, the financial viability of the plant was threatened when the 
supply of liquid waste declined due to competition from private sector plants 
that were taking the more easily treated forms of liquid waste (appendix 
B5.5.1:18-21).
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5.5.2 The Castlereagh Depot
The Castlereagh Depot was established in 1972 as a temporary site for land 
disposal of liquid industrial waste for several years until a centralised treatment 
plant was constructed at what was thought at that time would be the near 
future in 1975 (appendix B5.5.1:l; B6.5.2:6). The Depot was not closed until 
1997, and in its twenty-five years of operation was responsible for the land 
disposal of some one million tonnes of liquid industrial wastes (appendix 
B5.5.2:34). As described in chapter 7, the Castlereagh Depot played an 
important role in the waste politics of the early 1990s.
Right from the early 1970s, the Depot was surrounded by political contention. 
The Castlereagh site had been investigated, and rejected as unsuitable 
geologically in 1970 (appendix B5.5.2:l). Local residents and the Penrith 
Council, within whose boundaries the Depot lay, resisted its establishment, but 
were over-ridden by the powers of the Minister for Local Government 
(appendix B5.5.2:3-7). Also right from its earliest days, there were suspicions 
about the disposal of hazardous chemicals on the site. For example, it was 
claimed in July 1972 that hexachlorobenzene (the chemical which was 
subsequently stockpiled in large quantities by ICI Australia Ltd and a major 
reason for the national search for a means of intractable waste disposal in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s) was being discharged onto the ground at 
Castlereagh (section 8.6; appendix B5.5.2:3). It would appear also that 
politicians were aware from the time of establishment of the Castlereagh Depot 
of the potential for liquid industrial waste disposal to precipitate NIME (not in 
my electorate) policy paralysis (appendix B5.5.2:4).
During the 1970s and 1980s, concerns about the environmental and health 
impacts of the Depot were raised from time to time (appendix B5.5.2:15, 20, 22, 
31), and the MWDA gave various forms of assurance about the safety of the 
Depot (appendix B5.5.2:8, 19, 21, 25). Throughout most of the period, it was 
assumed that the Depot would be eventually rehabilitated for forestry and/or 
recreational use (appendix B5.5.2:6, 24). When it came to power in 1976, the 
Labor Government blamed the previous Coalition Government for the 
unsatisfactory means of dealing with liquid industrial waste (appendix 
B5.5.2:13). When it replaced the Labor Government in 1988, the Coalition 
Government was also able to blame the previous Government for the 
Castlereagh Depot (appendix B5.5.2.30). In 1981 and 1986, the planning 
permission to operate the site was renewed by the Government's recourse to
[ 129]
various means of over-riding Penrith Council's objections to the Depot 
(appendix B5.5.2:18, 23, 28).
The amounts of liquid industrial waste delivered to the Castlereagh Depot 
increased markedly in the mid-1970s and the late 1980s, while there was a 
period in the early 1980s, during which the volume of waste for disposal fell, 
due both to economic recession and attempts by the MWDA to have industry 
treat more of its waste on-site (appendix B5.5.2:ll, 17, 26, 32). By 1990, the 
amount of liquid waste being disposed of at the Castlereagh Depot had 
increased to 192 000 tonnes per year (appendix B5.5.2:40).
The 1990s brought a significant change for the MWDA in degree of political 
interest in the operation of the Castlereagh Depot. The newly elected Labor 
member for Londonderry, Paul Gibson, in whose electorate the Depot lay, 
actively brought the concerns of his constituents about the Depot before the 
Legislative Assembly and the media. These concerns centred around outbreaks 
of animal and crop deaths, cancers and birth deformities on the properties 
surrounding the Depot following periods of heavy rain (appendix B5.5.2:32, 33- 
35, 37). Gibson also raised doubts about the validity of the results from the 
monitoring of groundwater bores around the Depot site (appendix B5.5.2:38).
Gibson's claims resulted in testing of surface and groundwater by various 
organisations. Waste Management Authority and State Pollution Control 
Commission testing revealed no contaminants (appendix B5.5.2:36). While the 
Authority admitted that surface water discharges had taken place during heavy 
rain, it reassured the public that, according to studies undertaken by 
consultants, there was no evidence of deterioration in water quality (appendix 
B5.5.2:43). However, both a local group from the University of Western Sydney 
and Greenpeace contested these reassurances (appendix B5.5.2:41, 44), while a 
scientist from the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation 
reported that there were high levels of heavy metals in the soil adjacent to the 
Depot (appendix B5.5.2:47).
Another response by the Government to Gibson's claims was to set up the 
Castlereagh-Londonderry Catchment Inquiry Steering Committee, comprising 
Government department, local government and community representatives. 
This reported in late 1990 that there had been no environmental or health 
problems that could be attributed to the Depot (appendix B5.5.2:42). However, 
Gibson had provided information from the Committee to an independent and
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un-named environmental scientist who drew contrary conclusions and 
criticised the validity of WMA and SPCC investigations (appendix B5.5.2:48).
The Government also commissioned an independent environmental audit of 
WMA facilities (including the Castlereagh Depot). According to the Authority, 
the audit revealed no significant environmental impacts from the Depot, while 
local groups claimed the audit supported their belief that contamination from 
the Depot was causing health problems and birth deformities in animals 
(appendix B5.5.2:42, 50).
The Government then commissioned in October 1992 a second stage 
environmental audit and a program of community consultation through a 
community monitoring committee (appendix B5.5.2:52-53). The Waste Service 
also undertook an extensive program of testing at the Depot (appendix 
B5.5.2:56). During the period the audit was being conducted, Gibson reported 
further animal deaths from tumours, these being also covered in page one 
stories in the Herald (appendix B5.5.2-.57). It appears that also about this time the 
Minister for the Environment, Tim Moore, may have been beginning to 
appreciate that more than scientific investigation was required to calm public 
fears:
The Government wants to check out not only the factual basis of those concerns 
but also people's perceptions. Unless the perceptions of people are understood, 
their concerns cannot be addressed. Giving people a mass of scientific 
information will not solve their worries or lessen their anxieties.
(Legislative Assembly, 
21.4 .93:1393)
However, his successor, Chris Hartcher, was still placing his faith in scientific 
information a year later, pledging to introduce stricter monitoring and further 
work at the Depot to 'ensure public confidence in site safety' (Legislative 
Assembly, 10.3.94:545-546).
The interim, draft and final reports of the second stage audit (released between 
July 1993 and April 1994) pointed to minor contamination of groundwater 
immediately below the Depot, but concluded there was no evidence of wider 
contamination from the Depot. Local groups once more rejected the findings 
and pointed to continuing animal birth deformities (appendix B5.5.255, 59, 60).
In October 1994, the Herald ran several prominent articles on the findings of the 
Department of Health study into the raised incidence of brain cancer in humans
[ 131]
in the vicinity of the Depot. One of these articles made it clear that it would not 
be possible to establish scientifically any link between the Depot and brain 
cancers because of the many possible confounding factors (appendix B5.5.2:61).
In April 1995, the newly elected Labor Minister for the Environment announced 
that the Castlereagh Depot would be closed, while the Minister for Health was 
quoted by the Herald as saying that 'there was no concrete evidence that the site 
was a "health hazard", but the lingering doubt was enough to warrant its 
closure and it was better to be "safe than sorry"/ (SMH, 22.4.95:7) (appendix 
B5.5.2:62:63).
5.5.3 A Policy Shift — Industrial Waste Minimisation
Apart from a brief period in the late 1970s when the MWDA announced that 
industry should wherever possible treat liquid waste so that it could be 
disposed of in ordinary landfills (appendix B5.5.1), the MWDA was for much of 
its existence content to take whatever volumes of liquid waste industry 
produced. However, in the late 1980s, the MWDA once again espoused the 
policy that industry had a responsibility to reduce the generation of liquid 
waste. In 1990, the Authority added to its registration conditions for waste 
generating firms the requirement that such firms prepare waste management 
plans. By mid-1991, a substantial number of firms had prepared plans which, if 
adhered to, were estimated to reduce waste generation by 40 per cent (appendix 
B5.5.3:l-3). Given the significant reduction this approach could achieve, the 
question arises as to why it had not been tried years earlier. According to 
informant 4, the concept of a reduction plan as part of negotiated licence 
conditions had only been thought of in the late 1980s. A further reason for the 
success of the approach was that, because of the public agitation for the closure 
of the Castlereagh Depot, industry was aware that continued delivery of waste 
there was an unlikely option for the future, and that disposal costs were likely 
to rise.
5.5.4 Intractable Waste and Scheduled Waste
Following the decision of the Joint Task Force on Intractable Waste in December 
1988 that a high temperature incinerator would be established in New South 
Wales (see section 8.6), the New South Wales Government introduced the
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Waste Disposal (Amendment) Act in March 1989 to authorise the MWDA to 
own and operate a high temperature incinerator for the disposal of intractable 
waste (see section 6.3.1). With the selection of Corowa by the Joint Task Force 
in September 1990 as the site for the incinerator, the Waste Management 
Authority established an office in that town, which became the focus of 
community opposition (appendix B5.5.4:l; section 8.6). With the abandonment 
of Corowa as a site in November 1990 and the formation of the Independent 
Panel on Intractable Waste in March 1991, the WMA then proceeded to 
commence preparatory planning, in the belief that the Panel would recommend 
an incinerator site somewhere in New South Wales (appendix B5.5.4:l; section 
8.6).
The Authority's account of the high temperature incinerator siting efforts 
suggests that it had not really come to grips with the nature of community fears 
about toxic waste incinerators. On the one hand, in reporting on the Dames 
and Moore study that eliminated four of the sites it noted that it had been 
'judged that the real or perceived threats of degraded water resources could 
mitigate against the siting of a HTI [high temperature incinerator]'. On the 
other hand, it reported that 'educational material has been carried out to 
factually address community concerns' (WMA, 1990-91:36).
In July 1992, the Independent Panel recommended to ANZECC against a 
central high temperature incinerator in favour of small scale relocatable plants 
using alternative technologies (appendix B5.5.4:3). In 1993-94, the Waste 
Service commenced the development of a community consultation program 
and the marketing the of Plasma Arc Centrifugal Treatment to the principal 
holders of scheduled wastes in New South Wales (WRAPS, 1993-94:25).
5.6 Recycling
5.6.1 Early Assessments and Initiatives
From its earliest days, the MWDA regarded recycling as something that was 
desirable but infeasible until technological innovations or economic conditions 
made it economically viable (appendix B5.7.1:l-3). The MWDA cited this lack 
of viability and householder cooperation as reasons for abandoning a trial of 
source separation in the Manly-Warringah area in 1978 (appendix B5.7.2:l-2).
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5.6.2 Recycling Centres
By 1977, the MWDA had begun to open recycling centres at its regional 
landfills, although it tended to report on the centres in a lukewarm fashion up 
until the mid-1980s, referring to low prices for recycled materials and poor 
patronage by the public (appendix B5.7.3:l-3). In the mid-1980s, there were 
some improvements in prices and patronage (at least north of the Harbour), 
and the MWDA began to give recycling more prominent treatment in its annual 
reports (appendix B5.7.3:3-5). However, in the late 1980s, the MWDA also 
began to downplay the role and potential of the recycling centres, referring to 
them as 'final filters' to capture the small amounts of remaining recyclables in 
the waste stream after the bulk had been removed by kerbside collection 
(appendix B5.7.3:6-7). The amounts collected by the recycling centres in the 
1970s and 1980s were minuscule compared to the size of the domestic waste 
stream, being of the order of 0.3 per cent of the domestic waste stream in 1980 
increasing to 0.5 per cent in 1989 (table B5.2).
Another recycling initiative of the MWDA that operated throughout the late 
1970s and 1980s was the Recycling Hotline, which provided information to 
callers on the location of their nearest collection point for recyclables (appendix 
B5.7.4:l-2).
5.6.3 The Industrial Waste Exchange
The MWDA established and industrial waste exchange in 1977 which provided 
industry with listings of waste materials available and wanted. By the mid- 
1980s, the MWDA reported that the listings were tending to be dominated by 
low value wastes in which there was little interest in utilisation (appendix 
B5.7.5:l-2). It appears also that the MWDA's role was changing from a provider 
of information to facilitate market exchanges, to a broker operating in the 
market (appendix B5.7.5:3). It was not until the period of heightened political 
and media attention to waste management in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
that the WMA began to take more substantive action towards establishing 
resource recovery plants (appendix B5.7.5:4-6).
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5.6.4 Resource Recovery
The recovery of materials from waste in large automated plants was seen by the 
MWDA in the 1970s as having great potential. Diagrams of the waste stream in 
the late 1970s showed resource recovery as the major recycling pathway, in 
contrast to an almost insignificant pathway for source separation (figure 5.1).
However, by the 1980s, the enthusiasm had declined markedly due, it would 
appear, to concerns about the difficulties of marketing such materials (appendix 
B5.7.6:1).
Throughout most of this decade the MWDA maintained a watching brief on 
overseas developments and conducted a program of waste sampling and 
analysis. The latter was claimed to be necessary as the high capital investment 
in resource recovery warranted detailed knowledge of the nature of the waste 
stream (B6.7.6:l-3).
With the increased political and media attention directed towards waste 
management in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the WMA then began to take 
more substantive action towards establishing resource recovery facilities 
(B6.7.6:4-6).
5.6.5 The Government/Industry Working Party and the Buy Back Centre
In August 1979, the Labor Government established the first of two committees 
by which it attempted during its term in government to bring about higher 
levels of recycling. The Government/Industry Working Party comprised a 
MWDA member, a local government member and four packaging industry 
members. In December 1981 it recommended that the MWDA should maintain 
its watching brief on resource recovery, that there should be an awareness 
raising program with industry, and that kerbside collection and buy-back 
centres should be trialled as the most feasible options for increasing recycling 
(appendix B5.7.7:l-3).
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Figure 5.1: Figure 6 from the 1978-79 annual report, titled 'Potential for recycling'. The
text on the lower broad black arrow (not visible in this reproduction of the 
figure) read 'Potential for recycling from mixed waste'. (Source: MWDA, 
1978-79:26).
The MWDA successfully established a trial buy back centre at Glenquarrie in 
1984, but failed to establish a kerbside recycling trial due to the breakdown of 
negotiations with a council and, presumably, private collectors. According to 
informant 4, the council was reluctant to become involved because of the 
additional costs and the fear that income would not cover costs. The 
implementation of the Glenquarrie Buy Back and Recycling Centre carried the 
imprint of the packaging industry dominance of the Working Party, insofar as 
the Centre was intended to be set up as a form of reverse consumerism, with all 
the trappings of the modern supermarket (appendix B5.7.7:4-6).
The Glenquarrie Buy Back and Recycling Centre did not, however, live up to 
expectations, being marginally financially viable and receiving poor public 
patronage. The operation of the Centre was taken over by the Challenge 
Foundation (an organisation that provides employment for the mentally 
handicapped) in 1988, thus ending any hope of the Centre living up to the ideal 
of the reverse supermarket (appendix B5.7.8:1-7).
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5.6.6 The NSW Recycling Committee
The NSW Recycling Committee was the second of the two committees 
established by the Labor Government in an attempt to increase the level of 
recycling. In comparison to the Government /Industry Working Party, the 
NSW Recycling Committee had a wider membership — groups that had not 
been represented on the Working Party included the SPCC, the NSW Recyclers 
Association, the Australian Institute of Health Surveyors, the Australian 
Council of Recyclers and the Keep Australia Beautiful Council. The NSW 
Recycling Committee was formed in 1986-87 and released its report in August 
1988. The Committee found that some 22 per cent of the domestic waste stream 
had commercial value and recommended the improvement of kerbside 
recycling (appendix B5.7.9:l-2).
5.6.7 Recycling Initiatives in the Late 1980s and Early 1990s
While the Government /Industry Working Party and the NSW Recycling 
Committee (see sections 6.6.5 and 6.6.6, above) provided a forum for 
discussions between industry and the NSW Government on the question of 
raising the amount of recycling, the recommendations of these two groups 
tended to be cautious small scale initiatives that did not commit industry to any 
significant investment in recycling infrastructure. However, 1989-90 seems to 
mark a change in the dynamics of the relationship between the Government 
and industry. From this time, the WMA appears to have taken a more active 
role in negotiating recycling initiatives with industry, such as the establishment 
of a newsprint recycling plant in Albury and the labelling system for plastics 
that enabled various types of plastic packaging to be identified (appendix 
B5.7.11:1-4). Another symptom of the changed climate was that the WMA 
committed itself to a recycling target for the first time in 1989-90 (appendix 
B5.7.10:1).
In 1990, the Government introduced its Government Recycling Policy which 
aimed to create markets for recycled materials by requiring Government 
departments to purchase products with recycled content where possible 
(appendix B5.7.12:l-3). As noted in appendix B6.7, market development for 
recycled materials was an integral part of Coalition waste management policy
[ 137]
in the early 1990s, and Government department purchasing was one of the few 
areas open to a Government committed to less intervention in markets.
After making grants available for several years to local government for 
developing kerbside recycling schemes, the WMA introduced the Council 
Recycling Rebate Scheme in January 1991, which provided a rebate of 
$17.50 per tonne of recyclables collected (appendix B5.7.13:1-3). Viewed with 
the advantage of hindsight, there seems to be little reason that kerbside 
recycling could not have been established in the early 1980s when 
Government/Industry Working Party recommended in favour of it. According 
to informant 4, the main factor that resulted in the rapid acceptance on kerbside 
recycling in the early 1990s was that the high levels of public environmental 
concern and the publicity7 over the shortage of landfill capacity gave councils a 
reason for adopting it which outweighed their misgivings about the financial 
aspects.
5.7 Harnessing Decomposition — Compost and Methane
From 1977 to 1987, the MWDA conducted a program of research into producing 
chip mulch and compost from tree loppings and garden prunings. The 
technical aspects were investigated for the first seven years, followed by 
investigation of marketing aspects. It was not until 1994-95 that the Waste 
Service awarded a tender for carrying out composting of gardening and wood 
waste at one of its waste facilities. According to informant 4, the lengthy delay 
between research and implementation was again due to the reluctance of local 
government to become involved in composting projects.
The MWDA started trials in 1983 of methane extraction from completed 
landfills and from that time developed methane extraction networks at a 
number of its landfills, the methane being used to fire brick kilns and generate 
power (appendix B5.9:l-2).
5.8 Industry Relations
From 1971 to 1992, the period during which the MWDA and WMA had 
responsibility for regulation of waste generating, transporting and disposal 
industries, it maintained good relations with these industries through
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formalised liaison via industry representatives. The penal provisions of the 
Waste Disposal Act were rarely invoked — too rarely according to some 
(appendix B5.10:l-3).
5.9 The Defence of the Public Sector Role in Waste Disposal
While it had been a Coalition Government that created the MWDA as a public 
enterprise, from 1980, the Coalition in opposition began to make known its 
preference for private ownership of waste disposal (appendix B5.11:1-2). By the 
mid-1980s, the MWDA saw this (and, according to informant 4, the increasing 
interest in putrescible landfills being shown by the private sector) as sufficient 
threat to warrant the introduction of a substantial new section in its annual 
reports that argued for the retention of waste disposal in public ownership, the 
reasons advanced being that putrescible waste landfills, as high cost 
investments would be better used and managed after their closure if in public 
ownership, and that the Authority already contracted out a considerable 
fraction of its operations to the private sector (appendix B5.11:3).
During the latter half of the 1980s, the Coalition (in opposition until March 1988 
and in government thereafter), continued to strengthen its position on the 
privatisation of waste disposal, culminating with the Green Paper of 1992 and 
its policy document of 1994, 'No Time to Waste', both of which proposed to 
allow the private sector to operate putrescible waste landfills, although falling 
short of privatisation of the WMA (see sections 7.7 and 7.11). Up until the 
release of the Green Paper, the MWDA and WMA continued to oppose private 
sector involvement in putrescible waste disposal, arguing that the existing 
system gave the best of both worlds with the Authority handling regional 
planning and the private sector tendering for operational aspects (appendix 
B5.11:4-8).
While the Waste Service publicly supported the Government's policy of 
competition in the putrescible waste sector, it would have been able to place 
pressure on the Government to retain its monopoly in the sector by arguing that 
it would be unable to invest in the composting and resource recovery 
technologies that were essential to the achievement of the 60 per cent waste 
reduction target. The reason for this was, presumably, that private sector 
putrescible landfills would not be attempting to develop the these technologies, 
thereby making their disposal price lower and introducing uncertainty into the
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supply of putrescible waste to the Service (appendix B5.11:9-10). According to 
informant 4, the Authority did actually withdraw from investing in composting 
and resource recovery technologies as a consequence of the uncertainty created 
by the Coalition Government's preference for private sector involvement in 
putrescible waste landfills.
5.10 Public Consultation and other Responses to Public Opinion
The relationship between the MWDA and the public underwent considerable 
changes between the 1970s and the 1990s. For most of the 1970s, the MWDA's 
contact with the public involved providing information and advice in much the 
same way as any statutory authority of the time (appendix B5.12:l). However 
in the early 1980s, with the difficulties experienced by both the private sector 
and the Authority in siting a centralised liquid waste treatment plant, and the 
observation by Authority staff of such plants had been successfully sited close 
to residential area through appropriate community consultation, the Authority 
began to take a more purposeful approach. This assumed that if it made full 
disclosure of its plans to establish landfills, and informed the public why there 
was a need for the landfills and how the impact would be minimised, then there 
would be less problems with community opposition (appendix B5.12.1:1-4).
This approach was successfully used with the Mill Creek extension to the Lucas 
Heights landfill (appendix B5.125).
While there is some evidence that the MWDA had some doubts about the 
wisdom of full disclosure of all plans in the late 1980s (appendix B5.12:7), by the 
early 1990s, it was obtaining community input to the most central and 
professionalised of its activities — long term waste planning (appendix B5.12:8- 
9). With the difficulties of landfill siting in the 1990s (see sections 7.4 and 7.5), 
the Authority continued to develop a more sophisticated approach, with both 
public relations strategies based on market research that put across simple 
messages via the mass media and formalised ongoing public consultation 
procedures in the vicinity of its facilities (appendix B5.12:13-17).
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6 THE WASTE MINIMISATION AND 
MANAGEMENT ACT 1995
6.1 Context and Precedents
6.1.1 Growth of Environmental Concern
6.1.2 Federal Waste-Related Initiatives
6.1.3 NSW State Environmental Politics and Policy
6.2 Early Concerns about the MWDA and Landfills
6.3 Legislative Change 1970-1990
6.3.1 The Debate on the Waste Disposal (Amendment) and 
Waste Disposal (Further Amendment Bills of 1989
6.3.2 The Waste Management Authority’s Legislative Proposals
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6.7 The Green Paper on Waste Management
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6.14 From Landfill Moratorium to 'Waste Reforms’
6.15 Labor Policy Document — ‘Waste Reforms’
6.16 The Waste Minimisation and Management Bill 1995
6.1 Context and Precedents
In  February 1980, the member for Campbell town noted in the Legislative 
Assembly that:
Although we are dealing only with amendments to the Act, legislation dealing 
with waste disposal, still in its infancy, w ill later occupy many hours of the 
time of this Parliament and w ill incur tremendous cost for the community in 
remedy.
(Legislative Assembly, 
27.2.80:4858)
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Although the 'later' to which he referred was to be some ten years later, he was 
quite correct with regard to the hours of Parliamentary time and the 
community costs incurred by the Waste Minimisation and Management Act of 
1995. This Act brought about a major reorganisation in waste management 
arrangements in Sydney and followed a period of heightened attention to waste 
issues in the legislature, in the media, in Government departments and among 
environmental groups. This commenced in the late 1980s, although there are a 
number of events starting from not long after the passing of the Waste Disposal 
Act in 1970 that are relevant to what occurred in the late 1980s and the early 
1990s. There are also a number of features of the period between the two Acts 
which, while not completely independent of what was happening in Sydney 
with waste management policy, nevertheless served as a context within which 
the evolution of waste management policy took place.
6.1.1. Growth of Environmental Concern
According to a number of national public opinion polls, environmental concern 
declined during much of the 1970s and 1980s, but increased sharply in 1989.
The volume of waste-related articles in the Herald, shows much the same 
pattern (appendix B6.1.1:1-2). However, the pattern of articles about dangers 
from chemicals and toxic waste increased for much of the period from 1970, to a 
peak in 1987, and decreased substantially thereafter (appendix B6.1.1:3-4).
6.1.2. Federal Waste-Related Initiatives
While there was some appreciation of waste issues in the Federal political 
sphere as early as the 1970s (appendix B6.1.1:1-3), the first substantive policy 
action did not occur until the early 1990s. At this time, a number of negotiated 
agreements were endorsed by the Australia and New Zealand Environment 
and Conservation Council (ANZECC), including the National Packaging 
Guidelines in 1991, and the National Kerbside Recycling Strategy and the 
National Waste Minimisation and Recycling Strategy in 1992 (appendix 
B6.1.1:4-14, 17). The first of these agreements set a target for the reduction in 
the per capita amount of packaging waste for disposal to be achieved by 2000, 
the second set targets for the proportions of various types of packaging that 
would be recycled by 1995, and the third set a target of a reduction in the per 
capita amount of waste to landfill of 50 per cent by 2000.
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There is some evidence to suggest that these targets were set by ANZECC 
without a great deal of reference to either economic or environmental 
assessments of what the targets might achieve. This was certainly the view of 
the Commonwealth Office of Regulation Review in 1993 (appendix B6.1.1:13) 
and was corroborated by key informant 1 (section 3.5). This person noted that 
the targets were 'policy devices' rather than 'concrete ceilings', and 'reflect a 
common goal for improving performance'.
The conservation movement was of the view that the targets did not provide 
any compulsion for industry, and would therefore be ineffective (appendix 
B6.1.1:12). However, a number of the targets set in the National Kerbside 
Recycling Strategy were shown to have been achieved within a few years 
(appendix B6.1.1:17, figure B6.1).
The National Waste Minimisation and Recycling Strategy acknowledged the 
concept of the waste hierarchy and, consistent with the confused reporting of 
waste quantities in the early 1990s (see section 11.2.3), the 50 per cent per capita 
target was reported as a total quantity target by the Herald (appendix B6.1.1:9). 
Even the 1990-91 annual report of the NSW Waste Management Authority did 
not make clear the nature of the target being discussed in the period prior to the 
endorsement of the Strategy (appendix B6.1.1:8). The confusion surrounding 
the Strategy was noted by an Inquiry into waste management that was held by 
the Senate Standing Committee on the Environment, Recreation and Arts in 
1994 (appendix B6.1.1:24).
The Committee found a serious lack of the sorts of information it considered 
necessary for rational policy-making and its recommendations were, in the 
main, incremental adjustments to existing policy, rather than pointing to new 
directions for policy (appendix B6.1.1:23). The conclusions of the Committee 
reflected a hybrid of the two interpretations of the waste management 
hierarchy (the menu of options v. the hierarchy of options — see section 11.3.1). 
The Committee argued that high priority had to be given to waste 
minimisation, recycling and re-use, and that more economic and environmental 
information was needed so that choices could be made between these three 
options to suit particular waste management circumstances (appendix 
B6.1.1:23).
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6.1.3. NSW State Environmental Politics and Policy
The need to respond to environmental concerns in the electorate caused 
problems for both the Coalition and Labor Governments of the 1970s. The 
Coalition Government experienced difficulties with the distribution of 
responsibility and friction between existing departments and the State Pollution 
Control Commission — difficulties that were not made any less by the 
outspoken Jack Beale, the first Minster for Environment Control (appendix 
B6.1.3:1-14).
The emergence of concerns about the environment that were related to the 
impacts of industry meant that both the Coalition and Labor when in 
government had to balance the demands of the middle class supporters with 
pro-environmental views against industry demands (in the case of the 
Coalition) or trade union demands (in the case of Labor) (appendix 
B7.1.3:15-16)
The Labor Wran and Unsworth Governments, in power from 1976 to 1988, were 
responsible for strengthening environmental regulation, although Labor lost the 
support of the green movement in the 1988 election (appendix B6.1.3:17-25).
A Coalition Government under Premier Nick Greiner came to power in 1988. 
This Government mixed conservative political ideology and environmental 
ideals under the banner of 'new environmentalism', which favoured the 
achievement of environmental goals by harnessing market forces rather than 
burdening the market with regulation, and the separation of regulatory and 
operational functions in government agencies. The Minister for the 
Environment, Tim Moore, appears to have supported the ideal that effective 
environmental regulation and policy making depended upon objective 
scientific investigation (appendix B6.1.3:26-27).
As will be described in greater detail below, waste issues became politicised in 
the 1991 election, in which the Coalition lost its absolute majority in the 
Legislative Assembly, and the 1995 election, in which Labor won government.
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6.2 Early Concerns about the MWDA and Landfills
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s there was broad support from both sides 
of politics for having waste management handled by a central government 
agency (appendix B6.2:2,15). However, there were also concerns expressed by 
both sides of politics in the mid-1970s that the MWDA should be making a 
greater investment in the centralised resource recovery plants of the type that 
were being established at that time in the USA (appendix B6.2:9, 20). However, 
it appears that it was the view of the Executive, consistent with the reservations 
expressed by the MWDA, that centralised resource recovery was not 
economical, that considerable recycling collection was being carried out already 
by the glass and paper industries (appendix B6.2:18).
It is worth noting that the concerns expressed in the Legislative Assembly in the 
mid-1970s involved many of the elements that were to surface in the 1990s, 
including the increasing per capita generation of waste (particularly packaging 
and plastics), Sydney Harbour as the measure of volume, increasing waste as 
symptomatic of a societal deficiency, the sense of urgency due to lack of landfill 
capacity (then estimated to be 2.5 years), the finiteness of resources and the 
problem of NIME (not in my electorate) induced policy paralysis (appendix 
B6.2:4-8,13).
The mid-1970s also marked the cusp between the old landfill logic whereby 
waste areas such as swamps and mangrove fringed estuaries were transformed 
into useful recreational area, and the new landfill logic that saw such infilling as 
destroying natural areas of ecological value that also had recreational value in 
their own right. At this time, the Coalition expressed preference for the old 
landfill logic, while it was Labor that articulated the new landfill logic 
(appendix B6.2.4:12,16).
6.3 Legislative Change 1970-1990
Minor amendments of an administrative nature were made to the Waste 
Disposal Act in 1980 and 1986 (appendix B6.3:l-3).
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6.3.1. The Debate on the Waste Disposal (Amendment) and Waste Disposal 
(Further Amendment) Bills of 1989
The Waste Disposal (Amendment) Bill of 1989 was to change the name of the 
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority to the Waste Management Authority, 
and to authorise it to own and operate a high temperature incinerator for the 
disposal of intractable waste. This incinerator was to take waste only from 
within Australia, and the issue of siting the incinerator was to be dealt with 
completely separately from the legislation to enable the Waste Management 
Authority to own and operate the incinerator.
The Waste Disposal (Further Amendment Act) Bill of 1989 aimed to apply 
several of the tenets of the Government's 'new environmentalism' to the Waste 
Management Authority. Firstly, regulatory and operational roles were to be 
separated by transferring the regulatory role to the State Pollution Control 
Commission. Secondly, the Government attempted to influence the 
environmental performance of the Authority by restructuring the Board so that 
it was able to appoint Board Members with environmental expertise 
(Legislative Assembly, 5.4.89:5910-5912). The Opposition did not take issue 
with the principle of separation of regulatory and operational roles, but did 
question whether appointment of environmental expertise to the Board could 
overcome organisational momentum (Legislative Assembly, 12.4.89:6346).
The debate on the Waste Disposal (Amendment) and Waste Disposal (Further 
Amendment) Bills of 1989 was distinctly different from previous waste 
management debates in a number of respects. Firstly, members from both sides 
of politics repeatedly emphasised the need for community consultation if the 
high temperature incinerator was to have any chance of being sited. Such was 
the sensitivity to community concerns, the Government was prepared to 
relinquish its ideal of increasing privatisation of waste management and ensure 
that the high temperature incinerator remained in public ownership. The new 
hypersensitivity about community concern did not, however, prevent some 
members from expressing the assumption long held by administrative 
rationalists (see Dryzek, 1997), that the community would accept the need for 
an incinerator if they were privy to the knowledge of the experts (appendix 
B6.3.1:4-11)..
The second novel aspect of the debate was the emphasis, from both the 
Coalition and Labor on a bipartisan approach to the problem of disposing of
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intractable wastes. The Government aimed to separate the issue of a site for the 
high temperature incinerator from the issue of the operation of the incinerator 
by first establishing the Waste Management Authority as the operator through 
the Waste Disposal (Amendment) Bill. Politicians on both sides of the House 
appeared to be only too aware of the potential for policy paralysis if the siting 
of the incinerator were to become an election issue, rather than being sited, as 
the Minister for the Environment, Tim Moore, hoped, on 'a totally political 
value neutral basis' (appendix B6.3.1:12-22).
The Waste Disposal (Amendment) Bill of 1989 was also notable for the 
increased influence of at least some sections of the environmental movement, 
both in having their arguments presented and acknowledged in Parliament, 
and in having amendments suggested by these sections of the movement 
moved by the Opposition and accepted by the Government (appendix 
B6.3.1:23-27).
6.3.2. The Waste Management Authority’s Legislative Proposals
In May 1990, the Waste Management Authority put forward a number of 
proposals in a discussion paper for legislation to replace the Waste Disposal 
Act. Among these proposals were some that were subsequently incorporated 
in policy documents of either or both the Coalition and Labor Governments, 
and in the 1995 Waste Minimisation and Management Act, including 
formalised and enforceable industry waste reduction plans, the retention of the 
Authority's monopoly on putrescible waste disposal, and the extension of the 
Authority's area of operations (appendix B6.3.2:!).
6.4 The Proximate Roots of the Waste Crisis — Londonderry
By the late 1980s, there was a need for a regional landfill in the north west 
region of Sydney. In December 1989, the Parliamentary Urban Development 
Committee of Cabinet chose a site at Londonderry from a list of sites and 
recommendations by the Waste Management Authority (appendix B6.4:l-3). 
The Londonderry site was opposed in the Land and Environment Court by the 
Penrith Council, which could not refuse a development application by a Crown 
authority, but sought a full environmental impact statement for the proposal, 
rather than the lesser document of a statement of environmental effects. The 
Penrith Council lost its case on technical grounds, but appealed the decision to
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the Supreme Court which, in December 1990, ruled that a full environmental 
impact statement was required (appendix B6.4:5, 8).
By early 1991, public meetings and petitions made it clear to the Government 
that there was considerable community opposition to the Londonderry 
proposal (appendix B6.4:ll, 14). The Liberal member for Penrith, Guy 
Matheson, who held the seat by a very slim margin, broke ranks and publicly 
opposed the proposal. With three other marginal Liberal seats in the vicinity of 
Londonderry, and an election a few months away, the Government announced 
in March 1991 that it had abandoned the proposal and that there would be no 
further landfills or transfer stations established by the Waste Management 
Authority — rather, these would become the responsibility of local government 
(appendix B6.4:9-10,13). Furthermore, the Government believed that the 
amount of waste requiring landfilling could be cut by half by recycling and 
composting (appendix B6.4:15).
6.5 The Lucas Heights Extension Proposal
Notwithstanding the Government's change in policy, the Waste Management 
Authority announced in October 1991 that it intended to extend the Lucas 
Heights regional landfill, amounting to a doubling in size. The Sutherland 
Shire Council, with a majority of Labor councillors, mobilised against the 
proposal (appendix B6.5:l-4). The development application was submitted in 
March 1992 and, amid substantial expressions of community opposition, the 
matter was referred to a Commission of Inquiry under the Environment 
Planning and Assessment Act (appendix B6.5:6-9).
The Commission of Inquiry commenced in June 1992, with three Liberal 
ministers opposing the Lucas Heights extension on the grounds that it was not 
consistent with the Government's move towards decentralised waste 
management. The Commissioner ordered that the Government release the 
Travers Morgan report into future waste management arrangements in Sydney 
that had been commissioned the previous year after the Government's 
withdrawal of the Londonderry proposal. The Government's response was to 
announce it would appeal the order before the Land and Environment Court 
(appendix B6.5:13-18).
Following the release by the Government and Sutherland Shire Council of legal 
opinion and counter-opinion as to the legality of the proposal, and further
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public protest, the development application was withdrawn in September upon 
the release of the Green Paper on Waste Management which set out the 
Government's policy not to support any landfills that did not have the support 
of the local community (appendix B6.5:19-25).
6.6 The Castlereagh Overtopping Proposal
While the placement of municipal solid waste on top of the Castlereagh Depot 
had been considered by the MWDA as early as 1981 (B6.2.2:7), and had been 
trailed in the late 1980s (B6.5.2:25-29), this proposal became a significant 
political issue in the early 1990s. While there is no doubt that the overtopping 
would have provided some relief to the shortage of landfill capacity brought 
about by the failure of the Londonderry and Lucas Heights extension 
proposals, the WMA justified its overtopping proposal in January 1992 more as 
a basis for rehabilitating the area. The community in the vicinity of Castlereagh 
had already been mobilised over concerns about the health and environmental 
impacts of the Castlereagh Depot (see, section 6.5.2), and opposed the 
overtopping proposal. The Labor Opposition gave an undertaking that the 
proposal would be shelved under a Labor government (appendix B6.6:1-3).
In September 1992, the Labor member for Londonderry, Paul Gibson, 
introduced into the Legislative Assembly a private members bill, the 
Castlereagh Liquid Waste Disposal Depot Bill, the main aim of which was to 
prevent the overtopping of the Castlereagh Depot with solid waste, and remove 
the legal uncertainty as to whether State Environmental Planning Policy No 3 
(SEPP3) (by which the Wran Government had expanded the Depot against the 
wishes of the Penrith Council in 1981), would allow overtopping or not 
(appendix B6.6:4-5). The Bill was debated in the Legislative Assembly in 
September 1992 and March 1993, and passed in April 1993, when two 
independents voted with Labor to defeat the Coalition minority government 
(appendix B6.6:5, 7-12).
Of all the debate over the Castlereagh Liquid Waste Disposal Depot Bill, it was 
probably the analysis provided by the Labor member for St Mary's,
Mr A.S. Aquilina, that made the political strategic implications for the 
Government the most clear. Given the concerns over the shortage of landfill 
space, any government would want to keep its options open with potential 
disposal sites. The Coalition Government, provided the Bill was not passed,
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could do this by retaining the existing SEPP 3, at the same time limiting political 
damage by maintaining that SEPP 3 was a Labor initiative and undertaking the 
environmental audit. However, there was some doubt as to whether SEPP 3 
would withstand a legal challenge to overtopping. Furthermore, by not 
allowing the environmental impact assessment process, the Government was 
exposed to claims of inconsistency with the considerable emphasis it had been 
placing on this in other areas of policy (Legislative Assembly, 11.3.93:682-685). 
Also, since an amendment to the Bill by Labor had been foreshadowed whereby 
the proponent and consent authorities for any overtopping proposal would be 
separated, the Government's opposition to the Bill would be inconsistent with 
the thrust of the Coalition Government's 'new environmentalism' which 
espoused the principal of separating operational and regulatory roles 
(Legislative Assembly, 3.11.93:700-701).
6.7 The Green Paper on Waste Management
In September 1992, the Government released its Green Paper on Waste 
Management. This positioned the Government as the blameless victim of a 
disposal-focused bureaucracy, the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority 
(appendix B6.7.L1-2). While the Green Paper's enunciation of the goals of 
reducing the volume of waste generated and improving the regulation of waste 
management facilities could be plausibly justified by reference to growing 
public concern about waste and landfills, the justification for shifting away 
from the centralised waste management authority that had been the main thrust 
of the Coalition's 1970 Waste Disposal Act was scarcely plausible, appearing 
more like rationalisation of the Government's March 1991 decision to disengage 
from involvement in landfill siting (appendix B6.7.L3-5).
The Green Paper described five principles that underlay its policy prescriptions: 
the 50 per cent waste reduction target introduced by the Federal Government 
the preceding June, a 'voluntary framework' for the achievement of this target, 
the waste management hierarchy (in a market-dictated menu of options form), 
full cost pricing of waste disposal and 'the whole community playing a role in 
waste reduction' (appendix B6.7.2:l-7).
Although many of the Green Paper's proposals were simply restatements of 
policies already in place, it did propose that:
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• the Waste Service, excluding the Castlereagh Depot and Lidcombe 
Aqueous Waste Treatment Plant, should be made available for purchase 
by local government,
• communities accepting regional landfills should receive compensation,
• the Independent Regulatory and Pricing Tribunal should undertake a 
review of waste pricing, and
• the Waste Prevention and Minimisation Plans introduced by the WMA 
for industry might become part of the licence conditions administered 
by the EPA (appendix B6.7.3:l-5, 7, 9).
The Government also took pains to refute the arguments for putrescible waste 
landfills remaining in public control, for enforceable waste reduction targets on 
industry and for container deposit legislation, although it hinted at the possible 
introduction of such legislation, and product bans if voluntary approaches were 
ineffective (appendix B6.7.3:8-14).
One page of the 39 page document was devoted to concrete proposals for action 
by the Government, These were that the Government would:
• reconvene the inactive New South Wales Recycling Committee (see 
appendix B6.7.9),
• announce the terms of reference for the Joint Select Committee on Waste 
Management, and
establish a Local Government Reference Group to provide local 
government with improved access to the Committee and greater 
opportunity to put its views to the Committee (Hartcher, 1992:37).
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6.8 The Joint Select Committee on Waste Management
Because the Opposition and independents were able to defeat the Fahey 
Government on the floor of the Legislative Assembly, and because the 
independent member for Manly had signalled in February 1992 his intention to 
introduce a private members bill for a public inquiry into waste management 
and its privatisation, the Government introduced its own motion to establish a 
Joint Select Committee in March 1992 (appendix B6.8.1:l-2).
The terms of reference for the Joint Select Committee on Waste Management 
were announced in October 1992 (not long after the release of the Green Paper) 
and generally required the Committee to report on the issues raised in the 
Green Paper. The terms of reference did not mention liquid industrial waste 
disposal (appendix B6.8.2:l-2).
The Committee comprised ten members, five of whom were Coalition 
members, three were Labor members, one was the Australian Democrats MLC, 
Richard Jones and one was the independent MLA for Manly, Dr Peter 
Macdonald. Perhaps symptomatic of the loss of confidence at this time among 
legislators in their ability to make decisions that would not be a threat to their 
political survival, the Committee included for the first time in Parliamentary 
history Reference Groups who would be privy to the submissions received by 
the Committee and provide the Committee with responses to the submissions 
(appendix B6.8.2:3-4).
The Committee commenced its deliberations on 29 October 1992 and completed 
them on 31 August 1993. The report of the Committee was published in 
September 1993.
The Joint Select Committee, in comparison with the policy outputs of the 
Coalition Government during the early 1990s, was significant for the way in 
which it allowed Labor and the Coalition to further develop and differentiate 
their respective policy positions on waste management, and for its articulation 
of some of the more complex and substantive issues in waste management that 
appeared not to have received serious thought up until that time, at least 
among parliamentarians.
The differences between the Coalition on the one hand, and Labor and the cross 
bench members on the other were made clear with the issuing by the
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Committee of a majority report and a minority report. The main differences are 
described below.
• The majority report proposed that only responsibility for achievement of 
waste reduction goals and regulation of environmental impacts of waste 
facilities should lie with the State Government. Waste planning should 
be done by regional groupings of councils and the Waste Service 
operated as a Local Government Business Enterprise in competition 
with private sector waste transporters and landfill operators (appendix 
B6.8.3:8, 23-26). The minority report held that the State Government 
should have the central role as waste management planner and 
operator, with the private sector specifically excluded from operating 
putrescible waste landfills (appendix B6.8.4:2, 3, 6).
• The majority report recommended that container deposit legislation 
should not be introduced (see section 10.5), while the minority report 
proposed that container deposit legislation should be introduced in 
three years if waste reduction targets were not met by the packaging 
industry (appendix B6.8.4:4).
• The majority report accepted the EPA submission view point that 
incineration had a role to play in modern waste disposal
(see section 8.4), while the minority report recommended a ban on 
further development of incineration in New South Wales (appendix 
B6.8.4:5).
The only justification provided for regionalisation of waste management in the 
majority report was that it was happening in Victoria and the USA (appendix 
B6.8.3:23).
The more complex and substantive issues in waste management that surfaced 
with the Joint Select Committee's deliberations generally revolved around the 
application of neo-liberal political ideology and economic logic to waste 
management. These included:
• the problem that raising waste disposal prices to discourage the 
generation of waste is also likely to lead to illegal dumping which is 
costly to detect and prosecute (appendix B6.8.3:17),
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• the problem of maintaining the financial viability of organisations, 
private or public, that depend on waste disposal charges for their 
revenue, when the volume of waste being disposed of is decreasing 
(appendix B6.8.3:18),
• the problem that requiring environmental bonds and guarantees to 
cover any after-care of landfills may act as a barrier to entry to smaller 
firms, thus reducing the potential for a competitive waste disposal 
industry (appendix B6.8.3:22).
The Joint Select Committee hearings were also important in making the 
interests of the private sector waste industry more explicit. For example, it was 
evident that, despite the difficulties the MWDA and WMA had experienced in 
siting large landfills, the private sector was confident that, with appropriate 
community consultation and access to negotiation with local government, it 
would be able to site landfills, particularly if there was a means of paying 
compensation to local communities (appendix B6.8.3:11, 15-16). The larger 
players, such as Pacific Waste Management, favoured stricter environmental 
regulation, presumably either to reduce uncertainties in investing in landfills or 
to act as barriers to entry by potential competitors (appendix B6.8.3:26).
Lastly, it should be noted that the Joint Select Committee majority report 
recorded the different versions of the waste management hierarchy diagram 
that were being used by various interest groups to position themselves in the 
waste management debate of the early 1990s (see section 11.1.3; 
appendix B6.8.3:3-6).
6.9 Disengagement of the State from Waste Policy
While the State Government's announcement in March 1991 that landfill siting 
would become the responsibility of local government may have been a 
defensive strategy precipitated by a looming election, marginal seats in the 
vicinity of Londonderry and continuing community resistance to the 
Londonderry proposal (section 6.4), the State Government was then faced with 
the problem of providing some policy substance to the announcement. While 
the Green Paper, the Joint Select Committee and 'No Time to Waste' (see 7.12, 
below), provided some of this substance, the gradual evolution of the 
Coalition's disengagement from waste policy was marked by a number of other
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policy announcements and leaks. In the period from March 1991 to the release 
of the Green Paper in September 1992:
• the Government announced financial assistance to local government as 
the State Government moved away from regional landfills to smaller 
ones owned and operated by local government,
• a leaked Cabinet Office document revealed the Government was 
considering privatising or handing over to local government the WMA, 
and
• the Government announced that its policy of non-interference in local 
government would be implemented using State Environmental 
Planning Policies (SEPPs) (appendix B6.9:2-4).
6.10 The Formation of Labor Waste Policy
As mentioned in section 6.8, the Joint Select Committee in 1993 was important 
in the articulation and differentiation of Coalition and Labor waste policy. 
Other sources suggest that Labor had begun to form its waste policy in early 
1992, with the setting of a target of a 25 per cent reduction in the waste going to 
landfills. In late 1992, the leader of the Opposition, Bob Carr, announced that 
Labor's election policy included a 60 per cent reduction in waste to landfill, 
thereby trumping the Federal and State Governments' targets of 50 per cent. 
The Labor policy also specifically targeted two rapidly growing components of 
the waste stream, green waste and building waste, as well as requiring the 
packaging industry to prepare waste management plans (appendix B6.10:1-2).
Labor's waste policy for the 1995 election included a state-wide waste 
management plan, no ownership of putrescible waste facilities by the private 
sector, a prohibition on the expansion of incineration in New South Wales, the 
introduction of container deposit legislation, the phasing out of yard waste and 
a requirement for industry to meet waste reduction targets (appendix B6.17.3).
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6.11 The Policy Issues in 1994 According to the Herald
By March 1994, Sydney's waste policy had received sufficient public debate for 
the Herald to be able to put together an account in a waste management feature 
of what had led to the need to reduce waste, the prospects for reduction and the 
views of the various interest groups involved. The account reflected several 
aspects of the evolving waste crisis story-line, viz. the leap from landfill capacity 
shortage to waste reduction without examining whether there was a physical or 
a political shortage of landfill capacity, and the tendency to focus on household 
waste that made up only one half of the total urban waste stream generated in 
Sydney (appendix B6.11:l-4).
6.12 Coalition Policy Document — ‘No Time to Waste’
The Fahey Government's policy document on waste management, 'No Time to 
Waste' was released in June 1994. Compared to the Green Paper, 'No Time to 
Waste' contained considerably less substance and more rhetoric. Nevertheless, 
it put forward some concrete proposals, some of which were to appear again in 
the Labor Government's policy document 'Waste Reforms' the following year, 
and in the Waste Minimisation and Management Bill at the end of 1995.
'No Time to Waste', in its formulation of the policy problem, further elaborated 
the idea of landfill capacity as a precious resource, an idea that first appeared in 
the 1991 in the reports of the WMA (B6.5.2:45) and that also appeared in the 
Green Paper (appendix B6.7.L2). The problem was also framed as fragmented 
planning, failure to use the 'full spectrum' of solutions with the 'right players' 
using the solutions to which they were best suited (appendix B6.12.1:1-3).
A new element that entered the Coalition's policy reasoning with 'No Time to 
Waste' was a form of what Ungar (1998) termed the 'small steps' discourse in 
Canada during the 1990s — environmental advocacy and public education that 
called for people to undertake small, simple, convenient behaviour changes 
which, in aggregate, would ameliorate environmental problems (appendix 
B6.12.2:3-4, 7).
The policy goals listed in 'No Time to Waste' were in effect a statement of the 
waste hierarchy, although the diagram was not included (appendix B6.12.2:!).
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The policy proposals in 'No Time to Waste' included:
• grouping councils into Regional Waste Authorities responsible for 
regional waste planning,
• stronger regulation of the waste management system by the EPA,
• local control of landfill siting and compensation for 'hosf communities,
• the requirement that particular industries prepare waste reduction 
plans, and
• the corporatisation of the Waste Service (rather than the transfer to local 
government proposed by the Green Paper and the Joint Select 
Committee) and the entry of the private sector into putrescible waste 
disposal (appendix B6.12.3:2-14).
While container deposit legislation was ruled out, 'No Time to Waste' hinted 
that the Government would be prepared to introduce stricter regulation 
(appendix B6.12.3:8-9).
The proposals were to be given effect by allocating $35 million to councils 
setting up Regional Waste Management Authorities, by the EPA negotiating 
waste reduction plans with industry, by the referral of waste pricing to the 
Government Pricing Tribunal and a one million dollar waste education 
campaign (appendix B6.12.4:l-7).
According to reports in the Herald following the release of 'No Time to Waste', 
the Local Government Association and environmental groups had serious 
concerns about the policies announced in the document, with the former group 
holding a 'crisis meeting' in early July 1994 (appendix B6.12.5:1-3).
6.13 The Landfill Depots (Moratorium) Bill, 1994
In a move that is difficult to see as other than a fairly desperate attempt by the 
Coalition Government to shore up electoral support in the coming election, it 
introduced the Landfill Depots (Moratorium) Bill into the Legislative Assembly 
in November 1994. According to the Government, the Bill was to give legal
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status to the moratorium on new applications for putrescible landfills it had 
announced in September 1994. The Opposition claimed the main purpose of 
the legislation was to protect the marginal Liberal seat of Badgery's Creek, in 
which a private firm had lodged a development application for a putrescible 
waste landfill. As the Opposition could defeat the Government in the 
Legislative Assembly with the support of two independents, it announced that 
it intended to support the Bill, and move amendments to extend it to all 
putrescible waste landfills, to ban incineration, and to prevent the extension of 
the Lucas Heights landfill and the overtopping of the Castlereagh Depot 
(Legislative Assembly, 29.11.94:5911-5912).
6.14 From Landfill Moratorium to ‘Waste Reforms’
In the period between the Coalition Government's introduction of the Landfill 
Depots (Moratorium) Bill to the March 1995 election, it appears to have 
announced no further significant waste management policy initiatives. In 
contrast, at least according to the Herald, there was a growing consensus among 
waste management experts, local government and environmental groups that 
the Coalition's policy of privatisation of waste management would lead to 
increasing waste to landfill (appendix B6.14:2).
In the March 1995 election, the Coalition lost government to Labor, partly due 
to the loss of two seats in which waste management had been an issue, 
Badgery's Creek (appendix B6.12:3) and Gladesville (see section 8.4). Within a 
short time of assuming office, the Labor Government increased waste disposal 
charges at landfills, introduced new guidelines on liquid waste discharged to 
sewers and increased spending on waste minimisation (appendix B6.15.1:1-3). 
Following the Coalition's proposal in 'No Time to Waste', the Government also 
referred the issue of waste disposal pricing to the Independent Regulatory and 
Pricing Tribunal. The report of the Tribunal, in applying the logic of economics 
to waste management issues, raised the substantive and complex issue of short 
run versus long run marginal costing for waste infrastructure, although the 
complexities of this issue were not to surface in subsequent policy debate. 
Perhaps more significantly, the Tribunal confirmed the probable inaccuracy (of 
the order of 30 per cent) in the EPA accounting of quantities of waste disposed 
to landfill — the quantities by which the achievement of the 60 per cent 
reduction target would be assessed (appendix B6.15.2:1-2).
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With the expectation of substantial waste policy reform by the Labor 
Government, various interest groups began lobbying the Government and 
publicly positioning themselves in the waste debate. Sutherland Council, 
which was by then receiving 70 per cent of Sydney's waste at the Lucas Heights 
landfill put a case for stronger centralised control of waste management to 
counter the current 'fractured rules'. Other local governments criticised the 
EPA's regulation of landfill operators. The Waste Service pointed to the need 
for source separation if the waste reduction target was to be achieved, while the 
packaging industry was involved in negotiations with the Government over 
recycling targets. The Private Landfilters' Association, representing small to 
medium landfill operators, warned that environmental bonds could put its 
members out of business (appendix B6.15.3:1-3, 5, 7).
6.15 Labor Policy Document — ‘Waste Reforms’
The policy document, 'Waste Reforms, was released in November 1995, only a 
few weeks prior to the introduction of the Waste Minimisation and 
Management Bill in the Legislative Assembly. The document was more 
substantial than its Coalition predecessor of the previous year, amounting to 
some 11 000 words.
In contrast to 'No Time to Waste', the Labor waste policy document did not 
provide any reasons as to why increasing levels of waste generation was 
considered to be a problem. Throughout the document, such increases were 
assumed to be self-evidently problematical. The account of the problems that 
the policy proposals were intended to address focused instead on the 
deficiencies in the existing institutional arrangement for management of waste. 
These deficiencies were seen to be in two broad areas. Firstly, it was argued 
that, overall, the Waste Disposal Act of 1970 would not bring about a reduction 
in the generation of waste, because it did not 'guide the community on how to 
reduce waste' (NSW Government, 1995:1). Secondly, institutional 
arrangements were described as being 'highly fragmented and there are no 
formally established systems to draw the parts together' (NSW Government, 
1995:6). The lack of uniformity in waste management across councils was also 
referred to: 'The present situation is basically every council for itself' (NSW 
Government, 1995:7), leading to the conclusion that 'We need more systematic 
and integrated waste planning and management across all waste streams' 
(NSW Government, 1995:10).
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The waste management hierarchy featured prominently, albeit in a changed 
diagrammatic form, in the statement of policy goal, which was to reduce the 
amount of waste per capita going to landfill by 60 per cent over 1990 levels by 
year 2000 (appendix B6.16.2:1-2).
Broadly, the policy proposals in 'Waste Reforms' involved both a broadening 
and focusing of regulation of waste management activities, the retention of 
putrescible waste disposal in public ownership, the establishment of the 
Minister for Urban Affairs and Planning as the consent authority for regional 
putrescible waste landfills, the establishment of regional waste planning and 
management boards (waste boards), the requirement for nominated industries 
to develop industry waste reduction plans (the Producer Responsibility 
Scheme), and the formation of a State Waste Advisory Council. These 
proposals were to be given effect by the enactment of new legislation, the Waste 
Minimisation and Management Act.
These proposals were to distribute waste management functions as follows.
• The State Waste Advisory Council was to represent local government, 
environmental, consumer, industry and EPA interests and advise the 
Minister on such things as waste research and reduction priorities, the 
constitution of waste boards and the waste plans they were to prepare, 
and industry sectors to be brought into the Producer Responsibility 
Scheme and their waste reduction plans.
• The responsibilities of the State Government were to set waste reduction 
targets and priorities, to establish and operate the system for regulating 
waste operators, to provide funding to support the proposed 
institutional changes and to provide State- and industry-wide education 
programs on waste.
• The waste boards were to develop waste management plans for their 
region and be accountable to the State Government for the achievement 
of targets set by the Government. As with 'No Time to Waste', there 
was no explanation as to why the economies of scale that were the 
justification for regionalisation did not also apply to centralisation 
(appendix B6.16.3:4). It is worth noting that the concept of 
regionalisation was rejected by the Labor members of the Joint Select
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Committee on Waste Management (appendix 
B7.16.3:6-7).
• Local government was to be accountable to the waste boards for the 
achievement of the targets, priorities and programs established in the 
waste plans. It, as formerly, would be able to operate waste facilities 
and would be the consent authority for such facilities, other than 
regional putrescible waste landfills. It would also be responsible for the 
enforcement of generic regulations applying to waste transporters, such 
as the requirement to cover loads. The intent of the proposed legislation 
was also to encourage local government to expand its role in waste 
management from its traditional focus on collection of waste and 
recyclables to include involvement in the management of industrial and 
commercial waste.
• The Waste Service would share with local government, the monopoly on 
operating putrescible waste landfills. It would compete with the private 
sector in the operation of other waste facilities.
• Those industry sectors nominated under the Producer Responsibility 
Scheme would be accountable to the State Government for meeting the 
targets negotiated in their waste plans. In contrast to 'No Time to 
Waste', which ruled out container deposit legislation, 'Waste Reforms' 
made no mention at all of container deposit legislation (NSW 
Government, 1995:6-7,10).
The Labor waste reforms were to be implemented through the Waste 
Minimisation and Management Act, a major difference from the approach 
proposed in 'No Time to Waste'. However, similar to proposals in this latter 
document, the Labor policy document proposed to establish a Waste Planning 
and Management Fund to support the formation of the regional waste boards. 
This fund would be allocated $35.8 million in the first three years, and a further 
$24.2 million in the subsequent two years (NSW Government, 1995:12).
6.16 The Waste Minimisation and Management Bill 1995
The Waste Minimisation and Management Bill was introduced into the 
Legislative Assembly on 15 November 1995 by the Minister for the
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Environment, Pam Allan. The substance of the Bill was closely similar to what 
had been proposed in the policy document 'Waste Reforms', released less than 
two weeks earlier. Either as a response to submissions received after the release 
of the policy document, or because the policy was still being developed after 
the drafting of the legislation, or both, the Government proposed to move some 
40 amendments to the Bill (Legislative Assembly, 5.12.95:4134).
The main criticism of the Bill by the Opposition in the Legislative Assembly 
was the lack of consultation in the preparation of the Bill (appendix B6.17.2:1). 
The waste management hierarchy appears to have suffered the first questioning 
of its universal validity in this debate (appendix B6.17.2:4). The criticism from 
the independent member for Manly was mainly confined to detailing a number 
of aspects on which the legislation fell short of Labor's election commitments 
(appendix B6.17.3:l).
The debate on the Bill in the Legislative Council was markedly different from 
that in the Legislative Assembly, in that the Opposition raised more substantial 
objections to the legislation and, with the Call to Australia Party, brought a 
great deal of information into the debate that had been provided by lobby 
groups, mainly from industry, but also from local government. In addition, 
there was also a strong case put for stronger regulation of industry by the 
Australian Democrats MLC, the Hon. Richard Jones, and the Greens MLC, the 
Hon. Ian Cohen. Jones and Cohen argued for container deposit legislation, a 
ban on incineration and a requirement that the dairy industry retain a certain 
proportion of milk sales in re-useable bottles (appendix B6.17.4:2-8).
The criticisms against the legislation from the Coalition in the Legislative 
Council were mainly about effects of the legislation on industry and, to a lesser 
extent, on local government. For the first time in the Parliament, the existence 
of a waste crisis was questioned, the Coalition suggesting there were an 
abundance of landfill sites throughout New South Wales 
(appendix B6.17.4:9-17).
The Call to Australia Party, being the most favourably disposed to industry 
among the cross bench parties in the Legislative Council, appears to have 
received the lion's share of industry lobbying. Reverend the Hon. Fred Nile's 
speech resembled a who's who of packaging, beverage, manufacturing and 
business interest groups. It was clear from the concerns raised by these groups 
that industry had serious concerns about the interventionist nature of the policy
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proposals and the power of the Minister. Some groups raised the possibility of 
capital flight from New South Wales as a consequence of the legislation 
(appendix B6.17.4:19-27).
It was clear from the Government's response to the Opposition and Call to 
Australia Party's claims of serious industry concern that many of the lobby 
groups who were deluging the latter with faxes in the few days before the 
legislation was debated in the Legislative Council, had in fact publicly 
supported the legislation in press releases several weeks earlier (appendix 
B6.17.4:29-36).
For interest groups lobbying the Legislative Council members, the best outcome 
they could hope for was an amendment to the legislation that shaped the 
legislation more to their interests. For industry, the key amendment, to be 
moved by the Coalition, was that industry waste reduction plans should be 
subject to 'economic and environmental cost benefit analyses', portrayed as the 
panacea of scientific objectivity to the ills of 'emotive and political' influence on 
waste reduction plans (B7.17.4:37). For environmental groups, with their 
commitment to container deposit legislation, the important amendments were 
the two moved by the Hon. Richard Jones. One of these was that the Minister 
should be taken to have determined that an industry waste reduction plan was 
required by the dairy industry and that the plan set a target level of use for 
refillable milk bottles. The other was that the State Waste Advisory Council 
may advise the Minister of the need to introduce container deposit legislation if 
the packaging industry failed to meet its waste reduction targets. Both 
amendments were passed, the former accompanied by a great deal of 
conflicting evidence about the environmental desirability or otherwise of 
refillable milk bottles (appendix B6.17.4:37-48, table B6.17.1).
In the immediate aftermath of the passing of the legislation, reactions from 
environmental groups were positive, while the reactions of industry groups 
were mixed, with the packaging industry signalling it would cooperate with the 
legislation, and manufacturing industry once again raising the spectre of capital 
flight (appendix B6.17.5:1-3).
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7 WASTE SPACES, LITTER AND 
CLEAN UPS
7.1 Ocean Dumping and Beach Pollution
7.1.1 The Watery and Sandy Wastes of 19th Century Sydney
7.1.2 Beach Pollution in the Early 1930s
7.2 Littering and Clean Ups
7.2.1 Littering 1943-1989
7.2.2 Clean Up the Harbour and Australia
7.2.3 Littering Issues in the 1990s
7.3 The Packaging Industry, Container Deposit Legislation and Litter 
Politics
7.4 Landfill Siting Controversies
Solid waste ends up in the environment in three ways: in a dispersed form — 
litter on land and sea — and a concentrated form — rubbish tips or landfills.
An intermediate form is when the physical processes of nature redistribute the 
dispersed form into a linear concentrated form — rubbish along the tide lines of 
beaches and harbour foreshores. All three forms of solid waste resting in the 
environment may catalyse social and political concern, as do proposals to place 
solid waste in landfills. This chapter deals with the dispersed and intermediate 
form of solid waste in the environment in 20th century Sydney and the 
concerns associated with its presence. The concentrated form — rubbish tips — 
is the subject of the next chapter.
7.1 Ocean Dumping and Beach Pollution
7.1.1. The Watery and Sandy Wastes of 19th Century Sydney
Shelton (1998:10), following Wright (1980) points out that Australia's colonial 
history has resulted in a change in the meaning of waste over time from 
meaning areas of land that had not yet been brought into some form of 
production for human use to discarded materials of human construction that 
currently have no value in the market economy. As mentioned in section 4.3, 
much of Sydney's waste in the second half of the 19th century was deposited in 
gullies or sandy areas such as the City Common or among dunes at Manly. The
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characteristic that all these areas had in common was that they were waste 
areas, not fit for other uses. The City Common (Moore Park), for example, 
bordered the area of swamps, sand ridges and heathy vegetation known as the 
Botany Swamps and the Lachlan Swamp (Coward, 1988:79-81).
Nineteenth century Sydney was endowed with a further waste space — the 
watery wastes beyond the Heads. In 1900, the bubonic plague outbreak in 
Sydney resulted in a number of hasty changes to waste management policy, 
one of which was the decision of the Sydney City Council that all city garbage 
would be taken to sea from 19 March 1900 onwards (Coward, 1988:214). At this 
time, a number of harbourside councils transported municipal garbage and 
street sweepings to wharves, where it was tipped into punts that were towed 
outside the Heads, where the garbage was discharged into the sea. This method 
had already come under criticism in the United States in the late 19th century 
(Melosi, 1980:42).
Not only was the ocean beyond the heads a watery waste, but it is likely that 
many of the ocean beaches were also regarded as waste areas. For example, the 
diary of a Nuisance Inspector for Manly Municipality reveals that in the 1880s 
the council buried the nightsoil from the municipality on Steyne Beach and 
along Pittwater Road adjacent to existing dwellings, resulting in complaints of 
the odour from residents (Fitzgerald, 1987:75).
The ocean beaches did not become recreational areas until the turn of the 
century. The New South Wales Surf Bathers Guide in 1910 noted that:
The Sydney public have only within the last four years at all appreciated the 
many seaside resorts that surround the City, and since that time Bondi has 
been one of the most popular and one of the most frequented beaches...
Property in the district has advanced tenfold in value...
(cited in Birch and Macmillan, 
1962:262-263)
Bathing at the ocean beaches was actively discouraged by local ordinances. For 
example, in 1902, Willie Cochrane, a Manly newsagent, defied the local 
ordinance against sea bathing during daylight hours. Prosecutions did not 
deter the many others who followed suit and, in November 1903, the ordinance 
was repealed, although until 1935 all bathers were required to be covered by a 
bathing suit from neck to knee (Coward, 1988:253 — Hamlyn, 1975:63, gives the 
newsagent as W. Gosher and the year as 1903, while Birch and Macmillan,
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1962:259, attributes the act of defiance to W.H. Gocher, proprietor and editor of 
the M anly and North Sydney News).
Surfing became a national pastime and by the 1930s was seen as an essential 
contribution to the vitality of the growing nation. As a New South Wales 
parliamentarian said in 1932:
Surfing is building up a type of young man the physique of whom is not 
surpassed by that of men of any other country in the world. Our life-savers are 
equal to any in the world. Reference was made to the importance of physical 
culture for children in our schools, but they can have no better physical culture 
than they can get on the beaches.
(Legislative Assembly, 
13.10.32:1069)
With the surfing beaches becoming the gymnasium of the populace, there was 
growing concern about the garbage washing onto the beaches.
7.1.2. Beach Pollution in the Early 1930s
In the early 1930s, pollution on the ocean beaches south of the Heads was 
repeatedly raised in the Legislative Assembly by the MLA for Randwick, who 
was also Mayor of Randwick Council (appendix B7.1:l). On 15 October 1932, 
Mr Arthur Moverly, the MLA for Randwick and the Mayor of Randwick 
Council, was successful in moving an urgency motion to have the question of 
ocean dumping debated in the Legislative Assembly. Moverly then moved 
that: 'This House is of opinion that steps should be immediately taken to 
prevent the pollution of the ocean beaches occasioned by the dumping of 
garbage at sea/. In speaking to the motion, Moverly quoted from a letter that 
had been submitted by the surf superintendent at Randwick to the Town Clerk:
On Monday, 19th December, Coogee and Maroubra beaches were littered with 
vast quantities of garbage, consisting of pumpkin and other vegetables, rotten 
fruit, garden refuse, tins, bottles, etc. Five drayloads of this matter was 
removed from in front of the dressing shed at Coogee. On Sunday morning,
2nd inst., Coogee Beach was again littered from end to end with an assortment 
of rotten fruit and vegetables, dead rats, kittens, fowls, on dog, one duck, 
butchers' shop offal, garden refuse, and other filth so thick that early morning 
bathers refused to enter the surf
(Legislative Assembly, 13.10.32:1070)
The source of the garbage was thought to be Glebe Council, the last of the 
councils still dumping its solid waste outside the Heads (appendix B7.1:l).
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Despite pressure from Moverly on the Government in the Legislative 
Assembly, and a number of deputations to the Minister for Local Government, 
the Government argued that it was unable to place bans on ocean dumping for 
a number of reasons, including the costs that Glebe Council might incur as a 
result, uncertainty as to whether the rubbish really came from Glebe Council, 
the Minister's lack of power to direct councils how to dispose of their garbage, 
and the pending Greater Sydney Bill which would centralise responsibility for 
waste disposal with a Greater Sydney Council (appendix B7.L1-3). Eventually, 
it appears that the need for New South Wales to enact legislation on ocean 
dumping was overtaken by enactment of similar legislation by the Federal 
Government (appendix B7.1:6-ll).
7.2 Littering and Clean Ups
7.2.1. Littering 1943-1989
The first serious attention by the Herald to littering as a newsworthy story 
appears to be towards the end of World War II, with clean-up campaigns being 
part of the return to normality after the upheaval of the war (appendix B7.2.L1). 
Litter and dumping received increasing attention by the Herald through the 
1950s and 1960s (appendix B7.2.2:l-3). The approach by the State Government 
and local councils throughout this period was solely punitive — the 
employment of litter rangers, the placement of warning signs, and increases in 
the fines for littering in 1952 and 1960 (appendix B7.2.2:4-9).
Fines were increased again in 1970, through the Local Government (Further 
Amendment) Act. The debate on the Bill showed that litter could symbolise 
both the pollution that was of concern about this time, and the moral deficiency 
of deviant groups in society. Reflecting the debates about compulsion versus 
cooperation that had occurred with the Water Pollution Bill in 1969 (see, for 
example, B5.5:17-18), there was debate over penalties versus education with the 
Local Government (Further Amendment) Bill, although the Coalition had 
favoured cooperation with the former Bill and penalties for the latter, with the 
opposite positions being taken by Labor. Also in the debate on the Local 
Government (Further Amendment) Bill, criticism by Labor of the packaging 
industry as the cause of the litter problem began to emerge (appendix B7.2.3:l- 
16).
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Despite the increased fines, there appears to have been little impact on litter 
levels in the early 1970s, due partly to councils' reluctance to use their powers 
to issue on-the-spot litter fines (appendix B7.2.4:3-4, 8). The apocalyptic 
dimension of environmentalism was connected to litter and cleaning-up — the 
Local Government Association launched Anti-Pollution Week in September 
1971, with the slogan 'Pollution is people...Survival is up to you'. The Herald 
labelled it the 'big clean-up week' (SMH, 9.9.71:3). Following criticism that the 
litter fines were not large enough, they were increased again in late 1973 
(appendix B7.2.4:3, 6-7).
Local government continued to complain about littering problems in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, and there were further calls for increased fines (appendix 
B7.2.4:16; B8.2.5:l). However, during the 1980s, monitoring of litter levels 
began to show decreases, despite the increases in packaging. The decreases in 
litter were attributed to the 'Do the Right Thing Campaign' (see section 7.3, 
below). Towards the end of the 1980s, media and political attention was again 
directed to litter, cleanliness and safety in Sydney, with the formation of the 
Sydney Environs Cleanliness and Safety Task Force (appendix B7.2.5:2-3, 5-8).
7.2.2. Clean Up the Harbour and Australia
There had been some concerns raised in the early and mid-1980s about floating 
rubbish in Sydney Harbour (appendix B7.2.6:l-5). However, in 1989, the 
Harbour became the focus of a massive community clean up involving some 20 
000 volunteers who collected over 3000 tonnes of rubbish.
The catalyst for this was Ian Kiernan, a property developer who had sought 
solace in ocean yachting when his business failed with a collapse of the Sydney 
property market. Kiernan attempted in late 1987 to interest the Minister for 
Ports in the New South Wales Government in a community clean-up of the 
Harbour — without success (Kiernan and Jarratt, 1995). The idea was not a 
new one, having been suggested by the Mayoress of Drummoyne in 1971 — 
'Our latest idea is pollution collection parties along the beach with lots of red 
wine and barbecued steak' (SMH, 9.11.71:14). Kiernan had entered the 1986-87 
BOC Challenge, a round the world yacht race. He recorded in his 
autobiography that he had been horrified by the amount of floating rubbish he 
had seen in the Sargasso Sea, and found the same sort of rubbish in Sydney 
Harbour when he returned to Australia (Kiernan and Jarratt, 1995).
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In December 1988, the Herald reported that Ian Kiernan had formed the Clean 
Up the Harbour Committee and was planning a clean up campaign on 8.1.89 
that was expected to attract 100 000 people.
The main message from the Herald report seemed to be one of universal 
acceptance of guilt and responsibility:
'People should not sit back and say it is a problem of the Government,' he said.
People are polluting the harbour, not the Government.
We are not interested in politics. We have all been guilty.
(SMH, 3.12.88:7)
The advertising campaign run in late 1988 and early 1989 by Kiernan's contacts 
in the advertising industry linked together three quite disparate things:
• the global environmental issues that were the source of environmental 
concern at that time,
• the instinctive dislike that people have for substances that are ambiguous 
in their properties and/or culturally defined as 'dirty' (see, for example, 
Douglas, 1966), and
• rubbish in Sydney Harbour.
Mo urrote a jingle zvhich immortalised the words 'Yukky Yukky Poo'. It was an 
advertising campaign which had a direct impact on kids, simplifying for them 
the vague concerns they had for the future of their environment. They didn't 
know much about greenhouse gases and the hole in the ozone layer, but they 
knew what yukky poo was, and the man on the telly was saying that the 
Harbour wasfidl of it. So come on, Mum, come on Dad, let's go down the 
Harbour and do something about it.
(Kiernan and Jarratt, 
1995:199)
Starting in mid-December 1988, the Herald ran a series of articles with the title of 
'Harbour Clean-Up' and a logo showing a traditional household bin with 
rubbish lying on the ground around it. The first article in the series, a human 
interest story on the MSB dog boats, carried a photograph that visually 
connected, the Sydney Harbour Bridge, a topmast schooner, the Sydney Opera 
House and a scow loaded with rubbish collected from the harbour. It may have 
been accidental, but the MSB workers on the scow were all immigrant
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Europeans (the Herald noting that this team was known by other workers as the 
'wog boat7). The theme of the text reflected these connections with its mention 
of 'the finest Harbour in the world' (from Captain Phillip in 1788 — 'We have 
found the finest harbour in the world, in which a thousand ships of the line 
may safely ride at anchor.'):
'Yon know/ said Tony as we ploughed back to the depot, a scow-load of rubbish 
trailing behind, 'some days it's just beautiful... ' He threw up his hands, 
without words. 'It's only what people do that spoils it.'
(SMH, 16.12.88:3)
This one article successfully placed rubbish into a context that had been the 
focus of Australia's bicentennial celebrations throughout the year — the birth 
of the nation at Sydney Harbour.
The historical significance of the clean up was further reinforced by the next 
Herald article in the series which referred to teams of workers with community 
service sentences organised by the Department of Corrective Services:
There was, apparently, some discussion among the Clean-Up Day committee: 
would other volunteers be frightened off by the presence on the foreshores of 
'convict labour'?
(SMH, 2.1.89:3)
While the rubbish bin logo identifying the series remained, the title changed to 
'Cleaning up C>ur Harbour', emphasising the universality of responsibility.
The day after the clean up, the Herald devoted part of its front page and half of 
page four to reporting the haul of 3000 tonnes of rubbish collected by an 
estimated 20 000 volunteers. The front page article emphasised the breakdown 
of the barriers of social class:
Some arrived in Rolls-Royces and kids came on skateboards.... 'There were 
Pierre Cardin groups and fishermen groups,' he [a local observer] said. 'I've 
never seen the people of Watsons Bay and Vaucluse combine so well.'
(SMH, 9.1.89:1)
The high proportion of plastic in foreshore rubbish was the subject of another 
article, being portrayed as having the characteristics of many other of the feared 
risks of modernity:
Plastic bottle-tops and stoppers, lids, straws, etc, etc — there was too much to 
count.
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We worry about nuclear attack, cigarette smoke, alcohol, AIDS. What about 
plastic? The trouble with plastic is it doesn't turn into anything else. It won't 
go away.
If it does, it always turns up somewhere else.
(SMH, 9.1.89:4)
This connection between litter and other risks was also made by a Democrat 
member in the Legislative Council, the Hon. Richard Jones, some months later:
If one goes on a picnic and leaves cans and bottles lying on the ground, one can 
be fined. If one throws a cigarette butt out of a car window, which most 
smokers seem to do, one can be fined. If you are a very power fid  transnational 
corporation which creates a gigantic dump of toxic wastes on the foreshores of 
Botany Bay, you not only are not fined for this act of environmental vandalism 
but also manage to persuade the Government to use taxpayers' money to clean 
up the waste for you.
(Legislative Council, 
18.4.89:6497)
The Organisation for Research and Rescue of Cetaceans in Australia (ORCCA) 
was reported as having found that half the rubbish collected on the Harbour 
Clean-Up Day was of types dangerous to marine life by entanglement or 
ingestion. Six pack beer wrappings were the most dangerous and ORCCA was 
urging industry to produce biodegradable plastic wrapping (SMH, 14.1.89:7).
Eight days and three rainfall events after the clean up, the Herald reported on 
Ian Kieman's inspection of the Harbour, in which he noted that the rubbish was 
likely to return. The Herald journalist simplified the relationship between 
rubbish and estuarine ecosystem health by comparing the litter strewn beaches 
of Shark Island which:
... was not included in the clean-up campaign. Here was a Before the Clean Up 
Look.
The After Look was of tailor on the run with seagidls diving at them and ahnost 
sparking waters.
(SMH, 17.1.89:17)
Kiernan's clean up became Clean Up Sydney in 1990, Clean Up Australia in 
1991 and Clean Up the World the following year (appendix B7.2.6:7, 9, 18).
Clean Up Australia attracted wide corporate support and became a permanent 
organisation (appendix B7.2.6:10, 28). Kieman became a spokesperson on waste
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management issues generally, or even simply placed in a photo in a news 
article about waste management (appendix B7.2.6:17-18, 21-22, 27).
The publicity about the Clean Up days continued to connect with wider 
environmental issues. The 1992 Clean Up Day was launched in January by Ian 
Kiernan at Taronga Park Zoo. According to the Herald, Ian Kiernan said that 
the location was appropriate because being surrounded by endangered species 
was a reminder that 'we are the only species that deliberately pollutes and 
poisons our own environment', and that the clean up would continue to place 
pressure on authorities to deal with the problem of polluted urban waterways 
(SMH, 21.1.92:4).
In late February, a run-up article in the Herald showed Ian Kiernan at a 
recreation and wetland area adjacent to the Cooks River that was being used as 
an illegal dumping ground by householders, demolition contractors and car 
thieves. Also in the photo was a member of the Cooks River catchment 
management committee who voice fears about surface and groundwater 
pollution from the site. Accompanying the article was a logo showing a 
stylised figure in an Atlas-like pose immersing the outline of Australia in a 
bowl of water (SMH, 22.2.92:11).
The connection between cleaning up and global environmental issues was also 
a motivation for those taking part. A reported conversation with a high school 
student revealed the connection in people's minds between the Clean Up and 
relatively unrelated environmental issues:
'We're [the present young generation! scared that in 10 years' time we 
won't be able to walk outside,' she said. 'We will be the ones to suffer from 
extreme heat, and we will watch the poles melt and see the seas rise because of 
the greenhouse effect.'
'This is why we are asking the rest of Australia to help us patch these holes 
[presumably ozone holes] and help us save the environment and the world.'
(SMH, 30.11.92:6)
A similar motivation was mentioned by participants in the focus groups 
conducted as part of this study (see section 8.8.8).
In the reporting in the Herald about the Clean Up days, plastic continued to be 
singled out as a problematical component of litter to public (appendix 
B7.2.6:14, 20, 25, 27). The reporting also continued its emphasis on the 
universality of participation (appendix B7.2.6:12-13) and the strange and
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dangerous finds (appendix 137.2.6:19, 25). These dangers, such as syringes, were 
also mentioned by the participants of the study focus groups (see section 8.8.8). 
The reporting was also framed in terms of Ungar's (1998) 'small steps' 
(appendix B7.2.6:19).
7.2.3. Littering Issues in the 1990s
In addition to the activities of Clean Up Australia, littering continued to attract 
industry and political attention in the 1990s. The penalties for littering were 
increased in 1991 (appendix B7.2.7:2). The Litter and Recycling Research 
Association (a lobbying organisation for the beverage and packaging industry) 
launched a new version of 'Do the Right Thing' which connected littering to 
environmental issues (appendix B7.2.7:3), an approach that had been 
recommended in an evaluation of the campaign in 1990 (see section 5.4 of 
Reeve, Ramasubramanian and McNeill, 2000).
7.3 The Packaging Industry, Container Deposit Legislation and Litter 
Politics
As early as 1972, the packaging industry was threatened with the introduction 
of a packaging levy by the New South Wales Government (appendix B7.3:l-2). 
Also from the early to mid-1970s, the Keep Australia Beautiful Council, the 
packaging industry and at least one Liberal MLA expressed their opposition to 
container deposit legislation, questioning whether it would bring about a 
decrease in litter levels. They also promoted education and enforcement 
directed at the litterer and downplayed the role of plastic in litter (appendix 
B7.3:4-6).
With the election of the Labor Government in May 1976, the Minister for 
Planning and Environment, Paul Landa moved fairly promptly to use the threat 
of the introduction of container deposit legislation to obtain some millions of 
dollars from the beverage and packaging industries to fund a publicity 
campaign by the SPCC. This campaign was the 'Do the Right Thing' campaign, 
the publicity component of which emphasised the moral rectitude of putting 
used packaging in bins (appendix B7.3:7-10).
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Measurements of litter levels showed that the campaign was having an effect, 
although the volume of packaging for disposal continued to increase, becoming 
as much a waste disposal problem as a litter problem. Consequently, during 
the mid- to late 1980s, State Governments from both sides of politics saw fit to 
raise the possibility of container deposit legislation. The Litter Research 
Association responded by funding, in part, a study of the costs of container 
deposit legislation by the Federal Government's Business Regulation Review 
Unit in 1989. This concluded that the costs on industry and others caused by 
the legislation would far exceed the benefits in litter prevention, a finding that 
was challenged by the SPCC, the Australian Consumers' Association and the 
Centre for South Australian Economic Studies (appendix B7.3:8-13,15 and 
interview with informant 5).
Although it was publicly known from at least 1977 that there was some sort of 
agreement between the SPCC and the Litter Research Association, the existence 
of a written agreement did not come to light until 1989, when it was published 
as an appendix in the Business Regulation Review Unit report. This was 
discovered by members of the Waste Crisis Network, an environmental group 
with links to the Friends of the Earth and the Nature Conservation Council (see 
section 10.4), in their researches into container deposit legislation and 
subsequently publicised in their report on container deposit legislation in 
December 1992. The NSW EPA ended the agreement in February 1993 
(appendix B7.3:14, 16-17 and interview with informants 5 and 6).
7.4 Landfill Siting Controversies
Landfill siting controversies is one way by which public concerns about the 
dangers of waste accumulations are made visible in the media and 
parliamentary debate. Before turning to these waste dangers in the next 
chapter, there are several aspects associated with landfill siting controversies 
that are worthy of note.
Firstly, the spatial distribution of social class in Sydney, at least up until the 
1970s, provides some explanation of the success or failure of landfill siting and 
closure proposals. When the landfill site was north of the Harbour, the siting 
decision was associated with council galleries packed with professional people, 
well-organised on-site protests and the formation of local action groups 
(appendix B7.4.3, B8.4.5, B8.4.6). When the site was south of the Harbour, in
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working class areas, the decisions appear to have been taken at a high political 
level, with little involvement of local residents, even though they may have 
been just as concerned about the amenity impacts (appendix B7.4.2, B8.4.4). 
However, after the 1970s, social class and location appear to have had little 
effect on whether decisions were made with or without the involvement of local 
residents. The methods of community activism and protest were brought to 
bear on decisions in all parts of Sydney.
Secondly, the location of landfill controversies described in appendix B7.4.1-15 
shows a trend with time from the inner parts of Sydney to the outskirts, 
reflecting the rationalisation and centralisation of the waste stream brought 
about by the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority.
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Wastes of various forms have always been regarded as sources of 
endangerment, through the transmission of harm from accumulations of waste 
to the individual. This chapter describes the sources and agents of danger 
associated with waste in 20th century Sydney, commencing with a historical 
survey of the perceived dangers of rubbish tips and landfills, finishing with a 
description of perceptions of waste, landfills and their dangers among 
participants in the three focus groups conducted as part of the study.
8.1 The Dangers of Rubbish Tips
The available descriptions of waste disposal in late 19th century Sydney 
(appendix B8.1.1:1-4) suggest that the only people concerned about the 
accumulations of waste throughout the city were the health and sanitary 
professionals of the Board of Health established in the early 1880s. Ironically, 
as Fitzgerald (1987:76) points out, Pasteur's germ theory that, in the 1860s, 
replaced the miasmic theory of disease provided less incentive to improve the 
management of solid waste than did the miasmic theory. For as long as it was 
believed that diseases were contracted through inhaling the odours of 
putrescence (the miasmic theory), there were good justifications for improved 
sanitary services. However, once attention was focused on water supply and 
food as carriers of disease germs, the justification for sanitary improvements 
that reduced the odours from accumulations of waste was no longer a matter of 
human life and death from disease, but rather one of human comfort.
However, the 1900 bubonic plague outbreak focused attention once again on 
the accumulations of waste in Sydney. Fear of spread of the disease from these 
accumulations precipitated substantial changes to the arrangements for dealing 
with waste, including taking waste beyond the Heads and dumping it at sea, 
and building incinerators (appendix B8.1.2:1-4).
Local rubbish tips continued to be a feature of Sydney's waste disposal 
throughout most of the 20th century. Concerns about their impact on residents, 
as reflected in articles in the Herald, appear to have declined since the early 
1960s due, at least in part, to the Department of Public Health's 
recommendation to councils of controlled tipping (covering the tipping face 
daily with soil) commencing in the 1930s, the Clean Air Act of 1961 and the 
Open Burning Amendment to that Act in 1972 (appendix B8.1.3).
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8.2 The Heyday of Incineration in the Early 20th Century
As shown in table B8.1, a large number of incinerators were build in Sydney 
between 1898 and 1937. Incineration was the preferred waste disposal method 
of the Department of Public Health for most of the 1930s (appendix B8.2.1:5). In 
contrast, the Department of Local Government, with its responsibility for 
ensuring that councils managed their financial affairs wisely, did not view 
incineration, which was more expensive than controlled tipping or ocean 
dumping, so favourably (appendix B7.1:l). Incineration also experienced a 
period of popularity at the end of the 19th century and in the early 20th century 
in the USA and the impression gained from the writing at that time of those 
promoting incineration, both in the USA and Australia is that it was regarded 
as part of the modernisation of the city (in today's terms, what perhaps might 
be called the application of Fordism and Taylorism to the waste stream) 
(appendix B8.2.L1; B8.2.2:2).
It is difficult to ascertain exactly why local government invested in incinerators 
about this time. The fear of plague has already been mentioned. Incinerators 
were also marketed aggressively (appendix B8.2.L4). Possibly, councils were 
not aware of the maintenance costs and with improvements in road transport 
infrastructure and tighter air pollution standards in the 1960s, the incinerators 
became impossibly uneconomic compared to landfill. The most recent record 
in the Herald of the closing of a pre-war incinerator was the Willoughby 
incinerator in 1967 (appendix B8.2.3).
Incinerators were not without local opposition — residents' concerns generally 
centring on vermin, smell and smoke. As shown in figure B8.2, the two main 
periods during which there was a substantial increase in articles about 
residents' opposition to incineration proposals were in the early 1930s and the 
late 1950s. In both cases, the residents who were protesting were from the more 
affluent Eastern and North Shore suburbs (appendix B8.2.2; B8.3.1).
8.3 An Incineration Resurgence in the Eastern Suburbs
While most councils in most parts of Sydney were able to replace their ageing 
incinerators with landfills, the Eastern Suburbs councils had difficulty in 
obtaining such sites. After an unsuccessful attempt by the Woollahra Council 
to establish an incinerator at View Street (due to resident protest and the
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Department of Local Government's preference for cheaper landfill) in the late 
1950s, the Waverly and Woollahra Councils decided to construct an incinerator 
at Waterloo in 1969. This subsequently gained the approval of the Department 
of Local Government. By this time, incineration had become a complex 
technology and the Councils were no doubt assisted considerably by their links 
with the Department of Fuel Technology at the University of New South Wales. 
This Department had hosted the First Australian Refuse Disposal Conference in 
1967, at which a number of pro-incineration papers were presented by 
Department and Council staff (appendix B8.3.1).
The Waterloo incinerator appears, at least from the sources used in this study, 
to have encountered little resident opposition, perhaps because its location was 
further from the more affluent suburbs than the View Street site was. The 
Waterloo incinerator was reported as being 'nearly pollution free' and the ash 
as being useful as fill in playgrounds, roads and tennis courts. Within a year of 
opening, the incinerator was claimed by the Coalition Opposition in the 
Legislative Assembly to be emitting 15 times the maximum level of particulates 
permitted by the Clean Air Act, due to damage to its pollution control 
equipment caused by plastics in the waste being incinerated. The incinerator 
was operated at a reduced rate and on a trial basis while work to solve the 
problem continued. In 1990, at the height of the national debate over the siting 
of a high temperature incinerator, the SPCC announced it had found in the 
incinerator stack gases dioxin and furan emissions at 30-60 times the 
concentrations permitted overseas. According to the Herald, a further study in 
1991 found the dioxin levels were 153 times higher than the overseas standard. 
Further studies were conducted with a view to upgrading the incinerator but, 
as community opposition to the incinerator increased, the Labor Opposition 
announced it would close the incinerator if elected. Waverly and Woollahra 
Councils continued with their plan to upgrade the incinerator or replace it with 
a waste-to-energy plant, while South Sydney Council, in whose area the 
incinerator was located, signalled it would refuse a development application. 
After election to government in March 1995, the Labor Government announced 
that the incinerator would be phased out (appendix B8.3.2).
8.4 Other Incinerator Proposals in Mid-20th Century
During the 1960s and 1970s various groups of councils in Sydney gave 
consideration to establishing incinerators, but despite the Health Department
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still recommending that incineration was the preferred method of waste 
disposal, no incinerators were established. Incineration continued to be put 
forward as a viable alternative in suitable circumstances by the NSW EPA in the 
1990s. None of the incinerator proposals in the 1960s and 1970s appear to have 
brought forth sufficient community opposition to register with the Herald. 
However, by the 1990s, with the publicity about incinerator emissions that 
resulted from the attempted siting of a national high temperature incinerator, 
fears about incinerators had grown sufficiently to result in the Ryde Council's 
proposal to establish an incinerator becoming an issue in the seat of Gladesville 
in the 1995 election. The Coalition subsequently blamed Labor for distributing 
'propaganda' that suggested a 'toxic waste incinerator' would be established 
(appendix B8.4).
8.5 Residential Incinerators and Backyard Burning
In the 1970s problems began to be experienced with air pollution from the 
residential incinerators that had been installed in previous years in blocks of 
home units and flats in inner south-eastern Sydney. Also about this time, it was 
realised that a great deal of Sydney's air pollution came from backyard burning. 
By the late 1980s, residential incinerators had been phased out and backyard 
burning banned by most councils (appendix B8.5).
8.6 Industrial Waste and High Temperature Incineration
A full account of liquid industrial waste disposal in Sydney from the 1960s 
would be a major study in its own right. Appendix B8.6 provides a summary 
account, from the perspective of the sources used in this study, from the time of 
the establishment of the MWDA in the early 1970s to the disbanding of the 
Independent Panel on Intractable Waste in November 1992. This section only 
deals with those aspects of liquid industrial waste disposal and high 
temperature incineration that appear to have had an influence on solid waste 
management policy in Sydney through the raising of concerns in people's 
minds about the dangers of these wastes and landfills more generally.
The term 'toxic' was first used in the Herald in relation to industrial waste in 
1974 by a Professor of Chemistry in describing the wastes from the 
manufacture of plastics and pesticides. Throughout the 1970s the Herald
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reported on the problems of illegal dumping of industrial waste into sewers 
and in bushland on the outskirts of Sydney, although the term 'toxic' was rarely 
used. This issue was also raised in the Legislative Assembly on a number of 
occasions in the 1970s. The amounts being dumped were, according to 
estimates in the early 1970s, of the order of several hundred thousand gallons 
per week (section 4.7.5). Even as late as 1989, it would appear that about one 
half this amount was still being dumped illegally each week.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the possible dangers from liquid industrial 
waste became more evident, with the Herald reporting several times on the 
discovery that dioxin contaminated waste had been placed in Sydney landfills 
in the past. Other events that brought the dangers of such waste to public 
notice included the visit of the incinerator ship, 'Vulcanus', and the death of a 
tanker driver in an explosion that occurred at the Castlereagh Depot when he 
was discharging liquid waste. By the early 1980s, 'toxic waste' had become a 
dangerous substance in its own right, rather than simply being a description of 
a number of types of industrial waste that posed health and environmental 
dangers.
Articles about past dumping of toxic waste in landfills continued in the 1980s, 
and the danger was emphasised once again with the secret shipping overseas of 
waste by a chemical company.
By the mid- and late 1980s, the 'toxic danger' news story framing was well 
established, often employed by the Herald's Tony Horwitz in his stories about 
'killer waste' and 'toxic time bombs'. Further publicity about the dangers of 
toxic waste resulted from the attempts of several companies to establish high 
temperature incinerators amid strong community opposition, further reports of 
the discovery of dioxin contamination at waste storage sites, health problems 
among residents adjacent to the Castlereagh Depot and the death of workers in 
an explosion adjacent to the Union Carbide storage of dioxin contaminated 
waste at Rhodes.
Reports of illegal dumping of industrial waste continued through the 1980s, 
reinforcing the public impression that the government was powerless to deal 
with this problem. Tanker drivers interviewed by the Herald in the late 1980s 
reported that illegal dumping was 'extensive'. Also in the late 1980s, it became 
publicly known that ICI had built up a store of 8,000 tonnes of waste 
hexachlorobenzene at Botany. Extensive contamination by dioxin was
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discovered at Homebush Bay and fishing banned in the vicinity because the 
dioxin had moved into the marine food chain.
The public's sense of a problem out of control was probably increased by the 
split in the position of environmental groups on high temperature incineration 
in the early 1990s, with Greenpeace opposing it and the Australian 
Conservation Foundation favouring it.
Further illegal dumping and industrial waste accidents were reported in 1990, 
followed by the announcement of Corowa as a high temperature incinerator 
site. This catalysed intense community opposition, with a protest meeting of 
5000 people attended by Christine Milne, who had successfully campaigned 
against the Wesley Vale Pulp Mill in Tasmania. It was also alleged that death 
threats had been made against the family of the owner of the motel where 
WMA staff were staying.
When the Corowa site was abandoned, and the Independent Panel on 
Intractable Waste formed, reporting on its deliberations kept toxic waste in the 
news through the early 1990s, as did further illegal dumping articles, and the 
impounding of a shipment of Australian industrial waste in Belgium.
8.7 Other Sources of Danger from Chemicals
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, there were continuing news reports about 
problems with plastics, pesticides and other chemicals (appendix B8.7). These 
problems were also frequently raised in the New South Wales Parliament 
(appendix B.7), with the Environmentally Hazardous Chemicals Act being 
passed in 1985.
8.8 Waste Dangers Today — Focus Group Findings
8.8.1. Introduction
As described in section 3, three focus groups were conducted on the topic of 
waste (see appendices A2 and A3 for a description of the prompt questions).
The following sections describe the responses to a number of discussion prompt 
questions that elicited the participants' perceptions about dangerous aspects of
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waste. The emphasis in these sections is on providing a rich description of 
participants perceptions, rather than a quantitative analysis of the frequency of 
particular perceptions. The description is limited to those themes that received 
considerable discussion within one or more of the groups, or were mentioned 
in all three groups. While the two Sydney focus groups were divided on age 
into an under-50s and over-50s group, with a view to contrasting the views of 
those who had, and those who had not, experienced landfills in the post-war 
period, relatively little difference was found between the two groups, although 
the over-50s group was able to identify some differences between present day 
waste management arrangements and those they remembered from earlier 
times. As was found in the interviews with the older key informants, the 
language and the framings of the waste crisis in the 1990s seem to have become 
the dominant frame through which earlier experiences are expressed.
Paragraphs in italics are quotes of actual discussion. A single paragraph 
generally represents the unbroken contribution of one participant from any of 
the three focus groups. Occasionally, where the sense of the discussion is better 
conveyed by including the response of one participant to another within the 
same focus group, the two contributions are separated by a slash.
8.8.2. A Graphic Symbol to Represent a Landfill
Participants were asked to draw or describe a graphic symbol that they would 
use for placards and letterheads on protest letters if they were protesting 
against a landfill that was proposed to be established in their vicinity. The 
symbol had to be chosen for its maximum impact
A number of graphic symbols were put forward by the participants.
Garbage bins
A garbage bin tipping out with stuff coming out and the words 'Don't dump on 
us'
But 1 thought for a placard, something like a rubbish bin you know like the 
old... not the wheelie bins ... the old fashioned sort of rubbish bin, just spillmg 
over.
But the rubbish bin spilling over, that would be my first choice. Maybe some 
plastic shopping bagsfallmg out of the old fridge, blowing away in the wind.
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I've drawn a garbage bin which symbolises a community, and rubbish being 
thrown into the bin and saying 'we're not garbage bins'.
I had a dead tree, fire, a polluted environment... like the haze. Also with a 
rubbish bin on its side, and spilling out. And a poison bottle. And a dead bush. 
A ll dead. A  bottle with a skull and cross bones.
Garbage trucks
The only thing 1 could think of is the old garbage truck tipping something
Very basic, um just the symbol w ith a dump truck in the middle of basically no 
tipping here.
I thought of the dump truck, sort of dumping garbage bags plus all open 
rubbish, but have it  set in like a nice paddock w ith a stream nearby.
The truck up like that and all the plastic bagsfidl of rubbish corning out, 
perhaps and then... per haps have bottles and the poisons on the load as well.
Children
I  just had the same sort ofth ing, you know, kids playing like in fie ld right next 
to afield with rubbish and flies fly in g  round it  and needles and all that sort of 
thing
I  have an image of small children, small children always seem to get people on 
side sort of surrounded by broken glass, jagged cans.
Yeah you know some thing with a cross and children on. And saying don't 
dump your rubbish fo r our children to get hurt in. Something like that. 
Needles, you know, all that sort of thing.
Pollutants, poisons, toxics (in addition the passing references above)
...it could be paint or anything that's in filte ring  through the soil and into the 
river systems and ocean and I mean jus t all is repulsive.
A  picture of contaminating the environment, sort of symbolising polluting the 
environment it is dumping toxics which coidd be harming the environment.
...on one hand you've got small children and zvhat different effects it's going to 
have on them but then you have also got other poisons and the toxins and how 
harmful it is, you've got, well the mam message, you don't want the dump 
there
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And I had tins of oil spilling out, and cars bodies. And tins of um... large tins 
of chemicals. Like pesticides and stuff. Sort of tipping over. Dented ones. 
With lids off. / With one of those skull and cross bones on them.
Plastic bags
The first one which to me means rubbish are those plastic shopping bags. You 
know those ones that you get like ten or fifteen of every time you go to 
Franklins. But I thought that wouldn't really look very sort of striking on a 
placard. That to me is like, that symbolises waste, really, those plastic shopping 
bags.
You know when you go to the tip it's just like, you know, big piles of plastic 
bags.
Maybe some plastic shopping bags falling out of the old fridge, blowing away in 
the wind. /  They do it, the wind picks them up and ju st spreads them. /  Or a 
fence, you know, with plastic shopping bags hanging on it. That seems to be 
symbolic of a tip as well.
Flies and disease
It's everyone's rubbish. It's household rubbish. Flies. Disease.
Yeah, flies, yeah that sort ofthing, stmky smelly
Any dump is contaminated because you have got old rubbish. You can catch 
anything from that.
A number of common themes can be seen across the contributions of the 
participants. Firstly, in almost all cases, the rubbish bin symbol was chosen as 
having rubbish spilling out of it. Similarly, the rubbish truck symbol was 
chosen as having rubbish spilling from it. In the case of plastic bags, they were 
represented as blowing around.
Secondly, children were almost always mentioned in association with sharp 
objects which might harm them. Thirdly, the representations of landfills as 
polluted places included a range of substances responsible for the pollution, 
such as paints, chemicals, pesticides, poisons and toxic substances.
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8.8.3. Comparison with the Past
Participants in the over-50s focus group were asked whether they would have 
used the same graphic symbol in the past. One person suggested that the way 
people protested about something like a landfill was different in the past.
1 think in the 1950s zve didn't have a visual sense of [unclear] and things like 
logos would have been very strange to us. I f we were upset about something 
you would get a big sheet of paper and you would zvork out a petition and go 
along the street and get everyone to sign it and send it off to the local council 
and that zvas the zoay or zuell somebody in authority and you didn't make this 
great [unclear] zvith this logo emblazoned all over the place.
Transfer stations were seen as possibly more dangerous than landfills.
A tip isn't urn like what it zvas twenty years ago nozv it is a complete 
manufacturing plant, so then you've also go to worry about what they're doing 
uh what they're burning there if they're putting out fumes, putting out just 
disposal of rubbish, it's not just an old tip any more. So they could be pumping 
out all sorts of things from there.
Attention was also drawn to how the amount of packaging had increased.
Urn that's my recollection of the 1950s. We didn't have all this packaging, you 
zvent to the grocer shop, in the country you were still getting served then. Not 
at the supermarket. And they got you out a pound of monte carlos or whatever 
and put it in a paper bag zve didn't have a plastic tray contained inside another 
thing inside another thing urn. I f you zvant to go and buy a biscuit nozv that s 
hozv you get it
8.8.4. Impacts of a landfill
Participants in all three focus groups were asked, in the event of their imagined 
protest against a proposed landfill being unsuccessful, how they believed 
things would change in their surroundings and in their home as a consequence 
of the presence of the landfill. The direct impacts mentioned frequently were 
noise, smell and trucks. Some were concerned about rubbish not being 
confined to the landfill.
... there is going to be more traffic and just the local person drops their rubbish 
their greenery or whatever it's dropping on the road. I mean the zvhole 
environment is just mucked up because of it. / Yeh so it sort of spreads around 
the place.
Yeah and you've got the zvind which blows the rubbish around.
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The indirect health impacts mentioned included stress and various diseases.
Stress
Oh well it's going to become worse for something is always at the back of your 
mind.
It is alzvays at the back of your mind right enough. They could misuse it or 
dump other things that shoidd not be dumped and all that.
Stress on people.
Well, it's an unhappy environment, like you want your neighbourhood to be 
you want like after you have worked all day you want to come home to a nice 
neighbourhood, relax, feel safe, feel comfortable. Not to think oh my god this 
rubbish is down the end of the street and it's doing this to me and this to me. It 
builds up stress yeh it builds up stress levels.
Disease
Disease like parasites.
Mosquitoes, you get like Ross River fever and they can pass all sorts of things 
on so there's so many things.
It's the rubbish that the animals will be transmitting there as well. The 
animals that go there
What if they got bitten by the rats.
You'd have outbreaks of all different diseases I think you'd find. / Yeah just 
general... the kids would be sicker. They'd be picking up more colds and bugs 
and stu ff going round.
A number of participants mentioned the environmental impacts of a landfill. 
And it would go into the watertable...
You put a dump in the land of course the land is going to soak it up ... if  you've 
got a dump next door and it's all being passed through in that land.
The lack of knowledge of what may be deposited in the landfill, and distrust of 
government assurances were also mentioned.
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That's what worries me in that yon don't know what's going in and what effect 
it  w ill have on your children and grandchildren or people long after we are dead 
arid gone.
You don't know what's going in when they start o ff / Chemicals. Toxic. We 
have got a big dump at Seven H ills  a big industrial waste. It's  near the water.
There are always the industrial situations where they dump in the middle of the 
night and get rid of it  then, the same as they put things down the drains and 
they can now track that back to whoever is putting chemical things and uh 
they're the sort of things that worry me and then you can't rely on this 
government investigation. I  mean they told us the chemicals were all right and 
they have now found they cause god knows what, you can't really rely on and 
even i f  they found out what did cause can rely on them to tell us about it  uh 
because what are they going to do i f  they don't dump it  there. They're the kind 
of things that worry me. I don't trust the government whichever lot is in urn in 
that regard. We don't have a good record over the years.
Lastly, the devaluation of property values was mentioned by a number of 
participants.
8.8.5. Waste in Mountains and Valleys
Participants were asked whether they would be more concerned about waste 
piled up in a mountain, as compared to waste filling a valley. In two of the 
groups, there was a consensus that they would be more concerned about the 
waste mountain, In the third group, participants could think of advantages and 
disadvantages for both mountains and valleys. The dangers attributed to a 
mountain of waste appeared to relate to its visibility, generation of gases and 
the ease with which rubbish might be scattered from it.
I t  would probably pose more of a health hazard.
It 'd  have to be. It'd  have to sort of... sweat almost wouldn't it. Give offgases. /
Cook. / It  could ignite.
It'd  be just like a compost heap, jus t worse. It 'd  have plastic in it. / I t  probably 
wouldn't compost as much, though. / Maybe. Maybe it 'd  be worse because of 
all the plastics and stuff. / 1 think it'd  be half- probably- you're going to have- /
It 'd  be more toxic.
I f  you've got a great big mound that's covered in paper that blows away in 
wind and whatever else is there and as you drive by you see it. But i f  you drive 
by and it's a hole in the ground you tend not to see it.
It is worth noting that, for at least one person, the man-made holes in which 
rubbish is put are also dangerous places.
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With that quarry they have already made landscape so at least if it gets filled in 
we might do something to make it look aesthetically pleasing and find a better 
use for it, otherwise it's just a hole in the ground. Who wants to go down 
quarries where urn they throw the dead bodies or do the murders.
8.8.6. Material at the Bottom of a Landfill
Participants were asked to imagine a sample taken from a hole drilled to the 
bottom of a landfill and write down five or six words that described the sample. 
Participants' contributions were then discussed by each group as a whole.
There were a number of themes that emerged from this discussion.
Sensory descriptions
Black and oozy.
Brown and oozy, or hideous grey.
Smelly greasy 
Black and grey.
Oh I just put very dark and muggy with smell.
Unpleasant. Messy liquid.
Urn yeh well all this dark murky smelling urn this half liquid half dirt type 
material, manure
I had stench, that was the first thing that I thought would come up. / Stink.
Yes, and it's in a sort of greeny browny sort of colouring. It doesn't have a 
distinct colour.
I had stinky, sticky, sludge and slime... Stench
I had sloppy sludgy slimy. A fetid porridge consistency zvith hard and 
squashable bits.
Well if you go deep enough down you will just get a turgid conglomerate of 
midlock it wouldn't be compost, there's no way, there would be no air working 
on it would just be mullock. / [facilitator] So when you say turgid tell me more 
about turgid. What's- / It's a mixture of dry and wet. / [facilitator] Dry and 
wet? / Yes it's still a conglomerate, sort of sticky and dry, it would be a mongrel 
mixture only good for landfill
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Many of these descriptions refer to ambiguous matter, neither liquid nor solid.
Descriptions of objects
I was just sort of picturing decaying rubbish like old cars and car toys and 
things like that, urn involves
And then I had like plastic bags because they're going to be there forever 
because they never break up... they never break down.
All right, well seeing as we are just going to the bottom of the tip, the things 
that haven't broken down like plastic, metal, glass...
Descriptions of living organisms
...and of course the worms and beetles. / Like those beetles in the Mummy.
Oil. Plastics and worms. Food scraps.
I'd reckon there'd be worms. / 1 don't, there might be cockroaches, that's all. / 
Yeah cockies, worms you get from the heat.
I had mush, maggots and cockies.
Worms and that sort ofthing. Rotten food.
Urn. Wriggly things.
Things growing, mutant.
Mutants and maggots. I mean I know maggots are horrible things but they eat 
things.
Well I've got sludge. Worms. Old tin rusted cans, you know the old rusted out 
cans. Tetanus. / And kind of mutant things.
Contaminated, hazardous area, urn fungi, toxic waste, it's like this stuff 
remember when we were at school we would grow in a petri dish, like you put it 
in and it grows all sorts of stuff.
Dangers and unknown things
Toxic waste.
Well chemicals that shouldn't be there urn.
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Who knows what lies at the bottom. / You could never guess what's at the 
bottom ofthat tip.
All kinds of things could come up. 5000 syringes or whatever else.
Reversion to natural substances
Some participants took a more optimistic view, suggesting that the materials in 
the bottom of a landfill would revert to natural substances such as soil, 
compost, peat and coal. Others, however, accepted it would break down, but 
such substances would not be natural because of the presence of plastics, heavy 
metals and other contaminants.
Well I was just hoping it would revert to ordinary dirt. It's just going to revert 
to ordinary, yeah.
I've put a couple of things down. Pure clean humus. I've got to think about 
what I've been talking about. Urn the conditions there are very much like 
conditions for peat and coal. You can dig it up and use it.
I put that it could be good for compost, it would be dark and it would be wet.
Can I just say something, if depending on what went into this tip this thing 
that we pidled out from the bottom of the tip could be a really really good 
fertiliser.
Do you reckon these plastic bags will turn to coal eventually? / We still get 
plastic in it's original form because it won't break down. We've got broken 
glass because it won't break down. We have heavy metal residues which filter 
down from where it's been dumped in the pile which would probably dump the 
tin and iron from old cans.
It's a mutant soil. O f course it's not soil. All of those things could make soil, 
but with those additives and poisons, plastic bags and probably some other 
items, you can't make soil. So it really is a mutation.
It won't form a soil. All the worms and tiny animals take on these chemicals 
and start to- / Mmm... like the turtles. / Yeah, other creatures... I get ants in 
my microwave, I don't know how, but I wonder what they're going to become.
8.8.7. Rubbish Dislikes
Participants were asked whether there was any particular type of rubbish they 
particularly disliked. These discussions were somewhat disjointed, with the 
discussion shifting rapidly from the mention of a pet hate to consideration of
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causes and then wandering off-topic. Several types of rubbish, however, did 
receive some cohesive discussion and general agreement. These included the 
dislike of oils and fats, the dislike of plastic packaging materials, both for their 
perceived increased abundance in shopping purchases and for their presence in 
litter in public places.
Oils and fats
The fat from bloody chops and things. /. I hate oilfgeneral agreement] / Car oil, 
engine oil. / And cooking oil. / Yeah, car oil and cooking oil.
Several people also mentioned ambiguous materials, which may have been oil­
like.
Gooey sludge. Things that you've got to pack in something else to get rid of it. 
You know. / You've got to pack it something. Sort of semi decomposed stuff.
Plastics in packaging
Ah! Those rotten plastic strips. You know, that comes on cardboard cartons. / 
Ties. / Tape [general agreement] / Yeah, oh yeah, they're a menace to society. / 
Hard plastic ties- / With the little flat metal things on them. / Well what about 
plastic bags. / 1 know, 1 know we do, but when you see an amount of rubbish 
being dumped by a truck, it's always just one plastic bag after another.
Plastics in litter
Plastic bags and old tyres. They're every way and no matter where you go, you 
find them on the roads plastic bags. People just throw them away. They're 
dreadful. It doesn't matter where you go.
Plastic bags. / Mcdonald's packaging. McDonalds, all those things they put 
hamburgers in. / Oh that styrofoam. / Pizza boxes.
8.8.8. Ciean Up Australia
Participants were asked whether they had been involved on Clean Up Australia 
days, and why they thought people participated in such large numbers on the 
first few Clean Up Australia days in the early 1990s. There was discussion of 
national pride, the dangers to children from syringes and the fact that litter was
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present again not long after the clean-up. Several participants referred to Clean 
Up Australia in the early 1990s being associated with generalised 
environmental concerns.
The advertising like what they showed, like they showed pulling cars out of our 
ocean and dead fish and like they showed us the devastation of what happened 
over the last- / And smiling people picking up rubbish.
I think that people were scared at the beginning that the world was actually 
going to end tomorrow and now they've realised a couple of years down the 
track that we're still here so it can't be as bad as what they're saying.
8.8.9. Other Aspects of Waste
Fears about waste similar to folk fears of the unquiet dead were expressed by 
one participant:
... we can't just put it in landfills because it's going to come back to us.
On several occasions discussion of the mutant nature of decomposition 
products brought forth mention of Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles, a commercial 
and cultural production of the late 1980s.
You put a dump in the land of course the land is going to soak it up and if it's 
close enough to anything that grows vegetables, which means to say I like to 
grow my vegetables out the back and cook all genetic free and not really, if 
you've got a dump next door and it's all being passed through in that land. So- 
/ Probably be huge tomatoes. Huge. / Ninja tomatoes.
It won't form a soil. All the worms and tiny animals take on these chemicals 
and start to- / Mmm... like the turtles.
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9.1 Introduction
While there are many components of the solid (and, indeed, the liquid) waste 
stream that are being recycled, or are potential candidates for recycling, it is 
packaging that seems to have attracted the most attention (see section 11.1). 
Motor car bodies, white goods, clothing and many other consumer goods have 
been and are being recycled to varying degrees, but none have attracted the 
sustained attention of the media, environmental groups and politics that 
packaging has. The content of this chapter reflects this dominance, with 
substantial sections devoted to paper and plastic recycling, container deposit 
legislation and the packaging industry, but rather less on glass and metal 
recycling. Container deposit legislation as a means of encouraging the 
packaging industry to take greater responsibility for its products has been 
raised both in connection to litter problems and to unsatisfactory recycling 
rates. The description of container deposit legislation and the packaging 
industry is split between sections 9.3 and 9.4 of this chapter, which deal with 
the recycling aspects, and sections 8.3 and 8.4 of chapter 8, which deal with the 
litter aspects.
9.2 Recycling
9.2.1 Early Recycling and Resource Recovery
The collection of waste materials for re-use and reprocessing by charitable 
organisations raising money for hospitals in Sydney goes back to at least before
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World War II. During World War II, the collection of these materials came 
under a State Controller of Salvage for National Purposes to support the war 
effort (appendix B9.1:l). In the immediate post-war period, many basic 
materials were in short supply and the Canterbury Municipal Council found it 
economic to establish a centralised resource recovery plant which separated 
paper, metal, bottles and rags from municipal waste and composted the 
remaining organic fraction into fertiliser. However, increasing wage costs and 
declining prices for recovered materials resulted in the plant's closure in 1957. 
The closure of the plant did not prevent some enthusiasm for centralised 
resource recovery being expressed in the Legislative Assembly in the mid- 
1960s, although the authority proposed to operate such plants did not eventuate 
(appendix B9:2:l-2). The establishment of centralised resource recovery plants 
continued to be proposed in the Legislative Assembly in the 1970s and 1980s 
(appendix B9.3:3), although by the 1980s the Metropolitan Waste Disposal 
Authority was arguing that there were uncertainties about the feasibility and 
viability of such plants (see section 5.6.4).
9.2.2 Glass, Metal and Recycling in General
In contrast to demand-driven resource recovery at the end of the waste stream, 
as exemplified by the Canterbury Council's plant, the impetus for recycling 
from the 1970s onwards came largely from other than economic considerations, 
and extracted materials before they entered the waste stream. The fact that 
environmental organisations in the 1970s perceived a need for recycling 
(appendix B9.3:3), had its origins in the increase in the packaging of retail 
goods, which itself was a necessary part of the shift to the supermarket as the 
dominant form of grocery retailing. The development of light weight 
aluminium and steel beverage cans that were well suited to the new retailing 
environment was a significant threat to the market share of the beverage and 
bottle industries, whose only defence against the rapid growth in the canned 
beverage market (see, for example, Pausacker, 1975:45-46) was to transfer 
beverage production to non-returnable bottles (appendix B9.3:10).
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The main features of urban recycling and its politics were in place by the end of 
the 1970s. These included:
• collection of recyclables by local government prior to materials entering 
the waste stream (but at far lower levels that was to occur in the 1990s) 
(appendix B9.3:10),
• the appeal of recycling to environmental groups and some politicians as 
a means of reducing the amount of waste going to landfills and the 
impacts of landfills on the environment (appendix B9.3:3,13),
• the promotion of the environmental benefits of refillable bottles by 
environmental groups (appendix B9.3:6),
• the development of defensive strategies by the packaging and beverage 
industries to deflect criticism about the increasing volumes of 
packaging, some strategies probably being a net cost to the industry but 
others, such as paying for returned aluminium cans, being profitable 
(appendix B9.3:5, 12),
• the instability of markets for recycled materials which resulted in cyclic 
expansion and collapse of activity by collection firms (appendix B9.3:2,
9,11, 12), and
• the difficulties identified by academics and experts in particular 
disciplines in the measurement of the costs and benefits of recycling 
(appendix B9.3:8).
There appears to have been little change during the 1980s. As described in 
sections 5.6.5 and 5.6.6, the Labor Government in 1979 and the mid-1980s 
attempted to increase the level of recycling by the formation of committees with 
industry, Government and local government membership. The concept of the 
buy back centre failed to live up to its promise, and it was not until the Council 
Recycling Rebate Scheme was introduced in 1991 that source separation by 
householders and kerbside collection began to bring recycling rates to more 
substantial levels (section 5.6.7).
As recycling assumed the dimensions of a 'modern-day secular religion' 
(appendix B9.3:34) in the 1990s, there were more substantial, and more
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publicised, doubts raised about its merits, particularly from economists in the 
Federal Government's Industry Commission and Bureau of Industry Economics 
(appendix B9.3:24, 33). The Herald's economics writer argued that there was a 
vicious circle in which politicians were unwilling to take the gloss off recycling 
by referring to its unprofitability, which meant that people believed that the 
materials they were putting out at the kerbside were valuable, which meant 
they were unwilling to pay for kerbside collection, which further exacerbated 
the unprofitability (SMH, 12.10.94:17). For politicians, however, the economic 
rationality that recycling ought to yield a net economic and/or environmental 
benefit was 'out of step with public feeling', as Labor Environment Minister, 
Pam Allan noted in 1995 (appendix B7.15.3). As described in section 11.2.1, for 
much of the early 1990s Coalition politicians also regarded high levels of 
recycling as evidence of successful waste management policy.
Recycling was further called into question by sections of the environment 
movement in the early 1990s, when the improving availability of figures broken 
down to local government area for quantities recycled and quantities sent to 
landfill enabled the Waste Crisis Network to point out that the local 
government areas which had been congratulated for their recycling 
performance were also those with the highest per capita amounts of waste 
being sent to landfill (section 11.2.1).
9.2.3 Paper Recycling
The experience with paper recycling in the late 1980s and early 1990s provides 
an exemplary illustration of how the web of economic relationships involved in 
a profitable industry such as paper production resists policy intervention by 
governments.
As early as 1975, Pausacker (1978:14-15) had identified the main difficulties in 
implementing recycling programs for paper. Firstly, the paper mills were 
situated close to the sources of virgin fibre, and not the sources of waste paper, 
the capital cities. Secondly, the paper mills could not use waste paper without 
substantial modification. Thirdly, waste paper was a less reliable and more 
variable source of supply than virgin fibre from the plantations owned by the 
paper mills. Fourthly, technological innovation in the packaging industry was 
resulting in a proliferation of composites of paper and other materials such as 
plastics, which made recycling technically difficult. Fifthly, manufacturers of
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paper products other than packaging believed that recycled content would 
lower the quality or appeal of their products (Pausacker, 1978:14-15). Added to 
these was the problem, identified by the Joint Select Committee on Waste 
Management in 1993, that the New South Wales Government could not simply 
mandate a particular recycled content in paper as this would be a restriction on 
interstate trade that would contravene Section 92 of the Australian Constitution 
(appendix B9.3.1:21). Finally, a further problem that emerged in the 1990s was 
that New South Wales's rate-pegging laws prevented local government from 
raising garbage rates so as to increase payments to firms collecting waste paper 
when prices were low.
Given the many good reasons for paper manufacturers not to substitute virgin 
fibre with waste paper, the collapse in prices for waste paper in the late 1980s as 
more households began separating newspapers from household rubbish 
(appendix B9.3.1:2) could have been anticipated. With the high levels of 
environmental concern amongst the public at this time, it would appear that 
both the paper industry and the Government were aware of the consequences 
of failing to take some form of action to overcome the problem. The State 
Government smoothed the path for the establishment of new paper mills to use 
waste paper (appendix B9.3.1:6,11), while the paper industry formed the 
Publishers' National Environment Bureau to provide financial support to the 
recycling industry (appendix B9.3.1:9). However, the slowness of the industry 
in establishing new paper mills led to threats of newspaper boycotts from the 
environmental movement (appendix B9.3.1:8,16), while the continuing low 
prices for waste paper led to the firms which were collecting and selling waste 
paper to threaten terminating kerbside collection unless a subsidy was 
provided (appendix B9.3.1:12, 15). Such subsidy was contrary to the ideology 
of the Coalition Government, with the result that it resisted any assistance until 
one day before kerbside collection was to be terminated (appendix B9.3.1:18).
With the characteristic volatility of markets for recyclables, by 1995 prices had 
risen substantially, with the Herald reporting a shortage of waste paper 
(appendix B9.3.1:23).
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9.2.4 Plastics Recycling
Plants for using recycled plastic were not established in New South Wales until 
1991 (appendix B9.3.2:l-4). In the case of polyethylene teraphthalate (PET), it 
would appear that the nature of the process for using recycled PET in 
packaging (which could accommodate a maximum of 30 per cent recycled PET) 
led inevitably to an oversupply of PET (appendix B9.3.2:4, 5, 8, 9) and falling 
prices. The achievement of a 30 per cent recycling rate was regarded with 
enthusiasm by the Australian Conservation Foundation as 'closing the loop' 
(appendix B9.3.25), but was seen as a cynical public relations exercise by 
Friends of the Earth (appendix B9.3.2:4).
9.2.5 Kerbside Collection
While kerbside collection as an approach to recycling had been introduced by at 
least one council in the mid-1970s (appendix B9.3.3:l), it was not until the late 
1980s and the early 1990s that the State Government began to provide 
incentives to encourage kerbside collection initiatives by councils (appendix 
B9.3.3:5, 6, 8), as well as canvassing the possibilities for punishing those 
councils that did not introduce kerbside collection (appendix B9.3.3:10, 11).
As mentioned in section 11.2.1, the recycling rates achieved by kerbside 
collection were regarded as an indicator of the success of the Government's 
waste management policy. However in 1994 and 1995 growing criticism of 
both recycling in general and kerbside collection began to emerge, both from 
environmental groups (see section 11.2.1) and economists (appendix B9.3.3:18). 
The former, and the Herald in late 1994 (appendix B9.3.3:17), pointed out that 
high levels of recycling did not necessarily translate into a reduction of waste 
going to landfill, while the latter questioned the environmental and economic 
benefits of kerbside collection (appendix B9.3.3:18).
9.2.6 Recycling Symbolism
The growth of recycling's symbolic meanings appears to have followed the 
growth of recycling itself, with limited evidence of such meanings prior to 1989 
(appendix B9.3.4:!, 2), but a wealth of meaning appearing thereafter. Recycling
was seen as:
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• an environmental issue on which there was general consensus 
(appendix 139.3.4:3),
• a practical way for people to save the environment and demonstrate 
their support for environmental protection (similar to Ungar's 'small 
steps' discourse) (appendix B9.3.4:4, 8),
• a means of saving trees (appendix B9.3.4:6, 7), and
• a quasi-religious ritual (appendix B9.3:33; B9.3.4:10).
9.3 Packaging Levies and Container Deposits
Since 1972, governments from both sides of politics in New South Wales 
canvassed the possibility of introducing container deposit legislation or taxes or 
levies on packaging (appendix B9.4:l, 5-7, 11,13, 16, 18). While the Labor Party 
appeared to give greater favour to such legislation in its election platform in 
1995, once in government its approach to the legislation was little different to its 
Coalition predecessors (appendix B7.17.3:!). From the early 1970s to the early 
1990s, container deposit legislation was consistently supported by 
environmental groups and vigorously opposed by the packaging industry 
(appendix B9.4:2, 4, 11,14,16). The arguments for container deposit legislation 
prior to the 1990s related mainly to the need for industry to bear some of the 
public costs of waste disposal due to its packaging (appendix B7.17.3:5, 6). 
However, in the 1990s, the arguments in favour covered a wider range which, if 
anything, made the justification more uncertain than when it was in moral 
terms of responsibility for waste disposal. The report of the Joint Select 
Committee on Waste Management in 1993 set out a number of the arguments 
that had been put to the Committee, noting that container deposit legislation 
was 'one of the most actively argued issues before the Committee'. 
Environmental groups put forward the following arguments in favour of 
container deposit legislation:
• it would involve manufacturers in taking 'cradle to grave' responsibility 
for their products,
it would provide and incentive for the public to return containers,
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• refillable containers had less environmental impact than non-returnable 
containers as they reduced materials and energy usage by the beverage 
industry,
• it would reduce litter,
• it could broaden the range of containers being refilled beyond the 
beverage industry, and
• three thousand new jobs would be created in the handling and sorting 
of returned containers.
Beverage and retail industry representatives argued that:
• beverage containers constituted only two per cent of the waste stream 
going into landfill,
• non-returnable glass containers were 30 per cent lighter than refillable 
ones and therefore used less materials and energy in their manufacture 
and less energy in transport,
• refillable bottles required water for washing,
• the caustic solution used for washing was a potential source of 
pollution,
• residues of the caustic solution in bottles might be a health risk,
• supermarkets did not have the space or staff to store returned bottles,
• returned bottles stored in supermarkets could be a health hazard,
• the financial viability of kerbside recycling would be threatened,
kerbside recycling was already covering most types of containers and 
the levels of recycling were increasing, and
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• more jobs would be lost in the glass production and recycling industries 
that would be created under container deposit legislation.
Friends of the Earth countered the industry argument by claiming that washing 
used less water than manufacture of new bottles and that only a mild caustic 
solution was required and it could be re-used (JSCWM,
1993:44-46).
There were also conflicting accounts over the period from the 1970s to the 1990s 
as to whether container deposit legislation increased recycling rates, with 
environmental groups arguing that it did and industry groups denying this 
(appendix B9.4:4, 14, 19).
9.4 The Packaging Industry and Recycling
From the sources available to this study, there appears to be strong evidence 
that the packaging industry has, from the early 1970s, sought to resist and 
deflect government policies aimed at encouraging the industry to take greater 
responsibility for its products in the post-consumer phase. While such 
resistance has generally been interpreted as a form of environmental 
immorality by the environmental movement, there is little doubt that the 
policies that have been proposed, such as container deposit legislation and 
packaging levies, would impose additional costs on the industry. For 
companies that had structured themselves with backward vertical integration 
to ensure certainty in the supply of raw materials (for example, the paper 
industry's ownership of pine plantations), the pressure for recycling threatened 
the closure of whole subsidiary companies (appendix B9.5:5).
There were a range of defensive strategies pursued by the industry. In the early 
1970s, some firms obviously hoped that the interest in recycling was a passing 
phase (perhaps more a non-strategy than a strategy) (appendix B9.5:7).
From the 1970s to the 1990s, the packaging industry formed a number of 
industry associations (often with words such as 'environment' in their title) the 
function of which was either to lobby governments and / or undertake research 
on recycling and litter (appendix B9.5:3, 4, 10, 13, 14). The research undertaken 
by, or funded by, these associations has largely been situated in economics (see, 
for example, the Business Regulation Review Unit study described in section 
7.3) or behavioural psychology or behavioural descriptions in which the focus is
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on the individual's household recycling behaviour or littering behaviour in 
public spaces (see, for example, the Beverage Industry Environment Council, 
1999 and the Litter and Recycling Research Association, 1995, respectively). 
Given that in economic studies it is generally far easier to quantify the costs to 
industry than the benefits to the environment, such studies are generally 
favourable to industry's case against interventionist government policies. 
Studies on littering focus attention away from the industry's role in creating the 
packaging and on to individual acts of dvic misdemeanour (appendix B9.5:2, 6, 
11, 12; Reeve, Ramasubramanian and McNeill, 2000). The industry also 
promoted incineration (energy recovery) as an alternative to recycling 
(appendix B9.5:15), and this was reflected in its version of the waste 
management hierarchy (see section 11.3.1).
In the opinion of the environmental movement, the packaging industry also 
engaged in a number of deceptive practices to deflect criticism 
(appendix B9.5:3, 6, 15, 16).
10. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND WASTE
10.1 The Parks and Playgrounds Movement
10.2 The Total Environment Centre and Friends of the Earth in the 
1970s
10.3 Involvement in Policy Making in the 1980s
10.4 A More Substantial Role in the 1990s
Environmental and other community organisations have taken an interest in 
waste issues in Sydney since at least the 1930s and their influence on waste 
management policy has been mentioned at various points in the preceding 
chapters. This chapter provides some additional background on these groups 
and their engagement with waste issues. With the Herald as the main source for 
this description and the fact that waste issues were not a major concern for most 
groups, it is inevitably somewhat disjointed. While in no sense providing an 
account of the development of environmental organisations in Sydney, it does 
identify the points of contact between the organisations and the waste issues 
that are central to this study. A more complete account of the development of 
environmental organisations in Sydney is given by Hutton and Connors (1999), 
although they present very little material on waste issues.
10.1 The Parks and Playgrounds Movement
While the State Government had taken a role in the late 19th and early 20th 
century in preserving areas on Sydney's outskirts (such as Royal National Park 
and Kuringai Chase), the Local Government Act of 1919 placed responsibilities 
on local government for the provision of parks and other open recreational 
spaces within the urban part of Sydney. Prior to this, parks had comprised 
areas of sandy wasteland that were unsuitable for any other use, such as Moore 
Park and Centennial Park, or were reclaimed areas of wetland, such as 
Wentworth and Birchgrove Parks (Cuneen, 1980:110). The Act required that 
councils, in approving subdivisions, give consideration to the amount of 
recreational space provided. This gave those who were dissatisfied with the 
amount or distribution of recreational space in Sydney the opportunity to press 
councils for improvements, although the view had already been put prior to 
this that Sydney was in need of more parks in some areas.
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For example, Joseph Henry Maiden, a botanist known today for his extensive 
work describing and classifying the flora of Australia, drew attention to the 
inequitable distribution of parks and recreational space in Sydney in a paper to 
the Royal Society of New South Wales in 1902. In an article for the Sydney 
Morning Herald in 1905, Maiden argued that there was a need to ensure that 
recreational space was not lost to buildings (Cuneen, 1980:110). In 1914, a Parks 
Preservation Society was formed, however from Cuneen's account, this group 
appears not to have had any influence on subsequent events relating to 
recreational space in Sydney.
In 1930, the Parks and Playgrounds Movement (PPM) was founded by Dr 
C.E.W. Bean, initially as an offshoot of the Town Planning Association. The 
PPM had a mainly middle class professional membership and in 1932 
published a study of Sydney's recreational space needs (Cuneen, 1980:111, 112). 
The Parks and Playgrounds Movement both promoted increased recreational 
space, and acted as a watchdog that lobbied governments whenever parks or 
other recreational spaces appeared to be under threat of replacement with 
another landuse. Membership of the Movement dwindled in the 1970s, with 
many of its members, such as Myles Dunphy, joining the increasing number of 
conservation organisations (Cuneen, 1980:114).
The views of the Parks and Playgrounds Movement appear to have made some 
impact, at least, on the members of the Legislative Assembly and were brought 
into the debates about beach pollution in the early 1930s (see section 7.1).
Dr C.E.W. Bean, speaking at the Health Week conference said that we should 
begin a systematic campaign for the preservation of our playmg areas. I 
maintain that the greatest playing areas the city of Sydney are her beaches, and 
than it is our duty to prevent the pollution of them that is taking place at the 
present time.
(Legislative Assembly, 13.10.32:1069)
Our beaches are the playground not only of Australians but of many persons 
from the other side of the world. In times of stress like the present they are the 
playground of the poor, who spend their days there. Surfing is building up a 
type of young man the physique of whom is not surpassed by that of men of any 
other country in the world. Our life-savers are equal to any in the world.
Reference was made to the importance of physical culture for children in our 
schools, but they can have no better physical culture than they can get on the 
beaches.
(Legislative Assembly, 13.10.32:1069)
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10.2 The Total Environment Centre and Friends of the Earth in the 
1970s
The Total Environment Centre (TEC) was founded in late March, 1972. Those 
involved in setting it up included Professor E.P. George of the School of Physics 
at UNSW, Anthony Strachan, president of the Civic Design Society, Maurice 
May, a solicitor, Terry Quantrill, a businessman, and R.D. Walshe, a publisher. 
The first director was Milo Dunphy. The TEC saw its role as providing 
information to the public generally and to assemble expert panels at short 
notice for specific projects. Dunphy listed the TEC's aims as:
• specific environmental campaigns,
• helping small groups to gain the support of institutions or political 
parties,
• building links between existing environmental organisations,
• forming expert panels (SMH, 21.3.72).
The Herald reported in August 1972 that the while the original intention of the 
TEC had been to counter the sense of individual helplessness people felt about 
environmental issues, it had been 'deluged' with enquiries from 'furious' 
citizens with a 'sense of aggressive militancy'. Also reported was that TEC 
members had been suffering harassment in the form of poison pen letters and 
hundreds of dollars of unordered goods being sent to them. (SMH, 19.8.72:20)
In October 1975, Jeff Angel, the coordinator of the Centre, described it as both a 
support group (providing advice, information, administrative services, 
equipment and meeting rooms) and an activist group (holding rallies, writing 
letters, collecting signatures for petitions and physically preventing 
objectionable developments). He was careful to emphasise that the Centre did 
not 'take the banner out of the local's hands' (Angel, 1975:1).
The Friends of the Earth first appeared in the pages of the Herald in relation to 
waste issues in January 1977, when they claimed that the Woronora River may 
have been contaminated by radioactive waste from the Lucas Heights nuclear 
reactor. It was having tests done by the NSW Institute of Technology and 
announced it would clean up rubbish at a popular swimming hole just
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downstream from Lucas Heights to draw attention to the dangers of nuclear 
energy (SMH, 15.1.77:4).
However, on the day of the clean up, any symbolic links to nuclear energy were 
forgotten in a confrontation that provided the Herald photographer with the 
opportunity to highlight on the front page a stark cultural contrast. The Friends 
of the Earth members had collected a large pile of rubbish which spilled onto an 
access road to the picnic spot on the Woronora River. According to the Herald:
...when Mr Reg Bird, of Carlingford, tried to drive past, he judged the space too 
small and drove into the pile.
'I've been waiting for an hour to get out.' he said. 'The Friends of the Earth 
have caused more trouble than they're worth.'
The Frie?ids protested that there had been enough room for him to pass.
Nearly 40 other picnickers joined the argument on M r Bird's side and flung 
cans and bottles back into the bush, shattering some on the rocks.
'They must be mad collecting rubbish,' one picnicker said. 'If they'd left it were 
it was, we wouldn't have noticed it.'
(SMH, 17.1.77:1)
The Herald photographs highlight the confrontation of cultures, with a group of 
young and middle-aged working class Sydney-siders in thongs and swimming 
attire, some over-weight, and with beer cans in hand, facing the young Friends 
of the Earth members, in their jeans and tee-shirts with campaign buttons 
affixed.
The actions of the Friends of the Earth were subsequently praised by the Shire 
Clerk of Sutherland Shire, while the Atomic Energy Commission insisted that 
any radio-active releases were within the limits negotiated with the State 
Government (SMH, 18.1.77:8).
In December 1977, the Total Environment Centre and the NSW Environment 
Centre each received grants of $7500 from the NSW Government. The ACF 
received $5000 (SMH, 20.12.77:3).
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10.3 Involvement in Policy Making in the 1980s
While there appears to have been some differentiation since the early 1970s 
between environmental groups in Sydney along the spectrum from activist 
groups aiming to mobilise public opinion by activism outside the policy process 
to groups who saw their roles as information providers and wished to work 
within the policy process, this differentiation appeared to become more 
pronounced in the 1980s. The issue of hazardous chemicals and high 
temperature incineration was one area where this differentiation was readily 
apparent.
In November 1985, the visiting Executive Director of the US Centre for the 
Defence of Free Enterprise told a conference of the Agricultural and Veterinary 
Chemicals Association of Australia that 'Anti-chemical activists are a social and 
political pest. They attack and infect public opinion and public policy'. These 
and other extreme claims provided an opportunity for a spokesperson for the 
toxic and hazardous chemical committee of the Total Environment Centre, Dr 
Kate Short, to take a more moderate stance, saying that the statements were 
'irresponsible, coming at a time when environmentalists and industry members 
were working towards better control of the use of chemicals in rural and urban 
areas' (SMH, 6.11.85:7) — a rare reversal of the usual pattern of industry claims 
to the high moral ground of moderation and responsibility against the 
indignant clamour of environmentalists.
By the late 1980s, the split in the environmental movement over high 
temperature incineration had become clear. Greenpeace had announced in 1987 
that it did not support high temperature incinerators because they encouraged 
industry to continue producing hazardous wastes (SMH, 17.3.87:5). High 
temperature incineration was also opposed by Friends of the Earth, while the 
Toxic and Hazardous Chemicals Committee of the Total Environment Centre 
and ACF supported it, on the provision that it was used only in the short term 
to dispose of the stockpile of accumulated intractable waste (Legislative 
Council, 18.4.89:6500, 6503).
Greenpeace continued its opposition to high temperature incineration, 
criticising the proposed Corowa incinerator in 1990 on the grounds that the 
technology would result in unacceptable levels of pollution and that safer 
alternatives would become available in the future. In an editorial the Herald
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condemned Greenpeace for 'playing on fears and whipping up hysteria' in 
relation to the Corowa incinerator proposal (SMH, 27.9.90:12).
10.4 A More Substantial Role in the 1990s
As depicted in figures B6.1 and B6.2,1989, marked the transition point between 
a declining number of articles in the Herald about toxic chemicals and waste, 
and an increasing number of articles about solid waste. There seems to have 
been a similar transition in the interest of the environmental movement in 
waste issues from hazardous waste to solid waste, particularly after the threat 
of a high temperature incinerator had receded in the early 1990s (it is possible, 
of course, that this shift of emphasis is more a reflection of the Herald's choice of 
news stories, in that when the Herald was reporting on hazardous waste, it 
sought reactions from environmental groups on hazardous waste issues, and 
similarly when it was reporting on solid waste).
In 1989, Friends of the Earth made a submission to the Government calling on it 
to revamp the New South Wales Recycling Committee (Legislative Assembly, 
4.4.89:5796), an initiative that was later proposed in the Coalition Government's 
Green Paper on Waste Management (Hartcher, 1992:37)
The Total Environment Centre ran a waste management conference in 1992 
with speakers from various Sydney environmental groups and from local 
government. The address by David Hughes of the Nature Conservation 
Council speculated that the State Government and the Waste Management 
Authority had:
...a hidden agenda to create the crisis so that waste corporations could pick up 
the profits at the end. ... I am extremely disturbed that the viability of Sydney to 
follow the emerging international path of waste minimisation, at source 
separation and control, recycling and waste avoidance, is in some way linked to 
the agenda of the major private waste management organisations to capture 
this lucrative market under the impetus of the ideological preconceptions of the 
New Right and its so-called market forces-led efficiencies.
(Hughes 1992:2-3, 
emphasis in original)
Hughes cautioned against the effects of private sector monopolies in the waste 
industries and argued that Sydney's environmental organisations had on their 
files 'much of the theoretical and practical fabric for a waste management and 
minimisation strategy ' for Sydney (Hughes, 1992:3). This was borne out by the
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Friends of the Earth waste management strategies appended to the published 
conference proceedings.
It is also interesting to note that Hughes was able adroitly to deflect any of the 
negative connotations of selfishness associated with the obvious nimbyism of 
the opposition to the Londonderry and Lucas Heights mega-landfill proposals 
by conceptually expanding the backyard from a local to global one.
... unless that community itself acts to either minimise or eliminate the creation 
of [toxic] waste, unless it deals with it locally, the very dangerous materials 
created will be disposed of in someone else's backyard.
Even if those backyards are elsewhere overseas a?id possibly in Third World 
countries, the toxic by-products of our lifestyles will still remain a problem for 
us as not only is the world a global village, it is also a global backyard and, 
ultimately, there is no escaping the problem.
(Hughes, 1992:1)
At the same conference Herbert Beauchamp (1992:36), of the Total Environment 
Centre Toxics Committee, called for the NSW Government to:
• halt any further privatisation of waste management,
• instruct the Waste Management Authority to produce management plans
for a 40 per cent reduction of waste in two years and 60 per cent in five 
years,
• introduce container deposit legislation, including for plastic containers,
• require the building industry to deconstruct rather than demolish
buildings,
• introduce effective waste education programs,
• allow local government joint responsibility for expenditure of funds
generated by waste management charges, and
encourage local government to accept four regional high temperature 
incinerators.
[212]
The waste reduction achievements in Seattle were cited to justify the feasibility 
of the proposed targets. It was also argued that there was a need to 'come to 
terms with a bogey of the past — incineration' and that with developments in 
incinerator technology dioxin and heavy metal emissions were no longer a 
problem (Beauchamp, 1992:35-36). On the other hand, mega-landfills were still 
a problem, with 'leaking tips, river pollution and hundreds of heavy trucks per 
day' (p.31).
Perhaps the most substantial influence by the environmental movement on 
waste policy in the 1990s came from the loose coalition known as the Waste 
Management Network or the Waste Crisis Network. The Waste Management 
Network was described in an appendix to the proceedings of the conference 
described above as comprising representatives of about 20 environmental 
groups, including all the peak groups. Its goal was to develop a joint policy on 
waste management for all the environmental groups. The contact person was 
given as David Hughes of the Nature Conservation Council (Anon, 1992:37).
The first mention of the Waste Crisis Network in the Herald was in a waste 
management feature in May 1993. The Network was described as a 'group of 
30 green agencies and community groups', with Peter Hopper as secretary and 
John Denlay as chairperson, the latter being also the waste minimisation officer 
with the Friends of the Earth (SMH, 31.5.93:18).
The Waste Crisis Network was important in broadening the range of options 
under consideration in the waste debate of the early 1990s, and increasing the 
depth of explanation for the waste issues it considered to be of concern. The 
report produced by Peter Hopper in December 1992 for Friends of the Earth 
(Hopper, 1992) was significant in this latter respect for drawing attention to 
structural change, both in the beverage industry and in retailing generally, as 
the cause of the increase in non-returnable beverage packaging. Hopper 
presented figures showing that between 1974 the number of soft drink 
companies in New South Wales had fallen from 135 to 27. Over the same 
period, production in the New South Wales beverage industry had increased by 
51.7 per cent, while employment fell by 53.7 per cent. The root cause of these 
changes was the emergence of the supermarket as the dominant form of 
retailing of groceries.
In early 1995, John Denlay (described as a 'leading waste management 
consultant' in the Herald) prepared for the Sutherland Shire Council an
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alternative waste management strategy, described in a report titled 'Wasted 
Time: Sydney's Solid Waste Crisis'.
The strategy included a number of novel suggestions which appeared not have 
been canvassed to that date (at least in the Herald), as well as standard 
approaches to waste management:
• reuse and repair centres,
• recycling,
• centralised composting of organics,
• separation of toxic substances from the waste stream,
• non-toxic, non-biodegradable materials baled and landfilled, and
• improved industrial design to avoid waste.
The report suggested that if the toxic substances in products could not be 
recovered or reused, then the products should not be made and that more space 
could be created in existing landfills if they were 'mined' for their toxic and 
recyclable materials. Denlay claimed that his strategy could reduce Sydney's 
waste to landfill by 90 per cent and strongly argued for a single authority that 
was a partnership between the Local Government Association and the State 
Government. A spokesperson for the Minister for the Environment rejected 
Deni ay's claim that the State Government had no waste planning policy 
through having transferred its responsibilities to local government. To the 
contrary, the State Government was working with councils and had negotiated 
with the LGA on waste issues, and with industry bodies to sign waste 
agreements (SMH, 6.2.95:4).
A concept that appears to have entered the 1990s waste debate through the 
agency of the Friends of the Earth and the Waste Crisis Network was extended 
producer responsibility, the view that manufacturers should take some 
responsibility for the recycling or disposal of their products at the end of their 
useful life, regardless of the fact that ownership of the product rests with the
consumer.
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The first mention of extended producer responsibility appears to be in the 
criticism of the National Waste Minimisation and Recycling Strategy by the 
spokesperson for Friends of the Earth, David Vincent, reported by the Herald at 
the time of the launch of the Strategy in Sydney in June 1992. Fie referred to 
German legislation which 'held manufacturers responsible for collecting and 
recycling containers' and argued that this was consistent with the 'polluter 
pays' principle (SMH, 23.6.92:10).
The Waste Crisis Network raised the issue of extended producer responsibility 
in October 1994, when, according to the Herald, it argued that 'Legislation is 
needed to put the responsibility on industry to take back its products and 
recycle them' (SMH, 22.10.94:13).
In March 1995, John Denlay, speaking as waste campaigner for Friends of the 
Earth, made quite clear that producer responsibility included financial 
responsibility 'We need especially to make manufacturers pay the costs of 
waste they generate so they have an incentive to keep packaging to a minimum' 
(SMH, 30.3.95:39).
The 'producer responsibility' found its way into the 1995 Labor waste reforms 
as the Producer Responsibility Scheme (B7.16.3:8), even if the Scheme was not 
strictly extended producer responsibility as defined above. There was, 
however, little doubt among the Coalition Opposition that the Friends of the 
Earth had influence (undue influence in the Coalition's opinion) on the 
Government:
Previously people have come straight out of the community into the Minister's 
office to give advice to the Government —  people such as Peter Hopper and 
John Denlay from the Friends of the Earth and Peter Wood from the Local 
Government Association.
(Legislative Council, 
15.12.95:5049)
11. RUBBISH REFLEXIVITY AND THE ROLE OF 
SCIENCE
11.1 C ontentious and Em blem atic Packaging
11.1.1 Plastic Packaging
11.1.2 B iodegradable Plastic
11.1.3 Milk Bottles and Containers
11.2 Rubbish Reflexivity
11.2.1 The Suburban Recycling Com petition
11.2.2 The Per Capita Slide
11.2.3 Doubts about the Target
11.3 W aste Representations, P rinciples and S tory-L ines
11.3.1 The W aste M anagem ent H ierarchy
11.3.2 Environm ental Sym bolism
11.3.3 The C onstruction of Crisis
11.3.4 Life Cycle Analysis
Scientific and engineering expertise is required both for the creation of the 
products that ultimately become waste and for the management of this waste. 
The application of expertise to the problems of leachate control in landfills and 
the treatment of liquid industrial waste brought about significant 
environmental improvements since the 1970s. The application of scientific and 
engineering expertise to these areas was generally uncontentious and did not 
enter waste policy debate, and so has been given only the briefest of 
descriptions in chapter 6 and appendix B5.
There are, however, a number of areas where the application of scientific 
expertise did enter policy debate, either as support for particular points of view, 
or through providing principles and concepts around which debate was 
structured. As waste management in Sydney became more sophisticated and 
better controlled by the MWDA, there was improved understanding of the 
waste stream and its relationship with the level of affluence in the suburbs that 
generated it.
It is these aspects that are the subject of this chapter.
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11.1 Contentious and Emblematic Packaging
11.1.1 Plastic Packaging
Plastic packaging was singled out as a waste problem as early as 1973:
1 believe one of the biggest of these [the community's solid waste problems] 
is the disposal of plastic containers. It is reported that in the United States of 
America more than 3 billion tons of plastic containers are discarded each year. 
Most of them end up in local tips and dumps, building up mountains of non­
rotting, non-rusting trash.
(Legislative Council, 
15.8.73:181-182)
(see also appendix B6.2:8)
Plastic shopping bags were identified as part of the over-packaging problem by 
a member of the Legislative Assembly in April 1985:
Supermarket commodities are sometimes wrapped in two, three or four different 
types of packaging material. The checkout operator then puts them in a plastic 
bag. Not only is that material difficult to dispose of, but the hidden cost of it 
must be paid for by the consumer.
(Legislative Assembly, 
11.4.85:5895)
Plastic was once again singled out as a cause of waste problems in March 1986:
Changes in types of packaging towards plastic products, increasing the volume 
of waste and non-biodegradability of disposable materials make the problem of 
waste disposal much worse.
(Legislative Assembly, 
12.3.86:868)
The first article on the refusal of plastic bags at point of purchase appeared in 
the Herald in June 1989. It was reported that Coles public relations controller 
was hoping that Coles would be using photodegradable bags soon. Paper bags 
were rejected because of the use of trees, while USA EPA research that 
biodegradable plastic resulted in undesirable soil leaching was cited as a reason 
for not using biodegradable plastic (SMH, 22.6.89:19).
Early in 1990, KMART introduced a scheme by which they made a donation of 
two cents to local charities and the Australian Trust for Conservation 
Volunteers for each customer who refused a plastic bag. The KMART public 
relations spokesperson was reported as saying that KMART'S research had
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identified two themes that were of concern to their customers in relation to the 
environment. These were the customers' perceived inability to do anything 
individually that would make a difference to environmental problems and their 
concern about the volume of plastic entering the waste stream (SMH, 
8.10.90:16).
In October 1990, the Herald ran an article comparing the merits of plastic and 
paper shopping bags. Acknowledging that green groups had convinced many 
that 'taking plastic grocery bags from stores is a mortal sin', the article referred 
to the Plastics Industry Association claim, supported by scientific studies, that 
plastic bag manufacture consumed 20-40 per cent less energy than paper bag 
manufacture and produced less carbon dioxide. Against this was set the pulp 
and paper industry's claim that paper bags were made from renewable 
resources and had up to 50 per cent recycled content, compared to the 0.5 per 
cent of plastic that was being recycled at that time. The journalist's own 
contribution to the article was a paragraph on uncontrollable nature of plastic 
bags.
There is no getting around the fact that plastic bags, unlike paper bags, don't 
bio-degrade. They find their way into the litter stream and stay there —  at best 
into landfill, at worst into storm water drains, on to beaches, into rivers, 
streams and everywhere else from Antarctica to the Amazon.
(SMH, 8.10.90:16)
A similar disagreement arose about this time over the relative environmental 
merits of polystyrene and paper packaging. In November 1990, McDonalds 
announced it was phasing out foam packaging and replacing it with paper and 
cardboard with recycled content. The USA president of McDonalds was quoted 
as saying: 'Although some scientific studies indicate that foam packaging is 
environmentally sound, our customers just don't feel good about it.' The 
Australian managing director was reported as saying that he fully expected to 
be criticised for using materials produced from trees once the change to paper 
packaging was made (SMH, 3.11.90:5).
In November 1991, the Herald published an in-depth article on the relative 
merits of polystyrene and paper packaging. Quoting an article from New 
Scientist that reported on a study that showed that a paper cup used more 
resources to produce than a polystyrene cup, the Herald article concluded that it 
was very difficult to make environmental assessments about the merits of 
packaging materials. Confusion among consumers was considered to be rife 
and this was attributed to the maturing of the debate about packaging in which
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the industry had the time to come up with studies countering the claims of the 
environmental movement. Coles was reported as having no immediate plans 
to replace polystyrene trays, while McDonalds was well advanced in phasing 
out polystyrene (SMH, 20.11.91:21).
The November article was supported by a further article in April 1992 reporting 
the views of a visiting Canadian professor of chemistry at the University of 
NSW. In addition to the higher level of resource use, he noted that while paper 
and polystyrene cups initially took up the same amount of space in a landfill, 
the paper cup would form methane, a powerful greenhouse gas, if it 
decomposed under anaerobic conditions (SMH, 7.4.92:2).
In March 1992, the Hon. Patricia Forsythe, MLC, criticised the Leader of the 
Opposition in the Legislative Assembly over his comments that consumers 
should refuse to take packaging away from supermarkets with them. Quoting 
extensively from Puplick and Nicholls (1992), a publication by the Packaging 
Environment Foundation of Australia, she drew attention to the figures in the 
publication which purported to show that packaging actually reduced the 
volume of waste. This argument turned on the point that householders 
preparing fresh food, such as home-squeezed orange juice, or cooked poultry, 
discarded more food scraps into the municipal waste stream than did 
householders who bought the same product already prepared, and simply 
discarded the packaging into the waste stream. For processed food, much of 
the unused portions, such as orange peel, were used in manufacturing other 
products, so that the amount of waste was far less than in the householder's 
kitchen (Legislative Council, 6.3.92:732-733).
In July 1993, Greenpeace successfully halted the shipment by Woolworths of 
9000 kg of plastic bags to Asia, accusing Woolworths of dumping its waste 
problems on the Third World. Woolworths said it was cheaper to recycle the 
bags in overseas countries than in Melbourne (SMH, 15.7.93:2).
In the aftermath of the tabling of the Waste Minimisation and Management Bill, 
the idea of rejection of packaging at point of sale re-emerged. According to an 
article on recycling in the Herald in late November 1995, 'the basic message [of 
the new approach embodied by the legislation] if it's not packaged responsibly, 
then reject it' (SMH, 30.11.95:13).
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11.1.2 Biodegradable Plastic
In August 1973, "Additive X' was mentioned in the Legislative Council as a 
recent discovery which, if added to plastic during its manufacture, would cause 
it to be broken down by enzymes when it came into contact with the soil 
(Legislative Council, 15.8.73:182).
In 1978, Pausacker claimed in his study of recycling in Australia at that time 
that research into accelerated decomposition of plastics was a "ludicrous 
exercise", given the impact of such an innovation in retailing where products 
might be stored for longer than anticipated. He concluded for this reason that 
such research was little more than a public relations exercise (Pausacker, 
1978:38-39).
In August 1987, ICI Australia announced a new biodegradable polymer, Biopol, 
which was produced by bacteria and a sugar or starch feedstock rather from a 
fossil fuel (SMH, 10.8.87:7).
In July 1989, Cut Price Deli announced it would be introducing Ecolyte photo- 
degradable plastic bags that break down in about 60 days. The General 
Manager was reported as saying that although the photo-degradable bags were 
more expensive, the firm believed it had an obligation to operate in an 
environmentally aware and responsible manner (SMH, 17.7.89:4). The Minister 
for the Environment, Tim Moore was reported as being in favour of the 
production and distribution of the bags, which were to be used by Coles. 
However, the SPCC expressed reservations, claiming that the bags would 
encourage greater use of plastic. The Opposition environment spokesperson, 
Pam Allan, pointed out that the bags would still cause problems because they 
might not degrade if they ended up out of the light, such as in landfills or in 
deep water. The independent member for Swansea wrote to Tim Moore 
requesting a moratorium on the manufacture of the bags until an 
environmental study could be carried out. The managing director of a large 
plastic manufacturing firm near Newcastle was quoted as saying that there was 
no evidence that the photo-degradable film would continue to degrade in 
darkness after a few days exposure to light, and that the bags would put an end 
of the plastic recycling industry, responsible for recycling 30 000 tonnes of 
plastic each year (SMH, 21.7.89:4).
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In October 1989, the Herald carried an article criticising photo-degradable plastic 
bags. A chemist and packaging expert with CSIRO claimed that these bags 
made no contribution to solving the problem of plastic wastes in landfills. 
Where bags were exposed to sufficient sunlight and oxygen, they would break 
down as claimed, but this would mean that if all of the two billion check-out 
bags used in Australia each year broke down in this way, this would contribute 
30 000 tonnes of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere. But if the bags did not 
receive sufficient sunlight, then they would be stable for many years. The 
CSIRO chemist also advised against using the bags for food as the chemicals 
released as the plastic degrades could contaminate food. He argued that photo- 
degradable bags should not be introduced — rather, polyethylene bags should 
be recycled or burnt as fuel (SMH, 10.10.89:1).
11.1.3 Milk Bottles and Containers
In October 1989, the Herald reported that, due to the efforts of the 
environmental movement, there had been slight increases in the demand for 
milk in bottles. It quoted a milk supplier to shops who said that whenever 
there was an environmental program on television, there would be an increase 
in bottled milk sales in the following days. A spokesperson for the Total 
Environment Centre was quoted as claiming that bottles were more 
environmentally sound because they used a plentiful resource, the 
manufacturing process was relatively clean and they could be re-used many 
times (SMH, 11.10.89:3).
In November 1989, the Friends of the Earth staged a 'National Milk Bottle Day' 
on which they asked purchasers of milk to buy only in bottles. The Herald 
article reporting the Day, presented graphs from figures provided by the NSW 
Dairy Corporation showing that, in the period 1984-85 to 1988-89, one litre 
cartons and 600 ml bottles had a declining share of milk sales, while the share of 
two litre plastic bottles had increased from 15 per cent to 55 per cent. A 
spokesperson for Tetra Pak, a manufacturer of cartons claimed that bottles were 
undesirable because light could reduce the vitamin content of the milk, because 
bottles required greater use of transport, and because milk would be more 
expensive if cartons were replaced by bottles. A spokesperson for ACI, a glass 
manufacturer, replied that no one would leave their milk out in the sun, and 
that the high prices quoted for the Canberra trial of one litre glass bottles was 
due to the small volume of bottles involved. This spokesperson rejected Tetra
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Pak's claim that glass bottles could leave flakes of glass in the milk, pointing out 
that dioxin could leach from cardboard into milk, a claim that was countered by 
Tetra Pak which had changed its supplier of cardboard to mills that did not use 
chlorine bleaching. Friends of the Earth reiterated its call for a deposit on milk 
bottles to improve the return rate, a scheme that it claimed had been opposed 
by the packaging industry for many years (SMH, 23.11.89:3).
In February 1990, it was reported that, according to the Friends of the Earth, 
sales of bottled milk had increased by 30 per cent since the previous November 
when it began the campaign. This was denied by a dairy industry 
spokesperson. The Friends of the Earth spokesperson, Peter Hopper, 
maintained that glass bottles enabled savings in the use of resources and energy 
and should be used more widely, while the managing director of Australian 
Cooperative Foods was reported as disputing the merits of glass, mentioning 
that plans were under way to recycle plastic containers (SMH, 20.4.90:3).
The glass versus plastics debate surfaced at a meeting of the Royal Australian 
Chemical Institute at the University of New South Wales in May 1990. A 
technical adviser with the plastics producer, Hoechst Australia, argued that 
plastic containers were cleaner and more energy efficient to produce, compared 
to glass. Paper bags used a lot of energy and gave off harmful residues in their 
manufacture, while string bags were undesirable because they were made from 
pesticide-treated cotton plants. The technical adviser also claimed that fourteen 
times as much carbon dioxide was given off in the manufacture of a glass bottle, 
compared to a plastic bottle of the same capacity. The industry construction of 
litter as a people problem was also deployed: 'Plastic doesn't cause rubbish; it's 
people not disposing of it as thoughtfully as they might. Why not burn it 
instead of burying it?'. The technical adviser pointed out that plastic had two 
and a half times the calorific value of brown coal and burning was widely used 
overseas to generate steam and electricity. A Friends of the Earth 
spokesperson, replying to the claims for the Herald, argued that 'the re-useable 
nature of string bags and glass packaging outweighed any environmental 
hazards in their production'. The spokesperson also pointed to the release of 
highly toxic vinyl chloride monomers during plastics manufacture, while a 
CSIRO packaging expert drew attention to the production of toxic and 
corrosive substances when PVC was burnt (SMH, 24.5.90:5).
In March 1992, the Herald reported New Zealand research which showed that 
exposure to light in two litre plastic container resulted in a decrease in the
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vitamin content and a change in the taste compared to milk in cardboard 
cartons (SMH, 18.3.92:6).
In September 1992, an article on the phasing out of milk that was not 
homogenised brought up the bottle versus carton issue. A person who 
preferred the non-homogenised milk was quoted as saying 'I have to believe 
that anything [such as bottles] that can be used up to 27 times is better7. The 
article went on to report that 'The first principle of many environmentalists is 
that re-use is preferable to recycling7, thus making bottles preferable to cartons. 
The general manager of the milk division of Australian Consolidated Foods 
was quoted as saying that the disadvantage of the bottles was the cost and 
pollution caused by washing (SMIT, 19.9.92:2). Several days after the Herald 
article, the issue was raised by Democrat MLC, the Hon. Richard Jones, in the 
Legislative Council (Legislative Council, 23.9.92:6257).
The milk bottle debate was reactivated in the aftermath of the tabling of the 
Waste Minimisation and Management Bill in November 1995. Conservation 
groups rallied outside Parliament House on 16 November to protest about a 
decision by Australian Cooperative Foods to phase out milk bottles, The Labor 
Minister for Agriculture, Mr Amery, claimed that the company had taken this 
action because the Government did not grant it the full milk price rise it had 
requested (Legislative Assembly, 16.11.95:3413). In early December 1995, the 
managing director of Australian Cooperative Foods was reported by the Herald 
as confirming that milk bottles would be phased out by Christmas because they 
were uneconomic to produce. According to a spokesperson for the Minister for 
the Environment, an amendment to the legislation was likely to be passed in the 
Legislative Council to compel the industry to retain a fraction of sales of milk in 
glass bottles (see appendix B6.17.4) The managing director was unabashed:
That would he interesting, wouldn't it? If the Government wants to legislate,
are they going to force people to drink a pint of milk a day from glass bottles?
We'll wait with interest to see what people are going to force us to do.
(SMH, 2.12.95:8)
According to the Herald, he also pointed out that consumer demand for bottles 
had fallen from nine per cent of the market four years previously to three per 
cent of the market, and that milk bottles were being used only five times instead 
of twenty-five times because they were not being returned (SMH, 2.12.95:8).
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11.2 Rubbish Reflexivity
In November 1988, the Herald published the first of what might be termed 
reflexive waste articles. The article described the relationship between waste 
generation and socio-economic status and location in Sydney. The article used 
per head waste generation rates and reported on the view of the MWDA that 
the larger 240 litre bins and the bans on backyard burning were responsible for 
the increasing waste generation rate (SMH, 22.11.88:4).
The introduction in January 1991 of the Council Recycling Rebate Scheme by 
the Waste Management Authority, which paid rebates to councils according to 
the quantities of domestic recyclables they collected, resulted in improved 
figures about recycling rates across Sydney's local government areas (WMA, 
1990-91:20).
11.2.1 The Suburban Recycling Competition
In March 1991, the Herald published local government area recycling 
participation rates, showing high participation rates in the northern suburbs 
and low rates in the south west. The findings came from a survey by Recycle 
Sydney, an organisation formed by the Glass Packaging Institute and the Litter 
Research Association in 1990. The manager of Recycle Sydney was reported as 
saying that the State Government should offer greater incentives to local 
government to provide weekly collections (which were shown to have a higher 
participation rate than monthly collections) (SMH, 12.3.91:2).
In June 1991, the Herald published the kg recycled per person per year figures 
for all Sydney Councils, based on a survey by the WMA. The figures showed 
higher rates in the northern and eastern suburbs (SMH, 4.6.91:5). The results of 
this survey in December showed that some of the southern suburbs had 
improved (SMH, 18.12.91:7).
In March 1992, the Minister for the Environment, Tim Moore, commended the 
member for Manly for his council 'coming in second or third in per capita 
recycling returns' (Legislative Assembly, 19.3.92:1467). Also at this time, Moore 
announced that just under 100 000 tonnes of recyclables had been diverted from 
the waste stream during 1991 under the Council Recycling Rebate Scheme. He 
used the per capita recycling rates calculated for each local government area to
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praise the northern and eastern suburbs where the rates were high, and the 
relative low rate in Sutherland Shire to chide the Liberal member for Sutherland 
to whose question he was responding (Legislative Assembly, 10.3.92:828).
The quarterly recycling survey results were published by the Herald in June 
1992 without the usual table of per capita recycling rates for each local 
government area. The article drew attention as usual to the differences in the 
rates between the northern and eastern suburbs and the inner southern and 
western suburbs. Tim Moore was quoted as saying he hoped the councils 
would compete with each other to be at the top of the recycling table (SMH, 
10.6.92:2).
In September 1992, in announcing the release of the Waste Management Green 
Paper, the Minister for the Environment, Chris Hartcher, referred to the 
excellent records on recycling of some councils and accused Liverpool Council, 
which had the lowest recycling rate, and other Labor controlled councils of 
'dragging] the chain badly on recycling (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.92:6492).
In October 1992, after eighteen months of published recycling figures in the 
Herald and of self-congratulatory articles about the progress being made with 
recycling, the Nature Conservation Council pointed out that the councils that 
were being rewarded with the greatest amount of recycling rebate, i.e. those 
collecting the most recyclables, were also those who were throwing away the 
most non-recyclables and therefore making the greatest contribution to the 
shortage of landfill space. According to the Nature Conservation Council 
project officer, Peter Hopper, the kerbside recycling scheme was rewarding 
those in the affluent suburbs who were producing the most waste, and 
therefore encouraging the production of waste for landfill disposal rather than 
reducing it. The argument was supported by the Independent member for 
Manly who said that although Manly had one of the best recycling records in 
Sydney, it had only reduced its waste stream by 10 per cent (SMH, 30.10.92:3).
In February 1994, the Herald raised the claims of the Nature Conservation 
Council and its associate, the Waste Crisis Network once again, the claims 
having been published in the 'Waste Crisis Quarterly' (a publication of the 
Nature Conservation Council with a title similar to the EPA's 'Kerbside 
Quarterly' which published success stories about kerbside recycling) The 
'Waste Crisis Quarterly' also claimed that the average reduction in waste going 
to landfill as a consequence of kerbside collection was only 2.4 per cent between
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1992 and 1993 which did not augur well for the target of 50 per cent reduction 
by 2000. Peter Hopper was quoted by the H erald  as saying that the focus placed 
on recycling by government and industry was 'a serious distraction from the 
real issue of 'waste avoidance' and that legislation to promote waste reduction 
and reuse was urgently required. A spokesperson for the Minister of the 
Environment, however, cast doubt on the significance of the report's findings, 
pointing out that it considered only household waste, which was only about 
one half of the total volume going to landfill (SMH, 2.2.94:5). On the other 
hand, given that it was the industry contribution which had increased most 
rapidly in the late 1980s, and industry waste management that had received 
relative little policy attention over the preceding decades, it was hardly likely 
that industry recycling initiatives would improve the figure suggested by 
Hopper.
It appears that the discrediting of recycling did not immediately discourage 
political support for it. In May 1994, the Minister for the Environment, Chris 
Hartcher, was still congratulating northern suburbs Liberal councils for being 
'at the top of the performers' list [on recycling rates]' (Legislative Assembly, 
4.5.94:1887).
The embarrassment suffered by the Government as a consequence of the 
Nature Conservation Council's discrediting of recycling rates as a measure of 
waste management performance was recounted by the newly elected Labor 
member for Badgery's Creek in December 1995:
The previous Government had a lovely document called 'Kerbside Quarterly'. I 
am sure the member for Pittwater remembers 'Kerbside Quarterly', which 
stated how wonderful councils were at recycling. The honourable member said 
a lot about how councils met their targets. The last column in that publication 
was about how much was thrown away per capita for everybody that lived in a 
local government area. The waste crisis network realised that all the great 
performers in recycling were really lousy performers when it came to reducing 
waste, that they threw away more waste than people in western Sydney. So 
what happened to the last column? It disappeared; it was not printed. People 
started saying that this was afurphy, a shonk, that the people in Penrith throw 
away half as much as the people on the North Shore. Yet the people of Penrith 
were told that they were lousy re cyclers.
(Legislative Assembly, 
5.12.95:4143)
Informant 5 corroborated this account of the Government's embarrassment, 
suggesting that the annoyance at the Nature Conservation Council's action was 
more due the action 'shifting the spotlight' away from recycling, on which the
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Government was depending as demonstration of its progress in dealing with 
the waste crisis, to reduction in consumption (see Figure 11.3 (b)), which was 
the environmental movement's favoured approach.
11.2.2 The Per Capita Slide
There was a tendency in the early 1990s for per capita figures to be used in a 
particular style of writing about the quantities of waste to be disposed of. This 
style frequently resulted in a slide of meaning from quoted total waste disposal 
weights per capita, to the idea that each person actually discarded that amount 
of waste. For example, the Authority wrote in its 1989-90 annual report: Tn 
1989, 3.7 million tonnes of solid waste were disposed of in metropolitan 
Sydney; more than 1 tonne for every man, woman and child' (WMA, 1989- 
90:18). Similarly, in the 1991-92 report, 'At present, the amount of solid waste 
we throw away, while falling, is still, on average, 870 kilograms a year for each 
one of us' (WRAPS, 1991-92:6). Reference to figure 11.1 will make it clear that 
'we' in this statement has to include industry and commerce. While the per 
capita figure is correct, there is a slide of meaning, implying that each person 
actually disposed of this much waste. This is incorrect as approximately one 
half of the total solid waste going to landfill in Sydney (which excludes 
agricultural and mining wastes which are generated outside of Sydney) was 
generated by industry and commerce.
In May 1993, per capita waste generation rates were completely misconstrued 
in a Herald special waste feature. An article framing events as a waste crisis 
assumed that the per capita rates were what individuals actually discarded. 
Following the headline, 'Waste Mountains' the article commenced: 'Our 
average family of four dispatches the equivalent of 13 220 kg Sumo wrestlers 
[i.e. 13 Sumo wrestlers each weighing 220kg, amounting to 2860 kg per family 
or about 715 kg per person] a year to the rubbish dump' (SMH, 31.5.93:18). 
Inspection of figure 11.1 would suggest that this figure includes commercial 
and industrial waste and building and demolition waste. In actual fact, the 
average family of four would send somewhat over one half of the amount cited 
by the Herald.
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Figure 11.1: Trends in per capita per annum generation of solid waste requiring disposal.
This excludes generation of waste which is collected for recycling, Prior to 
1982, only data for the total amount of solid waste are available. (Source: data 
supplied by NSW Environmental Protection Authority Waste Branch.)
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A similar misconstrual occurred in a Herald article in March 1994 (appendix 
B6.11:2) and in the Herald in a waste management feature in March 1995: 
"Sydneysiders each dispose of 774 kg of garbage a year" (SMH, 30.3.95:39). In 
November 1995, the introduction to an article on recycling referred to "one of 
Sydney's most pressing political and environmental problems — the household 
rubbish bin', thereby ignoring the half of the problem that was due to industrial 
waste (SMH, 30.11.95:13).
11.2.3 Doubts about the Target
At the Land and Environment Court hearing in October 1994 into the rejection 
by Penrith Council of Pacific Waste Managements application to extend its 
landfill at Badgery's Creek to take putrescible waste, the possibility was raised 
that the amount of waste going to landfill each year was being underestimated 
by 1.3 million tonnes (see Waste Industry, below), compared to an estimated 
total of about two million tonnes per year (SMH, 17.10.94:4; 18.10.94:12).
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By August 1995, it was becoming clear that the amount of waste going to 
landfill was being systematically under-reported. In its first discussion paper, 
the Government Pricing Tribunal confirmed the claims that had been raised in 
the Land and Environment Court hearing The discussion paper claimed that 
one million tonnes of waste, about one third of that going into landfills, was not 
registered in official figures due to contractors dumping illegally at landfills to 
avoid paying a $7.20 per tonne environmental levy. If this was allowed for, 
then the current figure for the volume of waste going to landfill was higher 
than the 1990 figure which was the benchmark for the target reduction in waste. 
Also in August 1995, the Herald reported on Melbourne University research 
which claimed that the official national figure of 14 million tonnes per year to 
landfill for the eight capital cities was closer to 22 million tonnes per year, due 
to illegal dumping and poor policing by regulatory agencies (SMH, 23.8.95:2).
Several months later, waste targets came under criticism in an inquiry by the 
Federal Government's Industry Commission. The commissioner of the inquiry 
was cited by the Herald as criticising the setting of targets in the National Waste 
Minimisation and Recycling Strategy as:
• 'generating hidden economic costs which ultimately had to be passed on 
to ratepayers and consumers',
• being set without 'clear environmental objectives or ... a clear 
understanding of the likely environmental and economic benefits and 
costs', and
• having 'perverse effects on incentives and on the policies of packaging 
waste management'.
The 50 per cent waste reduction target was singled out as having been 'adopted 
with poor information about the amount of waste going to landfill at the time' 
(SMH, 23.10.95:2). This view was corroborated by informant 1, an officer within 
the Waste Section of the Commonwealth Environment Protection Authority.
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11.3 Waste Representations, Principles and Story-Lines
11.3.1 The Waste Management Hierarchy
As described in appendix B2.3, the waste management hierarchy and its 
triangular diagram can be traced back to the Second Environmental Action 
Programme (1977-81) of the European Union. The Minister for Local 
Government, Mr Jensen, was quoted by the Herald on 21.12.77 as saying that 
'disposal should only be a last resort', a view that is consistent with the concept 
of the waste hierarchy.
In the case of the top step of the hierarchy, the Authority appears to have first 
publicly acknowledged the possibility of waste reduction as a policy objective 
in its 1985-86 annual report:
Throughout the world there has been a growing awareness at the community 
level of resource recovery and waste reduction as significant issues. Waste 
management policies are increasingly being viewed in terms of national 
environmental objectives with the following priorities:
•  Waste reduction
• Separation at source for recycling
•  Mechanical separation of useful materials
• Energy recovery
•  Landfill
(MWDA, 1985-86:44)
While not specifically stating that the first mentioned objective had the highest 
priority, such an ordering is very similar to the waste hierarchy. In noting that 
'local circumstances and economic factors will, of course, dictate the order of 
those priorities [in the hierarchy]' (MWDA, 1985-86:44), the Authority clearly 
subscribed to the 'menu of options' school. This term was used by Schall 
(1992:1) to describe the view of the waste hierarchy as options any of which 
may be preferable under appropriate economic and environmental 
circumstances. The Authority appeared to remain committed to this school 
during the late 1980s (see, for example, MWDA, 1988-89:31).
In 1989-90, the Waste Management Authority (WMA) explicitly dted the waste 
management hierarchy as something around which its waste management 
strategies would be based. According to the Chairperson of the Board and the 
Managing Director:
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This hierarchy prioritises waste reduction programs as our primary 
environmental objectives. The Authority has adopted a role of encouraging and 
facilitating increased levels of waste reduction by industry, councils,
Government and the community.
(WMA, 1989-90:3)
In the main part of the annual report, the hierarchy was described as:/... a 
sequentially integrated approach to waste management which gives primary 
concern to waste minimisation and recycling (WMA 1989-90:9). The diagram 
shown in figure 11.2 appeared adjacent to both of the above descriptions of the 
waste management hierarchy.
Figure 11.2: The waste management hierarchy (Source: WMA, 1989-90:3, 9 — grey tones 
may differ slightly from original).
WASTE MANAGEMENT HIERARCHY
Waste mininisation
/  \
Landfill gas recovery
The account of the waste management hierarchy given in the 1989-90 annual 
report represents a switch, at least publicly, from the "menu of options' school 
to the 'hierarchy of options' school as Schall (1992:1) terms it.
A question that arises about the presentation of the waste management 
hierarchy in the annual reports of the Authority is whether the hierarchy was a 
serious guiding principle for the waste management professionals of the 
Authority, or presented in the annual reports merely to show an up-to-date and 
impressive public face. According to informant 4, the hierarchy was regarded 
as a guiding principle by the professionals of the Authority. Much of the 
comment received on the 1990 Sydney Waste Management Strategy was framed 
in terms of the hierarchy. Informant 4 believed that the Authority had 'brought 
the hierarchy to Australia' and reported that the Coalition Environment
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Minister, Tim Moore, viewed the hierarchy as a means of thinking about the 
distribution of waste management authority, viz. that the EPA should deal with 
the top of the hierarchy, while the Authority should deal with the bottom.
The hierarchy made its first appearance in the Legislative Assembly in April 
1989. The Labor member for Wallsend, Mr Mills, presented his maiden speech 
in the debate on the Waste Disposal (Amendment) Bill and made what appears 
to be the explicit reference to the waste hierarchy in the Assembly, although the 
concept of placing greater priority on minimisation and recycling had already 
been put forward by the Labor spokesperson on the environment earlier in the 
same debate.
The Organization of Economic Co-o-peration and Development hierarchy of 
management of toxic wastes deserves some reflection also in the light of these 
amendments. ... The Opposition is committed to the higher priorities in that 
hierarchy. I hope that this Government is also so committed.
(Legislative Assembly, 
4 .4 .89:5805)
In the Green Paper the waste management hierarchy was represented as a 
menu of options dependent on the dictates of the market (B7.7.2:3). In 'No 
Time to Waste' the waste management hierarchy was both a true hierarchy in 
the statement of policy principles (B7.12.2:3) and a menu of options for waste 
planning (B7.12.3:3). In the majority report of the Joint Select Committee, the 
different interest groups positioned themselves in the waste management 
debate through the use of different versions of the waste management 
hierarchy (figure 11.3).
Government and industry versions of the hierarchy placed emphasis in the 
achievement of the 50 per cent waste reduction target on the diversion of 
materials from landfill through recycling, while the Nature Conservation and 
Local Government Reference Group diagrams emphasised reduction at source 
(figure 11.2 (b), (d)) (appendix B6.8.3:3-6).
While various waste management options were mentioned in groups in the 
Herald during 1990 to 1993, it was not until May 1993, that these articles 
conveyed the sense that these options could somehow constitute a prescriptive 
principle for action. In a waste management feature, an article stated that: 
'Environmental groups say that the first two components of the 'three Rs' — 
reduce and reuse — have been largely ignored in the rush towards recycling' 
(SMH, 31.5.93:19).
[232]
In the Labor Government's 'Waste Reforms' the hierarchy was a true hierarchy 
in the statement of policy principles, but with the triangular diagram inverted 
(figure 11.4) (appendix B6.16.2:1). However, in introducing the Waste 
Minimisation and Management Bill, the Government described an approach to 
industry waste reduction plans that was very like a menu of options (appendix 
B6.16.2:3).
Figure 11.3: Versions of the waste management hierarchy presented in the majority report
of the Joint Select Committee on Waste Management.
(a) The Green Paper version
WASTE MANAGEMENT HIERARCHY
▲
Waste minimisation
Materials energy recovery
Landfill disposal
Landfill gas recovery
(b) The Nature Conservation Reference Group version.
Consumption reduction
Product re-use
Material recycling
Material biodegradability
Landfill and incineration 
(not approved)
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Figure 11.3(contd): Versions of the waste management hierarchy presented in the majority 
report of the Joint Select Committee on Waste Management.
(c) The Industry and Recycling Reference Group version.
Waste minimisation
Materials energy recovery
Landfill disposal etc
(d) The Local Government Reference Group version.
Materials energy recovery
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Figure 11.4: Version of the waste management hierarchy presented in the Labor
Government's waste policy document of 1995, 'Waste Reforms'.
THE WASTE MANAGEMENT HIERARCHY
MAXIMUM 
CONSERVATION 
OF RESOURCES
1. Avoiding w aste
2. Re-using m aterials
3. Recycling and rep rocessing  m aterials
4. W aste d isposal (if th e  first th ree  a re  not possib le)
However, at this time, the packaging industry was promoting the 'menu of 
options' interpretation of the waste hierarchy, arguing in its submission to the 
Senate Standing Committee on Environment, Recreation and Arts that waste 
management policy should be based on consideration of all available options 
and a mix of solutions chosen which would optimise economic and 
environmental outcomes (Senate Standing Committee on Environment, 
Recreation and Arts, 1994:14).
While the waste management hierarchy was a fundamental principle in the 
Waste Minimisation and Management Act 1995, as had been the case for the 
previous five years, the merit of the hierarchy was taken as self evident. 
According to informant 8, this unquestioning acceptance of the merit of the 
principle extended to the section within the NSW EPA with policy and 
regulatory responsibilities under the Act.
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11.3.2 Environmental Symbolism
Towards the end of the 1980s, there was a distinct change in how waste was 
related to environmental issues, being particularly noticeable in the annual 
reporting of the MWDA. It commenced in 1986-87, with the justification for 
recycling, which had been given for many years previously as conserving 
natural resources, being widened to include conserving landfill space (MWDA, 
1986.87:37). In 1987-88, recycling was mentioned as a means of reducing the 
waste stream (MWDA, 1987-88:13).
Then, in 1988-89, the introductory paragraphs to the Director's review, left little 
doubt that the Authority was operating in a new set of conditions, although this 
particular annual report marked the first in a new format and the first for the 
new Director (see section 5.1):
In the past year environmental issues have sprung to the forefront of the minds 
of the entire community. It is now clearer than ever before that our 
environment is our most valuable resource and that its capacity to absorb 
humanity's waste products is far from limitless. Its fragile nature is now 
clearly evident as a result of the recent focus on issues such as the greenhouse 
effect, ozone depletion and beach pollution.
(MWDA, 1988-89:2)
Compared to the Director's reviews in the past, such reference to the 
environmental issues of the day was novel subject matter. The Review went on 
to note that waste management was 'in crisis' in some parts of the developed 
world and extrapolated the current waste generation trends to show that 100 
million tonnes of waste would be generated by 2011,' a pile of garbage which 
would fill Sydney Harbour'.
The linking of waste management to the apocalyptic dimensions of global 
climatic change was more specific in the year's review in the 1989-90 annual 
report:
The recent dramatic increase in the environmental awareness of the community 
continues to grow and is not likely to wane as we approach the 21st century.
This concern has been precipitated by issues such as ozone depletion and the 
greenhouse effect. However, it has also focussed the community's attention on 
waste management issues in general...
(WMA, 1989-90:3)
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The review went on to describe the responses of the New South Wales 
Government to this community concern, suggesting that This change recognises 
that the environment is at risk unless community wastes can be reduced 
substantially' (WMA, 1989-90:3). This statement is difficult to reconcile with the 
previous 18 years of MWDA research and development that had gone into 
reducing the environmental impacts of its landfills to an extremely low level. 
Indeed, the detailed accounts of the Authority's achievements in this area 
which had occupied up to several pages in previous annual reports were 
reduced to several short paragraphs in the 1989-90 annual report.
About this time, landfill capacity, at Castlereagh and elsewhere began to be 
represented as a precious finite resource (appendix 135.5.2:45), a representation 
that also occurred in the Green Paper (appendix B6.7.1:2) in 1993.
11.3.3 The Construction of Crisis
In 1990-91, the Waste Management Authority was operating under crisis 
conditions, with a major reorganisation under the Protection of the 
Environment Administration Act 1991 looming before it, with the Government 
decision not to proceed with the Londonderry landfill and to place a 
moratorium on further landfills, and with delays in the siting of a high 
temperature incinerator due to intense public opposition. It is interesting to 
note, that under these conditions, the Authority's account of its twenty years of 
operation presented its origins in terms of a crisis.
Crisis
1970 Local Government closes their mostly open dumps to the acceptance of 
industrial liquid wastes because of mounting environmental problems and 
community concern. Great concern arises as the possibility of waste 
transporters dumping liquid wastes into sewers, rivers and in bushland.
A proliferation of local dumps have become an environmental and operational 
nightmare. Fires, vermin infested piles of uncovered rotting garbage and 
leachate polluted streams and rivers are co??imon. The Government of the Day 
calls for an independent report by Mr A.E. Barton, a representative of the 
British Government on Toxic Waste Disposal.
(WMA, 1990-91:8)
As discussed in section 4.7.6, there is little evidence in the Herald for 
widespread public concern about the liquid waste 'crisis' of 1969 and 1970, and 
the impetus for the appointment of Alan Barton came originally from an
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approach to the NSW Department of Decentralisation and Development by a 
number of liquid waste transporting firms, requesting the provision of an area 
of land where they could dispose of liquid wastes.
In 1991-92, the newly formed Waste Recycling and Processing Service (WRAPS 
or the Waste Service), wrote of changes in community attitudes in terms of 'as 
people get further away from the disasters of the early 1970s' (WRAPS, 1991- 
92:14).
11.3.4 Life Cycle Analysis
In September 1992, life cycle analysis was put forward in the Legislative 
Assembly as a solution to making decisions about waste management:
I am concerned that we may jump to possible solutions with regard to our 
waste stream without a comprehensive analysis.... The reality is that when it 
comes to waste management we are dealing with probably the most critical 
issue facing society today.... New South Wales cannot hope to move to a 
comprehensive strategy unless we all recognise the importance of life cycle 
analysis for the various packaging options. ...In short, it is time to elevate 
discussion zvith regard to waste disposal from snnplistic solutions, away from 
nostalgia, and to truly recognise and consider in depth all the issues for the sake 
of our society now and in the future. I hope the Minister will encourage a 
consideration of life cycle analysis,...
(Legislative Assembly, 
24.9.92:6529)
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12.1 Introduction
In chapter 1, the research questions set for the study were:
• whether the formation and evolution of public policy for the
management of solid waste in the dty of Sydney in the period 1900-1996 
was affected by changes in the understanding among the general 
populace of waste substances and waste places and, if so, in what way,
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• whether waste policy making may sometimes be a form of moral panic 
over deviant matter,
• whether the various dualisms, binary codes and story lines that occur in 
waste policy discourse have a role in problem closure, policy formation 
and policy paralysis,
• how realist and structuralist accounts of waste policy formation and 
evolution might relate to each other, and
• whether Beckian and ecological modernist theories of long term change 
in environmental policy making are supported by the history of waste 
management in Sydney.
Also, as mentioned in section 2.8, it was anticipated that the compilation of the 
history of waste management could also lead via inductive reasoning to 
conjectures about explanations for waste management policy formation that lay 
outside the questions posed above.
The following sections set out in detail the conclusions that have been reached 
in respect of these questions, and the arguments that support those conclusions.
12.2 Dirt, Deviance and Danger
12.2.1 The Ambiguity and Deviance of Waste
From the sources used in the study, it is possible to discern two obvious ways 
in which waste has ambiguous qualities that defy the orderings and 
classifications of everyday life.
The first, which was pointed out by Douglas (1966), is ambiguity in the physical 
properties of substances that are regarded as waste. As described in section 8.8, 
there was little doubt in the minds of the focus group participants that the 
substances at the bottom of a landfill would have ambiguous properties 
somewhere between liquid and solid. The advertising professionals who 
provided the advertisements for the first Clean Up the Harbour Campaign in 
1989 (with the 'Yukky Yukky Poo' jingle) connected, either intentionally or 
subconsciously, this innate dislike of ambiguous substances with the littered 
foreshores of the Harbour and global environmental problems (section 7.2.2).
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Waste can also be spatially ambiguous, i.e. it defies the expected order of where 
certain types of things ought to be in our surroundings (matter out of place, as 
Douglas, 1966 noted). Things which are finished with and disposed of (thrown 
'away'), cause concern if they continue to assert their presence by refusing to 
stay 'away7. This concern over spatial ambiguity appears most frequently in 
discussions of litter problems. The journalist describing the litter collected on 
Clean Up the Harbour day referred to plastic always turning up somewhere 
else (section 7.2.2). Parliamentarians have expressed their ire over McDonalds 
packaging by referring to its ability to appear at great distances from its source 
(appendix B6.17.45). Several focus group participants referred to plastic bags 
as blowing around and being 'everywhere' (section 8.8). Waste in landfills was 
also believed to have this unruly quality by one of the focus group participants 
(section 8.8).
There are, however, a number of other ambiguities associated with some of the 
constituents of waste, plastic in particular. The temporary usefulness of plastic 
packaging contrasts with its durability in the environment. A number of focus 
group participants raised concerns about plastic not breaking down, as did the 
journalist mentioned above (sections 8.8, 7.2.2). They also referred to the 
decomposition in landfills on a number of occasions as 'mutant7, implying that 
the decomposition that took place in landfills would not be natural 
decomposition as in other places, due to the presence of plastic and poisons 
(section 8.8).
Plastic, then, is ambiguous in a number of ways. Indeed, with its refusal to 
decompose and its ability to return to haunt those who thought it had been 
thrown 'away', plastic realises the ancient folk fears of the unquiet dead.
Added to this are some dangerous qualities such as the suffocations of children 
playing with plastic bags that occurred in the 1950s (appendix B4.1:2), the 
emission of hazardous fumes when it is burnt and past problems with 
plasticisers migrating into foodstuffs wrapped in plastic (section 8.7). It is 
perhaps not surprising then, that informant 3, a senior manager with an 
industry-sponsored litter reduction organisation, bemoaned what he regarded 
as the unfair share of attention plastic received as a scapegoat for modem ills. 
As Rathje and Murphy (1992) note of the USA:
Plastic is surrounded by a maelstrom of mythology; into the very word Americans seem 
to have distilled all of their guilt over the environmental degradation they have wrought 
and the culture of consumption they invented and inhabit.
Rathje and Murphy (1992:99)
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12.2.2 Waste Places
As mentioned in section 2 .2.2, Lynch (1990) introduced the idea of waste places 
as symbolically debased areas that signal the local relaxation of social control 
and attract litter and dumping. However, as touched on in section 2.2.4, the 
concept has a longer history, related to British colonial governments' 
classification of lands, both in Australia (Shelton, 1998) and in India (Hoeschele, 
2000) .
A number of sources located in this study suggest that both Sydney's ocean 
beaches, the dunes behind them, and other areas of heath and swamp land 
were regarded as waste lands in the 19th century, in that they were not 
perceived to have any immediate use (section 7.1.1). As sanitary standards 
improved in the 19th century, and waste began to be transported further afield, 
rather than being allowed to accumulate in the streets, it was these waste lands, 
together with the watery wastes of the ocean beyond the Heads, that received 
the garbage and night soil of the city (section 7.1.1).
There is also evidence that the mangrove fringed estuaries of the inner Harbour 
and other peripheral wetlands were viewed as waste land that was better 
converted to recreational space by filling with garbage and covering with soil, a 
practice that was recommended in the first half of the 20th century by both the 
Department of Health (appendix B8.1.3) and the Parks and Playground 
Movement (section 10.1).
By the late 1950s, the Health Department was beginning to have doubts about 
the wisdom of landfills in Harbour estuaries (appendices B7.4.3:l; B8.4:5), 
although in some local government circles such areas were still regarded as 
waste lands (appendix B8.3.1). By the mid-1970s, the issue of whether landfills 
in wetlands created recreational areas or destroyed areas suitable in their own 
right for other forms of recreation was being debated in the Legislative 
Assembly (appendix B6.L12).
By the 1990s, the fringing beaches and wetlands of the Harbour had become the 
focus of massive community clean ups (section 7.2.2), and were certainly no 
longer regarded as suitable places for the accumulation of rubbish.
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12.2.3 Out of Mind, Out of Sight
The popular saying 'out of sight, out of mind' was often encountered in the 
material examined as part of this study, including in academic literature, 
newspaper articles, parliamentary debate and inquiry and policy papers. The 
saying is often advanced as a simple rationalisation for any perceived failure of 
policy or individual behaviour in relation to waste management.
However, from the interpretations presented in the preceding sections, it would 
seem that 'out of mind, out of sight' might be an equally valid rationalisation. It 
could be argued that waste materials deposited in waste places do not excite 
concern among citizens — it is simply a case of material of no value resting in a 
place of no value. If this is the case, then it follows that concern might arise 
when there is a dissonance between the waste material and its place of 
accumulation. If the mind of the citizen is disturbed by this dissonance, to the 
extent that some form of remedial action is embarked upon, either physical or 
political, then it could be said that the waste has become visible. In other 
words, while the juxtaposition of waste and location is mentally unremarkable, 
it is effectively invisible. As the irate picnickers on the Woronora River in 1977 
were reported by the Herald to have said as they threw the rubbish collected by 
the Friends of the Earth members back into the bush: "If they'd left it where it 
was, we wouldn't have noticed it." (section 10.2).
This suggests that concern about accumulations of waste might arise in two 
different ways, according to how the formerly unremarkable juxtaposition of 
material and location becomes visible, i.e.:
• a change in the way in which the place of accumulation is understood or 
used, or
• a change in the way in which the waste material itself is understood.
It would appear that several instances in which public concern about waste 
have arisen in Sydney may have had their origins in the types of changes above.
Change in the way in which places of accumulation of waste are understood 
seems to be at the root of the gradual contraction of suitable sites for depositing 
garbage in Sydney. The places of accumulation that underwent the most 
dramatic transformation were the ocean beaches and the dunes behind them.
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The rapid rise in popularity of surfing in the early 20th century had elevated 
some beaches, such as Bondi and Manly, to the status of outdoor gymnasia that 
were essential to the vitality of the growing nation (section 7.1.1). The washing 
up of garbage on these beaches from ocean dumping by Sydney councils was 
unpleasant for bathers, as well as an affront to the growing symbolic meaning 
of the ocean beaches to Sydney (section 7.1.2).
A second example of the rise of concern about accumulations of waste due to a 
change in the way the place of accumulation is understood occurred in 1989. 
During much of the 1980s, concern had been expressed in the Herald and in 
Parliament about floating rubbish in the Harbour and Ian Kiernan, the 
instigator of Clean Up the Harbour had unsuccessfully attempted in late 1987 to 
interest the Government in a Clean Up Day, an idea that was not a novel one. 
However, a year later, Kiernan was able to mobilise a great deal of support 
from government and other sources, resulting in 20 000 volunteers turning out 
for the Clean Up (section 7.2.2). From the sources examined in this study, there 
appears to have been no startling scientific discoveries showing that the ecology 
of the Harbour was endangered by floating rubbish, nor were there reported 
any sudden increases in the amount of floating rubbish in the Harbour. There 
appear to be two things that lay behind the popular support for the Clean Up. 
Firstly, the Harbour had been the focus of year-long national bicentennial 
celebrations in 1988. Secondly, the problem of the greenhouse effect and ozone 
depletion had been receiving increasing political and media attention towards 
the end of the 1980s. The media reporting leading up to the Clean Up Day had 
placed the floating rubbish in stark contrast with the Harbour's symbolic 
importance as the birthplace of the nation, while the advertising for the Clean 
Up Day had provided an antidote against the vague concerns about possible 
global climatic catastrophe in the form of a simple action anyone could take 
(section 7.2.2). From both the media reports (section 7.2.2) and the focus group 
discussion (section 8.8.8), there is evidence that many people were motivated by 
beliefs about impending climatic catastrophe. The interesting thing about the 
Clean Up the Harbour example is the suggestion that a change only in the 
symbolic meanings attached to a place of accumulation of waste can result in 
the waste being seen as problematical.
It is also possible that changes in scientific understanding can lead to concern 
about accumulation of waste in particular locations. The change from what was 
termed in appendix B6.2T2 the 'old landfill logic' (landfills in wetlands 
improve recreational opportunity) to the 'new landfill logic' (landfills in
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wetlands destroy recreational opportunities) in the period from the late 1950s 
(appendix B7.4.3:l) to the mid-1970s (appendix B6.2:12) was largely a 
consequence of the increasing scientific appreciation of the ecological 
importance of estuarine mangroves. As a result, garbage that had been resting 
in a waste area of smelly mangroves that bred sandflies and mosquitoes came 
to be resting instead in a crucial and highly productive part of estuarine 
ecosystems.
Turning now to the second way in which waste accumulations might come to 
be seen as problematical — changes in the way the waste itself is understood — 
there seems little doubt that, as touched upon in section 12.2.1 above, the 
appearance of plastic in the waste stream from the 1950s has had an impact on 
how waste is understood. Apart from the disquieting ambiguities of plastic 
mentioned in section 12.2.1, plastic and plastic packaging in particular, appears 
to have taken on a considerable range of symbolic meanings in the last fifty 
years. From at least since the early 1970s, plastic packaging, has come to 
symbolise the waste problem generally and its intractability (section 8.8.1; 
appendices B9.4.2:l, 3; B8.7:14; B6.2:8), the litter problem generally (section 
7.2.2; appendix B7.2.6:25), the disappearance of the refillable milk bottle and the 
frugality values it represented (appendix B6.17.3:41-46), the disappearance of 
old-fashioned retailing (section 8.8.3) and the 'over-packaging problem' 
(appendix B9.4.2:2). This objectification into plastic packaging of concerns 
about waste generally, changing economic life and values was encountered 
from a wide range of actors, from the ordinary people of the focus groups 
through to Ministers of the Government.
From the sources available to this study, there appear to have been no 
comparable concerns or objectifications in the 19th century and early 20th 
century about particular constituents of waste. Sustained concern over several 
decades focussed on the ambiguous and dangerous qualities of a particular 
constituent of the waste stream, which comes to have a wide range of symbolic 
meanings attached to it, seems to be a phenomenon of the second half of the 
20th century.
12.2.4 Waste and Danger
In section 2.2.4, the inference was drawn from the work of Hoy (1995) and 
others that the idea of invisible or near-invisible agents that carry dangers from
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distant accumulations of waste has a long history, certainly back to times prior 
to the European settlement of New South Wales. The germ theory of disease at 
the end of the 19th century replaced one agent of danger (miasmas) with 
another (rats, flies, fleas, germs). In the 1900 plague outbreak, the logic behind 
the massive civic clean-up was guided by both the germ and miasmatic theories 
of disease (appendix B8.1.2). Throughout the first half of the 20th century in 
Sydney germs, rats and flies were the main agents of danger, although there is 
evidence that the role of the latter was exaggerated (appendix B7.4.2), as Hoy 
(1995) found in the USA.
A number of events in the 1970s led to public awareness of a new agent of 
danger. These included the world wide news coverage of Love Canal in the 
late 1970s, the local news coverage of the ongoing illegal dumping of liquid 
industrial waste in Sydney (section 8.6), the growing awareness of the potential 
for pollution of ground and surface waters by landfill leachates (appendix 
B5.2.L1; section 8.6), and the publicity given to the discovery by the State 
Pollution Control Commission that 60 tonnes of dioxin contaminated waste had 
been dumped in three Sydney landfills in the early 1970s (section 8.6). Also in 
the 1970s, smoke from burning rubbish at landfills came to be considered as 
poisonous, rather than as a nuisance as it had been during the first half of the 
20th century (section 8.1). This meant that landfills then had the capacity to 
endanger the health of people distant from them through the transport of 
dangerous and largely invisible chemicals via water or air.
With their invisibility, the agents of danger of the late 20th century have more 
in common with the miasmas of the 19th century, than with the biological 
agents of danger in the early 20th century. This is not to say that people in the 
late 20th are not unaware of the potential for harm transmitted by biological 
agents such as flies (appendix B8.1.3:15; section 8.8.4), rather the advent of the 
awareness of the possibility of toxic substances has added an additional and 
possibly more frightening agent of danger.
The third way, then, in which the concern of citizens might be aroused by 
accumulations of waste is changes in the agents of danger. While there is a 
continuity spanning the 19th and 20th century insofar as there always have 
been agents of danger that can make distant accumulations of waste seem 
problematical, the different agents of danger each open up their own 
possibilities, not only for remedial action by professionals and policy makers, 
but for the social construction of the dangers and their causes. As Fitzgerald, S.
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(1992:215-216) notes, the cleansing of Sydney during the outbreak of bubonic 
plague related more to the location of 'problem' slums than to the actual 
incidence of plague cases (appendix B8.1.2:l). The advent of the germ theory of 
disease presented opportunities for the manufacturers of pesticides to prey on 
people's fears by exaggerating the dangers of flies (appendix B7.4.2:l). The 
possibility of hazardous chemicals in waste materials has given rise to such 
cultural and marketing productions as Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles (and a 
wide range of other teenage heroes — Corcos, 1997), and the association 
between substances in landfills and mutation (section 8.8.9).
One instance where there may have been an increase in concern and policy 
change that is attributable to the advent of a new agent of danger was the 
abrupt change in policy that occurred with the death of a child from plague at 
Moore Park in 1900. In the context of a response to the plague outbreak that 
consisted mainly of slum cleaning in central Sydney rationalised with a mixture 
of miasmatic and germ theories of disease, the possibility that the 
accumulations of waste further out from the city centre could be nuclei for 
further spread of plague brought swift action that resulted in all of Sydney City 
Council's waste being dumped at sea (B8.1.2:3). However, the sources 
examined in this study do not make it clear whether this action by the Council 
was in response to the mobilisation of community concern, or to professional 
advice.
Turning to more recent times, the public concern about landfills in the early 
1990s far exceeded that expressed about landfills or incinerators in the first half 
of the 20th century, to the extent that the coverage by the Herald and political 
debate can be taken as an indication. It might be argued that the greater 
coverage of environmental issues in the media, and increased public awareness 
of the mechanisms by which hazardous substances can circulate in the 
environment (e.g. Antarctic penguins carrying PCBs in their body fat) resulted 
in a growing perception that there was no refuge from the reach of the agents of 
danger. However, while it is difficult to point to a specific episode of public 
concern and consequent policy change that was solely due to the advent of 
these new late 20th century agents of danger, there is little doubt that they 
added to public fears of landfills, not only through fears of exposure to toxic 
substances, but also through fears of the 'mutant' substances that might form in 
modern landfills (section 8.8).
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12.2.5 The 1990s Waste Crisis as a Moral Panic
In section 2.2.3, the conjecture was put forward that periods of heightened 
media and political attention to waste problems may be a form of moral panic, 
with deviant matter as the focus, rather than deviant groups within society.
This turns on Douglas's characterisation of things that are regarded as dirty and 
polluting as falling between, or blurring, the categories by which daily 
experience is understood. The social groups that are the subject of moral 
panics, such as teenage mothers, homosexuals, Mods, or bikie gangs, generally 
defy classification in the normal categories by which other people in society are 
understood. As has been argued in section 2.2.2, and demonstrated by the 
focus group findings reported in section 8.8, some waste materials such as 
plastic and imagined substances in landfills similarly defy the categories by 
which materials are understood. Just as the bulk of the populace have little 
personal experience of the deviant groups that are the focus of moral panic, so 
do they also have little personal experience of such things as 'toxic waste'. Both 
are invisible threats, understood from the productions of culture more than 
from everyday life.
It might also be argued that deviant social groups are stigmatised as being 
'dirty' in some sense, the conjecture being that dirty substances can give rise to 
moral panics in the same way that 'dirty' social groups do. However, an 
investigation of which social groups in Sydney may have been regarded as 
'dirty' lies outside the scope of the thesis as defined in chapter 1, whereas the 
argument that appeals to Douglas's work is believed to be sufficient to establish 
the similarity between deviant materials and deviant social groups.
From the waste and litter policy making examined in this study, a number of 
observations can be made about this conjecture. There is little doubt that many 
of the features that have been described as characteristic of moral panics also 
apply to waste and litter policy making. Perhaps one of the clearest parallels is 
the role of the media in the early stages of a moral panic in creating the 
inventory of symbols and meanings which provide frames for subsequent 
reporting. For example, the reporting of hazardous waste issues during the 
1980s created 'toxic waste' as a specific substance with its own set of dangerous 
qualities (section 8.6), when in fact there always had been a wide range of 
industrial waste products lying along a continuum from the mildly unpleasant 
to the life-threatening. The toxic waste frame was then used extensively in the 
reporting of the concerns of residents in the vicinity of the Castlereagh Depot
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(section 5.5.2), fuelling the fears of those who did not understand the chemistry 
of liquid industrial wastes, and exasperating the Government in its search for a 
rational scientific assessment of the impacts of the Depot.
Another parallel is Cohen's (1972) 'not only this' phenomenon (representing the 
problem as the tip of an iceberg of social ills) which is readily discernible in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, when Ian Kiernan's Clean Ups, recycling, and waste 
minimisation were all seen as solutions, not just to litter, excess packaging, or a 
shortage of landfill, but to the threat to survival posed by global environmental 
problems (section 7.2.2, appendix B9.3.4).
Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) and Thompson (1998) draw attention to the role 
of social movements in moral panics in emphasising the moral dimensions of 
the problem. One moral dimension pertaining to packaging waste is the 
principle of extended producer responsibility. This is an alternative way of 
framing the relationship between the packaging industry and its products when 
these have come to the end of their useful life. A simple commercial framing 
would see packaging as the property of the person who bought the product, 
and therefore of no concern of the manufacturer. The extended producer 
responsibility principle, on the other hand, seeks to establish manufacturers' 
moral responsibility for their products long after they have passed out of their 
ownership. Extended producer responsibility appears to have first been 
promoted during the 1990s waste crisis by the Friends of the Earth and the 
Waste Crisis Network (section 10.4). However, while the environmental 
movement had generally been responsible for feeding emerging ideas from 
overseas into the waste policy debate during the 1990s, there is evidence to 
suggest that this moral dimension of packaging waste has a longer history. For 
example, the substantial financial contributions since 1976 by the packaging 
industry to anti-littering programs are certainly promoted by the industry as an 
example of its responsible behaviour, even if it is the threat by government of 
container deposit legislation that makes the contributions so readily 
forthcoming.
Finally, it would be tempting to argue that the 1990s waste crisis arose, as moral 
panics are held to arise, at a time when, as Schudson (1989) argues, the symbols 
and meanings of the cultural repertoire fail to resonate with people's experience 
of reality. For example, it could be suggested that the 1970s and 1980s had 
provided a certain amount of reassurance that environmental problems were 
under control as pollution control technology became more effective during the
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1970s, as development decisions came under the influence of environmental 
impact assessment in the late 1970s and as even the apparently irreconcilable 
conflict between economic development and environmental protection was 
ameliorated by the emergence of the concept of sustainable development in the 
mid-1980s. The sudden media publicity about global climate change and ozone 
holes that had occurred despite the reassurances of governments that the 
environment was being 'managed sustainably' may have represented a 
dissonance between past experience and reality. Certainly, both generalised 
measures of environmental concern and the Herald's attention to waste issues 
rose dramatically in the late 1980s (figure B6.1),
However, it is probably none too difficult to propose some form of dissonance 
as Schudson envisages at any period in history. To demonstrate that the late 
1980s was more significant in this respect than some other period would be a 
difficult undertaking, and certainly require a more thorough examination of 
environmental discourse than was undertaken in this study with its emphasis 
on waste issues.
In balance, the parallels between the 1990s waste crisis and the moral panics 
described by Cohen (1972), Thompson (1998) and others do not necessarily 
amount to a monopoly by moral panic theory on the explanation of waste 
policy making in times of crisis. Rather, moral panic theory deals with a 
particular type of policy making where the concerns that attract political 
attention are exceptionally well endowed with the sorts of meaning that lends 
itself to representation in media frames that command audience interest. Waste 
policy making could be thought of as occupying a position somewhere between 
policy making driven by moral panics and environmental policy making (such 
as industrial energy efficiency, for example) that lacks concerns that can readily 
be worked upon by the media to commence what Hall and Jefferson (1976) 
termed the signification spiral. Waste issues, and particularly litter issues, 
usually have a moral dimension to them (see, for example, appendices B6.2:6; 
B6.17.4:15; B7.2.3) and there is greater potential for bringing moral 
considerations to waste or litter issues than to something like industrial energy 
efficiency, but nowhere near the potential for moral explorations that can attend 
the concerns of classical moral panics about things like teenage pregnancies.
It is likely that moral panic theory may also apply to some other areas of 
environmental policy making, wherever materials being deposited in the 
environment, or the impacts of human activity on the environment have both
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moral dimensions and an ambiguity or deviance that defies accommodation in 
existing systems of meaning, thereby encouraging media invention of new 
codes and symbols that capture public interest.
12.3 Reducing Complexity — Science, Simplifications and Stories
For most of Sydney's history, policy makers (from 19th century councillors to 
1990s parliamentarians) have faced choices in what actions to take to deal with 
citizens' concerns about waste. From the earliest forms of local government, the 
available financial resources have fallen short of that needed for adequate waste 
management infrastructure, so that choices have always been complicated by 
the uncertainties in costing the options (section 4.3). From the late 19th century, 
the distribution of waste management functions between local government and 
the State Government has been contentious, with no universally acceptable 
principles on which a stable distribution of responsibility might be established 
and maintained (sections 4.4 and 4.5). Throughout much of the first half of the 
20th century, the logic of economics favoured landfill or ocean dumping, while 
the logic of public health favoured incineration (section 7.1.2; appendix B8.1.3:l, 
3). The early 20th century hopes of a single straightforward and mechanised 
solution to waste disposal through incineration faded with the burden of 
maintenance and replacement costs (section 8.2).
The post-war growth of material affluence took place in a city largely 
dependent on landfills scattered within its boundaries, one or more landfills in 
each local government area. Even for the MWDA in the 1970s, concerned 
mainly with ensuring there were enough landfills for the waste being generated 
and that waste disposal costs were kept to a minimum, the task of trading off 
landfill locations and short-haul and long-haul transport costs to arrive at a 
least cost distribution of inner transfer stations and peripheral regional landfills 
was a task of considerable complexity (section 5.2). With growing 
environmental concerns about municipal and industrial waste from the 1970s, 
with an increasing array of constituents in the waste stream, with increasing 
private sector involvement and with increasing public pressure for recycling 
and waste reduction, waste management for a city the size of Sydney had 
become an enormously complex enterprise by the 1990s.
Considering the position of waste management functions relative to the 
materials flow (from resources, mining, manufacture, consumption to disposal)
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that is the foundation of modern industrial societies, it should come as no 
surprise that waste management faces major uncertainty in its raison d'etre, the 
waste stream. Almost any social, economic or technological change impacts on 
the nature or size of the waste stream. The breaking down of gendered division 
of household labour increases the amount of packaging in the municipal waste 
stream (Godbey et al.f 1998). Economic structural change in retailing led to the 
proliferation of non-returnable beverage containers, which had a significant 
impact on the waste stream (section 9.2.2). Growth of the rate of waste 
generation due to unanticipated causes beyond the control of the MWDA, such 
as the introduction by waste contractors of 240 litre wheeled bins (appendix 
B5.2.2:12) and the rapid growth in industrial solid waste with economic 
recovery in the late 1980s (section 5.2.3) were contributing factors to the 1990s 
waste crisis. Positioned at the receiving end of the waste stream, waste 
management generally has to make the most of whatever it is presented with at 
the end of the materials flow pipeline of the modem industrial economy.
Given the uncertainty associated with the waste stream, and the complexity of 
waste management, it might be expected that the media, politicians and interest 
groups involved in policy debate will have recourse to discursive devices such 
as simplifications, dualisms or binary codes and story-lines by which the 
complexity is rendered comprehensible and communicable. The following 
sections discuss the discursive devices which appeared most frequently in the 
sources examined in this study.
12.3.1 Bans
The banning by the state of certain actions by individuals is probably one of the 
oldest and simplest forms of social regulation. The local government 
ordinances that evolved during the 19th century to regulate waste management 
affairs were essentially a set of bans supported by punishments for 
contravention. Viewing the last 100 years of waste management in Sydney, it 
appears that bans were only seriously proposed in policy debates when the 
public was affronted by an undesirable set of circumstances. A ban on ocean 
dumping was seen as the solution to the beach pollution in the 1930s (sections 
7.1.1, 7.1.2), although taking the garbage further out to sea might have 
prevented beach pollution and still been cheaper than incineration. During the 
waste crisis of the 1990s, the Coalition's Green Paper referred to the possibility 
of banning products that were 'entirely non-recyclable' (appendix B6.7.3:14),
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the Joint Select Committee recommended the banning of garden waste from 
landfills (appendix B6.8.5:3), the Labor Party proposed banning incineration as 
part of its election campaign for the 1995 election (appendix B6.17.3) and the 
Waste Minimisation and Management Act allowed for product bans (appendix 
B6.17.4:23). Environmental groups also tended to place their demands in terms 
of bans, for example, calling for compostable waste to be banned from 
household garbage collection (appendix B6.11:3) and for some types of plastic 
packaging to be banned (appendix B7.2.6:25). A further parallel with moral 
panics can be seen in these calls for bans at times of heightened concern, insofar 
as Cohen (1972) argued that a consistent feature of moral panics was that 
specific principles were deduced from the general value believed to be under 
attack, and a method of control followed from consideration of the principle. 
For example, for beach pollution the principle deduced was that ocean 
dumping caused pollution and was an attack on the values that the ocean 
beaches stood for, leading to the proposal to ban ocean dumping.
It is worth noting that, in contrast, with the 1930s beach pollution episode and 
the 1990s waste crisis, the debate over the Waste Disposal Act in 1970 did not 
bring forth any calls for bans.
12.3.2 Centralisation of Responsibility
The concept of a centralised authority to deal with environmental problems has 
a long history in New South Wales. The Clean Air Act of 1961, with its 
establishment of a central operational instrumentality, the Air Pollution Control 
Branch, and a central advisory body, the Air Pollution Advisory Committee 
was partly modelled on the Alkali Inspectorate in the United Kingdom (section 
4.7.2; appendix B4.4:3). The Clean Waters Act of 1970 followed a similar 
pattern, with frequent reference in the Legislative Assembly to the need for a 
centralised authority to overcome the problem of fragmentation of 
responsibility (section 4.7.4), although there was never any attempt in debates 
to unpack the concept to examine, for example, the advantages and 
disadvantages of varying degrees of centralisation. The debate over the State 
Pollution Control Commission Act 1970, that followed soon after was also 
structured around the centralisation-fragmentation dualism (section 4.7.6)
The power of this dualism to obscure alternative policy options is nowhere 
more clear than in the Barton Report into waste management in Sydney in 1970
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(section 4.8.1). Despite clear evidence that eight of the 21 rubbish tips Barton 
visited were being managed satisfactorily by local government, he failed to 
examine the question of how this was occurring under existing institutional 
arrangements in some cases, but not in others. Rather, he concluded that the 
current problems would never have occurred had a central authority with 
responsibility for waste management been in place, and proceeded to 
recommend that such an authority be established.
At times when policy problems appear to be complex and inter-dependent, 
with possible solutions conflicting with other policy goals, the proposal for a 
central authority removes from politics and the legislature the task of working 
out a policy response that engages with the complexity and conflicts inherent in 
the problem. The legislature simply has to set the goals for the proposed 
authority, which can be done in simple terms without becoming ensnared in the 
complexity of the problem. This was seen in the debates on the environmental 
legislation of 1970 when argument could range across the ground of whether 
the proposed institutional arrangements were sufficient to overcome 
fragmentation, or whether there were enough 'teeth' in the legislation, or 
whether the Minister had too much or too little power. Parliamentarians were 
content to debate the legislation in these terms without ever unpacking any of 
these simplifications. The attractiveness of the centralised authority to politics 
surfaced again with the problem of disposing of hazardous waste in the late 
1980s, when the high temperature incinerator as a solution appeared much 
simpler than a number of the alternatives that were being proposed at the time 
(appendix B6.3.1:27).
With a centralised waste management authority established by the Waste 
Disposal Act of 1970, the centralisation-fragmentation dualism did not appear 
in political debate about solid waste management until the late 1980s and the 
early 1990s. At this time, centralisation of responsibility was seen as more the 
problem than the solution by a Coalition Government faced with making 
decisions at a time of heightened environmental concern about siting the large 
regional landfills that were inevitable with the system of inner transfer stations 
and peripheral landfills established by the Metropolitan Waste Disposal 
Authority.
Consequently, the dualism was transformed from centralisation-fragmentation 
to centralisation-regionalisation with the former becoming the problem and the 
latter seen as the desirable option. Just as the centralisation concept was never
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unpacked in the late 1960s and in 1970, the regionalisation concept was never 
subject to detailed analysis in the 1990s. Perhaps the clearest evidence of this is 
in the justification of regionalisation in both the Coalition and Labor policy 
documents in terms of the economies of scale that would be achieved across 
groupings of councils (appendix B6.12.3:2, 4; B6.16.3:4). In neither case was 
there any mention of whether even greater economies of scale might be 
achieved by centralised waste management authority.
However, while a great deal of debate in the 1990s was structured round the 
centralisation-regionalisation dualism, this did not prevent fragmentation being 
put forward as a concern. The Coalition's short-lived 'No Time to Waste' policy 
document, for example, justified its proposals (including regionalisation!) by 
reference to fragmented planning (section 6.12). It would appear that this and 
other brief references to fragmentation in the 1990s debate are a consequence of 
the rhetorical dimension of policy discourse, i.e. the need for politics to have 
something to say when faced with problems of public concern. As 'No Time to 
Waste' demonstrated admirably, it is relatively easy to claim that problems are 
due to fragmentation or not having the 'right players' using the solutions to 
which they were best suited, or a failure to use the 'full spectrum' of solutions, 
and then proceed to claim that the policy proposals will rectify these vaguely 
defined transgressions of non-controversial and universally accepted policy 
values such as integration, coordination and comprehensiveness.
The advance towards, and retreat from, centralised waste management 
responsibility as described above raises some questions with respect to other 
explanations that have been advanced for what has been termed the 
demunicipalisation of waste management by Gandy (1993). If 
demunicipalisation is seen as a loss of waste management functions by local 
government under the pressure of the increasing complexity of waste 
management, the increasing capabilities of the large waste management 
corporations and the application in local government of neo-liberal policies 
favouring replacement of employees by contractors, then the establishment of 
the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority in 1971 could be seen to some 
extent as a form of demunicipalisation. Certainly, the liquid waste disposal 
problem appeared to be beyond the capabilities of some local governments. 
Local government also lost what little waste planning function it had been 
performing up to that time.
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However, it is important to note that local government's loss was not 
necessarily the private sector's gain. While the role of the private sector in 
transport and collection of waste grew during the 1970s and 1980s, substantial 
areas of waste management were the responsibility of the Metropolitan Waste 
Disposal Authority, including regulation of waste transport, operation of a 
large network of transfer stations, operation of putrescible landfills and liquid 
waste disposal facilities.
From the late 1980s with a Coalition government in power that favoured neo­
liberal policies and with further economic concentration in the private sector 
waste management industry, the stage should have been set for another phase 
of demunicipalisation. Instead, a period of policy paralysis ensued, that was 
eventually broken by a change of government and the regionalisation of waste 
management, wherein waste planning powers were transferred to regional 
waste boards and local government was encouraged to take a greater role 
beyond collection of household waste. It is worth noting here that, while neo­
liberalism may have favoured the gradual shift of local government waste 
management functions to the private sector, it was, as argued in section 12.4.2, 
also partly responsible for this re-municipalisation of waste management which 
took place in 1995. However, as this chapter shows, there are many other 
factors that led to this re-municipalisation, not the least the discursive factors 
discussed in this section and the others in section 12.3.
12.3.3 The Waste Management Hierarchy
As described in section 11.3.1, the waste management hierarchy had its origins 
with environmental policy in the European Union about 1977. The concept of 
prioritising waste management approaches appeared in the MWDA in the mid- 
1980s. By the time of the 1990s waste crisis, the hierarchy and its triangular 
diagram had become an important policy principle that structured thinking 
about institutional arrangements for waste management. It was brought forth 
as evidence of the Coalition Government's action on the waste problem, and 
was used by various interest groups to position themselves in the policy debate. 
Throughout the period the hierarchy appeared in waste policy debate, it was a 
remarkably flexible concept, sometimes being described as a strict hierarchy 
and other times as a menu of options. In its original form, its top level (or in 
some cases, second top, level), waste minimisation, referred to the minimisation 
of the generation of waste (see, for example, figure B2.3.1). However, with the 
focus on waste disposal to landfill brought about by the Federal and State
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Government waste reduction targets, the Coalition and industry interests 
shifted the meaning of waste minimisation to minimising the amount of waste 
going to landfill, something that could be achieved by diverting part of the 
waste stream into recycling. This interpretation of waste minimisation, of 
course, avoids the need to question the generation of waste by industry. The 
Labor Party, local government and environmental groups, on the other hand 
saw waste minimisation as minimising the generation of waste and emphasised 
this in their versions of the hierarchy (figure 11.3(b), (d); figure 11.4) by placing 
waste avoidance or consumption reduction at the top of their versions of the 
hierarchy.
Probably the most striking thing about the waste hierarchy is the contrast 
between its extensive use in policy debate in the 1990s and its almost total 
absence of significant content. A few moments of reflection would suggest that 
the hierarchy is somewhat of an emperor with no clothes. In its strict 
hierarchical form, it expresses the obvious principle that some approaches to 
the policy goal of less waste going to landfills will reduce the need for other 
approaches. For example, the more waste that is not produced, the less there 
will be to re-use, recycle or dispose of. In its menu of options form, it expresses 
the commonsense principle that policy options should be chosen to suit the 
situation to which they are to be applied.
Both of these policy principles are hardly novel or a great step forward in policy 
analysis. They are probably second nature to policy makers in many areas of 
public policy. For example, the principles could be embodied in a crime 
reduction hierarchy going from civic education (^avoidance), security measures 
(=minimisation), to rehabilitation of criminals (=recycling) to corporal 
punishment (=disposal!). This example suggests that in most areas of public 
policy, it would be possible to develop an unremarkable triangular diagram 
similar to the waste hierarchy.
The question that is of interest is why the hierarchy was used so extensively in 
the 1990s when, in essence, it is no more than an expression of several 
unremarkable commonsense policy principles. There are several possible 
explanations. Firstly, it is clear that in the state of policy paralysis the Coalition 
found itself in during the early 1990s, due to the constraints that its 'new 
environmentalism' ideology placed on its options for waste management policy 
(see section 12.4.2 below), the hierarchy was an attractive 'initiative' to refer to 
when under attack for its inaction. Secondly, the Coalition's flexible
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interpretation of waste minimisation could be accommodated in its version of 
the diagram, thereby enabling it to incorporate the increasing demands from 
the environmental movement for reduction of waste at source, while avoiding 
any significant intervention in industry's production of waste. Once the 
Coalition and industry were deploying the hierarchy in this way in policy 
debate to protect the interests of industry, the environmental movement would 
have an incentive to produce a competing hierarchy that expressed its 
preference for waste reduction at source. By 1995, so many differing 
interpretations had been attached to the hierarchy, that it is scarcely surprising 
that the Labor Government felt it necessary to invert the triangle and add 
arrows and text explanations to produce the version that was an underpinning 
principle of the Waste Minimisation and Management Act 1995.
12.3.4 Container Deposit Legislation
From a waste management perspective, the principle concern with packaging 
has been its increasing contribution to the waste stream and its use of composite 
materials that make separation and recycling more difficult. In theory, a wide 
range of policy instruments could be considered to meet the policy goal of 
reducing the amount of waste going to landfill. Internationally, a number of 
approaches have been used, such as the large scale Duales System Deutschland 
which requires industry to accept returned packaging or provide for its 
collection and recycling, the carefully graduated packaging tax in Norway (see 
figure 12.1), and container deposit legislation that has been introduced into a 
number of States of the United States.
Even the apparently simple policy instrument of container deposit legislation 
has many complexities when it is subjected to policy analysis (see, for example, 
Ackerman, 1997:123-141). Seen against this variety of possible and actual policy 
responses to the packaging problem, the situation in Sydney from the early 
1970s to the 1990s (sections 7.3 and 9.4 and the latter parts of chapter 6) has 
been remarkably simple and stable. Container deposit legislation started its life 
as a proposed solution to litter problems and, during the 1990s, became a 
proposed solution to the increasing amounts of packaging in the waste stream.
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Figure 12.1: Beverage packaging tax in Norway, showing the level of tax related to the type
of packaging and the return rates being achieved. Source: Figur 4.1: 
Avgiftssatser 1999 ved ulik returandel og emballasjetype from St meld nr 2, 
(1998-99), Revidert nasjonalbudsjett 1999, at
http://odin.dep.no/html/nofovalt/offpub/repub/98-99/stmld/2 /kap04.htm
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For some proponents, container deposit legislation represented a turning back 
of the clock to the 'good old' pre-supermarket days of comer stores and 
returnable bottles. For the environmental movement it was the legislative 
embodiment of extended producer responsibility. The Coalition generally 
opposed container deposit legislation, but nonetheless hinted that its opposition 
was not necessarily permanent.
The Labor Party favoured container deposit legislation when in opposition, to 
the extent that it proposed to introduce it if industry did not meet the waste 
reduction targets set for it. However, when in Government in 1995, Labor did 
not incorporate container deposit legislation, or the threat of it, into the Waste 
Minimisation and Management Act — the latter was left to a Democrat 
amendment in the Legislative Council.
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While container deposit legislation has, in comparison with the waste 
management hierarchy been exposed to more thorough, but contested, policy 
analysis, such as the Business Regulation Review Unit's report (section 7.3) and 
the Hopper study (section 10.4), it nonetheless was frequently mentioned in 
policy debates by its proponents as though its merits were self evident. 
However, the interesting aspect of container deposit legislation in New South 
Wales has been what it has achieved as non-legislation by not being introduced. 
Since at least 1976, the threat of container deposit legislation has been used as a 
Damoclean sword over the packaging industry as a means of obtaining 
contributions from industry to fund public education programs, and as a means 
of encouraging the packaging industry to take the waste reduction plans 
negotiated with the Government reasonably seriously. It could be argued that 
container deposit legislation is more valuable to government as a Damoclean 
sword by which industry can be got to acquiesce to other policy initiatives, 
rather than if it was enacted and implemented and the defects in the container 
deposit legislation were exposed. In other words, the combination of 
performance standards negotiated with government and the threat of harsher 
regulation if standards are not met may be more effective than the regulation 
itself.
12.3.5 Waste Reduction Targets
As described in section 6.1.2, a target for the reduction in the per capita quantity 
of waste going to landfill was introduced by the Federal Government in 1992. 
This target, and its counterpart in New South Wales was industry wide and did 
not involve negotiated targets and accompanying covenants and permits at the 
level of separate firms as has occurred in the Netherlands (Gunningham, 
Grabosky and Sinclair, 1998:49-50). In contrast, the target for waste reduction 
appears to have been negotiated with peak industry organisations with very 
little analysis of the environmental and economic costs and benefits. This target 
was accepted by both sides of politics in New South Wales, with the Labor 
Party increasing the target from 50 per cent to 60 per cent as part of its election 
platform for the 1995 election (section 6.10). The Labor Government also 
extended the use of targets to industry waste reduction plans and regional 
waste planning (section 6.15). While the analysis of the means of achieving a 
particular overall waste reduction target carried out by the Waste Service 
revealed the potential complexity of targets as policy instruments (appendix 
B5.2.4), with one exception (see section 12.4.5) targets appeared in political
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discourse as unproblematic goals. This contrasts with the obvious distaste for 
targets among Industry Commission economists (section 11.2.3), although it is 
worth noting that the economic analysis of waste pricing carried out by the 
economists of the New South Wales Independent Pricing and Regulatory 
Tribunal concluded that so many assumptions were needed for the kind of 
economic estimation of optimal targets favoured by the Industry Commission, 
that such an approach would be no better than the politicians' arbitrary choice 
of a 60 per cent target (appendix B2.3).
12.3.6 Packaging Principles
As described in section 11.1, plastic packaging has attracted considerably more 
media and political attention than its proportion in the waste stream. In 
addition to container deposit legislation, the environmental movement 
promoted during the 1990s the idea that re-useable packaging, such a refillable 
milk bottles, was environmentally superior to disposable packaging, and that 
paper or cardboard packaging with recycled paper content was 
environmentally superior to plastic packaging such as polystyrene. In contrast 
to the general principle of the waste management hierarchy, these principles 
that related directly to the packaging and dairy industry were hotly contested 
(section 12.4.4). The environmental movement also introduced the principle of 
extended producer responsibility into waste policy debate in the early 1990s, 
although this appears not to have been resisted with such fervour by the 
packaging industry, possibly because the industry did not wish to expose itself 
to accusations of irresponsibility.
12.3.7 Recycling
As mentioned in section 9.3.4, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, recycling 
came to represent the socially acceptable way for householders to contribute to 
the solution of the global environmental problems that were of concern at the 
time. For the Coalition, and as described in section 11.2.1, the growth in 
recycling was tangible evidence of the success of its waste management policy. 
Fortunately, the economic downturn of the early 1990s and a fall in the 
quantities of industrial and building and demolition waste going to landfill 
(figures 1.1, 1.2), helped reinforce this impression. However, as the levels of 
recycling participation increased during the early 1990s, it also came under
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attack both from the Industry Commission, whose economic sensibilities were 
offended by the political support for recycling in the absence of any rational 
account of the costs and benefits, and from the more waste-focussed parts of the 
environmental movement which saw recycling as a distraction from the need to 
reduce consumption and the generation of waste at source. By mid-1990s, and 
under the Labor Government and the Waste Minimisation and Management 
Act, waste minimisation began to overshadow recycling as the main focus of 
waste management policy.
12.3.8 Waste Management Story-Lines
There is some evidence (section 11.3.3) that the Waste Management Authority 
attempted to position itself more favourably during the 1990s waste crisis by a 
graphic (perhaps exaggerated) portrayal of the liquid industrial waste 'crisis' of 
the late 1960s. However, while it may have been advantageous to the Authority 
to emphasise its origins in this other 'crisis' (while not mentioning it took some 
16 years before a central liquid waste treatment plant was established — section 
5.5.1), there is little in the sources available to this study to suggest that this 
construction of the organisation's history played a significant role in waste 
policy debate.
12.4 Other Influences on Waste Management Policy
The preceding sections have described a number ways in which it appears that 
the inherent complexity of waste management policy was rendered tractable in 
waste policy discourse in 20th century Sydney. In some cases, such as the 
waste management hierarchy, the concept7s main existence was within the 
political system. In other cases, such as recycling, the concept had multiple 
existences, both within and outside of the political system. For those in 
Sydney's fledgling recycling industry grappling with the problems of price 
volatility, establishment of infrastructure and quality control in the early 1990s, 
there was a great deal more to recycling than 'closing the loop' that was the 
preoccupation of the Coalition politicians and a favoured goal of conservation 
organisations (appendix B9.3.25, 6).
What is of interest to this study is the role that these codes or shorthand 
concepts within the political system played in the formation and evolution of
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waste management policy. For example, it is possible that these codes were 
simply deployed publicly to facilitate justification of policy decisions that had 
been taken on other grounds. Alternatively, the codes themselves may have 
placed very real constraints on the availability of policy options. Before these 
possibilities can be examined in the light of 20th century waste management in 
Sydney, it is necessary to outline some of the more obvious influences on waste 
management policy that have been identified in the study.
12.4.1 Geography, Demography and Psephology
In the 19th century, the nature of the terrain surrounding Sydney Harbour 
played an important role in the distribution of industry, work and social class 
in Sydney. South and west of Sydney Cove lies the relatively flat Cumberland 
Plain where the factories of the 19th century could be easily serviced by 
transport infrastructure that enabled their products to reach markets in the 
growing settlement and overseas (Spearitt, 1978:192). By 1889, 20 000 of the 
25 000 factory jobs in Sydney were in the three municipalities of Sydney, 
Balmain and Redfem (Spearitt, 1978:116).
Prior to the advent of the private motor car and commuting, people lived 
within walking distance of their place or work, or of the train and tram lines, so 
that the inner southern and south-western suburbs became home to the 
working class, while the eastern and northern suburbs were home to those in 
the white collar and professional occupations. This demographic 
differentiation either side of a north west to south east line through the centre of 
Sydney was also reflected in the distribution of Labor and Liberal electorates, 
and in the financial status of local governments. Butlin (1976:112) noted that 
there was still a broad division between the southern councils with relatively 
low property valuations and less financial resources and the better off northern 
councils. This broad demographic differentiation was also reflected in the 
distribution of local landfills, at least up until the early 1970s. For example, 
Barton's survey of local rubbish tips in 1970 shows the relatively greater 
number of tips, often receiving industrial waste, south of the Harbour (section 
4.8.1). The emergence of coordinated resident protest against the siting of 
landfills occurred first in the northern suburbs and was successful in preventing 
the establishment of several landfills in that area (appendix B7.4.2, B7.4.6).
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The continuing growth of Sydney in the latter half of the 20th century brought 
additional geographic, demographic and psephological factors into play. The 
amount of non-urban space within Sydney's natural bounds of the Blue 
Mountains in the west, the Royal National Park and various military and 
catchment reserves to the south, and the Kuring-gai National Park and 
Hawkesbury estuary to the north was reduced, with the consequent contraction 
in possible sites for large regional landfills. While the traditional differentiation 
of voting behaviour either side of the north west to south east axis was 
maintained to some extent as Sydney grew westwards, the tight 19th century 
linkages between factory location, place of residence, social class and voting 
behaviour were no longer to be found in the service economy of the late 20th 
century. Consequently, as discussions with the well known Australian 
psephologist, Antony Green, confirmed, the new electorates of Sydney's west, 
while preserving some of the old differentiation around the north west to south 
east axis, had a demographic diversity that resulted in a number of swinging 
electorates in the 1990s, rather than safe seats for one party or the other.
The combination of these long term trends in spatial demography and voting 
behaviour, and the need to site landfills on Sydney's western periphery, was 
important in the politicisation and policy paralysis of waste management in the 
1990s. The natural bounds of the Blue Mountains, Royal National Park and 
Kuring -gai National Park also meant that, as Sydney grew, waste management 
policy could not proceed in incremental fashion by gradually shifting 
peripheral landfills further afield. If landfills within the natural bounds were 
not feasible, then the next best sites were very much further away, such as in 
the Hunter Valley to the north or the southern tablelands to the south 
(appendix B7.4.13; B7.4.15).
A further long term trend that contributed to the politicisation of waste 
management in the 1990s was the withdrawal of, and structural change in, 
manufacturing industry from immediately south of the Harbour. This resulted 
in industrial sites becoming available for residential or recreational 
development, and the 'discovery' of the industrial wastes of previous eras, 
something which made good news copy and contributed to the growing public 
concerns about toxic wastes in the late 1980s.
To these trends can be added the changes in meaning attributed to waste and 
waste places over time discussed in section 12.2, above. As the waste lands of 
the 19th century took on new symbolic meanings as the nation's gymnasium
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(the ocean beaches), important ecosystems (harbour estuaries and wetlands), 
and the birthplace of the nation and site of public penances for globed 
environmental problems (the Harbour), there was an inevitable contraction in 
the areas where waste might be deposited legally, or tolerated as illegal 
deposits.
Finally, the appearance of plastics and inadvertent contamination by hazardous 
chemicals in the waste stream resulted in new fears about landfills that 
contributed to public resistance to having them in their vicinity, thereby making 
it increasingly difficult to site landfills in the few remaining suitable areas.
12.4.2 The Constraints of Political Ideology
Section 12.4.1, above, describes the broad long term trends within which 
governments of any political persuasion would have to work in developing 
waste management policy. From the post-war period to the end of the 1980s, 
the political ideology of the party in government appears to have had little 
impact on the formation of waste management policy. There was a tendency, at 
least in Parliamentary debate, for Labor to favour a greater degree of 
compulsion on industry to ensure it disposed of its wastes without causing 
significant environmental problems, and the Coalition to favour cooperative 
approaches with industry. Prevention of discharges into rivers by industry had 
the potential to disadvantage industry, and the Coalition's Clean Waters Act of 
1970 had an advisory committee and ministerial discretion to protect the 
interests of industry. Provision of facilities for land disposal of liquid waste 
was, on the other hand, of benefit to industry, and the Waste Disposal Act of 
1970 established a statutory authority with greater independence from 
ministerial intervention.
The opposite tended to be the case when it came to littering by individuals, 
with the Coalition favouring harsher penalties and Labor promoting the virtues 
of public education. Despite these differences, the Metropolitan Waste Disposal 
Authority appears to have functioned equally satisfactorily for some 18 years 
under both Coalition and Labor Governments. Both Coalition and Labor 
Governments probably contributed equally to the inordinately long time it took 
to establish a central treatment plant for liquid industrial waste, and to close the 
Castlereagh Depot.
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However, the 1990s waste crisis demonstrated very dearly how political 
ideology closed off some waste management policy options for the Coalition, 
but made these options possible for the Labor Government. Central to the 
policy paralysis of the early 1990s was Premier Greiner's 'new 
environmentalism' which attempted to reconcile the need for governments to 
exercise some control over industry and commerce to protect the environment 
and the Coalition's ideological preferences for small government and markets 
unencumbered by government intervention. It is possible to point to particular 
policy preferences of the Coalition, such as removing the Waste Management 
Authority's monopoly on putrescible waste disposal, as being ideologically 
driven. Undoubtedly, local government and the public were deeply suspicious 
of the environmental consequences of putresdble waste landfills operated by 
the private sector, which saw these landfills as a lucrative new business. In 
addition, neither the Coalition nor the waste industry itself was ever able to 
provide a convincing explanation as to how reductions in waste would be 
achieved when profits could be maximised by filling landfills as quickly as 
possible. A Coalition proposal introduced in the Green Paper — the 
economistic logic that communities should be compensated for landfills in their 
vicinity — raised the ire of those who saw the problem in the moral framing of 
landfill siting as a question of whose waste should end up in whose backyard.
While the Coalition's political ideologies resulted in a number of policy 
proposals that did not attract wide support, comparison of the Coalition's 'No 
Time to Waste' policy document with Labor's 'Waste Reforms' would suggest a 
simpler and more basic reason for the Coalition being a prisoner of its own 
ideology. In terms of policy substance, there was not a great deal of difference 
in the two documents — both proposed the regionalisation of waste 
management and a strengthening of industry waste reduction plans. In terms 
of policy detail, however, there was a great deal of difference. The Labor 
document surrounded the policy substance with a detailed set of regulatory 
and administrative proposals that were seen as excessive bureaucracy by the 
Coalition. The Coalition document surrounded its policy substance with 
appeals to 'motherhood' values, such as coordination, integration, local 
participation, and to its own ideological values, such as minimising 
intervention in industry. For the Coalition, landfill space was a commodity 
suffering over-consumption. For Labor, landfill was public infrastructure. This 
difference was not simply an error of 'spin doctoring' by the writers of the 
Coalition document. Rather it is a fundamental consequence of the Coalition's 
political ideology. If a government aspires to small government and to leaving
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many coordinating functions to the powers of the free market, then it is difficult 
to put together a comprehensive and cohesive package of reforms that does not 
have the appearance of excessive government intervention. While neo-liberal 
policy making has a range of economic policy instruments available to it, these 
do not lend themselves to packaging together in a substantial piece of 
legislation. Rather, such policy instruments are more suited to application to 
specific instances of market failure.
While the Labor Party's platform for the 1995 election was structured around 
the more populist waste management policy options, such as introducing 
container deposit legislation or banning incineration, once in government it did 
not have the constraints of free market ideology in preparing its response to the 
waste problems of the time. Consequently, it was able to propose what 
appeared to be a comprehensive package of reforms, with considerable detail of 
the bureaucratic machinery by which the reforms would operate. Had the 
Coalition introduced legislation similar to the 1995 Waste Minimisation and 
Management Act in the early 1990s, much of the politicisation and policy 
paralysis of the waste crisis might have been avoided. However, such a course 
of action was not open to the Coalition, rather it had little choice but to canvass 
various free market options and attempt to disengage itself from politically 
damaging landfill siting decisions. Regionalisation as proposed by the 
Coalition had the appearance of an abrogation of responsibility. The same 
regionalisation proposed by Labor, and surrounded with a detailed description 
of the bureaucratic arrangements, had the appearance of substantial policy 
reform. Given the heightened environmental concern of the early 1990s, the 
connections between waste issues and global environmental concerns, and the 
media attention to waste mountains and Harbours full of waste, substantial 
policy reform was what the public was looking for from government, not 
apparent abrogation of responsibility.
There are of course, other contributing factors to the inability of the Coalition to 
respond to the 1990s waste crisis in a way that attracted broad support.
Because of the involvement of local government in waste management, through 
household waste collection, kerbside collection of recyclables and, in some 
cases, operation of landfills, any State Government waste management 
initiatives have to interface with the needs of local government. Given the 
Labor Party's more extensive involvement in local government politics, the 
Labor Party was in a better position to gain the cooperation of local 
government. Certainly, the sources available to this study provide more
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evidence of consultation between Labor and local government and of a more 
favourable response by local government to Labor's waste management 
proposals.
12.4.3 The Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority
Given that this large statutory authority and its successors have played a major 
and central role in waste management in Sydney for nearly 30 years, it could be 
expected that the Authority might have had an important influence on waste 
management policy. The Authority was a convenient scapegoat for Coalition 
politicians in the 1990s waste crisis. They were able represent it as an 
organisation focussed on filling holes in the ground with waste. However, the 
Authority paid considerable attention to alternatives to landfill right from the 
time of its establishment, insofar as its professional staff were aware of 
developments in recycling, composting, and resource recovery occurring 
overseas. The Authority also espoused a policy of industry waste reduction in 
the late 1970s, long before this issue gained wider political attention. Despite 
this, the actual implementation of waste management alternatives to landfill 
was very slow and, by the 1990s waste crisis, certainly slower than what the 
Government would have preferred. To a certain extent, this failure of the 
Authority to be responsive to public concern about the increasing waste stream 
and landfills, was as much the fault of its political masters. With the 
Authority's ongoing research into alternatives, and its watching brief on 
overseas developments, it was always simple for a Minister to deflect criticism 
by referring to this work.
With the advantage of hindsight, it seems to have taken the political system an 
inordinately long period of time to realise that a statutory authority set up to 
take responsibility for disposal of the waste stream, with all the engineering 
expertise and centralised waste management infrastructure that this 
responsibility entails, would have difficulty influencing the quality and 
quantity of the waste stream. Centralised resource recovery plants appealed 
more to engineering expertise than the complex task of organising the collection 
of recyclables and finding markets for their use. The design of centralised 
composting was more appealing than the task of marketing the output. It took 
almost ten years from when kerbside recycling was first proposed until it was 
successfully implemented through the Council Recycling Rebate Scheme.
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In addition to the problems of turning parts of an engineering organisation into 
a marketing organisation, there were other more basic reasons that contributed 
to the momentum of the Authority. The Authority made great advances in the 
prevention of environmental impacts from landfills. These techniques added to 
the cost of establishing and managing landfills, although these costs were more 
of the nature of fixed costs related to the landfill rather than variable costs 
related to the volume of waste received. Thus, the more waste could be 
received in a landfill, the greater the amount of money could be devoted to 
environmental management. With this logic, more waste could be good for the 
environment, and the Authority generally seemed comfortable with waste 
planning projections that showed ever increasing volumes of waste. But the 
1990s brought a change in the relationship between landfill and environment 
when waste issues became symbolic of global environmental problems and 
shortcomings of modem industrial societies. Landfill capacity became a scarce 
resource symbolic of other scarce resources, and graphs of waste volumes 
sloping upwards to the right became matters of environmental concern.
However, even if the Authority had been sensitive to the changing symbolic 
meanings of the millions of tonnes of waste it managed each year, it is unlikely 
it could have done much more that it did. If the totality of the materials flow 
from mining, through manufacturing, consumption to disposal is considered, 
policy intervention becomes more difficult the further upstream the locus of 
application of policy is shifted, as Wynne (1992) pointed out (section 2.6.2). 
Policy initiatives further upstream involve a greater degree of intervention in 
the affairs of industry, which is often resisted by industry (except in the special 
circumstances identified in section 12.6.4, below), and has uncertain outcomes. 
Such a shift would also require a change in the nature of the professional 
expertise of the Authority — something which would not occur readily.
The effect of centralised authority on waste management has received some 
attention in other studies, such as those by Gandy (1993, 1994), in which it was 
concluded that higher levels of recycling were attained where waste 
management was the responsibility of a central authority. Gandy (1993) 
compares Hamburg, which had a central authority responsible for both 
strategic planning and the operations of collection and disposal, and a recycling 
rate of 13 per cent (tonnage recycled as a percentage of total waste generated), 
with London, which had responsibility distributed between local governments 
and the Greater London Council, and a recycling rate of 2 per cent. However, 
in the same period (1989-90), Sydney, with a similar distribution of
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responsibility across levels of government as in London, had a recycling rate 
estimated by the MWDA to be of the order of 17 per cent (appendix B5.7.3:ll).
While the difficulties in estimating recycling rates, such as accounting for on­
site recycling by manufacturing firms, mean that the possibility cannot be ruled 
out that these differences are measurement artefacts, several factors can be 
identified that may have contributed to the Sydney recycling rate being higher 
than that in London, or to the Sydney rate not being higher than that actually 
achieved in 1989-90. In the case of the former, there is little doubt that the 
efforts of the beverage, packaging and paper industries to avoid government 
intervention through such policy instruments as container deposit legislation, 
coupled with the favourable economics of recycling aluminium, and to a lesser 
extent, glass and paper, contributed to the increase in recycling during the 
1980s. By 1989, the recycling rate for cans, for example, had reached 56 per cent 
(B9.3:18). On the other hand, because of the initial difficulties experienced by 
the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority in negotiating with local 
government to trial kerbside collection, the expansion of the latter was delayed 
for some years while the Authority experimented with a 'bring' system (the 
Glenquarrie Buy Back and Recycling Centre). This temporary abandonment of 
kerbside collection occurred despite recommendations by an advisory 
committee that were equally favourable towards kerbside collection and the 
'bring' system. By the time the then Waste Management Authority introduced 
the Recycling Rebate Scheme, a number of local governments had already 
introduced kerbside recycling themselves (sections 5.6.5-7).
12.4.4 Industry
There is little doubt from the sources available to this study that industry in 
Sydney has been a substantial influence on waste management policy, at least 
since the late 1960s. As described in section 4.7.5, the 1970 Waste Disposal Act 
had its origins in the growth of manufacturing industry in the post-war period, 
the concomitant growth in volumes of liquid industrial waste for disposal, and 
the growing public concern about water pollution that displaced much of this 
liquid waste out of streams into local government rubbish tips. Industry had 
already experienced difficulties with 'over-zealous' councils who placed the 
comfort of their residents ahead of either industry profitability or State 
Government economic development goals. For this reason, the formation of a 
central authority to take control of waste disposal, liquid waste included, was
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favoured by industry as a means of reducing uncertainty about the standards to 
which it would have to comply, and decreasing its exposure to the vagaries of 
local government attention to pollution.
With the formation of the MWDA, and the establishment of the Castlereagh 
Depot, industry was content to pay a reasonable charge to transfer the 
environmental risks of liquid industrial waste from itself to the State 
Government. For those firms which did not want to pay the charge, there was a 
thriving illegal disposal industry based on road tanker owner/operators who 
would, for a lesser fee, find a sewer manhole or an area of deserted bushland in 
which to discharge the wastes. It was the State Government7s inability to 
control illegal dumping of industrial liquid waste, the inherent newsworthiness 
of toxic waste dumping stories, and the growing accumulation at Castlereagh 
that made a significant contribution to the public resistance to landfills in 
western Sydney in the 1990s.
The other strategy pursued by industry (necessitated in part by the 
Government policies pertaining to the disposal of hazardous chemicals) was to 
simply stockpile liquid industrial waste. By building up a stockpile of some 
8000 tonnes of hexachlorobenzene, ICI Australia successfully transformed what 
was originally a private disposal problem into a public disposal problem. This 
stockpile, located not far from central Sydney, became the focus of public 
concern and a great deal of political attention at both the State and Federal 
level, comprising as it did a substantial part of Australia's total inventory of 
intractable waste. The attempts by the State Government to site a high 
temperature incinerator in New South Wales, the massive community 
resistance that emerged, and the media stories that kept toxic waste before the 
public were a second significant contribution to the difficulties the Coalition 
Government experienced in siting regional landfills in western Sydney in the 
1990s.
The other area in which industry has had a significant influence on policy is 
packaging waste. While some elements of the environmental movement might 
represent the increase of packaging waste as some form of corporate conspiracy 
and environmental immorality, the real reasons behind the increase more 
probably lie with the synergistic relationship between modem retailing and 
packaging. The emergence of supermarkets as the dominant form of grocery 
retailing provided a lucrative opportunity for an expansion in the volume and 
complexity of packaging. Today the packaging industry could not survive
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without the modern forms of retailing — and the retail industry could not 
survive without packaging.
The special qualities of plastic, both as a packaging material and as a source of 
public concern, together with the apparent simplicity of container deposit 
legislation has meant that the packaging and beverage industries have had to 
devote considerable resources to protecting themselves from the types of 
government intervention that have occurred overseas. From the early 1970s, 
the industry pursued the strategy that had already proved successful in the 
United States of representing litter as a problem of civic misdemeanour, rather 
than an oversupply of materials more likely to end up as litter. The Litter and 
Recycling Research Association, and its successor, the Beverage Industry 
Environment Council have also allocated substantial resources to behavioural 
psychology and descriptive behavioural research that focuses on individual 
action in the household or in public places. Reeve, Ramasubramanian and 
McNeill (2000) in a review of New South Wales and overseas litter research 
made a strong case that such research has long passed the point of diminishing 
marginal returns to research, which leads to the conclusion that the research, 
which gains considerable media exposure, is more important to the industry as 
a means of deflecting attention from its role in the creation of the packaging, 
some or all of which becomes a litter or a waste disposal problem.
The second research strategy pursued by industry is analysis of the 
environmental impacts and benefits and costs of various forms of packaging. 
This can generally be reckoned upon to cast doubt upon the simple principles, 
often promoted by environmental groups, that suggest which forms of 
packaging might be more desirable. Because these principles, such as refillable 
milk bottles being preferable to plastic ones, or paper packaging being 
preferable to polystyrene, can have political appeal, they pose a danger to the 
industry as a source of possible policy intervention. Given the 
noncomparability of the various environmental impacts that are of concern, 
such as greenhouse gas emissions, emissions of hazardous chemicals in 
manufacture or disposal, or use of forest resources, such analyses inevitably fail 
to provide incontrovertible evidence in favour of one form of packaging over 
another, except in the obvious cases of grossly damaging packaging which is 
unlikely to be on the market in any case. The value of this form of research to 
industry was well shown in the reaction of industry to the introduction of the 
Waste Minimisation and Management Bill in 1995. While publicly welcoming 
the Act and signalling support for its the goals, industry vigorously lobbied the
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Coalition and the Call to Australia Party with meetings and faxes to introduce 
an amendment to the Bill that would require analyses of the environmental and 
economic costs and benefits to be carried out on any industry waste reduction 
plans.
Since the early 1970s, it would appear that the main impact on waste 
management policy of the defensive industry strategies described above has 
been to stifle policy innovation in, as was noted in the previous section, the 
difficult issue of shifting the locus of policy application away from the 
downstream end of the materials flow. For the last 30 years, policy evolution in 
the area of packaging waste has been characterised by incremental concessions 
gained from industry through governments' use of the Damoclean sword of 
container deposit legislation. As a result, resources have been directed to 
public education to deal with the civic misdemeanour dimension of the 
problem and, ironically, container deposit legislation which may be less than 
ideal as a policy instrument has distracted attention from other instruments, 
such as the Duales System Deutschland and the beverage packaging tax system 
in Norway which may be more desirable instruments.
This is not to say, of course, that industry has steadfastly refused to respond to 
environmental concerns. The role of industry in increasing the recycling rate in 
the 1980s was referred to in the previous section. However, it could probably 
be said that industry has successfully retarded the rate of response to a level 
that protects its investment in existing plant, i.e. environmental responses are 
accommodated in the normal cycles of replacement of plant, rather than being 
obtained at the expense of premature replacement. This level, of course, falls 
well short of the demands of the environmental movement and may, in some 
circumstances lead to the exacerbation of environmental problems thus 
bringing more odium to industry. An example of this on a long time scale is the 
packaging and chemical industries' tardiness in responding to public concerns 
about plastic. Because plastic remained (and increased in quantity) in the waste 
stream in the 1960s and 1970s, municipal incineration technology that had 
functioned well over the preceding 70 years failed due to corrosion problems 
caused by burning plastics. The plastics also contributed to dioxin emissions, 
the latter having the toxicity, latency, and invisibility to mobilise strong public 
resistance to incineration. Consequently, the MWDA became increasingly 
dependent on landfill, leading to the waste crisis of the late 1980s and early 
1990s. This crisis brought the packaging and chemical industries back to the
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centre stage of waste politics, where they were exposed to further demands for 
intervention.
12.4.5 The Disabling of Political Momentum by Science
The capacity of analyses of environmental and economic impacts, or even 
simply improved knowledge of the waste stream, to cast doubt on principles or 
codes that reduce the complexity inherent in waste management choices has 
been demonstrated in areas other than the defensive strategies employed by 
industry that were mentioned in the previous section. For example, as the 
knowledge of the volume and nature of the waste stream improved during the 
1990s, this also cast doubt on the accuracy of the 1990 base-line on which the 
waste reduction targets were based (section 11.2.3).
As described in section 12.3.7, the gloss on recycling as the main thrust in 
reducing waste to landfill was tarnished by both economic arguments and the 
environmental movement's exposure of the relationship between recycling 
rates and waste generation rates. The politicians' need for such codes was 
shown by Environment Minister Pam Allan's rejection of Industry Commission 
findings as 'out of step' with 'community demands' (appendix B6.15.3:10).
The fragility of the political legitimacy of these principles and codes was 
demonstrated by the Coalition Opposition's criticism of both waste reduction 
targets and of the waste management hierarchy (policy principles that it had 
supported throughout its period in government) in the debate on the Waste 
Minimisation and Management Bill in 1995. The desirability of industry waste 
reduction targets was easily brought into doubt by posing questions as to 
whether targets should apply equally across all firms in an industry sector as 
moral logic would suggest, or whether those firms which could make 
reductions more cheaply should have more stringent targets, as economic logic 
would suggest. The strict hierarchy version of the waste management 
hierarchy was readily brought into doubt by deploying the arguments of the 
menu of options version that point to instances where a waste management 
approach higher on the hierarchy would be more costly, both economically and 
environmentally, than an approach lower on the hierarchy. The ease of 
discrediting the basic codes on which policy consensus was founded points to 
an important aspect of the 'constructive dialogue' held by Papadakis (1996) as 
being important in institutional innovation. It may be the case that the survival
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of such dialogue depends on the parties involved refraining from wielding 
scientific rationality that places value on logic, experimental method and 
explanation by causation (as is found in such evaluative techniques as 
environmental impact assessment, cost benefit analysis, or life cycle analysis) in 
the interest of maintaining a set of codes and principles around which policy 
consensus can be built.
It would seem, then, for those in the political system, scientific rationality is a 
two-edged sword. On the one hand, it promises policy solutions based on 
objective measurement and impeccable logic — on the other, these promises 
may be in many cases empty promises when scientific rationality destroys the 
codes and principles with which the political system must work. Life cycle 
analysis, with its promise of an objective assessment of the environmental 
advantages and disadvantages of products, is an example of a scientific 
technique that is appealing to politicians (section 11.3.4). Yet, as a number of 
studies have shown, it often reduces to choices between non-comparable 
environmental impacts which have to be made subjectively. For example,
Dutch life cycle analysis practitioners acknowledge the non-comparability 
problem and attempt to use social survey techniques to obtain weighting 
factors that are held to reflect the preferences of the populace as a whole for the 
different impacts (see:
http:/ / www.pre.nl/life_cycle_assessment/impact_assessment.htm 
and linked pages at this site). Poll and Schneider (1993:7-9), in making a case 
for translating all environmental impacts into the economist7s favoured metric 
of market prices, describe two life cycle analyses (termed 'eco-balances') for 
returnable and non-returnable milk containers that, in addition to arriving at 
non-comparable lists of impacts, came to opposite conclusions across all the 
impacts as to which type of container was more environmentally friendly.
Of course, this is not to say that life cycle analysis is incapable of supporting any 
assessments as to the environmental friendliness of manufactured products. 
Obviously, a little of this analysis would soon demonstrate that paper 
packaging was preferable to packaging laced with radioactivity and dioxin. 
However, it is incapable of providing firm answers to the sorts of questions that 
matter to politicians and the public, such as whether plastic packaging might be 
preferred, or not preferred, to paper packaging.
Once it is generally realised that the apparent environmental merit of products 
can be changed simply by altering the subjective weightings applied to their
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health, ecological and resource impacts, or by including or excluding second 
and third round impacts, any political momentum that may be built around the 
'objectivity' of life cycle analysis will always be prone to dissipation by 
exposure of its non-comparabilities and subjectivities. For these reasons, it is 
the socially constructed meanings attached to materials entering the waste 
stream, such as plastics and paper, that become important in explaining where 
political attention and policy effort is directed. The ambiguous and dangerous 
qualities of plastic discussed in section 12.2.1, above, are likely to ensure its 
prominence in waste debates in the future, regardless of efforts by industry to 
wield scientific rationality in its defence.
12.4.6 Environmental Movements
There is little doubt that environmental movements, in particular the Sydney 
Friends of Earth and the Waste Crisis Network had some influence on the 
evolution of waste management policy. Probably most important influence of 
these groups was their capacity throughout the early 1990s to continually 
publicise and argue for waste reduction and minimisation as legitimate and 
preferable policy alternatives to recycling. As described in section 11.2.1, it was 
the Waste Crisis Network and the Nature Conservation Council that 
undermined the political legitimacy of recycling by using the Government's 
own waste disposal and recycling figures to show that the suburbs with the 
best recycling performance were also sending the most waste to landfill. The 
waste management policies of Labor when elected in 1995 clearly reflected 
some of the ideas, such as extended producer responsibility, that had been 
promoted by the Friends of the Earth and the Waste Crisis Network.
12.4.7 Small but Important Influences
There are two influences on the evolution of waste management policy that 
could be said to be far more important than they appear at first sight. The first 
is particular persons whose actions would seem, at least with the advantage of 
hindsight, to have transformed policy debates. For just under 20 years, the 
Castlereagh Depot was a minor policy issue which each side of politics could 
use to blame the other for its continued existence, and which both sides, when 
in government, could make reassuring statements about as to its necessity and 
safety, while over-riding Penrith Council’s objections as the Depot needed to be
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extended from time to time to accommodate the growing amount of industrial 
waste. This state of affairs probably would have continued through the 1990s, 
if not for the election of the Labor candidate, Paul Gibson, as member for the 
Londonderry electorate in which the Castlereagh Depot lay. Gibson's style was 
to put the concerns of his electorate ahead of both his party's interests and the 
calls for bipartisan support for high temperature incineration, ensuring that the 
Castlereagh Depot issue was continually brought to the attention of politics and 
the media. It was Gibson's persistence that brought to an end the benign 
neglect practiced for 20 years by both sides of politics. However, it should be 
noted that both the mega-tip siting proposals and the increased levels of public 
environmental concern in the early 1990s probably made his task easier than it 
would have otherwise been in the absence of these factors.
The second small but significant influence on waste management policy is the 
Tumpiness' of investment in landfill capacity, i.e. although there is a constant 
stream of waste for disposal, landfills have to be established sequentially to 
accommodate this. So while the waste stream appears as a given and constant 
fact of life, the establishment of a landfill, as is also the case with mining and 
other site specific development proposals, appears as a one-off event for those 
affected by it. A proposed landfill (or incinerator) has a location in space and a 
point in time which can more readily focus community and political attention 
than something like the waste stream, which is derived from all parts of urban 
space and is occurring all the time. Doyle and Kellow (1995:270) suggested that 
it might be expected that environmental groups would play a greater role 
where issues are 'lumpy', arguing that the normal politics of compromise 
become difficult with such issues, thus leading environmental groups to try to 
work outside of mainstream politics. In Sydney's case, the combination of 
centralisation of waste management and the inherent lumpiness of investment 
in landfill certainly led to mega-tip proposals that captured community and 
media attention to a greater extent than would have a series of smaller landfills. 
However, it could hardly be said that environmental groups such as the Waste 
Crisis Network and the Total Environment Centre operated outside of 
mainstream politics during the early 1990s, given the calibre of their policy 
analysis, the consensual approach of the latter group, and their access to 
ministers and the legislature. It may be the case that Doyle and Kellow's view 
is more applicable to mining proposals, where the private sector may be less 
inclined to consensual relations with its critics and the nature of the public 
interest is not so readily articulated.
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12.5 The Influence of Discursive and Structural Factors
At first sight, the influences on waste management policy described in the 
previous section would appear to be more important than any influence that 
the simplifications, principles and codes described in section 12.3 may have 
had. However, there was at least one instance when the way in which the 
policy problem was framed was critical in obtaining a consensus among 
various interest groups as to what policy response was required.
In the case of the 1970 Waste Disposal Act, the interests that various groups had 
in the establishment of a central authority to take control of the disposal of 
industrial and municipal waste were clearly articulated in the Barton Report of 
1970. Both industries generating liquid waste and those transporting and 
disposing of it favoured a central authority as a means of reducing the risks 
they faced. Local government favoured a central authority because it would 
relieve it of the difficulties of disposing of liquid industrial waste at local 
government tips, a service that some councils believed they should not be 
responsible for providing to industry. For the State Government, the provision 
of a service to industry through the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority, 
enabled it to continue to demonstrate its program of support for industry that 
commenced with the Department of Decentralisation and Development.
While there were good reasons for all the groups involved in the liquid waste 
'crisis' of late 1969 to support a central authority for waste disposal, this is not 
to say that existing institutional arrangements for dealing with industrial and 
municipal waste were in complete disarray or totally ineffective. As Barton 
discovered, there were a substantial number of municipal and private tips in 
Sydney that were disposing of municipal and industrial waste in a satisfactory 
way. But an approach that built on existing institutional arrangements was 
likely to be less attractive to the various groups. For example, it might have 
been theoretically possible to increase the resources of the Department of 
Health to improve the monitoring of industrial and municipal tips, to amend 
the Local Government Act to clarify the responsibilities of councils with respect 
to liquid waste generated within their boundaries and to give councils greater 
powers to require pre-treatment (de-watering in particular) of liquid wastes by 
industry before accepting it for disposal in council tips. However, either the 
officers of the Health Department or its Minister, or both, were not happy with 
their increasing burden of environmental responsibilities under the Clean
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Waters Act. An approach that increased their involvement still further would 
have faced strong opposition from the Minister for Health. Similarly, an 
approach that required councils to have greater involvement in liquid waste 
disposal would have been opposed by the Local Government Association.
Overall, the framing of the waste problems of the late 1960s as a question of 
fragmentation of responsibility that required a central authority as a solution 
enabled a coincidence of interest among the various groups involved that 
would not have been possible had the problem been framed as a need for 
strengthening or clarifying of existing institutional arrangements. The 
approach of the waste transport and disposal industry to the Department of 
Decentralisation and Development may have been a fortuitous event in that it 
placed the task of the initial framing of the problem with a department and a 
committee (the State Development Co-ordinating Committee) oriented to 
thinking in terms of the coordination of support for industry. The terms of 
reference given to Barton, and particularly the second one of the two:
'measures which should be taken to prepare for and organise a comprehensive 
and co-ordinated approach to the overall problem of waste disposal and 
pollution control in the future', may have reflected this orientation and resulted 
in the study findings that were so readily acceptable to the various groups 
involved. However, the framing of environmental problems as being due to 
lack of coordination and to fragmentation of responsibility cannot be solely 
seen as the result of the involvement of the Department of Decentralisation and 
Development and the State Development Co-ordinating Committee. This 
framing had been extensively used by both sides of politics in New South 
Wales in all of the environmental legislation that preceded the Waste Disposal 
Act. It is possible, though, that the increasing environmental concern in the late 
1960s and early 1970s supported the fragmentation framing. During this 
period, new and previously unimagined environmental problems were 
emerging in areas that either spanned the division of responsibilities among 
government departments, or that imposed environmental considerations on 
departments whose responsibilities had never included them before. 
Consequently, even if the Department of Decentralisation and Development 
and the State Development Co-ordinating Committee had not been involved, it 
seems highly unlikely that the liquid industrial waste 'crisis' would have been 
framed in any other way than as a problem of fragmentation of responsibility.
The genesis of the 1970 Waste Disposal Act provides strong support for the 
views of those, such as Hajer, who wish to emphasise the discursive aspects of
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problem definition as explanations for policy formation. However, the genesis 
of the 1995 Waste Minimisation and Management Act demonstrates that, 
regardless of the appeal of the connections that can be discerned between policy 
discourse and policy formation, there are also important physical and structural 
factors at work. Regardless of the nature of waste policy discourse in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, the physical, demographic and psephological factors described 
in section 12.4.1, above, made it virtually inevitable that landfill siting would 
become a difficult political issue.
To generalise from Sydney's experience in the 1980s and early 1990s, it would 
appear that there are at least four conditions that can lead to waste policy 
paralysis as cities expand in size. If the government holds power by a small 
majority in the legislature, if the system of government involves representatives 
in the legislature being elected from relatively small geographic areas, if there is 
a tendency for marginal electorates to occur on the outskirts of the city, and if 
landfill siting options are also confined to the city outskirts, then it is likely that 
the government will be unable to site landfills in a timely fashion to keep pace 
with waste generation. In Sydney's case, the absence of any one of these 
conditions would probably have prevented the waste crisis of the early 1990s 
reaching the proportions that it did.
Had the Coalition Government held a more substantial majority, the opposition 
to landfills would not have been a threat to its remaining in power. If the 
electorates of the members of the Legislative Assembly had been sufficiently 
large that the concerns of residents in the vicinity of proposed landfills could be 
ignored in the interests of the waste disposal needs of a much larger 
population, landfills could have been sited without endangering the seats of 
sitting members. Also, the seats of sitting members would not have been 
threatened by opposition to landfills if the seats had been held by a safe margin. 
And if the Waste Management Authority had been able to consider a greater 
range of sites in less densely settled areas a little further away from Sydney, but 
not so far as to constitute a great leap in both costs and thinking about waste 
transport, the marginal electorates of western Sydney would not have become 
involved.
To conclude this section's assessment of the relative importance of discursive 
and structural influences (using the latter term in the widest possible sense to 
include the influences discussed in sections 12.4.1-3 and parts of 12.4.4) on 
waste management policy, it would appear that neither has a monopoly on
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explanation. It might plausibly be argued that the two are complementary and 
interacting rather than independent and competing. Perhaps the most 
important way in which structural and discursive influences interact relates to 
the difficulty of discursive closure. Structural influences can determine the 
difficulties and complexities of the domain within which policy discourse has to 
operate. If physical, historical and structural circumstances allow a ready 
solution to an environmental problem, then policy discourse can relatively 
easily arrive at a framing of the problem that matches this solution. For 
example, had a central waste management authority already existed in Sydney 
in the 1960s, then the centralisation-fragmentation dualism would not have 
been available to bring the convergence of interest that enabled institutional 
change. Had there been more knowledge of waste quantities and the 
availability of disposal sites, there may have not been the same preparedness 
among politicians simply to leave the task of disposal to the proposed central 
authority. It follows from this, then, that the idea of generative metaphors as a 
means of bringing discursive closure (as put forward by Schön and Rein, 1994 
and Hajer, 1995) may be more applicable to situations where structural factors 
permit a feasible solution.
In situations where such a solution is not so readily forthcoming, the political 
system may give rise to any number of discursive devices such as dualisms, 
codes, metaphors or simplified policy principles as attempts at discursive 
closure proceed. Structural factors also constrain the availability of such 
devices. For example, in the 1990s waste crisis, a central authority already 
existed, so the centralisation-fragmentation dualism was not available to policy 
discourse. These discursive devices may be woven into the sorts of story-lines 
that Hajer found associated with add rain policy in Britain and the Netherlands 
or, as appears to be more the case with the 1990s waste crisis in Sydney, these 
discursive devices may fall in and out of favour as the appeal of a simple 
principle to cut through the policy complexity evaporates when one or other 
group of policy actors dedde to discredit the principle by the application of 
scientific rationality in the ways described in section 12.4.5. The failure of 
policy discourse to bring discursive closure may also be a consequence of 
incompatibilities in the way various policy actors frame the problem, as 
Williams and Matheny (1995) found with long running hazardous waste issues 
in the USA. Certainly, the Castlereagh Depot issue showed the tensions 
generated by the incompatibilities between managerial and communitarian 
framings. When discursive closure fails to occur for either of the above reasons, 
and policy paralysis sets in, it may be structural influences that finally break the
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impasse. In the case of Sydney, the election to government of a political party 
that was not averse to basing its waste management policy on wide ranging 
administrative reforms was what brought the 1990s waste crisis to an end with 
the introduction of the 1995 Waste Minimisation and Management Bill.
It should be noted that, from a longer historical perspective, the policy 
outcomes and institutional change that result from discursive practice in one 
decade can become structural influences in the next decade. For example, the 
fragmentation framing of the late 1960s that made a central authority in the 
form of the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority a self-evident solution put 
in place a large waste management bureaucracy that was a structural influence 
in the 1990s waste crisis.
Finally, it should be emphasised that the above account of the complementarity 
of, and relationship between, structural and discursive factors does not claim to 
be a theory that might challenge other theories of waste management and 
environmental policy making. Rather it has the much more modest goal of 
drawing attention to the insights that might await those who pursue the 
methodologically pragmatic approach mentioned in section 3.1.
12.6 Trends in Waste Policy Making
From the broad historical perspective of this study, a number of trends in waste 
policy making in Sydney can be identified. The following subsections discuss 
these trends, commencing with simple observations about waste management 
generally, followed by speculation about cyclicity in the distribution of 
responsibility for waste management, and finally moving to an evaluation of 
the extent to which various theories of long term change in environmental 
policy making are supported by Sydney's experience in waste management 
policy.
12.6.1 Growing Physical, Institutional and Perceptual Diversity
Starting with the physical and engineering aspects, there is little doubt that 
waste management has become more professionalised, the waste stream more 
diverse in its composition and prone to fairly rapid changes in composition. 
Waste management institutions have become more complex as State and 
Federal governments have taken on new roles in waste management (the
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'institutionalisation' of waste management in the terminology of Morrison, 1986 
or Langton, 1984). As Gandy (1993) argues, this complexity has contributed to 
the difficulties local governments face in carrying out their waste management 
responsibilities, and to the penetration of waste management operations by 
large corporations.
However, the symbolism of waste and waste management has also become 
more diverse, insofar as household waste practices are increasingly understood 
in terms of not just simple home hygiene, but also in terms of regional and 
global environmental problems. The householder who, in the 1950s, was 
simply 'putting out the rubbish' may be, in the 1990s, recycling to 'do their bit 
for the environment', avoiding buying plastic packaging to reduce fossil fuel 
usage (or to prevent plastics ending up in landfills and 'lasting forever'), or 
composting their kitchen scraps to 'help Sydney meet the Waste Challenge'. 
These additional layers of meaning that have been taken on by household 
rubbish prepare the stage for such rubbish, or litter, to become the 
objectification of global environmental concerns (section 7.2.2). The public's 
desire to take action to address these concerns is deflected into household 
recycling and community clean ups by the impossibility of individual action to 
remedy such things as the greenhouse effect or ozone holes, as the rapid 
uptake of recycling and participation in clean-up campaigns showed in the 
early 1990s. The implication for waste management policy is that community 
mobilisation and political attention to waste may be catalysed not only by waste 
management events, but also by other environmental events that are physically 
disparate but symbolically connected. To express this in terms of Kingdon's 
model of environmental policy making (appendix B2.7.3), the policy 
entrepreneur has to scan not only the waste problem stream, but also the stream 
of broader environmental problems, as either could project waste management 
into public concern and debate.
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12.6.2 Cycles of Distributed and Centralised Waste Management
The institutional arrangements for waste management in Sydney (and London 
— see Gandy, 1993) appear to have gone through greater changes over time 
than other large cities for which accounts are available. In 1970, Sydney went 
from a decentralised system where almost all waste management functions 
rested with a large number of local governments, to a partly centralised system, 
in which local government was responsible for collecting waste, while a State 
instrumentality was responsible for transporting and disposing of much of this 
waste, and for the associated large scale waste planning. Then in 1995, the 
planning and landfill siting functions were transferred back to groups of local 
governments, leaving the State instrumentality to operate existing waste 
management infrastructure, partly in competition with private operators.
These changes, and the politics that accompanied them, point to the possibility 
of, over longer time periods, cyclic swings in the extent of centralisation of 
waste management responsibility. When waste management responsibilities 
and functions are distributed among local governments, unsatisfactory 
performance can easily be represented as problems of 'fragmentation' of 
responsibility. In addition, the local governments themselves may have 
difficulty in arriving at an institutional form with the requisite degree of 
centralisation of authority. For example, local government in Sydney in the 
1960s had available to it the option of forming a county council to take 
responsibility for waste, as had been done earlier for electricity generation 
(section 4.5). However, because some local governments were well endowed 
with landfill capacity which they were understandably reluctant to share, 
progress towards a county council was painfully slow — so slow that local 
government's efforts were overtaken by the Coalition's need to move on 
environmental issues generally in the late 1960s, and on liquid waste disposal 
problems in particular in 1970. Consequently, the centralisation of authority 
was expressed through the other institutional form available at that time — the 
statutory authority established by State legislation. In general then, waste 
management authority distributed across local governments is likely to be 
prone to accusations of 'fragmentation'. Local governments may find difficulty 
in overcoming this due to the conflicts of interest among themselves, thereby 
providing a higher level of government with further justification for providing 
the centralised authority from among the institutional forms available to it.
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However, one consequence of centralisation of waste management can be 
centralisation of the waste stream itself. For a single organisation with 
responsibility for waste transport and disposal, there are attractive economies 
of scale to be had. For example, it is cheaper to transport waste in large trucks 
or rail cars than in the smaller trucks used for household collection. Some of 
the costs of landfill establishment are independent of the size of the landfill, so 
that larger landfills enable the disposal cost per unit volume of waste to be 
reduced. Consequently, if cost of disposal is a matter of concern, centralisation 
of waste management with a single organisation is likely to lead to larger 
landfills. Proposals for such 'megatips' are more newsworthy and local 
opposition is stronger than for smaller landfills.
If, for the reasons described in section 12.5, above, establishment of landfills 
becomes politically difficult and a 'waste crisis' ensues, then devolution of 
responsibility to local government becomes an attractive option, not simply 
because it relieves the central government of the problem, but also because a 
number of smaller landfills may be easier to site than one large one. For the 
host community, the sense of inequity may be lessened if it is only receiving in 
its 'backyard' the wastes of the local community, rather than the wastes of the 
whole city. Once waste management responsibilities are distributed among 
local governments, then the stage is set once more for attributing shortcomings 
in waste management to 'fragmentation'.
While the time period of interest to this study terminated with the introduction 
of devolved waste planning in 1995, it can be noted that such arrangements for 
waste management do not guarantee freedom from siting conflicts. Ackerman 
(1997:61-62) describes how the requirement that subregions of Toronto be 
responsible for disposing of their waste within their own boundaries led to 
strong local opposition. The impasse was not resolved until waste could be 
transported out of the Toronto region. This suggests that, should Sydney's 
waste boards not have access to landfill capacity outside of their boundaries, 
the difficulties of the early 1990s waste crisis could re-occur.
Finally, it should be noted that, for this cyclicity in centralisation and 
distribution of waste management to occur, it is essential that there exist at least 
two levels of government and the institutional arrangements that make it 
possible for the upper level of government to take responsibility for waste 
disposal. This was the case in both Sydney and London, the latter city having 
experienced almost the same cycle from local government responsibility to a
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central authority in charge of planning and disposal, and back to local 
government responsibility. However, the upper level of government involved 
in the cyclicity in the two cities was different — the NSW State Government in 
one case and the Greater London Council in the other.
12.6.3 Ecological Modernisation
As described in section 2.6.2, the term ecological modernisation refers to a late 
20th century change in the nature of environmental policy and policy discourse 
— towards anticipatory measures that are profitable for industry; towards 
consultative relationships between industry, government and environmental 
interests; towards valuation of nature as a scarce resource rather than a free 
good and an orientation that sees science and capitalism essential to the 
solution of environmental problems, rather than being the cause of these 
problems (Hajer,1995:26-30; Dryzek, 1997:137-152). Gunningham, Grabosky 
and Sinclair (1998:8) characterise this change in the nature of environmental 
policy as a transition from 'first phase' environmental policy making (command 
and control regulation) to 'second phase' policy making (a retreat from 
regulation in favour of market-based policy instruments) to 'third phase' policy 
making which is held to be the 'smart' combination of the two previous phases.
Waste management policy discourse, and some aspects of waste management 
practice, in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Sydney undoubtedly bore many of 
the hallmarks of ecological modernisation. Waste management in Sydney 
became more anticipatory, insofar as waste avoidance, reduction and 
minimisation were explicit and widely discussed policy goals, expressed in 
simplified form in the various forms of the waste management hierarchy 
diagram. Whether the practice of waste management became more anticipatory 
is open to question. The professionals in the Metropolitan Waste Disposal 
Authority were working with a 30 year planning horizon in the early 1970s 
(appendix B5.2.1:2) and the Authority announced in the late 1970s that industry 
would be expected to reduce the amount of waste it produced (appendix 
B5.5.15). The Industrial Waste Exchange, which allowed industries to save 
disposal and input costs by exchanging waste materials, was also established 
about this time (section 5.6.3). On the other hand, during the waste crisis of the 
early 1990s, and with the removal of the waste planning function of the Waste 
Management Authority when it became the Waste Service, there appears to 
have been little attention paid to waste disposal beyond the immediate future
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when it was thought that landfill capacity would be exhausted. In all, the 
Sydney experience would suggest that the anticipatory character claimed for 
ecological modernist policy making may apply more to policy discourse than 
policy practice. This may particularly be the case at times of political crisis and 
policy paralysis, when it is important for the legitimacy of politics that 
problems be discussed in the framings of ecological modernisation so that the 
irreconcilable conflicts of interest that cause the paralysis remain out of sight.
As described in section 5.2.3, a fair proportion of the blame for the 1990s waste 
crisis could be laid at the feet of industry, the waste generation rate of which 
increased much faster than that of municipal waste in the 1980s. To this extent, 
the ecological modernist discourse of the crisis period was necessary to keep 
out of sight the uncomfortable fact that industry waste generation was tightly 
linked to economic growth. Not only this, the 'per capita slide' described in 
section 11.2.2 actually shifted industry's contribution to the oversupply of waste 
onto the householder.
With regard to the trend to consultative relationships, there was clearly a 
significant change in Sydney in the period 1970 to 1995. As described in section 
5.10, the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority transformed its public 
relations activities from simple one-way information transfer to sophisticated 
strategies that allowed public input into some of its most professionalised 
functions. However, this is not to say that public input was unheard of in waste 
management prior to the late 20th century. As described in section 7.1.2, 
deputations to ministers of citizens concerned about beach pollution by rubbish 
occurred in the 1930s. There also existed at this time institutional arrangements 
that allowed the concerns of the public to be considered in public inquiries such 
as the one set up to examine the siting of an incinerator in 1934 (appendix 
B8.2.3:3). This type of ad hoc inquiry marks an intermediate stage in the 
institutions of environmental control between sole reliance on common law and 
the introduction of state legislation — a stage not recognised in Lake's 
(1994:237) characterisation of the rise of centralised environmental policy 
making.
With regard to the trend to value nature as a scarce resource, this was also 
clearly demonstrated in Sydney in the early 1990s. While the concept of landfill 
capacity, i.e. the unused volume remaining in existing landfills, had been 
developed in the early 1970s by the Authority's waste planning professionals, 
neither this capacity, nor land for future landfills, were referred to as resources 
until the early 1990s. At this time, this terminology became commonplace in
[288]
policy discourse as the neo-liberal economic rationalist analysis of the Greiner 
Government's 'new environmentalism' transformed public goods such as 
landfill capacity into scarce resources for allocation by the market; and waste 
disposal into consumption of waste facilities (section 6.12; appendices B6.7.1:2, 
B6.12.1:1).
Hajer (1995:33) suggests that there were affinities between ecological 
modernisation and the environmental policy ideas put forward by various neo­
liberal think-tanks in the 1980s. As mentioned in appendix B6.1.3:27, and in 
section 5.9, the neo-liberal 'new environmentalism' of the Coalition Greiner 
Government brought pressure for increased privatisation and competition in 
the waste management in Sydney. While the idea of 'win-win' solutions that 
simultaneously met the needs of government, industry and the environment 
was very much part of Greiner's 'new environmentalism', the Greiner and 
Fahey Governments preference for privatising putrescible waste disposal found 
little public support and contributed to the Coalition's loss to Labor in 1995. 
Labor's Waste Minimisation and Management Act of 1995 ensured that 
putrescible waste disposal remained the responsibility of a statutory authority.
The transfer of waste management functions from the public to the private 
sector has been termed 'demunicipalisation' by Gandy (1993) (see appendix 
B2.4.2), and it could be argued that demunicipalisation is one of the 
manifestations of ecological modernisation in the waste management sector 
(see, for example, Hajer, 1995:32). Demunicipalisation as experienced in 
Sydney has some similarities to, and differences from, that which occurred in 
London and Hamburg according to Gandy's account. In Sydney, there was 
growing involvement of the private sector in the collection of waste (under 
contract to local government) and in the operation of non-putrescible waste 
landfills. However, the operation of putrescible waste landfills and large scale 
waste planning remained in the public sector (although such waste planning all 
but disappeared in the period between the replacement of the Waste 
Management Authority with the Waste Service and the formation of regional 
waste boards under the Waste Minimisation and Management Act of 1995). In 
the debates about allowing the private sector to operate putrescible waste 
landfills, there was never a plausible case put forward by the Coalition 
Government as to how waste reduction goals could be achieved when the 
private sector had every interest in filling landfills as quickly as possible to 
maximise their cash flow. In this respect, the ecological modernist ideal that
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environmentally desirable solutions can be profitable for industry may not be 
achievable when it comes to waste disposal.
The final aspect of ecological modernisation to be considered in this section 
concerns the techno-optimistic aspects, such as put forward by Huber (1991), 
and Spaargaren and Mol (1992) - see the section on ecological modernisation in 
section 2.6.2. The experience with waste management in Sydney would suggest 
that some care has to be taken with any claims that the application of science 
and technology to developing anticipatory and preventative measures will lead 
industrialised societies out of the environmental problems of the late 20th 
century. In the first instance, it can be noted that the Metropolitan Waste 
Disposal Authority made significant advances in the technology of landfill 
operation and liquid waste treatment that avoided the worst of the 
environmental impacts of landfills and liquid waste disposal that had occurred 
in the 1960s and earlier. Insofar as these technological advances were made in 
anticipation of the known impacts of waste disposal, they were preventative 
measures that ameliorated the perceived environmental problems of the time, 
as the optimistic face of ecological modernisation would suggest. But viewed 
more broadly, these technological advances were still end-of-pipe solutions of 
the sort the ecological modernisation is supposed to supersede — these 
advances did not have any impact on the increasing production of waste by 
households and industry.
From the 1980s onwards, the Authority, Labor and Coalition Governments 
attempted to develop policy principles and measures that were more 
anticipatory in the broader sense mentioned above. While simplified policy 
principles such as recycling as the solution to waste problems, the waste 
management hierarchy, and various principles about the environmental 
friendliness of packaging types could be seen as the outcome of at least some 
scientific or ecological analysis of the waste disposal problem, such analysis 
was also capable of destroying political commitment to these policy principles 
by casting doubt on their environmental efficacy, as described in sections 12.4.4 
and 12.4.5, above. The important point here, which appears to be overlooked in 
techno-optimist accounts of ecological modernisation, is that scientific 
rationality, while necessary for the development of new anticipatory solutions 
to environmental problems, is also capable of undermining the political 
momentum, built around simplified policy principles, that is necessary for the 
eventual implementation of the anticipatory solutions.
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12.6.4 The Risk Society
The concept of ecological modernisation, viz. the application of science to 
developing anticipatory and preventative solutions to the environmental 
problems caused by science and technology, bears some resemblance to Beck's 
(1992(a):155-158) concept of reflexive modernisation, which refers to the 
application of the methods of science to the critique of science and technology 
itself, particularly the production of risks. Both ecological modernisation and 
reflexive modernisation deal with the role of science in modern environmental 
problems — but the former confines itself uncritically to the positive outcomes 
while the latter is more concerned with the legitimacy of science and the politics 
of risk.
The 20th century history of waste management in Sydney provides support for 
some aspects of the theory of the risk society, and suggests possible refinements 
to other aspects. With regard to the former, there were undoubtedly new 
sources of risks to health and environment associated with waste disposal that 
became evident in the 1980s, such as dioxin in landfills (section 8.6). Public 
perceptions of landfills have come to include more dangers than just the bad 
smells, vermin and disease that were the main concerns in the first half of the 
20th century. As section 8.8 shows, fears about landfills can include exposure 
to toxic chemicals, danger of needle-stick injuries and AIDS, plastics and 
'mutant' substances. Consistent with Beck's views, many of these modern risks 
are more a consequence of industrial production than an undersupply of 
hygienic technology (the health impacts of landfills were much reduced with 
the introduction of controlled tipping in the 1930s). However, Beck's claim that 
modem risks are global (affecting all individuals), while the risks of earlier 
times were personal (affecting just some individuals) may need more careful 
consideration. As described in section 12.2.2, above, there have been for some 
hundreds of years fears about agents of danger to which all individuals are 
exposed. In this sense, the miasmas of the 19th century were just as global as 
the risks of the late 20th century, although imagined rather than real. As 
argued in sections 2.2.3, 2.6.3 and 12.2.3, the important hallmark of modern 
risks may not be so much the universal exposure of the population to them, but 
rather the fact that the fundamental ecosystem processes that support life on the 
planet are transmitting risks from their point of production to their point of 
endangerment of the individual. Whereas this endangerment could be reduced 
in the past by remedial measures on minor components of ecosystems (for
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example, controlled tipping that buried each day's food wastes to remove food 
and breeding habitat from rats and flies), the solutions to modern risks may 
involve major interventions in basic global life support systems (for example, a 
recent proposal to sequester carbon dioxide by fertilising the surface of whole 
oceans to promote plankton growth). In other words, it is the ecological 
seriousness of risks, rather than universal exposure of the population to them, 
that is the hallmark of the risk society.
What Beck (1992(a):29) terms the 'momentous consequence' of modern risks, 
viz. the loss of science's monopoly on rationality, was well demonstrated by the 
handling of the Castlereagh Depot. As described in section 5.5.2, Coalition 
ministers in the early 1990s continued to cling to the belief that scientific 
investigation could quell the fears of the people living in the vicinity of the 
Depot. This belief was ill-founded for two reasons. Firstly, consistent with 
Beck's view, the fact that the Government and its scientific advisers had 
allowed dangerous chemicals to be produced in large quantities and carelessly 
stored or disposed of, compromised the public's faith in any reassurances from 
scientific investigations of ground and surface waters around the Castlereagh 
Depot. Secondly, and this is an aspect that Beck appears to have neglected, it 
was mathematically impossible for an investigation of brain cancer clusters in 
the vicinity of the Depot to attribute the cancers to the presence of the Depot, or 
to rule out this possibility (what might be termed the 'iron law of statistical 
significance and sample sizes'). With the failure of science to resolve the issue, 
the incoming Labor Government closed the Depot on the grounds of the simple 
folk wisdom that it was better to be safe than sorry. As Beck (1992(b)) argued, 
the point is reached when the reassurances of the safety bureaucracy no longer 
carry any weight in policy debate. This was also seen with the British 
Government's slaughter of cattle during the mad cow disease scare, not on 
scientific grounds, but in an attempt to restore public confidence in British beef 
(Woollacott, 1998:47). The impossibility of science providing the assurances 
required by the political system and the public further strengthens Beck's claim 
as to the end of science's monopoly on rationality. Not only is science 
discredited for its past mistakes and for the value judgements embedded in its 
methods, as Beck describes at length, but science is incapable (mathematically 
for all time, not just temporarily due to lack of knowledge or tools) of 
answering some questions that are significant in politics and policy making. As 
Majone (1989:3), following Weinberg (1972), has argued, some of the questions 
that are of significance to politics and policy making are trans-scientific, i.e. 
while the questions can be stated in the language of science, the answers are
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beyond the reach of investigation by scientific methods. Majone gives the 
example of the determination at the 95 per cent confidence level of whether X- 
ray radiation of 150 millirems increases the spontaneous mutation rate in mice 
by 0.5 per cent. Such a determination would require an experiment involving 
eight billion mice!
The Castlereagh Depot experience suggests further modifications to some of 
Beck's characterisations of the risk society may be needed. Beck frequently 
refers to the invisibility of modem risks and the dependence on science rather 
than the senses in making risks comprehensible, although admitting 
(1992(a):53) that personal experiences can make also risks visible. During the 
period that the Castlereagh Depot was attracting media and political attention, 
it was obvious occurrences such as birth deformities, illnesses and deaths 
among livestock that were the manifestations of danger which elevated the 
Depot to a political issue. While the community tended to attribute these 
occurrences to the invisible transport of chemicals in surface and groundwater, 
the scientific studies did not bring any new terminology or concepts to the 
public debate, as has been the case with other modem risks such as the 
greenhouse effect, ozone depletion or nuclear radiation. In other words, science 
was not necessary to make the risks visible at Castlereagh. Given the point 
made above that there have always been fears about invisible agents of danger, 
such as miasmas, and that the politics played out over the Depot's fate appears 
to be a good example of Beckian risk politics, it would seem that Beck's 
visibility-invisibility distinction between earlier and modem risks is not needed 
in explaining all forms of risk politics.
Viewing the history of waste management in Sydney more broadly, there is also 
clear support for one of the more important theses of risk society theory. Beck 
argues that, with the fall from favour of the policy approaches of the welfare 
state, and with the acceleration of industrial progress and the production of 
risks, there is an increasing tendency for decisions that affect the structure of 
society and the welfare of the populace to occur within the private sphere of 
business and industry, rather than within the public sphere of the legislatures 
and public policy making that is, at least in theory, accessible to the wishes of 
the populace through the institutions of democracy. It is such decision making 
within the private sphere that Beck terms 'subpolitics'. Perhaps the starkest 
example of waste subpolitics in Sydney was ICI's decision to stockpile 
hexachlorobenzene at its factory at Botany Bay. Whether or not Sydney's 
citizens should have to live with 8000 tonnes of a dangerous chemical in their
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midst is clearly a matter for public policy, yet the decision (and subsequent 
non-decisions to develop safer methods of disposal) remained out of sight in 
the private sphere until initiatives by the Federal Government and associated 
stocktaking activities brought the hexachlorobenzene to public notice. As Beck 
(1992(a):186) notes, once risk production in the private sphere is the centre of 
political attention, industry finds that formerly internal decisions become 
politicised and public. Certainly, ICI and other chemical companies have 
experienced considerable intrusion by the requirements of legislation 
introduced in the 1980s and 1990s. However, Beck appears not to appreciate 
that such intrusion can be welcomed by industry. In the case of ICI, by 
allowing hexachorobenzene to accumulate to the point that it became a public 
policy issue, a substantial part of the costs of discovering a solution were then 
borne by the Federal and New South Wales Governments. A further example 
of industry welcoming environmental policy initiatives was described in 
section 4.8.1 in relation to the interests of industry in the centralisation of waste 
management authority in the late 1960s. More generally, a number of 
circumstances can be suggested in which industry will welcome the imposition 
of environmental standards.
Firstly, if green issues are irrelevant for the purchasers of a firm's products, 
then there is no point in the firm competing on the level of pollution control 
involved in production of the goods. Consequently, firms may prefer uniform 
standards simply to preserve the reputation of the industry as a whole, 
provided compliance is not too costly (Rees, 1994, cited by Gunningham, 
Grabosky and Sinclair, 1998 used the term 'community of shared fate' to 
describe this situation). Secondly, if there are economies of scale in effluent 
treatment, then larger firms may welcome uniform standards as a way of 
disadvantaging their smaller competitors, or as a means of raising barriers to 
entry in the industry (see, for example, Cohen, 1998:5). Thirdly, if there are 
those among consumers who are sensitive to green issues, and some firms are 
competing successfully for this segment of the market, but with misleading 
claims about the environmental friendliness of their product, then other firms 
which have a real competitive advantage in terms of the actual environmental 
friendliness of their product may welcome the imposition of uniform standards 
that would disadvantage those firms making misleading claims. Fourthly, if 
firms believe they are exposed to the risk of common law litigation by those 
affected by their pollution, they will welcome the imposition of government 
standards, as then they only have to comply to these standards to absolve 
themselves of responsibility for the impacts of their pollution. In addition, legal
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defence under statute law will generally be less complex and expensive than 
under common law.
A less stark example of subpolitics at work in the waste stream, but perhaps 
one that is more significant for the understanding the long term evolution of 
waste management policy, is the myriad of decisions made within the private 
sphere that result in the growth of the volume of the waste stream. The volume 
of the waste stream has important public policy implications, as the waste crisis 
of the early 1990s showed. Yet it is commercial decisions, such as replacing 
reusable glass milk bottles with cardboard and plastic containers, to name just 
one of the thousands of decisions made in the packaging industry alone, that 
affect the volume of the waste stream. The invisible subpolitics of waste 
creation creates major uncertainties and difficulties for the visible public politics 
of waste disposal, as the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority found, for 
example, when the introduction of wheeled garbage containers by private 
contractors rapidly increased the volume of garden waste in the waste stream 
(appendix B5.2.2:12). It is such difficulties at the disposal end of the waste 
stream that make anticipatory and preventative policy approaches applied 
further upstream an appealing proposition although, notwithstanding the 
circumstances mentioned in the previous paragraph, some such measures may 
meet with industry resistance, such as the actions of the packaging industry 
mentioned in section 12.4.4, above.
The final aspect of risk society theory that the present study suggests could be 
more fully developed relates to the means by which public perception of risks 
may or may not come to political attention. Beck is somewhat brief in this area, 
referring to risks developing 'an incredible political dynamic,(1992(a):77), but 
providing little detail as to exactly how this happens. In particular, Beck 
appears not to give any explanation as to why risks may be ignored for long 
periods, only to become the centre of political attention at other times. For 
waste, the social constructivist concepts of waste as matter out of place and as 
deviant matter subject to a form of moral panic as described in sections 12.2.4 
and 12.2.5 above offer a more developed explanation. Of course, such an 
explanation may not apply to other types of modern risks, such as nuclear war 
or climate change. Explanation for these risks may have to draw, for example, 
on the risk perception work of Slovic and others (see, for example, Slovic, 1987; 
Slovic, 1993 and Slovic and Peters, 1998).
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12.7 Waste Management Histories
There are a number of similarities between waste management in Sydney and 
in the large cities of the USA as described by Melosi (1980). The replacement of 
the miasmic theory of disease by the germ theory, the sanitary movements of 
the late 19th and early 20th century and the professionalisation of waste 
management in the early 20th century occurred in Sydney in much the same 
way as in large cities in the USA. Incineration became a popular means of 
waste disposal in Sydney in the 1930s, as in the USA, not the least because USA 
incinerator firms marketed their products aggressively in Sydney. However, 
the upsurge of incineration (waste-to-energy) plants in the 1980s in the USA 
was not mirrored in Sydney, despite the efforts of US firms to sell incinerators 
in Sydney. In the early 1980s, the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority was 
achieving economies of scale and improvements in leachate control that would 
have made incineration an unattractive proposition. By the late 1980s, the 
mobilisation of public concern over high temperature incineration had made 
incinerators politically unattractive. Thus while there was a form of 
'globalisation' even in the 1930s by which the actions of private companies 
resulted in similar approaches to waste management in the USA and Sydney, 
the experience in the 1980s showed that local conditions could easily over-ride 
these global commercial forces. Finally, it should be noted that this study is in 
agreement with Melosi's finding for the USA that there is no relation between 
the quantitative data for waste quantities and landfill capacity and the 
occurrence of waste or garbage crises, thereby supporting the view that such 
crises are socially constructed and need to be studied from a constructionist 
perspective.
In relation to Gandy's case studies of New York, London and Hamburg, the 
present study supports Gandy's view that waste management has gone 
through a period of municipalisation during much of the 20th century, followed 
by a period of demunicipalisation in the last 20 or so years of the century. 
However, the extent of demuni cipalisation of waste management in Sydney 
appears not to have been as great as it was in the cities Gandy studied, due 
largely to the replacement of a conservative government which favoured neo­
liberal approaches to waste management by a Labor government which was 
prepared to support the popular view that putrescible waste management 
should remain in public hands. Once again, this demonstrates the potential for 
local politics to cause departures from broad trends that are discernible across a 
number of countries. While financial constraints affected local government in
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Sydney in much the same way as in the United Kingdom or the United States, 
leading to the contracting out of household waste collection, the contribution of 
these constraints to the demunicipalisation of waste management in Sydney 
may have been less, due to the commitment of the Labor government to keep 
putrescible waste management in public hands. This commitment may have 
also limited the opportunities for expansion of the growing international 
corporate presence in waste management. There have been, however, changes 
to this situation in the period subsequent to that set for the study (see section 
13.4), with the result that further demunicipalisation and penetration of waste 
management by international corporations is taking place.
Gandy's conclusion that higher levels of recycling are more likely to occur 
where a central authority has responsibility for planning, collection and 
disposal is not well supported by the findings of the present study, insofar as 
Sydney had a higher recycling rate than Hamburg in the late 1980s, despite the 
former's distribution of responsibility between the MWDA and local 
government. Although there were problems in the MWDA obtaining the 
cooperation of local government to trial kerbside collection, the recycling rate 
was considerably higher than that in London in the same period, due perhaps 
to the efforts of packaging interests. The introduction of kerbside collection, 
however, was more a consequence of innovative local governments responding 
to ratepayer concerns than, as Gandy found, of involvement by packaging 
interests seeking to avoid interventionist packaging legislation. Nevertheless, 
at the national level in Australia, packaging interests, along with 
representatives of local government, are now very much involved in the 
development of national arrangements for funding kerbside collection of 
recyclables.
Colten's (1994) study of chemical waste disposal in the USA from 1900-1960 
revealed a number of strategies employed by the industry to deflect public 
intervention in its production and disposal of wastes, either through litigation 
or public policy. The present study has found, as Colten did, that site isolation, 
discharge to sewers and re-sale of disposal sites were strategies pursued by 
industry to avoid the costs of effluent treatment. However, the experience with 
hazardous and liquid industrial wastes suggests two other strategies that 
industry can use to transfer future risks and the costs of discovering disposal 
solutions to the public sector. One is to encourage governments to establish a 
central disposal facility under government control, such as the Castlereagh 
Depot — the other is to store waste until sufficient quantities accumulate to
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pose a serious concern. In both cases, the effect is to transform a private 
disposal problem into a public policy issue. While both the Castlereagh Depot 
and hazardous waste disposal involved charges to industry, it is unlikely that 
these ever covered the enormous costs of public discovery of solutions, such as 
the two high temperature incinerator inquiries and the extensive research by 
the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority into liquid waste treatment and the 
environmental management of the Castlereagh Depot. Indeed, if governments 
were to charge the full cost of industrial waste disposal via its facilities, much 
waste would simply be dumped illegally, either in bushland or hidden in loads 
of solid waste to landfill, as is borne out by the relatively high rates of such 
dumping that have occurred in Sydney, even with disposal costs set well below 
the level of full cost recovery. It is this impossibility of completely preventing 
illegal industrial waste dumping that ensures that solid waste issues will 
remain linked to hazardous waste issues in the politics of waste management. 
Luton's (1996) study of waste management in Spokane in the 1980s and 1990s 
also revealed the structural impotence of public policy that is located at the 
receiving end of the materials and waste stream (figure 12.2). In this case, local 
government was unable to avoid bearing most of the financial risks from the 
operation by the private sector of a large scale municipal incinerator, given the 
uncertainties in waste volumes and composition.
12.8 Policy and the Materials Stream
Lastly, it remains to return to the concept of the materials flow introduced in 
chapter 1 and suggest that the fundamental nature of the materials stream has a 
role in determining the incidence of the types of waste policy debates that resist 
ready resolution. Central to this is the argument put forward by Wynne (1992), 
that anticipatory and preventative policy that has a locus of application further 
upstream in the materials flow will have a greater degree of uncertainty about 
the ultimate environmental outcomes. According to Wynne, the most extreme 
form of uncertainty is indeterminacy, which applies to policy intervention at 
the upstream end of the materials flow, from where it is theoretically 
impossible to determine the outcomes. This view is consistent with the 
description of the shortcomings of life cycle analysis and principles that suggest 
preferred types of packaging (sections 12.4.4 and 12.4.5, above). Both of these 
involve a locus of application of policy at the upstream end of the materials 
flow (in the 'Manufacturing' box in figure 12.2, below) to achieve outcomes in
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the 'Environment' box via the 'Retailing', 'Consumption', 'Municipal Waste 
Collection' and 'Municipal Waste Disposal' boxes.
Figure 12.2: Waste policy and the materials stream
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Compared to the indeterminacies of the path to the environment via the 
'Retailing', 'Consumption', 'Municipal Waste Collection' and 'Municipal Waste 
Disposal' boxes, the path to the environment from 'Mining' and 
'Manufacturing' via 'Mining Waste' and 'Industrial Waste' has considerably 
fewer intervening social and economic influences that might render 
environmental outcomes difficult to predict.
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It is suggested that uncontentious waste policy making tends to be found on the 
right side of the figure 12.2, viz. control of pollution by mining and 
manufacturing industries, and at the bottom, viz. the control of impacts of 
municipal waste disposal, such as leachate pollution. The exception is 
hazardous waste policy, where uncertainty and indeterminacy derive from 
environmental and biological factors, rather than from the sorts of social and 
economic factors that affect materials flow through 'Retailing' and 
'Consumption'. Contested and drawn out waste policy debates are also more 
likely to be found in attempted anticipatory policy interventions in the upper 
part of the materials flow through the 'Consumption' box. The history of waste 
management in Sydney since the 1960s reflects this difference — the main 
thrust of the 1970 Waste Disposal Act was to control the disposal of relatively 
benign liquid industrial wastes while the quantities of municipal solid waste 
were not an issue. On the other hand, anticipatory policy that attempted to 
reduce the waste quantities generated by the 'Retailing', 'Consumption' route 
was an important issue in the 1990s waste crisis.
It is the waste policy domains marked in dark grey in figure 12.2, i.e. 
anticipatory municipal solid waste management policy and hazardous 
industrial waste policy which will remain fertile grounds for constructionist 
approaches to understanding the evolution of waste management policy. These 
are also the domains where Beckian risk politics will be played out and the 
ecological modernist transition to anticipatory policy will continue to fall short 
of the theoretical ideal.
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13.1 Introduction
The previous chapter has discussed and drawn a number of conclusions from 
the detailed findings of the study that followed from the research questions that 
were set for the study in chapters 1 and 2 . This chapter provides an overview 
of these conclusions.
13.2 Influences on the Evolution of Waste Policy
13.2.1 The Social Construction of Waste and Waste Places
The study shows that that solid waste management policy is influenced by the 
social construction of meaning in relation to waste substances and places in the 
environment where waste is deposited intentionally or unintentionally. This 
occurs through the elevation of particular aspects of waste or waste 
management to become matters of public concern and policy debate. It is 
argued that this has some of the features of moral panics, particularly with 
respect to the role of the media in the early stages of emerging waste policy 
debates in creating the inventory of symbols and meanings which provide the 
frames for subsequent reporting and political debate (section 12.2).
However, the study shows that it is important to consider the meanings for 
people of both waste and the place where it accumulates. Juxtapositions of 
waste and places of accumulation may be largely invisible to public notice for 
long periods of time. However, at particular times, these juxtapositions begin 
to attract public concern and policy debate for two reasons: either there is a 
change in the way in which the place of accumulation is understood or used, or
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there is a change in the way in which the waste material itself is understood 
(section 12.2.3).
Not only is the meaning attributed to waste and waste places significant in the 
emergence of public concern, but also people's awareness of the agents of 
danger that can convey dangers to a person's cleanliness or health from distant 
accumulations of waste. It is argued that these are a persistent feature of public 
concern about waste accumulations and the emergence of new agents of danger 
is a further way by which accumulations of waste may come to excite public 
concern and policy debate (section 12.2.4).
This analysis of how the way in which wastes and waste places are understood 
affects waste policy is a first step towards a more formal social constructionist 
theory of the evolution of waste policy making, an area which has received very 
little attention to date.
13.2.2 The Role of Discursive Devices in Policy Debate
The construction of waste management issues and policy options by policy 
actors has also received very little attention, although other environmental 
issues have been the subject of a small number of studies. The findings lend 
strong support for constructionist theories of policy formation which emphasise 
the importance of discursive devices such as binary codes or dualisms, 
generative metaphors and story-lines that make discursive closure and policy 
progress in particular directions possible, while closing off other directions. 
However, this study is the first, as far as I am aware, that has shown how, 
under conditions of vigorous debate and politicisation, discursive devices such 
as simplified policy principles can only facilitate policy progress if the 
protagonists in the debate refrain from scientific scrutiny that raises uncertainty 
about these principals and destroys their political legitimacy (section 12.3).
13.2.3 Other Factors Influencing Policy
While it is argued that the sorts of constructionist analysis summarised above 
can make a significant contribution to understanding the evolution of waste 
management policy, considerable effort has also been devoted to a realist 
analysis to understand the many structural factors that also influence the 
evolution of waste policy. The study has shown that a number of the influences
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on environmental policy making that have been described in the literature also 
apply to waste management policy. These include electoral factors (section 
12.4.1), the constraints of political ideology (12.4.2), factors associated with the 
state agencies charged with implementing policy (12.4.3), environmental 
movements (12.4.6) and individual policy actors (12.4.7).
13.2.4 Longer Term Trends in Policy
The study suggests that it is unwise to attempt to claim an explanatory 
monopoly for the effect of either structural or discursive factors on 
environmental policy making. Viewed over the longer time period available to 
this study, it would appear that structural and discursive factors are inter­
related, in that structural factors may determine the amount of discursive effort 
that the political system has to put into obtaining problem closure. If structural 
factors mean that the policy issue is a tractable one, then discursive closure may 
occur fairly rapidly around a single framing of the problem. When structural 
factors severely restrict the range of possible policy solutions, it is then that 
discursive elements such as dualisms and simplified policy principles may 
appear in abundance in policy discourse as policy actors attempt to find 
framings that will make the problem fit the available solutions. The inter­
relationship between structural and discursive factors also works in the 
opposite direction. If a particular discursive element allows problem closure 
and is reflected in institutional innovations, then these new institutions may 
furnish the structural constraints on future policy discourse.
The relatively long time period of the study has also made it possible to 
propose a novel theory of cyclic change between centralised and regionalised 
responsibility for waste management, a theory that is not only supported by the 
evolution of policy in Sydney, but also by that in London.
The study has also provided some useful insights relevant to two theories of 
long term change in environmental policy — ecological modernisation and the 
risk society.
With regard to ecological modernisation, the findings show that, consistent 
with other areas of environmental policy making, ecological modernisation has 
made an impression both on the language and the rationale expressed in waste 
policy discourse, and on the degree of public consultation during the resolution
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of waste management issues (section 12.6.3). However, the optimistic claim 
that the ecological modernist approach to policy will mean an end to 
environmental problems is not supported. While anticipatory approaches have 
made some impression on the less complex problems, such as non-hazardous 
liquid industrial wastes, it is the problems, such as the increasing volume of the 
waste stream, that originate in the structural dependence of society and the 
economy on materials consumption, where the promise of ecological 
modernisation fails to be realised. This is due in large measure to both the type 
of indeterminacy discussed in section 12.7 and the ability of industry to protect 
its interests by wielding scientific analysis to undermine any politically 
appealing anticipatory principles that would intervene in its decision making 
(section 12.4.4). Science enables successful anticipatory solutions to be devised 
when problems are tractable, but it can also destroy the political support and 
momentum for overly simplistic solutions to intractable problems, thereby 
preventing the organisational learning that might have occurred if the solutions 
were implemented and brought either success or failure.
In respect of risk society theory, the 20th century history of waste management 
in Sydney provides some support for Beck's enunciation of the theory, but also 
suggests there are a number of aspects where it unduly simplifies the nature of 
modem risks and their role in policy evolution (section 12.6.4). The sorts of 
risks that lie behind public fears of landfills have certainly come, in the late 20th 
century, to include a substantial component of industrially produced risks. 
However, the thesis argues that the history of waste management shows that 
neither the global nature of risks, nor their invisibility, is necessarily a hallmark 
of modern industrial production of risk as Beck maintains. The decline of the 
monopoly of scientific rationality in the risk society is borne out by the events 
around the closure of the Castlereagh Depot, but there is a need to acknowledge 
that this is not only due to loss of public faith in science, but the trans-scientific 
nature of some policy issues. Lastly, the argument in the thesis that public 
concerns about waste can be brought to political attention in a similar fashion to 
that which occurs in moral panics, fills out an area of the theory of the risk 
society where Beck provides very little detail.
13.3 Concluding Comments
The Sydney case study has largely supported the findings of similar studies of 
USA cities in general, and of New York, Hamburg, London and Spokane in
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particular. Where the studies have been largely atheoretical, any differences 
between such studies and the Sydney case study do not appear to significantly 
compromise the generalisations that have been put forward in this and the 
previous chapter. Taking the Sydney case study together with other studies 
which have brought various theoretical perspectives to bear on the task of 
explaining waste management policy making, such as the work of Gandy and 
Luton, it would have to be said that realist explanations appear to have wide 
application across a number of cities. However, it is hoped that this study has 
demonstrated the explanatory utility, both of constructionist approaches in 
their own right, and of bringing together constructionist and realist approaches.
The Sydney case study has also demonstrated that the study of waste 
management policy can make a significant contribution to the understanding of 
trends in environmental policy making and the factors that are involved. 
However, the special qualities of waste with respect to the social construction of 
meaning would suggest that waste management will remain an important topic 
for constructionist study, and the theories of environmental policy making are 
unlikely to explain all aspects of waste policy making.
13.4 Postscript
Just over nine years have passed since the passage of the 1995 Waste 
Minimisation and Management Act — the event that was chosen as the end of 
the period with which this study would be concerned. However, the one 
question about this period that is likely to be of most interest to the reader is 
whether or not the target of a 60 per cent reduction in the per capita amount of 
waste going to landfill by 2000 was achieved. It will be recalled that this target 
was a major aim of the 1995 Waste Minimisation and Management Act, not to 
mention an important discursive element around which the policy discourse of 
the 1990s waste crisis was structured.
The report of the State Government's Inquiry into Alternative Waste 
Management Technologies and Practices published in April 2000 found that the 
amount of waste to landfill in 1998 was about the same as in 1990, the base year 
for the 60 per cent target. Approximately 4.0 million tonnes were disposed of 
annually, with 2.5 million tonnes of waste diverted to recycling. Given the 
relatively low rates of recycling in 1990, this would suggest that the overall 
generation of waste has increased during the 1990s. The reduction in per capita
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terms in waste going to landfill between 1990 and 1998 was reported by the 
Inquiry to be 18 per cent. This would suggest that it is extremely unlikely that 
the 60 per cent target was achieved by 2000.
If the figure of 4.0 million tonnes in 1998 is compared with graph of figure 13.1, 
it would appear that the amount of waste to landfill has essentially returned to 
the relationship to GDP that existed prior to the mid-1980s.
In June 2001, the pendulum of waste management responsibility swung back 
towards centralisation with the introduction and passage of the Waste 
Avoidance and Resource Recovery Bill by the New South Wales Government. 
This Bill establishes a statutory authority, Resource NSW, to replace the 
regional waste boards that were formed under the 1995 Waste Minimisation 
and Management Act. Consistent with the view put in the thesis that the waste 
management hierarchy is a symbolic code around which political actors and 
interest groups position themselves, the hierarchy has undergone yet another 
transformation as part of the objectives of the 2001 Waste Avoidance and 
Resource Recovery Act.
Figure 13.1: Australian GDP and solid waste sent to landfill in Sydney for the period 1977
to 1994. GDP for Australia is a proxy variable for the level of economic 
activity in Sydney. ( Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1997; Waste 
Management Authority, 1990(a) and data supplied by NSW Environmental 
Protection Authority Waste Branch).
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Perhaps the most interesting development, from the historical perspective of 
this thesis, is the establishment of a large resource recovery plant, the Eastern 
Creek UR-3R facility in Sydney's west. This will ultimately take 16 per cent of 
Sydney's household waste and transform 80 per cent of that into energy and 
materials that can be used rather than being disposed of in landfill. This plant, 
operated by Global Renewables Ltd under contract to Waste Service NSW (the 
descendant of the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority), was established in 
2004 with scarcely any of the political and public angst that surrounded the 
'mega-landfills' of a decade previously. A study of the ten years of waste 
management policy from 1996 to 2005 would make a significant contribution to 
the further understanding of the evolution of waste management policy.
[308]
Bibliography
Abe, K., Murase, Y., Nakano, Y., and Umino, M. 1995. Conditions affecting 
agreement to user charges on waste: a quantitative analysis, Kankyo 
Shakaigaku Kenkyu/Journal of Environmental Sociology, 1:117-129.
Ackerman, F. 1997. Why Do We Recycle. Markets, Values, and Public Policy,
Island Press, Washington, DC.
Adler, J.H. 1992. Little Green Lies. The environmental miseducation of 
America's children, Policy Review, 18-26.
Adriaanse, A. et al. 1997. Resource Flows: The Material Basis of Industrial 
Economies. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC.
Air Pollution Committee 1970. Annual Report, NSW Government Printer, 
Sydney.
Angel, J. 1975. The Environment - People, Issues and Tactics, Total Environment 
Centre, Sydney.
Anon. 1969. Corporation's landmark report recommends selective
decentralisation, New South Wales Regional Development Newsletter, 23:2.
Anon. 1971. Editorial. New South Wales Horizons, 1971(Sept/Oct):2.
Anon. 1992. Recycling, financial prods reduce solid waste, Human Ecology 
Forum, 20:28.
Appadurai, A. 1986. The Social Fife of Things. Commodities in Cultural Perspective. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Austin, J., Hatfield, D.B., Grindle, A.C., and Bailey, J.S. 1993. Increasing
recycling in office environments: The effects of specific, informative 
cues, Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 26:247-253.
Australian Bureau of Statistics 1997. Year Book Australia, Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Canberra.
Australian Bureau of Statistics 2003. Year Book Australia, Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Canberra.
Axelrod, R. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New York.
Aylmer, S. 2004. Glossary of terms. Website of the United Kingdom
Environment Agency, http: / / www.environment-agency.gov.uk/ 
regions / midlands / 567079 / 567087 / 528272 / 770540 / 814991 / ?lang=_e
Ayres, R. U. and Ayres, L. 1996. Industrial Ecology : Towards Closing the Materials 
Cycle. Edward Elgar Publishers, London.
Ayres, R.U.and Kneese, A.V. 1969. Production, consumption,and externalities. 
American Economic Review, 59:282-297.
[310]
Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M. 1962. Decisions and non-dedsions: and analytical 
framework, American Political Science Review, 56:947-952.
Bagozzi, R.P. and Dabholkar, P.A. 1994. Consumer recycling goals and their
effect on dedsions to recycle: A means-end chain analysis. Spedal Issue: 
Psychology, marketing & recycling, Psychology and Marketing, 11:313- 
340.
Baird, C.W. 1992. What garbage crisis?: a market approach to solid waste 
management. Reprinted from The Freeman, June 1991, Policy (St 
Leonards, NSW), 8:23-25.
Barron, J.M. 1989. An Introduction to Wastes Management. JWEM Booklet 1 The 
Institution of Water and Environmental Management, London.
Barton, A.E. 1970. Report by A.E. Barton, Esq., F.InstP.C. upon Investigations into 
the Problem of Waste Disposal in the Metropolitan Area of Sydney, NSW 
Government Printer, Sydney.
Bashford, A. 1994. Responsibility, morality, cleanliness: the feminism of
hospitals in colonial Australia. In: Bashford, A. (ed.), Responsibility, 
morality, cleanliness: the feminism of hospitals in colonial Australia, Sir 
Robert Menzies Centre for Australian Studies, London, 85-96.
Baumgärtner, S. and de Swaan Arons, J. 2003. Necessity and Inefficiency in the 
Generation of Waste. A Thermodynamic Analysis. Journal of Industrial 
Ecology, 7(3):113-123
Beauchamp, H. 1992. Waste - how councils can influence State Government 
policy in respect to Sydney's waste problems? In: Total Environment 
Centre (ed.)Waste Management, Sydney, 11.4.92. Total Environment 
Centre, Sydney, 31-36.
Beck, U. 1986. Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne, Suhrkamp 
Verlag, Frankfurt am Main.
Beck, U, 1992(a). Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity, Sage, London.
Beck, U. 1992(b). From industrial society to the risk society: questions of
survival, social structure and ecological enlightenment, Theory, Culture 
and Society, 9:97-123.
Beck, U. 1998. Politics of Risk Society. In: Franklin, J. (ed.), The Politics of Risk 
Society. Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 9-22.
Beder, S. 1989. The effects of environmental regulation on the development of 
waste management technology. National Environmental Engineering 
Conference, Sydney, 20-22 March. Preprints of Papers, 124-128.
Bell, A. 1994. Climate of opinion: public and media discourse on the global 
environment, Discourse and Society, 5(l):33-64.
Ben Ari, E. 1990. A bureaucrat in every Japanese kitchen? On cultural
assumptions and coproduction, Administration and Society, 21:472-492.
[3 1 1 ]
Bennett, W.L. and Lawrence, R.G. 1995. News icons and the mainstreaming of 
social change, Journal of Communication, 45:20-39.
Bernard, A. et a l, 1999. Food contaminatin by PDBs and dioxins. Nature, 
401:231-232.
Birch, A. and Macmillan, D.S. 1962. The Sydney Scene 1788-1960. Melbourne 
University Press, Parkville, Victoria.
Birrell, J. 1964. Walter Burley Griffin. University of Queensland Press, Brisbane.
Black, A.W. and Reeve, 1.1994(a): Attitudes, knowledge and behaviour in relation to 
motor vehicle use and air quality in New South Wales. Report to the N S W  
Environment Protection Authority. University of New England, Armidale.
Black, A.W. and Reeve, I. 1994(b): Attitudes, Knowledge, Skills and Behaviour in 
Relation to Water Quality and Associated Issues in New South Wales. Report 
to the N S W  Environment Protection Authority. University of New 
England, Armidale.
Black, A.W. and Reeve, I. 1994(c): The Benchmark Survey in Global Perspective.
Report to the N S W  Environment Protection Authority. University of New 
England, Armidale.
Black, A.W. and Reeve, I.J. 1994(d): Attitudes, Knowledge, Skills and Behaviour in 
relation to Waste Management and Associated Issues in New South Wales. 
Report to the N S W  Environment Protection Authority. University of New 
England, Armidale.
Black, A.W. and Reeve, 1.]. 1994(e): The Relative Importance of Various Factors in 
Explaining or Predicting Environmentally Responsible Behaviour. Report to 
the N S W  Environment Protection Authority. University of New England, 
Armidale.
Blowers, A. 1984. Something in the Air: Corporate Power and the Environment, 
Harper and Row, London.
Boerschig, S. and de Young, R. 1993. Evaluation of selected recycling curricula: 
Educating the green citizen, Journal o f Environmental Education, 24:17-22.
Bogert, S. and Morris, J. 1993. The Economics of Recycling, Resource Recycling, 
12:76-80.
Bromley, D. 1992. The commons, common property and environmental policy, 
Environmental and Resource Economics, 2(1):1-18.
Brown, P. and Mikkelsen E.J. 1990. No Safe Place. Toxic Waste, Leukemia, and 
Community Action. University of California Press, Berkeley.
Bullard, R.D. 1983. Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community, 
Sociological Inquiry, 53:273-288.
Bullard, R.D. 1984. Endangered Environs: The Price of Unplanned Growth in 
Boom town Houston, California Sociologist, 7:85-101.
[312]
Butlin, N. G. 1976. Sydney's Environmental Am enity 1970-1975: A  Study of the
System of Waste Management and Pollution Control, ANU Press,. Canberra.
Butlin, N.G. 1977. Factory Waste Potential in Sydney, Australian National 
University Press, Canberra.
Callon, M. and Latour, B. 1981. Unscrewing the big leviathan: how actors 
macro-structure reality and how sociologists help them to do so. In 
Knorr-Cetina, K. and Cicourel, A.V. (eds), Advances in Social Theory and 
Methodology: Toward an Integration o f Micro and Macro Sociologies, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, Boston, 277-303.
Carson, R. 1962. Silent Spring. Hamish Hamilton, London.
Chapin, C.V. 1902. The end of the filth theory of disease, Popular Science 
M onthly, 60:236.
Choe, C. and Fraser, 1.1998. The economics of household waste management: a 
review, The Australian Journal o f Agricultural and Resource Economics, 
42:269-302.
Chryssides, H. 1996. Recycling in Australia: the hidden truth, Reader's Digest, 
November, 1996:17-24.
Clark, C. 1997. Radium Girls: Women and Industrial Health Reform, 1910-1935. 
University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill.
Cohen, M., March, J., and Olsen, J. 1972. A garbage can model of organisational 
choice, Administrative Science Quarterly, 17:1-25.
Cohen, M.A. 1998. Monitoring and Enforcement of Environmental Policy, Owen 
Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University, Nashville.
Cohen, S. 1972. Folk Devils and Moral Panics. Granada Publishing Ltd, St 
Albans, Herts.
Colbom, T., Dumanoski, D., and Myers, J. P. 1996. Our Stolen Future. Penguin 
Books, New York.
Collin, R.W. 1992. Waste Siting Decisions and Communities of Color: A Call for 
Research, Journal o f the Community Development Society, 23:1-10.
Colten, C.E. 1994. Creating a toxic landscape: Chemical Waste Disposal Policy 
and Practice, 1900-1960, Environmental History Review, 18(1):85-116.
Commission of the European Communities 1996. Draft Council Resolution on 
Waste Policy. COM(96) 399final. Brussels, 30/07/1996.
Corcos, C.A. 1997, 'Who ya gonna c(s)ite?' Ghostbusters and the
environmental regulation debate, Florida State University Journal of Fand 
Use and Environmental Eaw, 13(1).
[313]
Corral, V., Obregon, F.J., Frias, M., and Pina, J.A. 1994. Educacion ecologica: 
comparacion de competencias pro-ambientalistas entre estudiantes 
universitarios mexicanos y estadounidenses. Ecological education: A 
comparison of pro-environmental competences between Mexican and 
U.S. university students, Revista Latinoamericana de Psicologia, 26:415-430.
Costain, W.D. and Lester, J.P. 1995. The evolution of environmentalism. In: 
Lester, J.P. (ed.), Environmental Politics and Policy: Theory and Evidence, 
Duke University Press, Durham and London, 15-38.
Coward, D. 1976. From public health to environmental amenity, 1870-1970. In: 
Butlin, N.G. (ed.), Sydney's Environmental Amenity 1970-1975: A Study of 
the System of Waste Management and Pollution Control, Consultative 
Committee of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, the 
Australian Academy of Humanities and the Australian Academy of 
Science in association with ANU Press, Canberra, 4-26.
Coward, D. 1988. Out of Sight... Sydney's Environmental History, Department of 
Economic History, Australian National University, Canberra.
Craig, H.B. and Leland, L.S. 1983. Improving cafeteria patrons' waste disposal, 
Journal of Organizational Behavior Management, 5:79-88.
Crenson, M.A. 1971. Th UnPolitics of Air Pollution: A Study of Non-Decision 
Making in the Cities, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore.
Crowley, K. 1992. Power theory and environmental policy analysis: towards a 
theoretical synthesis. In: Hay, P. and Eckersley, R. (eds), Ecopolitical 
Theory: Essays from Australia, Centre for Environmental Studies, 
University of Tasmania, Hobart, 131-147.
Crump, S. 1995. Towards action and power: post-enlightenment pragmatism?, 
Discourse: studies in the cultural politics of education, 16(2):203-217.
Cuneen, C. 1980. 'Hands off the parks!' The provision of parks and
playgrounds. In: Roe, J. (ed.), Twentieth Century Sydney. Studies in Urban 
and Social History, Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 105-119.
Cutler, A. and Moore, S. 1995. Consumer Education: The Key to Successful 
Plastics Recycling, Resource Recycling, 14:29-30,32.
Dawes, R.M. 1980. Social Dilemmas, Annual Review of Psychology, 31:169-193.
Department of Decentralisation and Development 1978. The Case for Country 
Eocation, NSW Government Printer, Sydney.
Department of Local Government 1953. Annual Report, NSW Government 
Printer, Sydney.
Department of Local Government 1960. Annual Report, NSW Government 
Printer, Sydney.
Department of Local Government 1962. Annual Report, NSW Government 
Printer, Sydney.
[314]
Department of Local Government 1965. Annual Report, NSW Government 
Printer, Sydney.
Department of Public Health 1929. Annual Report, NSW Government Printer, 
Sydney.
Department of Public Health 1930. Annual Report, NSW Government Printer, 
Sydney.
Department of Public Health 1933. Annual Report, NSW Government Printer, 
Sydney.
Department of Public Health 1934. Annual Report, NSW Government Printer, 
Sydney.
Department of Public Health 1937. Annual Report, NSW Government Printer, 
Sydney.
Department of Public Health 1939. Annual Report, NSW Government Printer, 
Sydney.
Department of Public Health 1959. Annual Report, NSW Government Printer, 
Sydney.
Department of Public Health 1960. Annual Report, NSW Government Printer, 
Sydney.
Department of Public Health 1961. Annual Report, NSW Government Printer, 
Sydney.
Department of Public Health 1962. Annual Report, NSW Government Printer, 
Sydney.
Department of Public Health 1963. Annual Report, NSW Government Printer, 
Sydney.
Department of Public Health 1965. Annual Report, NSW Government Printer, 
Sydney.
Department of Public Health 1966. Annual Report, NSW Government Printer, 
Sydney.
Department of Public Health 1967. Annual Report, NSW Government Printer, 
Sydney.
Department of Public Health 1968. Annual Report, NSW Government Printer, 
Sydney.
Department of Public Health 1970. Annual Report, NSW Government Printer, 
Sydney.
Department of Public Health 1971. Annual Report, NSW Government Printer, 
Sydney.
[315]
de Young, R. 1986. Some psychological aspects of recycling: The structure of 
conservation satisfactions, Environment and Behavior, 18:435-449.
de Young, R., Duncan, A., Frank, J., and Gill, N. 1993. Promoting source
reduction behavior: The role of motivational information, Environment 
and Behavior, 25:70-85.
Dickens, P. 1992. Society and Nature: towards a Green Social Theory, Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, London.
Dietz, T. and Rycroft, R.W. 1987. The Risk Professionals, Russell Sage 
Foundation, New York.
Dorfman, L.T. 1992. Couples in retirement: Division of household work. In:
Szinovacz, M., Ekerdt, D.J. and Vinick, B.H. (eds), Families and retirement. 
Sage focus editions, Vol. 137., Sage Publications, Inc, Newbury Park, CA, 
USA,159-173.
Douglas, M. 1966. Purity and Danger, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Downs, A. 1972. Up and Down with Ecology—The 'Issue-Attention Cycle', 
Public Interest, 28:38-50.
Doyle, T. and Kellow, A. 1995. Environmental Politics and Policy Making in
Australia, MacMillan Education Australia Pty Ltd, South Melbourne.
Dror, Y. 1971. Muddling through - science or inertia? In Dror, Y. (ed.), Ventures 
in Policy Sciences, Elsevier, New York.
Dror, Y 1986. Policymaking under Adversity, Transaction Books, New Brunswick.
Dryzek, J.S. 1997. The Politics of the Earth : Environmental Discourses, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, New York .
Dryzek, J.S. and Schlosberg, D. 1998. Debating the Earth: The Environmental 
Politics Reader, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York.
Dunlap, R. and Catton, W. 1980. A new ecological paradigm for post-exuberant 
sociology, American Behavioral Scientist, 24(l):15-47.
Dunlap, R.E. 1995. Public opinion and environmental policy. In: Lester, J.P. 
(ed.), Environmental Politics and Policy: Theories and Evidence, Duke 
University Press, Durham and London.
Easton, D.A. 1965. Framework for Political Analysis, Prentice-Hall, Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.
Edelman, M. 1964. The Symbolic Uses of Politics, University of Illinois Press, 
Urbana, Illinois.
Elliott, S.J., Taylor, S.M., Walter, S., and Stieb, D. 1993. Modelling psychosocial 
effects of exposure to solid waste facilities, Social Science and Medicine, 
37:791-804.
[316]
Environmental Protection Agency, 2003. The State of Waste and Recycling in 
Queensland 2003. State of Queensland Environmental Protection 
Agency, Brisbane.
Erikson, K.T. 1966. Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance, John 
Wiley, New York.
Ewen, S. 1976. Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social Roots of the 
Consumer Culture. McGraw Hill, New York.
Eyles, J., Taylor, S.M., Johnson, N., and Baxter, J. 1993. Worrying about waste: 
Living close to solid waste disposal facilities in southern Ontario, Social 
Science and Medicine, 37:805-812.
Feiock, R.C. and West, J.P. 1993. Testing competing explanations for policy 
adoption: municipal solid waste recycling programs, Political Research 
Quarterly, 46:399-420.
Fellbaum, C. (ed.) 1998. WordNet. An Electronic Lexical Database. MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusets.
Feller, I. and Menzel, D.C. 1978. The Adoption of Technological Innovations by 
Municipal Governments, Urban Affairs Quarterly, 13:469-490.
Fenna, A. 1998. Introduction to Australian Public Policy, Addison Wesley 
Longman Australia Pty Ltd, South Melbourne.
Fenna, A. and Economou, N. 1998. Green politics and environmental policy in 
Australia. In: Fenna, A. (ed.), Introduction to Australian Public Policy, 
Addison Wesley Longman Australia, South Melbourne, 331-357.
Fisher, D.E. 1993. Environmental Law: Text and Materials, Law Book Company, 
Sydney.
Fisher, R.1.1975. A reinforcement program designed to increase school lunch 
consumption, SALT School Applications of Learning Theory, 8:1-9.
Fisher, S. 1982. An accumulation of misery? In: Kennedy, R. (ed.), Australian 
Welfare History: Critical Essays, Macmillan Co. of Australia, Melbourne, 
32-50.
Fisher, T., 2003. What we touch touches us: Materials Affects and Affordances. 
Paper presented at the 5th conference of the European Academy of 
Design, Barcelona, 28-30 April. Paper available at: 
www.ub.es/5ead/PDF/6 /Fisher.pdf
Fitzgerald, N. 1992. What's wrong with this kitchen, Scholastic Choices, 7:30-33.
Fitzgerald, S. 1987. Rising Damp. Sydney 1870-90, Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne.
Fitzgerald, S. 1992. Sydney 1842-1992, Hale and Iremonger, Sydney.
[317 ]
Forester, W.S. 1991. Municipal solid waste management in the United States. 
Paper presented to the London Waste Regulation Authority Annual 
Conference, 21.3.91, London.
Foucalt, M. 1979. The History of Sexuality. Vintage paperback edition ed., Allen 
Lane, London.
Fowler, R.T. 1971. The need for research into waste disposal. In: Kirov, N.Y. 
(ed.), The 1971 Australian Waste Disposal Conference. University of New 
South Wales, Sydney. 17-19.2.71, Dept Fuel Technology, University of 
NSW, Sydney, 199-201.
Fox, W. 1992. New philosophical directions in environmental decision-making. 
In: Hay, P. and Eckersley, R. (eds), Ecopolitical Theory: Essays from 
Australia, Centre for Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania, 
Hobart, 1-20.
Fuller, J.B. 1965. A message from the Minister, New South Wales Regional 
Development Newsletter, 9:1.
Funabashi, H. 1995. Sociological Perspectives on Environmental Problems: The 
Theory of Social Dilemmas and the Theory of Social Control Systems, 
Kankyo Shakaigaku Kenkyu/Journal of Environmental Sociology, 1:5-20.
Galbraith, J.K. 1958. The Affluent Society. Houghton Mifflin, Boston.
Gamba, R. J. and Oskamp, S. 1994. Factors Influencing Community Residents' 
Participation in Commingled Curbside Recycling Programs,
Environment and Behavior, 26:587-612.
Gandy, M. 1993. Recycling and Waste: An Exploration of Contemporary 
Environmental Policy, Avebury, Aldershot, UK.
Gandy, M. 1994. Recycling and the Politics of Urban Waste, Earthscan Publications, 
London.
Gardner, G and Sampat, P. 1998. Mind over Matter: Recasting the Role of Materials 
in our Lives. World Watch Institute, Washington, DC.
Geller, E.S., Chaffee, J.L., and Ingram, R.E. 1975. Promoting paper recycling on 
a university campus, Journal of Environmental Systems, 5:39-57.
Georgescu-Roegen, N. 1971. The Entropy Law and the Economic Process. Harvard 
UniversityPress, Cambridge, Massachussets.
Giddens, A. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. Polity Press, Cambridge.
Giddens, A. 1998. Risk society: the context of British politics. In: Franklin, J. 
(ed.), The Politics of Risk Society, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 23-34.
Gilpin, A. 1980. Environment Policy in Australia, University of Queensland Press, 
Brisbane.
[318]
Godbey, G., Lifset, R., and Robinson, J. 1998. No Time to Waste: An
Exploration of Time Use, Attitudes Toward Time, and the Generation of 
Municipal Solid Waste. Social Research, 65(1):101-140 .
Goldschmidt, B. 1989. Uranium's Scientific History 1789 -  1939. Paper presented 
at the Fourteenth International Symposium of the Uranium Institute, 
London, September 1989.
Goode, E. and Ben-Yehuda, N. 1994. Moral Panics: The Social Construction of 
Deviance. Blackwell, Cambridge, MA
Goodwin, M., Duncan, S., and Halford, S. 1993. Regulation theory, the local 
state, and the transition of urban politics, Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space, 11:67-88.
Gunningham, N., Grabosky, P. and Sinclair, D. 1998. Smart Regulation.
Designing Environmental Policy, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Hajer, M. 1995. The Politics of Environmental Discourse, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Hall, S. and Jefferson, T. 1976. Resistance through Rituals: Youth Sub-Cultures in 
Post-War Britain, Hutchinson, London.
Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J. and Roberts, B. 1978. Policing the 
Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order, Macmillan, London.
Halstead, J.M., Luloff, A. E. and Myers, S. D.1993. An Examination of the NIMBY 
Syndrome: Why Not in My Backyard?, Journal of the Community 
Development Society, 24:88-102.
Ham, S.H. 1983. Communication and Recycling in Park Campgrounds, Journal 
of Environmental Education, 15:17-20.
Hamad, C.D., Cooper, D., and Semb, G. 1977. Resource recovery: Use of a
group contingency to increase paper recycling in an elementary school, 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 62:768-772.
Hamlyn, P. 1975. The Manly-Warringah Story, Paul Hamlyn, Dee Why West, 
New South Wales.
Hannigan, J.A. 1995. Environmental Sociology: A Social Constructivist Perspective, 
Routledge, London and New York.
Hardin, G. 1968. The tragedy of the commons, Science, 162(3859):1243-1248.
Hartcher, C. 1992. Waste Management Green Paper, New South Wales 
Government, Sydney.
Hine, T. 1995. The Total Package: The Evolution and Secret Meanings of Boxes, 
Bottles, Cans and Tubes, Boston, Little, Brown and Co.
Hoeschele, W. 2000. Whose Waste? Waste Lands as seen by 19th century
British colonial officials in Southern India, paper presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the Association of American Geographers, Pittsburgh, 4.5.2000, 
unpublished.
[319]
Hopper, P. 1992. Container Deposit Legislation for New South Wales - Bringing 
Back Returnables, Friends of the Earth, Sydney, Sydney.
Hopper, P. 1998. Container Deposit Legislation for New South Wales - Bringing 
Back Returnables,
http: / / www.geko.net.au/-gargoyle/CDL/Reports / BringingBackRetur 
nables/index.html. Accessed 22.9.00.
Hornik, J., Cherian, J., Madansky, M., and Narayana, C. 1995. Determinants of 
Recycling Behavior: A Synthesis of Research Results, Journal of Socio 
Economics, 24:105-127.
Hoy, S. 1995. Chasing Dirt: The American Pursuit of Cleanliness, Oxford 
University Press, New York.
Huber, J. 1982. Die Verlorene Unschuld der Ökologie, S. Fischer, Frankfurt.
Huber, J. 1985. Die Regenbognegesellschaft. Oekologie und Sozialpolitik, S. Fischer, 
Frankfurt.
Huber, J. 1989. Eine sozial wissenschaftliche interpretation der humanekologie. 
In: Glaeser, B. (ed.), Grundlager Präventiver Umweltpolitik Westdeutscher, 
Opladen, 57-75.
Huber, J. 1991. Unternehmen Umwelt. Weichenstellungen für eine Ökologische 
Marktwirtschaft, S. Fischer, Frankfurt.
Hughes, D. 1992. The changing role of the state in waste disposal. In: Total 
Environment Centre (ed.), Waste Management, Sydney, 11.4.92, Total 
Environment Centre, Sydney, 1-3.
Hughes, W.W. 1984. The method to our madness: The Garbage Project 
methodology. Special Issue: Household refuse analysis—theory, 
method, and applications in social science, American Behavioral Scientist, 
28:41-50.
Humphrey, C.R., Bord, R.J., Hammond, M.M., and Mann, S.H. 1977. Attitudes 
and conditions for cooperation in a paper recycling program, 
Environment and Behavior, 9:107-124.
Hunt, H.C. 1968. Garbage Disposal in the Sydney Metropolitan Area, Bankstown 
Municipal Council, Sydney.
Hutton, D. and Connors, L. 1999. A History of the Australian Environment 
Movement, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K.
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales 1996.
Pricing Policies of the Waste Recycling and Processing Service of NSW, 
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales, 
Sydney.
Industry Commission 1996. Packaging and Labelling, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra.
[320]
Ingram, H.M., Colnic, D.H., and Mann, D.E. 1995. Interest groups and
environmental policy. In: Lester, J.P. (ed.), Environmental Politics and 
Policy: Theories and Evidence, Duke University Press, Durham, 113-145.
Jacobs, H.E., Bailey, J.S., and Crews, J.1.1984. Development and analysis of a
community-based resource recovery program, Journal of Applied Behavior 
Analysis, 17:127-145.
Jacobs, M. 1993. Economic instruments: objectives or tools? Paper presented at 
Environmental Economics Conference, National Convention Centre, 
Canberra, 15.10.93-17.10.93.
James, D. 1994. Using Economic Instruments to Control Pollution in the
Hawkesbury-Nepean, NSW Environment Protection Authority, Sydney.
Jänicke, M. and Weidner, H. 1997. Germany. In: Jänicke, M. and Weidner, H. 
(eds), National Environmental Policies. A Comparative Study of Capacity- 
Building, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 133-155.
Jasanoff, S. 1999. The Songlines of Risk. Environmental Values, 8:135-152
Jenkins, P. 1992. Intimate Enemies: Moral Panics in Contemporary Great Britain, 
Aldine de Gruyter, New York.
Johnson, D.L. 1977. The Architecture of Walter Burley Griffin, Macmillan 
Company of Australia, South Melbourne.
Joint Select Committee on Waste Management 1993. Report of Joint Select
Committee on Waste Management. September 1993. NSW Government 
Printer, Sydney.
Kamieniecki, S. 1995. Political parties and environmental policy. In: Lester, J. P. 
(ed.), Environmental Politics and Policy: Theories and Evidence, Duke 
University Press, Durham, 146-167.
Kellow, A. 1995. Federalism and environmental policy reform. In: Caroll, P.
and Painter, M. (eds), Microeconomic Reform and Federalism, Federalism 
Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 200-215.
Kieman, I. and Jarratt, P. 1995. Coming Clean, MacMillan Australia, Melbourne.
Kilvington, S.S. 1889. Garbage furnaces and the destruction of organic matter 
by fire, Public Health: Papers and Reports, 14.
Kingdon, J.W. 1984. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, Little, Brown and 
Co., Boston.
Kirov, N.Y. and Toner, H.K. 1967. Refuse disposal — a growing world 
problem. In: Kirov, N.Y. (ed.), First Australian Refuse Disposal 
Conference. Sydney, 22-23.8.67, Dept Fuel Technology, University of 
NSW, Sydney, 1.1-1.15.
Ladd, A.E. 1990. The Solid Waste Crisis and Support for Recycling: A Research 
Note, Sociological Spectrum, 10:469-484.
Ladd, A.E. and Laska, S. 1991. Opposition to Solid Waste Incineration: Pre- 
Implementation Anxieties Surrounding a New Environmental 
Controversy, Sociological Inquiry, 61:299-313.
Lafferty, W. M. 1998. The politics of sustainable development: global norms for 
national implemenation. In: Dryzek, J. S. and Schlosberg, D. (eds), 
Debating the Earth. The Environmental Politics Reader, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, UK, 263-284..
Laffin, M. and Painter, M. (eds) 1995. Reform and Reversal: Eessonsfrom the
Liberal Coalition Government in New South Wales 1988-1995, Macmillan, 
Melbourne.
Lake, R.N. 1994. Central government limitations on local policy options for 
environmental protection, The Professional Geographer, 46:237-243.
Langeheine, R. and Lehmann, J. 1986. A New Look at the Social Basis of 
Environmental Concern; Ein neuer Blick auf die soziale Basis des 
Umweltbewusstseins, Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 15:378-384.
Langton, S. 1984. Environmental Leadership, Lexington Books, Lexington, MA.
Lansana, F.M. 1992. Distinguishing Potential Recyclers from Nonrecyclers: A 
Basis for Developing Recycling Strategies, Journal of Environmental 
Education, 23:16-23.
LaPlante, B. and Lückert, M.K. 1993. The Wastepaper Dilemma: Can
Newsprint Recycling Legislation Kill Two Birds with One Stone?, Society 
and Natural Resources, 6:361-379.
LaPlante, B. and Lückert, M.K. 1994. Impact of Newsprint Recycling Policies on 
Canadian Waste Production and Forests, Canadian Public Policy/Analyse 
de Politiques, 20:400-414.
Larcombe, F.A. 1961. The Development of Local Government in New South Wales, 
F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne.
Larsen, K. S. 1995. Environmental waste: Recycling attitudes and correlates, 
Journal of Social Psychology, 135:83-88.
Lee, K.N. 1998. The Columbia River Basin: experimenting with sustainability. 
In: Dryzek, J.S. and Schlossberg, D. (eds), Debating the Earth. The 
Environmental Politics Reader, Oxford University Press, Oxford, U.K.
Lester, J.P. 1995. Environmental Politics and Policy: Theories and Evidence, 2 ed. 
Duke University Press, Durham, NC.
Lexico Publishing Group 2003. Webster's New Millennium Dictionary of English, 
Preview Edition (v 0.9.5). Lexico Publishing Group, Los Angeles, 
California.
Lindblom, C.E. 1959. The science of muddling through, Public Administration 
Review, 19:79-88.
[322]
Lindblom, C.E. 1977. Politics and markets: the world's political economic systems, 
Basic Books, New York.
Lindblom, C.E. 1981. The Market as Prison, Journal of Politics, 44:324-336.
Liptäk, B.G. 1991. Municipal Waste Disposal in the 1990s, Chilton Book Co, 
Radnor, PA.
Lothian, J.A. 1994. Attitudes of Australians towards the environment: 1975 to 
1994, Australian Journal o f Environmental Management, 1:78-99.
Luhmann, N. 1989. Ecological Communication, Polity Press, Cambridge.
Luton, L. 1996. The Politics of Garbage. A  Community Perspective on Solid Waste 
Policy Making, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh.
Lynch, K. 1990. Wasting Away. An Exploration o f Waste: What It Is, How It
Happens, W hy We Fear It, and How to Do It Well, Sierra Club Books, San 
Francisco.
MacIntyre, A.A. 1987. Why pesticides received extensive use in America: A 
political economy of agricultural pest management to 1970. Natural 
Resources Journal 27(3):533-578
Maiden, H.E. 1966. The History o f Focal Government in New South Wales, Angus 
and Robertson, Sydney.
Majone, G. 1989. Evidence, Argument and Persuasion in the Policy Process, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, CT.
Martinez-Alier, J. 1987. Ecological Economics: Energy, Environment, and Society. 
Basil Blackwell, Oxford
Matthews, E. et al. 2000. The Weight o f Nations: Material Outflows from Industrial 
Economies. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC.
Maturana, H. and Varela, F. 1980. Autopoiesis and Cognition, D. Reidel, Boston
Mazur, A. 1989. Communicating risk in the mass media. In Peck, D.L.(ed.),
Psychosocial effects o f hazardous toxic waste disposal on communities, Charles 
C Thomas, Publisher, Springfield, IL, USA, 119-137.
McCarty, J.A. and Shrum, L.J. 1994. The recycling of solid wastes: Personal
values, value orientations, and attitudes about recycling as antecedents 
of recycling behavior. Special Issue: Linking theory to policy, Journal of 
Business Research, 30:53-62.
McGuire, R.H. 1984. Recycling: Great expectations and garbage outcomes. 
Special Issue: Household refuse analysis—theory, method, and 
applications in social science, American Behavioral Scientist, 28:93-114.
Melosi, M.V. 1980. Garbage in the Cities. Refuse, Reform and the Environment, 
Texas A&M University Press, College Station and London.
[323 ]
Melosi, M.V. 1993(a). Down in the dumps: Is there a garbage crisis in America? 
In: Melosi, M.V. (ed.), Urban Public Policy. Historical Modes and Methods, 
Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pennsylvania, 
100-127.
Melosi, M.V. 1993(b). The place of the city in environmental history, 
Environmental History Review, 17(l):l-23.
Membiela, P. Nogueiras, E. and Suarez, M 1993. Students' Preconceptions 
about Urban Environmental Problems and Solid Waste, Journal of 
Environmental Education, 24:30-34.
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority 1971-72. Annual Report. Metropolitan 
Waste Disposal Authority, Sydney.
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority 1972-73. Annual Report. Metropolitan 
Waste Disposal Authority, Sydney.
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority 1973-74. Annual Report. Metropolitan 
Waste Disposal Authority, Sydney.
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority 1974-75. Annual Report. Metropolitan 
Waste Disposal Authority, Sydney.
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority 1975-76. Annual Report. Metropolitan 
Waste Disposal Authority, Sydney.
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority 1976-77. Annual Report. Metropolitan 
Waste Disposal Authority, Sydney.
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority 1977-78. Annual Report. Metropolitan 
Waste Disposal Authority, Sydney.
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority 1978-79. Annual Report. Metropolitan 
Waste Disposal Authority, Sydney.
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority 1979. Resource Recovery and Sydney's 
Waste Potential — A Status Report, Metropolitan Waste Disposal 
Authority, Sydney.
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority 1980-81. Annual Report. Metropolitan 
Waste Disposal Authority, Sydney.
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority 1981. A Decade of Progress 1971-1981, 
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority, Sydney.
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority 1981-82. Annual Report. Metropolitan 
Waste Disposal Authority, Sydney.
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority 1982-83. Annual Report. Metropolitan 
Waste Disposal Authority, Sydney.
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority 1983-84. Annual Report. Metropolitan 
Waste Disposal Authority, Sydney.
[324]
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority 1984-85. Annual Report. Metropolitan 
Waste Disposal Authority, Sydney.
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority 1985-86. Annual Report. Metropolitan 
Waste Disposal Authority, Sydney.
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority 1987-88. Annual Report. Metropolitan 
Waste Disposal Authority, Sydney.
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority 1987. Community Recycling. A Review of 
the 'Glenquarie Buy-Back Recycling Centre' Experience, Metropolitan Waste 
Disposal Authority, Sydney.
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority 1988-89. Annual Report. Metropolitan 
Waste Disposal Authority, Sydney.
Mikkelsen, A. 1992. Waste: The Legacy of Cultural History, Affald- 
kulturhistorisk belyst, Nord Nytt, 46:24-34.
Miliband, R. 1969. The State in Capitalist Society. Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 
London.
Montesinos, L.P., Greene, B.F., and Preciado, J. 1985. Reducing food waste at a 
migrant day care center through the rearrangement of existing activities, 
Education and Treatment of Children, 8:179-197.
Morrison, D.E. 1986. How and why environmental consciousness has trickled 
down. In: Schnaiberg, A., Watts, N. and Zimmerman, K. (eds), 
Distributional Conflicts in Environmental-Resource Policy, St Martin's, New 
York, 187-220.
Neuman, W.L. 1997. Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches, 3 ed., Allyn and Bacon, Boston.
New South Wales Government 1994. No Time to Waste, New South Wales 
Government, Sydney.
New South Wales Government, 1995. Waste Reforms, Environment Protection 
Authority, Sydney.
Nieves, L.A., Himmelberger, J.J., Ratick, S.J., and White, A.L. 1992. Negotiated 
compensation for solid-waste disposal facility siting: An analysis of the 
Wisconsin experience, Risk Analysis, 12:505-511.
NSW Waste Management Authority, 1990. Sydney Solid Waste Management
Strategy, Waste Management Authority of New South Wales, Sydney.
O'Brien, M. 1999. Rubbish-power: towards a sociology of the rubbish society. 
In: Hearn, J. and Roseneil, S. (eds), Consuming Cultures. Power and 
Resistance, Macmillan Press, London, 262-277.
Obermiller, C. 1995. The baby is sick/the baby is well: A test of environmental 
communication appeals. Journal of Advertising, 24:55-70.
Odum, H.T. 1971. Environment, power and society, Wiley-Interscience, New York.
[325]
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, 2003. Municipal Solid Waste in 
the United States: 2001 Facts and Figures. Office of Solid Waste and 
Emergenccy Response, Environmental Protection Agency, Washington 
DC.
Oskamp, S. 1983. Psychology's role in the conserving society, Population and 
Environment Behavioral and Social Issues, 6:255-293.
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution o f Institutions for Collective 
Action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Ozawa, C.P. 1991. Recasting Science: Consensual Procedures in Public Policy 
Making, Westview Press, Boulder, Co.
Packard, V. 1960. The Waste Makers, McKay, New York.
Paehlke, R.C. 1989. Environmentalism and the Future o f Progressive Politics, Yale 
University Press, New Haven.
Palmer, J.A. 1994. Acquisition of environmental subject knowledge in pre­
school children: An international study, Children's Environments, 11:204- 
211.
Palmer, J.A. 1995. Environmental Thinking in the Early Years: Understanding 
and Misunderstanding of Concepts Related to Waste Management, 
Environmental Education Research, 1:35-45.
Papadakis, E. 1996. Environmental Politics and Institutional Change, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, U.K.
Parkin, A. 1982. Governing the Cities: The Australian Perspective in Experience, 
Melbourne, Macmillan Co. of Australia.
Parkinson, V.H. 1967. Refuse disposal — the Sydney Problem. In: Kirov, N.Y. 
(ed.), First Australian Refuse Disposal Conference. Sydney, 22-23.8.67, Dept 
Fuel Technology, University of NSW, Sydney, 2.1-2.5.
Patterson, J. 1987. The Dread Disease: Cancer and Modern American Culture, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusets.
Pausacker, 1.1975. Is recycling the solution? An assessment o f waste recycling in 
Australia, Patchwork Press, Monbulk, Victoria.
Pausacker, 1.1978. Recycling. Is it the Solution for Australia?, Penguin,
Harmonds worth.
Payne, W.D. 1971. The Protestant Ethic: The Pervasiveness of Work and
Production as Ideologies in Contemporary America, Sociological Focus 
(Utah), 2:36-45.
Peterson, J. 1970 The impact of sanitary reform on American urban planning, 
1840-1890, Journal o f Social History, 13:83-103.
Petrovic, W.M. and Jaffee, B.L. 1978. Measuring the Generation and Collection 
of Household Solid Waste in Cities, Urban Affairs Quarterly, 14:229-244.
[326]
Plueddemann, D.W. 1994. Creating Incentives for Waste Reduction: State and 
Local Perspective, Journal of Environmental Health, 57:23-26.
Poleszynski, D. 1977. Waste Production and Overdevelopment: An Approach 
to Ecological Indicators, Journal of Peace Research, 14:285-298.
Poll, G. and Schneider, F. 1993. Returnable and Non-Returnable Packaging. The 
Management of Waste and Resources towards an Eco-Social Market Economy. 
James and James Science Publishers, London.
Pongräcz, E. 2002. Re-defining the Concepts of Waste and Waste Management: 
Evolving the Theory of Waste Management. Doctoral Dissertation. 
University of Oulu, Department of Process and Environmental 
Engineering, Oulu, Finland.
Potter, J. and Wetherell, M. 1987. Discourse and Social Psychology. Beyond 
Attitudes and Behaviour. Sage, London.
Porter, B.E., Leeming, F.C., and Dwyer, W .0.1995. Solid waste recovery: A
review of behavioral programs to increase recycling. Special Issue: Litter 
control and recycling, Environment and Behavior, 27:122-152.
Price, D. 1965. The Scientific Estate, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA.
Przeworski, A. and Wallerstein, M. 1988. Structural Dependence of the State on 
Capital, American Political Science Review, 82(l):ll-29.
Puplick, C. and Nicholls, B. 1992. Completely Wrapped. Packaging, Waste
Management and the Australian Environment, Packaging Environment 
Foundation of Australia, Sydney.
Purcell, A.H. 1981. The World's Trashiest People: Will They Clean Up Their Act 
or Throw Away Their Future?, Futurist, 15:51-59.
Rathje, W.L. and Ritenbaugh, C.K. 1984. Household Refuse Analysis: Theory, 
Method, and Applications in Social Science, American Behavioral Scientist, 
28:9-160.
Rathje, W. and Murphy, C. 1992. Rubbish! The Archeology of Garbage. Harpers 
Collins, 1992.
Raufer, R.K. 1998. Pollution Markets in a Green Country Town. Urban
Environmental Management in Transition, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut.
Rees, J.V. 1994. Hostages of Each Other: the Transformation of Nuclear Safety since 
Three Mile Island, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, USA.
Reeve, 1.1993. The changing role of the land resource manager: Implications 
for professional education. Paper presented at the Natural Resources 
Beyond 2000 Conference, University of New England, Armidale, 2-4 
October.
[327]
Reeve, I. 1998. Commons and Coordination: Towards a Theory of Resource
Governance. In: Epps, R. (ed.), Sustaining Rural Systems in the Context of 
Global Change. Proceedings o f the Conference of the Joint IGU Commission for 
the Sustainability of Rural Systems and the Land Use - Cover Change Study  
Group, University of New England, Armidale, 5th-12th July 1997, School 
of Geography, Planning, Archeology and Palaeoanthropology,
University of New England, Armidale, NSW, 54-65.
Reeve, I., Ramasubramanian, L., and McNeill, J. 2000. Lessons from the Litter-
ature: A  Review of New South Wales and Overseas Litter Research. Report to 
New South Wales Environment Protection Authority. The Rural 
Development Centre, University of New England, Armidale.
Renz, M.A. 1992. Communicating about environmental risk: An examination of 
a Minnesota county's communication on incineration, Journal of Applied 
Communication Research, 20:1-18.
Roqueplo, P. 1986. Der saure Regen: ein "Unfall in Zeitluppe" — ein Beitrag zu 
einer Soziologie des Risikos, Soziale Welt, 4:402-426.
Rosenbaum, W. 1995. The bureaucracy and environmental policy. In: Lester, 
J.P. (ed.), Environmental Politics and Policy: Theories and Evidence, Duke 
University Press, Durham, 206-241.
Rosenthal, S. and Russ, P. 1988. The Politics o f Power, Melbourne University 
Press, Melbourne.
Rushefsky, M. 1995. Elites and environmental policy. In: Lester, J.P. (ed.),
Environmental Politics and Policy: Theories and Evidence, Duke University 
Press, Durham, 275-299.
Sabatier, P.A. and Hunter, S. 1989. The incorporation of causal perceptions into 
models of elite belief systems, Western Political Quarterly, 42(3):229-261.
Sabatier, P.A. and McLaughlin, S. 1988. Belief congruence of governmental and 
interest group elites with their constituencies, American Politics 
Quarterly, 16(l):61-98.
Schall, J. 1992. Does the Solid Waste Management Hierarchy Make Sense. Working
Paper #1, School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, 
New Haven.
Schnaiberg, A. 1980. The Environment: From Surplus to Scarcity. Oxford 
University Press, New York.
Schnaiberg, A. and Gould, K. A. 1994 . Environment and Society: The Enduring 
Conflict. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Schön, D. and Rein, M. 1994. Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution o f Intractable 
Policy Controversies, Basic Books, New York.
Schudson, M. 1989. How culture works. Perspectives from media studies on 
the efficacy of symbols, Theory and Society, 18:153-180.
[328]
Schultz, I. and Sievert, J. 1993. Women and Waste, Capitalism,Nature,Socialism, 
4:51-63.
Seguin, M., Maheu, L., and Vaillancourt, J.G. 1995. Quebec's Garbage: From a 
Pressure Group Issue to One of Social Movement, Les Poubelles du 
Quebec: dun enjeu de groupe de pression a un enjeu de mouvement 
social, Revue Canadienne de Sociologie et d'Anthropologie/Canadian Review of 
Sociology and Anthropology, 32:189-214.
Senate Standing Commitee on Environment, Recreation and Arts (SSCERA). 
1994. Official Hansard Report: Waste Disposal Facilities and Methods, 
vols 1-3, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.
Shelton, D. 1998. Aborigines, environment and waste: a post-colonial 
perspective, Social Alternatives, 17:7-10.
Shrum, L.J., Lowrey, T.M., and McCarty, J.A. 1995. Applying social and
traditional marketing principles to the reduction of household waste: 
Turning research into action, American Behavioral Scientist, 38:646-657.
Simon, H.A. 1973. The organisation of complex systems. In: Pattee, H.H. (ed.), 
Hierarchy Theory - The Challenge of Complex Systems, George Braziller,
New York, 1-27.
Sisler, H.H. and Wass, H. 1988. Threats to global survival. In: Wass, H.,
Berardo, F.M. and Neimeyer, R.A. (eds), Dying: Facing the facts, 2nd ed. 
Hemisphere Publishing Corp/ Harper & Row Publishers, Inc, 
Washington, DC, US, 369-392.
Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., and Lichtenstein, S. 1979. Facts and fears: 
understanding perceived risks, Environment, 21:14-20, 36-39.
Slovic, P. 1987. Perception of risk,Science, 236,:281- 285.
Slovic, P. 1993. Perceived risk, trust, and democracy, Risk Analysis, 13(6):675- 
682.
Slovic, P and Peters, E. 1998. The importance of worldviews in risk perception, 
Journal of Risk Decision and Policy, 3(2):165-170.
Smithson, M. and Foddy, M. 1999. Theories and strategies for the study of
social dilemmas. In: Foddy, M., Smithson, M., Schneider, S. and Hogg, 
M. (eds) Resolving Social Dilemmas. Dynamic, Structural, and Intergroup 
Aspects. Psychology Press, Philadelphia, 1-14.
Smoke Abatement Committee 1958. Annual Report, NSW Government Printer, 
Sydney.
Spaargaren, G. and Mol, A.P.J. 1992. Sociology, Environment, and Modernity: 
Ecological Modernization as a Theory of Social Change, Society and 
Natural Resources, 5:323-444.
Spearitt, P. 1978. Sydney Since the Twenties, Hale and Iremonger, Sydney.
[329]
Springer, T. and Haver, R. 1994. Preventing Waste at the Source: Educating the 
Public, Resource Recycling, 13:95-96,98.
Stem, P.C. and Dietz, D. 1994. The value basis of environmental concern,
Journal of Social Issues, 50(3):65-84.
Strasser, S. 1999. Waste and Want. A Social History of Trash. Henry Holt and 
Co., New York.
Stum, M.S. 1992. Seeking Solutions to Solid Waste Management: The Role of 
Lifestyles, Journal of Consumer Education, 10:20-26.
Tani, MK. and Rathje, W.L. 1995. Consumer behavior reflected in discards: A 
case study of dry-cell batteries. In: Sherry Jr., J.F. (ed.), Contemporary 
marketing and consumer behavior: An anthropological sourcebook, Sage 
Publications, Inc, Thousand Oaks, CA, USA, 86-104.
Taverner Research Co. 1997. Who Cares about the Environment in 1997? New 
South Wales Environment Protection Authority, Sydney.
Taylor, S. and Todd, P. 1995. An integrated model of waste management 
behavior: A test of household recycling and composting intentions, 
Environment and Behavior, 27:603-630.
Taylor, S.M., Elliott, S., Eyles, J., and Frank, J. 1991. Psychosocial impacts in 
populations exposed to solid waste facilities. Fourth International 
Symposium in Medical Geography: Medical geography: A broadening 
of horizons (1990, Norwich, England), Social Science and Medicine, 33:441- 
447.
Thompson, K. 1998. Moral Panics, Routledge, New York.
Thompson, M. 1979. Rubbish Theory. The Creation and Destruction of Value. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Thompson, M. 1998. Waste and fairness. Social Research 65(1): 55-73.
Treanor, P. 1999. Moral Panic about Fragmentation,
http: / / web.inter.nl.net/users/Paul.Treanor/fragment.html, last modified: 
25.3.99, accessed 22.9.00.
Tuan, Y-F. 1981. Landscapes of Fear, University of Minnesota Press, Chicago.
Turner, G.W. (ed.) 1987. The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current 
English. Oxford University Press, Melbourne.
Ungar, S. 1998. Recycling anf the dampening of concern: comparing the roles of 
large and small actors in shaping the environmental discourse, Canadian 
Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 35:253-277.
Usherson, J. 1992. Recycled Office Paper: Why It Costs More, Resource 
Recycling, 11:52,54-52,56.
van Dam, A. 1975. The Limits to Waste; Les Limites au Gaspillage, Futuribles, 1- 
2:21-30.
[330]
van Dam, A. 1977. The Future of Waste, Dritte Welt [Die ], 5:461-467.
Vogel, D. 1993. Representing diffuse interests in environmental policy making. 
Weaver, In: R. K. and Rockman, B. A. (eds), Do Institutions Matter: 
Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad, The Brookings 
Institution, Washington, D.C., 237-271.
Vyner, H. M. 1985. Invisible Trauma: The Psychosocial Effects of the Invisible 
Environmental Contaminants, Lexington Books, Lexington, MA.
Waldo, D., 1984. The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of 
American Public Administration. Holmes and Meier, New York.
Walker, J. 1989. Going green, buying brown: The trends towards
environmentally safe products and recycling, Australian Left Review, 
113:5-6.
Walker, K.J. 1992. Conclusion: the politics of environmental policy. In: Walker, 
K.J. (ed.), Australian Environmental Policy, University of NSW Press, 
Sydney, 233-254.
Wanna, J. 1993. Spitting images? Political parties and the policy process. In: 
Hede, A. and Prasser, S. (eds), Policy-making in Volatile Times, Hale and 
Iremonger, Sydney. 47-55.
Wasserman, H. and Solomon, N. (with Alvarez, R. and Walters, E.) 1982.
Killing Our Own. The Disaster of America's Experience with Atomic 
Radiation. Delta Books, New York.
Waste Management Authority 1989-90. Annual Report. Waste Management 
Authority, Sydney.
Waste Management Authority 1990-91. Annual Report. Waste Management 
Authority, Sydney.
Waste Management Authority 1990(a). Sydney Solid Waste Management Strategy, 
Waste Management Authority, Sydney.
Waste Management Authority 1990(b). New Legislation for Future Directions. A 
Discussion Paper, Waste Management Authority, Sydney.
Waste Recycling and Processing Service 1991-92. Annual Report. Waste 
Recycling and Processing Service, Sydney.
Waste Recycling and Processing Service 1993-94. Annual Report. Waste 
Recycling and Processing Service, Sydney.
Waste Recycling and Processing Service 1994-95. Annual Report. Waste 
Recycling and Processing Service, Sydney.
Watney, S. 1987. Policing Desire: Pornography, Aids and the Media, Methuen, 
London.
Watt, K. 1968. Ecology and Resource Management. McGraw-Hill, New York
[331 ]
Weale, A. 1998. The politics of ecological modernization. In: Dryzek, J. S. and 
Schlosberg, D. (eds), Debating the Earth. The Environmental Politics 
Reader, Oxford University Press, Oxford, U.K.
Webler, T. 1995. 'Right' discourse in citizen participation: an evaluative
yardstick. In: Renn, O., Webler, T., and Wiedemann, P. (eds), Fairness 
and Competence in Citizen Participation, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Dordrecht, 35-86.
Weeks, J. 1985. Sexuality and its Discontents: Meanings, Myths and Modern 
Sexualities, Routledge, London.
Weinberg, A. 1972. Science and trans-science, Minerva, 10(2):209-222.
West, J.P., Lee, S.J., and Feiock, R.C. 1992. Managing Municipal Waste:
Attitudes and Opinions of Administrators and Environmentalists, 
Environment and Behavior, 24:111-133.
White, P.R., Franke, M. and Hindle, P. 1995. Integrated Solid Waste Management: 
A Eifecycle Inventory. Blackie Academic and Professional, London.
Williams, B.A. and Matheny, A.R. 1995. Democracy, Dialogue and Environmental 
Disputes. The Contested Eanguages of Social Regulation, Yale University 
Press, New Haven and London.
Wilson, D.C. 1996. Stick or Carrot?: The Use of Policy Measures to Move Waste 
Management up the Hierarchy, Waste Management and Research, 14:385- 
398.
Winchester, S. 2003. Krakatoa. The Day the World Exploded. Penguin Group, 
Camberwell, Victoria, Australia.
Woollacott, M. 1998. Risky business, safety. In: Franklin, J. (ed.), The Politics of Risk 
Society, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 47-49.
Working Party for Industry-Government Co-operation 1981. Resources Recovery 
and Recycling in N.S.W., Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority, 
Sydney.
Wright, J. 1980. Wilderness, waste and history, Habitat Australia, 8:7-31.
Wynne, B. 1992. Uncertainty and environmental learning: reconceiving science 
and policy in the preventative paradigm, Global Environmental Change, 
2(2): 111-127.
Zimmer, M.R., Stafford, T.F., and Stafford, M.R. 1994. Green issues:
Dimensions of environmental concern. Special Issue: Linking theory to 
policy, Journal of Business Research, 30:63-74.
